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                                                         Abstract 
 
Just as market regulators around the world adopt a more rigorous attitude towards short selling 
and margin trading, Chinese authorities at its first time approve trades on margin in the 
domestic stock market. With this introduction event, we conduct three empirical studies 
regarding short selling and margin trading in the A-share market. The first study examines the 
impact of the dual introduction on feedback trading behaviour and stock volatility dynamics of 
the underlying stocks. With a combination of the heterogeneous trader model and GARCH-
type models, we highlight the conditional nature of return persistence stemming from feedback 
trading behaviour. Our findings indicate that the introduction of short selling and margin 
trading contribute to a moderated level of unconditional positive autocorrelation and 
conditional positive feedback trading. Besides, no evidence shows that the two mechanisms 
destabilise the stock market by increasing the volatility persistence in stock returns. Rather, the 
two mechanisms support the informational efficiency and contribute to the stabilisation of the 
stock market. 
 
With more precise data of each mechanism’s trading activity, the second study investigates the 
different impacts of short selling and margin trading on the degree of feedback trading and 
returns volatility at three levels, the individual stock level, the portfolio level, and the market 
level. Also, we study the impact differences between the trading activity of retail margin 
investors and that conducted by institutional margin investors. Our results indicate that neither 
short-selling activity nor margin-trading activity increases positive feedback trading among 
studied stocks. However, an increasing impact of short selling on negative feedback trading is 
observed. The strategy of negative feedback trading adopted by short sellers is not conducive 
to market stability since it does not involve evaluation of a security’s intrinsic value. We also 
find that margin-trading activity has a significant increasing impact on the level of volatility, 
while short-selling activity has a slightly decreasing impact. Besides, it reveals that retail 
investors who have a lower level of financial literacy are more prone to feedback trading 
strategies. During the stable and booming periods, trades on margin conducted by institutional 
investors are positively related to a lower level of returns volatility. During the bearish and 
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crash periods, the participation of retail margin investors leads to a higher level of negative 
feedback trading. 
 
Our third study estimates the determinants of short selling and margin trading respectively with 
panel regressions of a hierarchical approach. We argue that short-selling (or margin-trading) 
activity is a function of various factors at both firm and market level. Taking together with 
control variables, the firm-level factors considered include past short-selling/margin-trading 
activity, past stock returns, stock returns volatility, financial ratios, ex-dividend date event, 
industry classification, insider trading event, stock analyst recommendations, block trading 
event, whereas the market-level factors include past market performance and investor 
sentiment. We find that short-selling activity is significantly related to past short-selling 
activity (+), past stock returns (+), historical volatility (-), EPS (-), financial industry stocks (+), 
insider sale (+), analyst upgrade (+), block plus-tick order (+), past market performance (+) 
and CCI (-). While margin-trading activity is decided by past margin-trading activity (+), past 
stock returns (+), historical volatility (-), EPS (+), ex-dividend date event (-), financial stocks 
(+), insider purchase (+), analyst upgrade (-), block plus-tick order (+), past market 
performance (+) and market turnover (+). These results provide crucial insights into the nature 
of information advantages that lead to abnormal returns earned by short sellers and margin 
traders. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview     
 
The stock market will benefit firms and investors if the potential risks of investment and the 
related expected returns can be identified through the pricing mechanism of the market. As a 
necessity to market efficiency and market completeness, short selling and margin trading play 
a significant role in the stability of the stock market. With a history of hundreds of years, these 
two mechanisms exert profound influences on the capital markets and all related market 
participants. By providing new trading mediums of the stock market, short selling and margin 
trading undoubtedly contribute to the price discovery progress (e.g., Miller 1977; Harrison and 
Kreps 1978; Jarrow 1980; Figlewski 1981; Rabb and Schwager 1993; Kempf and Korn 1998). 
Trading activities of these two mechanisms help increase the market volume and reduce 
liquidity risk (Woolridge and Dickinson 1994).  
 
During the two recent financial crises, the global financial crisis of 2007-08 and the European 
debt crisis 2009-10, regulators in many countries have imposed bans/constraints on short-
selling activities to prevent further excessive declines in stock prices. In the announcement of 
the 2008 ban on naked short selling, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
asserted that panic selling occurred during the subprime crisis. “As a result, the prices of 
securities may artificially and unnecessarily decline well below the price level that would have 
resulted from the normal price discovery process.” These comments of SEC reveal that the U.S. 
regulators consider short sellers as akin to positive feedback traders who increase price 
deviations from the fundamental value of a stock. While governments and the social media 
blame short sellers for their reinforcement in stock market downturns, the academic literature 
demonstrates that short sales bans and constraints distort market efficiency and lead to issues 
like stock overvaluation. 
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Short selling is the trading activity of shorting a borrowed stock without owning it. Investors 
are motivated to generate shorting positions when they are extremely confident about the 
negative news of the underlying stock. Short selling is well documented in the current literature 
from several aspects. A group of studies testify that short selling improves the flow of private 
information into stock prices and increases price efficiency (e.g., Miller 1977; Harrison and 
Kreps 1978; Figlewski 1981; Diamond and Verrecchia 1987; Chen et al. 2002; Duffie et al. 
2002; Hong and Stein 2003; Scheinkman and Xiong 2003; Chang et al. 2007; Sharif et al. 2012; 
Boehmer and Wu 2013). They demonstrate that bearish investors are forced to remain out of 
the market when short lending is not sufficiently available, thereby allowing bullish buyers to 
bid at a higher price level. However, Bris et al. (2007) argue that short selling may not be easily 
practised in the market due to the restrictiveness of a bunch of factors. The legal prohibitions 
like the up-tick trading rule, a lack of stock lending, and a high level of transaction costs can 
all be stumbling blocks of short selling transactions. A branch of literature exploits the changes 
in short sales regulations to study the economic implications of short selling. Their findings 
show that the short sales bans/constraints decrease the market quality (e.g., Autore et al. 2011; 
Bohl et al. 2012; Boehmer et al.  2013; Beber and Pagano 2013; Bohl et al. 2013). During May 
2005 and April 2006, the U.S. SEC implemented a regulatory experimental program，
Regulation SHO, to allow pilot stocks exempt from short-sale price tests, including the tick test 
etc. A group of studies employ this one-year pilot program as an exogenous shock to investigate 
the impact of short selling on several perspectives, including market quality (Alexander and 
Peterson 2008; Diether et al. 2009b), short-sale strategies and return predictability (Diether et 
al. 2009a), news media and manipulation (Engleberg et al. 2012), bond yields (Kecskés et al.  
2012), equity issues and investment (Grullon et al. 2015), and earnings management (Fang et 
al. 2015). All these researches implicitly assume that investors in the stock markets who do not 
confront short-sale bans/constraints and are thus silent considering the impacts of such 
bans/constraints.  
 
It is well argued that short sellers are informed traders, and the level of short interests predicts 
future stock returns. As twin brother of short sellers, margin traders are neglected by most of 
researchers. Investors will buy a stock if they feel optimistic about the future of the underlying 
firm. When the good news is quite precise and extremely bullish, investors tend to act further 
by building up a leveraged long position. Normally, margin traders borrow money from their 
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registered security companies; sometimes they also finance from other possible resources. 
Similar to short selling, the legitimacy and regulations of margin trading have long been 
concerns to the public. The controversy over margin requirements attracted a lot of attention 
of regulators, market participants, and academia right after the market crash of 1987. 
Considered as potentially informative investors, margin traders are often blamed for their 
speculative practice. The conservative conception believes that margin trading activities may 
produce excess volatility and destabilise the market. However, the currently empirical findings 
of margin trading are mixed. With data of U.S. OTC stocks, Seguin (1990) finds that the 
eligibility of margin trading does not lead to a higher level of volatility or improved liquidity 
and price informativeness. Hardouvelis and Peristiani (1992) study the Japanese market 
demonstrating that a higher level of margin requirements helps deter market speculators and 
this regulatory change does not incur market instability. Lee and Yoo (1993) find no significant 
relationship between the margin requirements and stock returns volatility in both Korean and 
Taiwan stock markets. There are many studies arguing that margin loans constraints lead to 
price undervaluation and limit trading volume. With a CCAPM benchmark valuation, Cuoco 
(1997) finds that stocks under short sales constraints are overvalued, while stocks under margin 
loans constraints are undervalued. Geanakoplos (2003) shows that the initial price of an asset 
is much lower when margin loans constraints are severe. Basak and Croitoru (2006) document 
that the binding investment restrictions, including short sales constraints and margin loans 
constraints, disrupt the normal trading activities of investors. Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) 
theoretically and empirically demonstrate that assets with high margin requirements are 
cheaper than their low-margin counterparts.  
 
 
As mentioned above, most of the current literature chooses to study short selling and margin 
trading separately. However, as trading mediums under the margin account, these two 
mechanisms are closely related. With opposite trading directions, transactions of short selling 
and margin trading both involve the leveraged positions. Due to the leveraged positions used 
and the quantity of trading service involved, short sellers and margin traders must bear higher 
commissions and extra costs. Because of this, short sellers and margin traders are often 
considered as informed investors who potentially own private information related to the firm’s 
fundamentals. The literature in both fields have documented that these two types of transactions 
contain advanced information (e.g., Aitken et al. 1998, Arnold et al. 2005, Huang and Wu 2009, 
Shyu et al. 2017; Mayhew et al. 1995). Surprisingly, in the literature scholars rarely study the 
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issues of short selling and margin trading together. On 31st March 2010, the China Securities 
Regulatory Committee (CSRC) formally launched the long-awaited pilot program of short 
selling and margin trading in the domestic market. A designated list of 90 blue-chip stocks on 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) start to be 
eligible for transactions of short selling and margin trading. This event provides us with a good 
opportunity to investigate short selling and margin trading further by considering their 
influences on each other and the interactions between the two.   
 
1.2 Objectives 
 
This thesis includes three empirical studies. These three studies are highly related to each other, 
with each one having its own focuses. The first empirical study examines the impact of the 
dual introduction on feedback trading behaviour and stock volatility dynamics of the 
underlying stocks. Unlike existing literature which mainly focuses on short sales constraints 
and margin requirements in the developed markets, our study provides direct evidence for the 
impact of the introduction of short selling and margin trading on an emerging market. While 
the first study analyses the impact of the dual introduction on feedback trading and returns 
volatility dynamics, our second empirical study adopts the separate activity data of these two 
mechanisms aiming to distinguish the impacts of short selling and margin trading on the level 
of feedback trading and volatility. Besides, with this study, we further investigate that whether 
the trading behaviour of different groups of margin investors, literally the retail and the 
institutional traders, makes different impacts on the level of feedback trading and returns 
volatility. Most of the early studies on short selling and margin trading are US-centric and rely 
on monthly data. In the first two studies of the thesis, we adopt daily stock data and activity 
data of short selling and margin trading in the Chinese A-share market to examine the impacts 
and the determinants of short selling and margin trading.  
 
To justify the role of short sellers and margin traders in the financial markets, our third study 
adopts a panel analysis of the hierarchical approach to identify the determinants of short selling 
and margin trading respectively. A widespread literature documents that short sellers and 
5 
 
margin traders are integral to the functioning of an efficient financial market. Though most 
regulators agree that trades on margin play an essential role to ensure market efficiency, many 
of them do not hesitate to limit short-selling and margin-trading activities. A wealth of bans 
and constraints on short selling and margin trading emerge especially during financial 
turbulences and market crashes. This paradoxical phenomenon is most likely due to a lack of 
understanding about what motivates short sellers and margin traders to make their investment 
decisions. In other words, the key question is whether motivations of these two types of traders 
are fundamental-related.  
 
1.3 Major Findings and Contributions 
 
Our first study examines the impact of the dual introduction on feedback trading and stock 
volatility dynamics of the designated stocks. With a combination of the heterogeneous trader 
model (Sentana and Wadhwani 1992) and GARCH-type models, we document that the 
introduction of short selling and margin trading lead to a moderated level of unconditional 
positive autocorrelation and conditional positive feedback trading. This finding to some extent 
agrees with the conclusion obtained by Chang et al. (2013). Although the term positive 
feedback trading is not mentioned, the paper finds that rather than identify trends, Chinese 
margin traders seem only capture very short-term undervaluation, and there is no evidence that 
they do it in a consistently rational way. This implies that Chinese margin traders have no 
potential role of being positive feedback traders. Besides, there is no evidence that the two 
mechanisms increase the volatility persistence in stock returns and destabilise the stock market. 
Instead, the two mechanisms support the informational efficiency and contribute to the 
stabilisation of the stock market. In contrast to findings of Wang (2011), which documents an 
increased volatility after the dual introduction with a measure of variance ratio, we obtain the 
same result as Sharif et al. (2013) and Chang et al. (2013) that the level of volatility in stock 
returns is reduced by short selling and margin trading. This study contributes to the literature 
in several aspects: Above all, we initially study the relationship between the introduction of 
short selling and margin trading and feedback trading behaviour. With a combination of the 
heterogeneous trader model and GARCH-type models, we highlight the conditional nature of 
return persistence stemming from feedback trading behaviour. Second, with the adoption of 
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GARCH-type models, we study both the level and the structural changes in stock returns 
volatility. Third, we explore the impact differences between short selling and margin trading 
on feedback trading by investigating parameter differences conditional on negative and 
positive historical returns. 
 
With more detailed data of each mechanism’s daily trading activity, the second empirical study 
investigates the different impacts of short selling and margin trading on the degree of feedback 
trading and returns volatility at the individual stock level, the portfolio level, and the market 
level. We also study the impact differences between the trading activity of retail margin 
investors and that conducted by their institutional counterparts. Our results show that neither 
short-selling activity nor margin-trading activity increases positive feedback trading among 
studied stocks. However, an increasing impact of short-selling activity on negative feedback 
trading is observed. The strategy of negative feedback trading adopted by short sellers is not 
conducive to market stability since it does not involve evaluation of a stock’s intrinsic value. 
We find that short-selling activity has a slightly decreasing impact, while margin-trading 
activity has a significantly increasing impact on returns volatility. In the previous literature of 
common stock trading, Lakonishok et al. (1992) document that pension managers do not pursue 
destabilising practices like positive feedback trading; while Grinblatt et al. (1995) find that 77% 
of mutual funds are momentum investors in the U.S. market. Our results reveal that the retail 
investors who are less financially educated tend to conduct more irrational trades than 
institutional investors. During stable and flourishing periods, trades on margin conducted by 
institutional investors are positively related to a lower level of returns volatility. During bearish 
and crash periods, the trading activities by retail margin investors leads to a higher level of 
negative feedback trading. This study contributes to the academic literature in the following 
four ways: First, this study fills the gap in the literature by studying the distinct impacts of 
short-selling activity and margin-trading activity on feedback trading behaviour. Second, our 
study extends the literature of volume-price relationship with the activities of short selling and 
margin trading. Third, we initially study the impact differences between the trading activity of 
retail margin investors and that conducted by institutional margin investors on feedback trading 
behaviour and stock returns volatility. Lastly, we investigate the relationships of short-
selling/margin-trading activities, feedback trading and returns volatility not only at the 
individual stock level but also at market and portfolio levels.  
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Our third study investigates the determinants of short selling and margin trading with the 
pooled regressions of a hierarchical approach. We argue that short-selling/margin-trading 
activity is a function of various factors at both firm and market levels. Taking together with 
control variables, the firm-level determinants considered include past short-selling (margin-
trading) activity, past stock returns, stock returns volatility, financial ratios, ex-dividend date 
event, industry classification, insider trading event, stock analyst recommendations, block 
trading event, whereas the market-level factors include past market performance and investor 
sentiment. We find that short-selling activity is significantly related to past short-selling 
activity, past stock returns, historical volatility, EPS, industry classification, insider sale, 
analyst upgrade, block plus-tick order, past market performance and CCI. While margin-
trading activity is decided by past margin-trading activity, past stock returns, historical 
volatility, EPS, ex-dividend date event, industry classification, insider purchase, analyst 
upgrade, block plus-tick order, past market performance and market turnover. These results 
provide additional insights into the nature of information advantages that lead to abnormal 
returns earned by short sellers and margin traders. In general, our third study makes three major 
contributions to the current literature: First, we initially investigate the determinants of margin-
trading activity at both firm-specific and market-level. Since short selling and margin trading 
share many similarities from both trading mechanism and investor characteristics. We study 
the two mechanisms with comparisons. Second, we introduce several additional firm-specific 
factors to the determinants of short-selling/margin-trading activity. The new firm-specific 
factors include industry classification, insider trading events, stock analyst recommendations, 
and block trading events. Third, we add a new market-level factor, the investor sentiment, to 
the determinants of short-selling/margin-trading activity.  
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 firstly reviews the literature of 
short selling and margin trading and then presents the background information of the Chinese 
A-share stock market and the 2010 dual introduction event of short selling and margin trading. 
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Chapter 3 empirically examines the impact of the introduction event on feedback trading and 
stock volatility dynamics of the designated stocks. With more precise trading data, Chapter 4 
investigates the different impacts of short-selling activity and margin-trading activity on the 
level of feedback trading and returns volatility independently at three different levels. An 
analysis of the impact differences between the trading activity of retail margin investors and 
that conducted by institutional margin investors is also included in this chapter. Chapter 5 
studies the determinants of short selling and margin trading with the pooled regressions of a 
hierarchical approach. Chapter 6 summaries our three empirical studies and states the 
limitations of this thesis and the recommendations for further research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Short Selling 
 
2.1.1 A brief review of short selling 
 
The issue whether selling a security that an investor does not own is justifiable has elicited a 
standing controversy. Beginning as early as the 1600s, the debate about the merits of short 
selling has been ongoing for around 400 years among investors, traders, market regulators, 
academia and various market participants in the stock market. It captures public attention 
especially amid the market downturn, while fades away when a rush of bull market arrives, at 
which time investors restore faith then value short selling as a contributor to market efficiency. 
The attitude of regulators towards short selling reflects both sides of the debate. On the one 
hand, regulators give open recognition and support to short selling. The UK Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) (2002) assesses short selling as an important and indispensable investment 
activity that plays a crucial role in sustaining market efficiency. It claims that either market-
wide ban or prohibitions for certain stocks on short selling are illegitimate, even in times of 
market turmoil.  
 
Additionally, a common belief held among market regulators is that short sales constraints, 
with its capacity of curtailing speculative excesses and reducing opportunities for market 
manipulation, conduce to market stabilisation. During times of market stress, regulators 
worldwide resort to trading constraints or outright bans on short selling to stem declines and 
excessive volatility in stock prices. Ever since the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) imposed a temporary ban on short selling during the 2008 subprime crisis, the costs and 
benefits of short sales ban are under even greater scrutiny. It is interesting to note that the 
former Chairman of the SEC, Christopher Cox regards the 2008 ban as the biggest mistake of 
his tenure. The SEC Commissioner Kathleen Casey shows her agreement by pointing out that 
instead of improving market conditions, the 2008 ban created significant distortions and 
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disruption in the US securities markets. However, European regulators seem not be convinced 
by this view, as many of them reintroduced short sales ban to tackle the European debt crisis 
during 2010-2011.  
 
Given the controversial role of short selling, a vast volume of literature debates over issues like 
whether short sales constraints induce an upward bias in asset valuation, or it, in fact, reduces 
price efficiency and brings financial stabilisation to the market. On the one side, restrictions on 
short selling are considered to be unfavourable to the processes of price discovery and 
information transmission (e.g., Miller 1977; Diamond and Verrecchia 1987; Hong and Stein 
2003). The proponents of short selling put forward that without allowance for market 
participants to sell shorts, the efficiency of portfolio construction would not be able to obtain. 
However, the opponents deem short sellers as a form of ‘skeletons at the feast’ or even a 
‘pecuniary vampire’ of capitalism. They argue that short selling destabilises market by 
reducing market liquidity and exacerbating market volatility; in extreme cases, it may lead to 
market crashes (e.g., Bierman 1991). 
 
2.1.2 Short sales constraints and asset prices 
 
The literature on short sales constraints emanates from the overvaluation hypothesis put 
forward by Miller (1977).  In his seminal work, Miller develops a model with heterogeneous 
expectations to detail how overpricing forms under short-sales constrains. He argues that a 
sufficient amount of short sales could increase the supply of a security until its price is forced 
down to the equilibrium value, see Figure 1. However, in the presence of constraints when 
pessimists are restricted from acting on their own beliefs, stock prices only reflect partial 
valuations of the most optimistic investors. This consequently turns into overvaluation, which 
proportionately increases with the degree of opinion divergence among investors. Later 
theoretical works extend the overvaluation hypothesis by examining it in the equilibrium 
settings (Harrison and Kreps 1978; Jarrow 1980; Figlewski 1981).   In the seminal paper by 
Harrison and Kreps (1978), with the assumption of heterogeneous expectations with no short 
sales, no Bayesian learning, and infinite wealth, the equilibrium asset price generally exceeds 
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the most optimistic investor’s present value of future dividend stream. Rabb and Schwager 
(1993) initially focus on the issue of the eligibility of short selling and the degree of the 
completeness of a market system. By building a model with spanning payoff vectors, they find 
that if assets are restricted to short selling transaction, the set of attainable payoff vectors is 
substantially reduced. Kempf and Korn (1998) find that the eligibility of short selling is an 
influential determinant of asset mispricing.  
 
Figure 2.1 The market clearing price of a security with binding short sales constraints 
             
                  Source: Miller (1977)   
 
In accordance with the overvaluation hypotheses, a bulk of empirical work find results that 
confirm the negative abnormal returns after implementation of some form of short sales 
constraints (e.g., Figlewski and Webb 1993; Asquith and Meulbroek 1995; Dechow et al. 2001; 
Danielsen and Sorescu 2001; Chen et al. 2002; Jones and Lamont 2002; Aitken et al. 1998; 
Desai et al. 2002; Gopalan 2003; Ofek et al. 2004; Chang et al. 2007; Cohen et al. 2007; Nagel 
2005; Ali and Trombley 2006;Boehme et al. 2006; Berkman et al. 2009; Berkman and Koch 
2008; Boulton and Braga-Alves 2010; Chen and Rhee 2010; Tseng 2010; Saffi and Sigurdsson 
2010; Lim 2011). Other studies support the overvaluation hypothesis partly (e.g., Brent et al. 
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1990; Asquith et al. 2005; Diether et al. 2007). However, there are also works find no 
significant relationship between sales constraints and stock prices (e.g., Battalio and Schultz 
2006; Diether et al. 2009b; Kaplan et al. 2010). Furthermore, by comparing the characteristics 
of stock returns in 111 countries, Charoenrook and Daouk (2005) provide conflicting findings 
with the overvaluation hypothesis. They find increased aggregate stock returns in short selling 
available countries, although they agree with that allowing for short selling in the market 
enhance the informational efficiency. 
 
2.1.3 Short sales constraints and informational efficiency  
 
Widespread theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that short sellers are integral to the 
efficient functioning of financial markets. For the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), if 
without the standard assumption of unlimited lending and borrowing at the risk-free rate, it 
cannot be realised in the real market. Black (1972) argues that with unrestricted short selling, 
the mean-variance efficiency of the market portfolio is preserved in the absence of a riskless 
security (inter alia, Kwan 1995; Elton and Gruber 2000; Fama and French 2004). Being 
different from Miller (1977), Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) present a rational expectations 
model in which sales constraints do not give rise to the bias in stock prices but reduce the speed 
of price discovery. They point out that the impact of short sales constraints on how quickly the 
private information being incorporated into the price is of particular significance for negative 
information. Similar results are derived by later theoretical work in very different settings (e.g., 
Bai et al. 2006; Gallmeyer and Hollifield 2008). Many empirical papers find results supporting 
the idea that stock prices cannot adequately incorporate diverse information in the presence of 
short sales constraints (e.g. Geczy et al. 2002; Jones and Lamont 2002; Reed 2002; Ofek et al. 
2003; Isaka 2007; Chang et al. 2007). With data of the Paris Bourse exchange, Biais et al. 
(1999) find stocks subject to short sales constraints reflect good news significantly faster than 
bad news. Bris et al. (2007) conduct a global study based on 47 equity markets demonstrating 
that adverse information is faster incorporated into prices in markets where short selling is 
allowed. Boehmer and Wu’s (2013) find that a higher short-sales order flow increases the 
informational efficiency of the stock pricing process. 
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Further to this point, a number of studies investigate the informational contents of short selling. 
The consensus is that short sellers possess superior information than ordinary traders. Diamond 
and Verrecchia (1987) argue that since short sales proceeds cannot be directly used for 
investment, short sellers never short for liquidity reasons. This signifies that relatively less 
uninformed traders exist among short sellers. Several empirical studies confirm this view with 
evidence that heavily shorted stocks are underperformed (e.g., Jones and Lamont 2002; Asquith 
et al. 2005; Saffi and Sigurdsson 2011). Focusing on transactions taken by individuals, 
Boehmer et al. (2008) conclude that short sellers are on average better-informed traders who 
contribute to efficient stock pricing. Similarly, Diether et al. (2009) find that heavily shorted 
stocks usually have negative future returns, which implies that short sellers are not only capable 
of correcting transient overreactions, but also predict future stock performance.  
 
2.1.4 Short sales ban and market quality  
 
As the market situation worsened and stock prices fell sharply in the 2008 financial crisis, 
governments around the world turned to the same scapegoat, short selling. Commencing in the 
US on July 15, 2008, the US regulators announced an emergency order banning naked short 
selling on 19 large financial firms. Later on September 18, the SEC prohibited all shorting in 
nearly 800 financial stocks. At the next day on September19, the UK FSA launched a ban 
targeting both covered and naked short selling at 34 financial stocks. Bans in other markets 
followed soon: Australia, Taiwan and Korea banned short selling on all stocks; Canada, 
Norway, Ireland, Denmark, Russia, Pakistan and Greece banned short selling on leading 
financial stocks; France, Italy, Portugal, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Austria and Belgium 
banned naked shorting on leading financial stocks; and Japan banned naked short selling on all 
stocks. To tackle the European debt crisis in 2010-2011, similar bans were reintroduced in 
France, Belgium, Italy, and Spain. On May 19, 2010, the German BaFin extended naked short 
sales bans on government bonds and CDS market. 
 
Several papers have examined whether the short sales ban launched by the SEC in September 
2008 is conducive to price’s restoration. Autore et al. (2010a), Boulton and Braga-Alves (2010), 
Gagnon and Witmer (2010) and Harris et al. (2009) all find supporting evidence. However, 
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clear results can hardly be obtained since the Troubled Assets Relief Program and other 
programs were announced on the same day by the SEC. In contrast to these findings, Boehmer 
et al. (2013) find that the US short sales ban fails to support stock prices with an analysis of 
stocks later added to the ban list; instead, it causes side effects on the already turbulent markets 
by retarding price discovery and reducing market liquidity. In perhaps the most comprehensive 
analysis of global 2008-2009 bans, Beber and Pagano (2013) find that among 30 countries 
short sales bans lead to economically and statistically significant disruptions in market liquidity 
and slow down price discovery on negative news. Mattatocci and Sampagnaro (2011) find 
consistent evidence in Italian markets that severe ban on short selling reduces the amount of 
information incorporated into stock prices. 
 
2.2 Margin Trading 
 
2.2.1 A brief review of margin trading 
 
With less attention being paid by the pubic than short sellers in recent years, margin traders 
also have a history of being blamed for producing excess volatility and market destabilisation 
due to their potential role of informative speculators. The first regulation to manage market-
wide margin trading is the 1934 act enacted by the Federal Reserve in response to the 1929 
stock market crash. The purpose of this act is to cut excess credit, curb speculative behaviour, 
and thus reduce stock price volatility. In history, the Fed has adjusted the margin requirements 
for 23 times, and the margin requirements maintain at 50% since 1974. After the 1987 stock 
market crash, the relationship between margin requirements and stock market quality has been 
fiercely discussed. Market regulators tend to introduce more stringent margin requirements to 
intimidate speculators. The Federal Reserve is then empowered to adjust the initial margin 
levels to reduce the excess volatility of stock trading. Since then, a batch of research has 
emerged to study the relationship between regulations of margin trading and stock market 
volatility. Although a large proportion of margin trading literature concentrates on the link 
between margin changes and stock volatility, the mixed results leave this issue elusive.  
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2.2.2 Margin requirements and volatility  
 
Hardouvelis (1988) shows a significant inverse relationship between initial margin 
requirements and stock market volatility. In contrast, several studies with application of 
different methodologies assert that no convincing evidence shows that margins affect volatility 
in the long run (e.g., Schwert 1989). As the securities purchased on margin serve as collaterals, 
Chowdhry and Nanda (1998) model that margin requirements itself can increase market 
instability. They point out that if the margin requirements are rigid enough, random fluctuations 
in stock prices may lead to forced liquidation, finally resulting in excess volatility.  
 
Empirical evidence is highly mixed. Notably, Hardouvelis (1990) suggest that a decrease in 
margin level causes greater market volatility. Likewise, Hardouvelis and Peristiani (1992) find 
that higher margin requirements in Japan lead to a reduction in the conditional volatility of 
daily stock returns. With Japanese data as well, Lee and Yoo (1993) find that margin decrease 
would lead to significant increase in stock volatility. Hardouvelis and Theodossiou (2002) 
specify the negative link between margin requirements and volatility further by arguing it only 
exists during bull and normal market. Kofman and Moser (2001) provide indirect support to 
Hardouvelis and Theodossiou (2002) which shows an inverse relationship between margin 
levels and price reversal. However, Ferris and Chance (1988) report the same direction of 
changes in margin requirements and stock volatility. With data of a sample of small over-the-
counter stocks, Seguin (1990) finds that stocks eligible for margin trading have lower price 
volatility and better market quality. Both Schwert (1989) and Hsieh and Miller (1990) criticise 
the findings of Hardouvelis (1990) by pointing out defects in his methodology. When a 
corrected form of the methodology is applied, no link between margin requirements and stock 
volatility is found. The relationship also displays insignificant and weak in the cases of Korea 
and Taiwan markets in Lee and Yoo (1993).  
 
2.3 The Chinese Stock Market 
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2.3.1 Establishment of Stock Exchanges 
 
The original stock market in mainland China was halted during the cultural revolution in the 
early 1970s, as capitalism was considered as a sign of the Western world. In 1978, Deng 
Xiaoping started the reform by launching the opening-up policy, taking the first cautious step 
towards the free-market economy. Before the establishment of official exchanges, securities 
were traded in the illicit market without any trading regulations or protections for investors. In 
the 1990s, China establishes the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE). On 19 December 1990, SSE, as the first government-approved securities 
market, was established to allow investors and enterprises to participate in securities trading. 
The SSE adopted a non-profit corporate membership system to deal with spot trading, which 
at the moment did not include derivative securities. In 1987, the Shenzhen Development Bank 
started to issue shares to the public. In the following three years, more issues were floated and 
actively traded in the OTC market in Shenzhen (Wang et al. 2014). The unique role of 
Shenzhen special economic zone led to the formal establishment of the SSE in July 1991. Many 
OTC markets are shut down in an effort to centralise market activities in the two new-built 
exchanges. 
 
With the further liberalization of the national economy, the Chinese securities market has 
developed rapidly in the last two decades. By the ending of the year 2016, the market 
capitalisation of the SSE had already surmounted USD 4.1 trillion, and the SZSE had a market 
capitalisation of over USD 3.2 trillion. In terms of total market capitalisation, the SSE ranked 
4th in the world and ranked 2nd largest in Asia following the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). 
 
2.3.2 A-share Market  
 
The two stock exchanges, the SSE and the SZSE, both have the A-share and the B-share 
markets. The key difference is that A-shares are denominated in Chinese Yuan while B-shares 
are denominated in foreign currency, e.g. US dollars in the SSE and Hong Kong dollars in the 
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SZSE. From a regulatory standpoint, the other main distinction between the two was that A-
shares are only allowed to be bought and sold by domestic investors, while the B-share market 
was only open to foreign investors. In order to improve the investment climate in domestic 
markets, in later 2001, the Chinese securities authority opens the B-share market to individual 
domestic investors. And in 2003, a scheme was introduced whereby qualified foreign 
institutional investors were allowed to buy A-shares (Su 2003). However, both markets remain 
unilateral trading till 31st March 2010, on which the long-awaited introduction scheme of short 
selling and margin trading are finally launched.  
 
2.3.3 Short Selling and Margin Trading in China 
 
“China’s capital markets and financial services industry have achieved significant progress in 
the past two decades. In particular, new markets and businesses launched in recent years, 
including the split-share-structure, the second-board market, margin trading and short selling 
have played important roles in promoting all-round economic and social development.” 
 
                         − Wang Qishan, The former Vice Premier of The People’s Republic of China1 
 
Introduction Event 
 
The eligibility of short selling and margin trading transactions has been in appeal by domestic 
investors in China for a long time. A series of rules and regulations contemplating short selling 
and margin trading were prepared and issued since the year 2005. On 30th June 2006, the CSRC 
(China Securities Regulatory Commission) issued ‘The Trial Administrative Measures for 
Short Selling and Margin Trading Business of Securities Companies’. The document states 
applying requirements of securities companies for margin account business and basic rules of 
                                                 
1 A translated excerpt of the press release “To Ensure the Smooth Launch of Stock Index Futures”, 9th April 2010.  
The China’s Securities Journal. 
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margin transactions. However, the preparatory process of margin transactions has been stalled 
for a while since the CSRC did not receive formal approval from the state council at that time. 
The preparatory process of short selling and margin trading recommenced on 5th October 2008, 
when the CSRC released a press stating that margin transactions of short selling and margin 
trading would be soon approved on a trial basis. On 31st October 2008, the CSRC followed up 
with new regulations about changes to the scope of securities companies’ business, which came 
into effect later on 1st December 2008.   
 
On 23 January 2010, the CSRC took the long-awaited action of issuing “Trial Guidelines of 
Short Selling and Margin Trading”, which lays out qualification requirements for securities 
companies that wish to carry on margin transactions business. The requirements include: 1) the 
net capital of the securities company must be at least 5 billion Chinses Yuan in the last six 
months; 2) the rating of the securities company has to be in the A class, which was evaluated 
and approved by the CSRC. There are only 31 securities companies rated A at the end of 2009; 
and 3) the securities company needs to pass all systems tests conducted by the CSRC, which 
basically assesses the capability of the company’s computer systems to deal with short selling 
and margin trading transactions. On 12th 2010, a list of designated securities and collaterals for 
the trial scheme was published by the SSE and the SZSE. On 19th March 2010, the CSRC 
announced approval for six securities companies to the pilot scheme of short selling and margin 
trading. After the SSE and the SZSE respectively issued guidance on pilot members and started 
to accept trading applications, the trail scheme of short selling and margin trading finally made 
its debut on 31st March 2010.  
 
Development 
 
The Chinese securities market was greeted in the new year by a breaking announcement from 
the CSRC. Released on 28th January 2010, an announcement discloses that the state council 
has agreed in principle to the trial scheme of short selling, margin trading and stock index 
futures trading. This is a crucial step in the Chinese securities market’s long march towards 
greater market liquidity and further market integrity. After an intense preparation of two 
months, the pilot scheme of short selling and margin trading officially commenced on 31st 
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March 2010. A designated list of 90 blue-chip stocks2 in the SSE and the SZSE start to be 
eligible for transactions of short-selling and margin-trading. Since the first announcement of 
the list, five key revisions have been made on the designated stocks by March 2017. This 
expands eligible stocks from the original 90 stocks to the current 950 stocks. Also, the number 
of qualified securities companies that are allowed to participate in margin transactions have 
been expanded from 6 to 25.  
 
As the second largest economy, increasing attention to the Chinese stock markets have been 
paid by worldwide investors. In the last two years, huge fluctuations including surges and 
slumps in stock prices in this powerful emerging market have never stopped. Since 15th June 
2015, the first round of collapse in stock prices in both A-share and B-share markets took place. 
In the following months, the SSE A-Share Index and the SZSE A-Share Index both plummet 
to its lowest level in the year of 2015. One-third of the value of A-shares on the SSE was lost 
within one month. Major crash aftershocks occurred on black Mondays of 27th July and 24th 
August. By 8th to 9th July, the Shanghai stock market had fallen 30 percent over three weeks. 
More than half of the listed companies (around 1400) had filed for a trading halt to prevent 
further losses. The value of Chinese stock markets continued to drop despite efforts had been 
made by regulators to reduce the fall. After three stable weeks, the Shanghai index fell again 
on 27th July by 8.5 percent, marking the largest fall since 2007.  
 
On this occasion, the authority took bold actions to rein in margin trading and banned short 
selling, threatening to prosecute violators and those who were spreading false rumours about 
the market. On 1st July 2015, the CSRC made a revision to the original “Administrative 
Measures for Short Selling and Margin Trading Business of Securities Companies”. This 
revision raises the requirements of opening margin account in the stock market, stipulating that 
                                                 
2 Blue-chip stocks are the stocks of large, nationally recognised and financially sound companies that have 
operated for many years. They typically have a large market capitalisation and they are normally the market 
leaders in the sectors. Blue-chip stocks are considered as less volatile investments than owning shares in ordinary 
companies without a blue-chip status, because blue-chip companies have a reliably institutional status in the 
economy.  
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only investors who had an asset value of at least 500,000 Chinese Yuan in his common stock 
account in the past 20 days can apply for a margin account. On 3rd August 2015, the trading 
rules of short selling were changed by the SSE and the SZSE from T to T+1 trading, which 
aims to limit high-frequency trades thereby reducing market volatility. From then, the more 
stringent supervisions of securities companies have been implemented, a number of securities 
companies has been fined for non-compliance with rules and regulations during their business 
activities related to margin transactions. Taking the CITIC Securities as an example, it has been 
punished a fine of three hundred million Chinese Yuan in May 2017, since it violates the 
regulations by allowing investors who have less than 6-month trading experience in common 
stocks to open margin accounts.  
 
Unique rules and regulations 
 
In “Detailed Rules for Implementation of Pilot Short Selling and Margin Trading,” the CSRC 
stipulates the tick rule, which refers to the declared selling (purchasing) prices for shortable 
(marginable) securities should be higher (lower) than the last transaction prices. Besides, the 
duration of either of these two transactions should be no more than six months. The duration 
limit implies that an investor must close his transaction within six months. In this case, an 
investor has to sell securities to raise money, or through direct payment to terminate his margin 
trading transaction by six months. This could lead to more frequent and short-term investments, 
which in turn cause larger transaction costs.  
 
Besides, the naked short selling is strictly prohibited in the A-share market. An investor is 
forbidden to sell shortable securities that he does not own or exceed the number that he has. 
When the transaction balance of a stock reaches one-quarter of its market capitalisation, the 
exchanges are entitled to suspend it from trading in the next day. When the balance drops below 
20% of its market capitalisation, trading will be resumed. The naked short selling limit and the 
amount limit are designed to prevent stock price manipulation and for better risk control. Both 
stock exchanges have legal right to suspend trading of certain underlying securities, market-
level short selling and margin trading to ensure a steady operational environment of the stock 
market. 
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Market reactions 
 
Generally speaking, the eligibility of short selling and margin trading has been warmly 
welcomed by market participants in the A-share market. There is no doubt that Chinese stock 
market benefits from the dual introduction. Short selling and margin trading turn the previous 
unilateral market to a more advanced bilateral market, and they are expected to add significant 
liquidity to the Chinese securities market and enhance price discovery mechanism in the long 
run. The Chinese stock market ceases being a long-positions only market, meaning that 
investors would be able to profit from bullish as well as bearish markets. This would allow 
investors to cope with market risks more efficiently and attract more funds and institutional 
investors onshore and offshore to invest in Chinese securities. 
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Chapter 3：The Impact of Short Selling and Margin Trading on Feedback 
Trading and Volatility Dynamics 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
3.1.1 Motivation 
 
Just as market regulators around the world adopt a more rigorous attitude towards short selling 
and margin trading, Chinese authorities at its first time approve trades on margin in the 
domestic stock market. On 31st March 2010, the China Securities Regulatory Committee 
(CSRC) formally launched the long-awaited pilot program of short selling and margin trading 
in the A-share market. A designated list of 90 leading stocks on the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) start to be eligible for short-selling and 
margin-trading transactions. Since its first announcement, five major revisions have been made 
on the designated list by March 2017, expanding eligible stocks from the original 90 blue-chips 
to 950 constituent stocks. In late 2011, the CSRC declared complete success of the pilot 
program of short selling and margin trading, finally making these two trial mechanisms routine 
practice in the Chinese stock market.  
 
The uniqueness of this introduction event is that the CSRC introduces short selling and margin 
trading at the same time. Any investor who wants to trade by either of these two mechanisms 
needs to register a margin account with an approved security company at the very first place. 
Through the mechanism of margin trading, investors are able to construct a leveraged long 
position by borrowing capital from security companies. Unlike short sellers who incorporate 
negative information into the market, margin traders hold positive expectations towards stock 
and make profits from conventional practice of going long. One thing that short sellers and 
margin traders have in common is that both of them are viewed as speculators in the academic 
literature. This point can be readily understood from the high costs of these two types of 
transactions. It is believed that the motivation for investors who use such expensive investing 
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instruments is more likely to be speculation rather than arbitrage or hedging. The literature 
documents that both of short seller and margin traders are more sophisticated and informed 
traders compared to ordinary investors (e.g., Wang 2011; Boehmer and Wu 2013). It argues 
that a higher possibility of increased volatility might stem from the speculative market 
behaviour of short sellers and margin traders. 
 
3.1.2 Gaps and Contributions  
 
The current study aims to examine the impact of China’s 2010 dual introduction of short selling 
and margin trading on feedback trading and stock returns volatility of the underlying stocks. 
Unlike existing literature which mainly focuses on short sales constraints and margin 
requirements in the developed markets, our study provides direct evidence for the impact of 
the introduction of short selling and margin trading on an emerging market. The research 
contributes to the literature in several aspects:  
 
Above all, we are the first to investigate the relationship between the introduction of short 
selling and margin trading, and feedback trading behaviour in the literature. Particularly, 
among all extant research focusing on China’s 2010 reform of short selling and margin trading, 
none of them studies the impact of the dual introduction on feedback trading behaviour. A great 
deal of literature provides evidence that the domestic Chinese investors engage in non-
fundamental trading, especially positive feedback trading. By using daily data of stock returns, 
we firstly study the overall impact of the initiation of short selling and margin trading to 
examine whether the degree of positive feedback trading is significantly changed before and 
after the event. With a combination of the heterogeneous trader model (Sentana and Wadhwani 
1992) and GARCH-type models, we highlight the conditional nature of return persistence 
stemming from feedback trading behaviour. Our paper thus at its first stage addresses the 
interaction between feedback trading behaviour and the stock returns volatility. 
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Bohl et al. (2013) investigate the impact of short sales constraints during the 2008 crisis on 
feedback trading in six developed countries. Unlike previous literature that reports 
unconditional autocorrelations, it studies the conditional nature of return changes interact with 
feedback trading behaviour. Following Bohl et al. (2013), we adopt the heterogeneous model 
to examine potential changes in the degree of positive feedback trading derived from the 2010 
reform. To the best of our knowledge, Bohl et al. (2013) is the only study that applies the 
heterogeneous trader model to the literature of short selling. Our study aims to extend the 
literature by investigating the impact of short-selling introduction together with another 
simultaneously introduced mechanism, margin trading. Methods including control group, sub-
periods comparison and event dummy approach are used to achieve this goal.  
 
Second, with the adoption of GARCH-type models, our study examines both the level and 
structural changes in stock returns volatility. In the current literature, three event-type studies 
examine the impact of China’s 2010 dual introduction on changes of stock returns volatility 
more or less. With an adoption of the range-based measure to calculate volatility difference, 
Sharif et al. (2013) argue that the removal of bans on short selling and margin trading decreases 
stock returns volatility generally. With two control groups, one selected from the remaining 
ineligible stocks in the Chinese mainland market and the others selected from the cross-listed 
eligible stocks in the Hong Kong market, the comparative results between the treatment and 
control stocks of the changes on volatility are not always consistent. Chang et al. (2013) uses 
the standard deviation to examine the changes in the level of returns volatility. They confirm 
that together with a lower frequency of extreme stock returns, the level of stock returns 
volatility is decreased in both up and down markets after the ban-lifting. In sharp contrast, 
Wang (2011) documents an increased volatility after the dual introduction with a measure of 
variance ratio. The mixed results of these papers leave the relationship between the dual 
introduction of short selling and margin trading and volatility elusive.  
 
Besides, although extant works study the impact of China’s 2010 reform on changes in the 
level of volatility, none of them investigates further by considering variation takes place in the 
nature of returns volatility. The current literature is thus not able to answer the question whether 
the changes observed in the level of volatility among designated stocks indeed stabilise or 
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destabilise the stock market. GARCH models are adopted in the paper to fill this gap. At the 
theoretical level, Ross (1989) stresses the relationship between information flow and volatility 
by pointing out that any change in the rate of information impacts stock price volatility directly. 
With an application of GARCH models, Antoniou and Holmes (1995) point out that an increase 
in the level of underlying stocks’ volatility after the introduction of futures trading is not 
necessarily a bad thing. The parameters contained in GARCH models indicate that an 
increasing impact on the level of volatility is the consequence of an improvement in the rate of 
information flow. If we achieve the same result as Sharif et al. (2013) and Chang et al. (2013) 
that the level of volatility in stock returns reduces after the 2010 introduction, GARCH models, 
similarly, enable us to examine the issue further by observing changes in the persistence of 
information in returns volatility. Hence, we can estimate whether the reduction in volatility 
implies a stabilising effect on the market. 
 
Third, we probe into the impact differences between short selling and margin trading on 
feedback trading behaviour by investigating parameter differences conditional on negative and 
positive historical returns. Although the term positive feedback trading has not been mentioned, 
Chang et al. (2013) provide some evidence that both short sellers and margin traders in China 
involve with technical analysis as a trading strategy when they make investment decisions. 
Notably, short sellers are more inclined to use technical analysis to select stocks and time the 
market than margin traders do. Unlike Change et al. (2013), we distinguish the impact of short 
selling and margin trading on feedback trading behaviour by adopting an additional dummy 
that is respectively connected with positive historical returns and negative historical returns. 
The intuition underlying this analysis is that short selling prevails more when there are negative 
historical returns, while margin trading is more likely to be exercised by investors following 
up on positive returns. 
 
3.1.3 Research Questions  
 
The practice of short selling and margin trading was banned in China before 31st March 2010. 
That the bans on both mechanisms are lifted overnight for a common designated list of stocks 
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allows us to conduct an event-based study on the impact of the two. Our study attempts to shed 
light on the event of China’s 2010 dual introduction by addressing three important issues:  
 
Question 1: Whether and to what extent the introduction of short selling and margin trading 
influences the degree of feedback trading behaviour? 
Question 2: Whether and to what extent the introduction of short selling and margin trading 
affects the level and the nature of underlying stocks’ returns volatility?  
Question 3: Whether the impact of short selling on feedback trading behaviour is different from 
that of margin trading? 
 
The first research question aims to examine the impact of the dual introduction on feedback 
trading behaviour among investors. Due to the strategy of feedback trading is simply based 
upon past stock returns, the academic perceives it as a typical type of irrational behaviour. De 
Long et al. (1990) argue that the presence of positive feedback traders destabilises securities 
market by driving prices away from fundamentals. Understanding how the dual introduction 
affects feedback trading is thus of particular interest to regulators who launch the reform with 
the aim of market stabilisation. Being viewed as informed traders, short sellers arguably behave 
more as contrarian traders in their securities investment. A few of research employing US data 
provide evidence that short sellers are contrarian traders who trade against past stock 
performance (e.g., Dechow et al. 2001; Diether et al. 2009a; Boehmer and Wu 2013). In 
consideration of different market setting, the same characteristics might not be shared by 
Chinese traders. As the literature is still silent about the relationship between short selling, 
margin trading and investors’ feedback trading behaviour, it would be valuable to investigate 
the question whether the eligibility of the two mechanisms has a direct influence on the degree 
of feedback trading behaviour.  
 
The second question focuses on the changes in volatility dynamics among designated stocks. 
As one of the major objectives for Chinese regulators to inaugurate the scheme is to stabilise 
its domestic stock markets, the close link between market stability and stock price volatility 
gives us a reasonable motivation to assess the reform by examining the changes in stock returns 
volatility before and after the event. Among the multitudinous literature on short selling, little 
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attention has been paid to the relationship between short selling and stock returns volatility. 
Although some insights are provided by Ho (1996), Henry and McKenzie (2006) and Bohl et 
al. (2012), the empirical results are highly mixed. A few recent papers focusing short sales bans 
during the 2008 crisis mentions the issue of changes in stock price volatility; however, the 
question is not fully addressed, and the results of their analysis are not conclusive. With unique 
data from an emerging market during an economically peaceful period, our research provides 
evidence on the relationship of short selling and volatility dynamics from a new perspective.  
 
The third research question is set to investigate the issue whether there are different impacts 
between short selling and margin trading on feedback trading behaviour. To achieve this 
purpose, we analyse daily returns data by studying the question of whether the impact of the 
dual introduction on feedback trading varies dependent on negative and positive historical 
returns. With trades on margin, it is commonly believed that short selling dominates margin 
trading under negative market condition while margin trading becomes the prevailing practice 
in uptrend market. Bearing this basic fact in mind, we link short selling to the changes 
conditional on negative historical returns while link margin trading with the positive ones to 
observe the separate impact of each mechanism on feedback trading behaviour. Far from being 
a perfect method to distinguish impacts of the two newly introduced mechanisms on feedback 
trading, this analysis enables us to gain an initial insight of the impact differences on feedback 
trading behaviour between the two.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature of short 
selling and margin trading and represents extant discussions about the relationship between 
either of the two mechanisms and the feedback trading behaviour, and stock return volatility. 
Three research hypotheses are developed and stated at the end of this section. Section 3 
introduces information about the data sample and the construction of control group.  
Methodology including the baseline model, extended models, testing methods and relevant 
robustness tests are outlined in section 4. The empirical results are represented and discussed 
in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper with a recommendation for future research. 
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3.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development  
 
3.2.1 Short Selling, Feedback Trading and Volatility 
 
Short selling and feedback trading 
 
Without directly focusing on feedback trading behaviour, a few papers study the relationship 
between short sellers’ trading strategies and technical analysis. Some argue that short sellers 
are contrarians, who take up contrary positions with borrowing stocks following successively 
positive returns and buying stocks when price declines. Diether et al. (2009a) document 
intensified shorts following higher historical return performance, especially when the stock 
becomes a cross-sectional winner. Following Diether et al., Lee and Wang (2013) study the 
behaviour of foreign short sellers in Korean stock markets and find that foreign short sellers 
are contrarians whose large shorting predicts short-term future returns. Zheng (2009) employs 
intraday transaction data of short sales from the NYSE to examine short selling around 
company quarterly earnings announcements. The results illustrate that short sellers act as 
contrarian traders after positive earnings surprises. Boehmer and Wu (2013) study short sellers’ 
behaviour during extreme price movements of single shortable stocks, finding that short sellers 
are contrarian traders no matter how stock prices fluctuate. The findings of Bohl et al. (2013) 
suggest that short sales bans in six countries during the 2008 crisis intensify conditional 
positive feedback trading among investors, which is exactly the opposite to regulators’ view 
that short sales ban is a legitimate tool to stabilise the market in times of turmoil. 
 
However, there is also evidence that short sellers are momentum traders or positive feedback 
traders. Another significant finding from Zheng (2009) is that short sellers act as momentum 
traders after negative earnings surprises announced by firms. Unlike Boehmer and Wu (2013) 
who study short sellers’ behaviour during extreme price movements of single stocks, Blau et 
al. (2010) use data of market indices to define extreme stock price movements and obtain an 
opposite finding that short sellers are positive feedback traders during episodes of volatile 
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markets. From another perspective, Shkilko et al. (2012) study short sellers’ behaviour around 
extreme intraday return movements, observing that short sellers are momentum traders when 
they face large intraday declines. With contrary evidence of short sellers’ feedback trading 
strategies at hands, further investigation about how short sellers behave in such an immature 
market would be valuable.   
 
Short selling and volatility 
 
The relationship between short selling and stock returns volatility is a contentious issue but has 
not received enough academic attention. Ho (1996) finds that the daily volatility of stock 
returns increases when short sales constraints are imposed in Singapore market during 1985–
1986 crises. It argues that short sales constraints can temporarily limit the effects of bearish 
sentiments on stock prices. But once bearish sentiments take hold, the decline in prices will be 
magnified by long selling. The volatility in stock returns then increases as a result. Scheinkman 
and Xiong (2003) set up a behavioural model with heterogeneous traders who show 
overconfidence to private information. When short sales constraints are lifted, both of trading 
volume and stock price volatility substantially decrease. In accordance with the theoretical 
model of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002), Boulton and Braga-Alves (2010) find that the naked 
short sales ban on 19 leading financial firms required by the SEC on July 2008 led to an increase 
in daily volatility among covered stocks. Bohl et al. (2012) adopt asymmetric GARCH models 
and a Markov switching model, finding that short sales bans in the Taiwanese markets raise 
the volatility in falling markets.  
 
Other studies obtain different conclusions. Both Alexander and Peterson (2008) and Diether et 
al. (2009b) investigate the removal of short sales constraints or price tests, with a finding of 
insignificant or weak augments in intraday and daily price volatility. Similarly, a recent paper 
by Lee and Wang (2013) studies the behaviour of foreign short sellers in Korean markets and 
find that foreign investors’ short-selling activities do not increase volatility. This again provides 
evidence against the common belief that short selling destabilises the market. However, Henry 
and McKenzie (2006) study the Hong Kong market where only a list of stocks is allowed for 
short selling, finding that with allowance for a period of short selling, the market exhibits 
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greater price volatility and exacerbated volatility asymmetry. Using a direct measure of sales 
constraints, Chang et al. (2007) obtain consistent conclusions in Hong Kong market. It 
documents a higher volatility but less positive skewness of designated stocks which are at the 
short selling list. Concentrating on large negative price reversals that occur on newsless days, 
Shkilko et al. (2008) find that short selling is abnormally aggressive during such reversals and 
the magnitude of price reductions is substantially increased by short selling activities. The 
mixed results of current empirical analyses do not provide clear guidance for the relationship 
between short selling and stock returns volatility.  
 
3.2.2 Margin Trading, Feedback Trading and Volatility 
 
Margin introduction and feedback trading 
 
The only one study so far examines the relationship between margin introduction and feedback 
trading is Chang et al. (2013). Focusing on China’s 2010 introduction of short selling and 
margin trading, it finds that Chinese margin traders rely less on technical analysis than Chinese 
short sellers. Their findings indicate that Chinese margin traders do not trade on momentum, 
but only on temporal under-pricing. Nevertheless, they do not identify trends in historical 
returns. And there is no sufficient evidence that margin traders in the A-share market 
consistently capture short-term under-pricing stocks implied by contemporaneous returns in a 
rational way.  
 
Margin introduction and volatility 
 
Margin trading has been viewed as a destabilising strategy in traditional wisdom, due to its 
potential role of involving speculative activities. However, almost all empirical studies support 
the practice of margin trading. By adopting a sample of NASDAQ small-cap firms and OTC 
issues which meet the lowest requirements for margin trading, Alexander et al. (2004) find no 
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significant impact of margin introduction on market liquidity and volatility. But the information 
environment of the marginable stocks improves substantially upon the introduction. By 
studying the addition of OTC issues to the marginable list, Seguin (1990) observes no increase 
in stock volatility. He finds that even though margin eligibility has produced an extra 30％ 
volume of stocks, both volatility and noise decrease. Besides, market liquidity, the flow of 
information and market depth all have been enhanced. With an observation that marginable 
stocks in NASDAQ, in fact, decreased less than the ineligible ones during the 1987 crash, 
Seguin and Jarrell (1993) claim that margin trading conduces to market stabilisation. Therefore, 
the general finding is that there is a negative relationship between margin trading and stock 
market volatility. 
 
 
3.2.3 Hypothesis Development  
 
Extant literature on China’s 2010 introduction 
 
A few studies have examined the impact of China’s 2010 introduction of short selling and 
margin trading on market conditions. Zhou and Wong (2012) study the impact of short selling 
on stock prices finding that short selling mechanism provides a desirable tool for informed 
traders to correct overpricing, which eventually helps mitigate the occurrence of price bubbles 
in Chinese stocks markets. Wang (2011) focuses on the introduction of margin trading to 
examine the effects of margin trading on trade informativeness and market liquidity. He finds 
that the eligibility of margin trading leads to more information-based trading and less market 
liquidity, which implies that the uninformed investors are discouraged by informed margin 
traders. Wang (2012) investigates whether idiosyncratic stock risk deters investors from 
shorting on negative information. His findings provide strong support for the idea that 
idiosyncratic risk of single stock deters arbitrageurs who own negative information from selling 
short in overvalued stocks. 
 
The impact of short selling and margin trading on feedback trading 
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A large volume of literature documents that Chinese domestic investors engage in positive 
feedback trading. Mei et al. (2005) and Fong (2008) provide evidence that there is more 
intensive positive feedback trading in Chinese stock markets than in foreign developed markets. 
One paper has studies the relationship between China’s 2010 introduction and technical 
analysis adopted by Chinese traders. With data of short-selling and margin-trading activities 
(e.g., daily short turnover, daily covered short), Chang et al. (2013) find strong evidence that 
short sellers in China adopt technical analysis to make investment decisions, but Chinese 
margin traders do not rely on technical analysis as much as short sellers do. Although the term 
feedback trading has not been mentioned, the results of their work imply links between the 
eligibility of short selling or margin trading and investors’ feedback trading behaviour. Chang 
et al. (2013) find that Chinese short sellers employ technical analysis to select stocks and to 
time the market. Following a downward trend, they sell current winner stocks with temporal 
overpricing and cover short positions of stocks which are current losers. These findings indicate 
that Chinese short sellers are intraday contrarian traders.  
 
However, margin traders in China do not identify trends. They seem only capture very short-
term undervaluation, and no evidence shows that they do it in a consistently rational way. 
Somehow this finding illustrates that Chinese margin traders have no potential to be positive 
feedback traders. Besides, since it is generally believed that margin traders are more informed 
than normal traders, and informed traders are more likely to make investment decisions on their 
private information, margin traders are more likely to be contrarian traders who do not make 
investment decisions by following market trends. We thus predict that the introduction of 
margin trading reduces positive feedback trading in the Chinese stock markets or at least leave 
it unchanged but improve informational efficiency to some level. The first hypothesis of our 
study is:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The degree of positive feedback trading reduces when short selling and margin 
trading are allowed. 
 
Instead of studying the separate impact of short selling and margin trading on feedback trading 
behaviour, which will be analysed in detail in a later section, the first research question aims 
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to fill the gap by investigating the integral impact of these two mechanisms on feedback trading 
with daily adjusted closing price. With a combination of the heterogeneous trader model and 
GARCH-type models, our paper addresses the interaction between stock price volatility and 
feedback trading behaviour among short sellers and margin traders.  
 
The impact of short selling and margin trading on volatility 
 
Three papers examine the impact of China’s 2010 dual introduction on stock returns volatility. 
With the range-based measure, Sharif et al. (2013) calculate the volatility difference and argue 
that the introduction of short selling and margin trading decreases the volatility level in general. 
Since only a small group of 90 stocks are eligible for the two mechanisms in the first batch, 
two control groups are constructed to compare with the treatment group: with one chosen from 
the rest ineligible stocks in mainland China, while the other chosen from cross-listed stocks in 
the Hong Kong market. However, the results of volatility changes between the types of two 
comparisons are not always consistent. When comparisons are taken by using the mainland 
control group, the level of volatility appears a clear decline after the introduction. While when 
the Hong Kong control group is employed, the volatility differential between the treatment and 
control groups based on 3-month pre-event and post-event period windows exhibits strongly 
positive in the down-side market, which presents a significant increase in volatility.  
 
Consistent with the general finding of Sharif et al. (2013), Chang et al. (2013) use standard 
deviation to examine changes in volatility. It documents a substantial drop in volatility both in 
up- and down-markets after the ban lifted; a lower frequency of extreme stock returns is also 
observed. Further, the authors adopt daily volatility to measure uncertainty, which is defined 
as the difference in the daily high and low price divided by the high price. They find that short-
selling transactions are normally accompanied by higher volatility and spread, which is 
consistent with the view that short sellers possess private information; however, a negative 
coefficient on the daily volatility and a positive on the spread is found for margin traders. In 
sharp contrast to Sharif et al. (2013), Wang (2011) uses the measure of intraday variance ratio 
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finding that volatility among designated stocks is increased by the introduction of short selling 
and margin trading. Based on the literature discussed above, our second hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The stock price volatility decreases when short selling and margin trading are 
allowed. 
 
Although major evidence shows a negative relationship between the dual introduction and 
stock price volatility, mixed results still leave this relationship unclear. Since all three extant 
studies focus on changes in the volatility level rather than changes in the nature of the stock 
returns volatility, this study adopts GARCH-type models to fill this gap. If our study obtains 
consistent results with Sharif et al. (2013) and Chang et al. (2013) that the level of volatility 
among designated stocks decreases after the 2010 reform, GARCH-type models would enable 
us to have a closer look at whether this reduction in stock price volatility indeed implies a 
stabilising effect of the introduction of short selling and margin trading. This is of particular 
interest to Chinese regulators who initiate the 2010 reform for market stabilisation. 
 
 The separate impacts of short selling and margin trading on feedback trading 
 
Since short selling and margin trading are initiated by the CSRC at the same event day, the 
daily stock price data adopted in the study, in fact, contains both groups of innovations which 
are brought about by short selling and margin trading separately. Rather than study the 
combined impact of both introduced mechanism as stated in previous two hypotheses, here we 
attempt to study the separate impact of short selling and margin trading on feedback trading 
behaviour. Both of short selling and margin trading belong to margin transactions, of which 
the investments are conducted in a margin account. It is arguably believed that short selling 
dominates margin trading following with negative historical returns; otherwise, margin trading 
becomes more prevalent. In order to distinguish the impact of short selling (margin trading) 
from the dual introduction, we link short selling to the changes related to negative (positive) 
historical returns. In other words, to split the impact brought about by short selling and margin 
trading individually, we study the impact differences of the dual introduction conditional on 
past returns with opposite directions. With findings of Bohl et al. (2013) and Chang et al. 
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(2013), which are previously mentioned in 3.2.1 and 3.2.3 respectively, the third hypotheses 
are: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The introduction of short selling/margin trading decreases the degree of positive 
feedback trading.  
 
3.3 Data  
 
3.3.1 Institutional Setting 
 
Since its foundation in the 1990s, the Chinese stock market had operated as a unilateral market 
with legal prohibition on short selling and margin trading for 20 years. Together with regulators 
of the two major exchanges in mainland China, the CSRC launches a pilot scheme of short 
selling and margin trading on 31st March 2010, allowing qualified investors to trade on margin 
at the very first time. The ban lifting of short selling and margin trading for a designated list of 
stocks overnight by the CSRC provides us with a great chance to conduct an event analysis of 
the changes brought about by the two mechanisms. A designated list of 90 constituent stocks 
including 50 stocks from the SSE and 40 from the SZSE starts to be eligible for transactions of 
short selling and margin trading. The list has been approved and revised at five times by March 
2017, with substantial expansion from the original 90 stocks to a significant number of 950 
stocks. Appendix 3.1 shows all listing adjustments for short selling and margin trading during 
the entire reform. All relevant indices in the two stock exchanges in China are listed in 
Appendix 3.2. The company profiles and detailed listing adjustments of the 90 designated 
stocks in the first batch are reported in Appendix 3.3.  
 
The 2010 reform is proposed to inject credit into the domestic stock markets. It aims to integrate 
more information into securities prices, thereby promoting market stability as a whole. The 
stringent requirements imposed by the CSRC during the reform highlights its cautious 
approach to process the trial scheme. As its primary regulations, stocks must meet several 
criteria to obtain the eligibility of short selling and margin trading. According to the detailed 
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rules and regulations promulgated by the SSE, eligible stocks must satisfy various criteria in 
aspects of size, liquidity and volatility. Only the largest stocks with the highest liquidity and  
 
Table 3.1 Requirements of stocks to be eligible for short selling and margin trading 
 
 
 
 
Regulator Official Document Requirements 
CSRC & SSE 
Authority 
Listing requirements of short selling 
and margin trading, “Detailed rules 
and regulations for margin 
transaction Pilot Scheme”, issued on 
21/08/2006 
1. The stock has been listed for at least three 
months on the underlying index; 
  
2. The stock has at least 200 million public 
floats, or the market value (the free float 
market capitalisation) should be at least 800 
million Yuan;  
 
3. The stock has at least 4,000 shareholders;  
 
4. Daily turnover of the stock is 20% higher 
than its index turnover;  
 
5. None of the following has happened in the 
past three months:  
a). Daily price fluctuation exceeds 4% of the 
increase (decrease) standard index daily 
level; 
b). Price fluctuation is five times or more 
than the standard index fluctuation.  
SSE Authority 
Requirements of index inclusion, 
“SSE 180 and 50 Index 
Methodology”, firstly launched in 
02/01/2004  
1.  Stocks are ranked by total market 
capitalisation and trading value; 
 
2. Top 50 will be selected except for stocks 
with abnormal market performance. 
SZSE 
Authority 
Requirements of index inclusion, 
“Compiling Methodology for the 
series of SZSE Component 
Indices”, firstly launched in 
05/05/1995  
1. The stock must have been listed for at 
least six months on the exchange; 
 
2. Stocks are ranked by total market 
capitalisation and free float market 
capitalisation; 
 
3. Top 10 with no massive swings or 
fluctuations in the stock prices during the 
observation period. 
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the lowest volatility are targeted. As a result, a designated list of 90 stocks including 50 stocks 
in the SSE 50 Index and 40 in the SZSE Component Index was approved for the first batch by 
the CSRC. The two indices mentioned above were designed to comprise stocks with the largest 
capitalisation, the highest liquidity and the most compelling industry representativeness. Thus, 
besides requirements of the dual introduction of short selling and margin trading, all selected 
90 stocks must meet inclusion criteria of the two indices. The detailed rules and requirements 
for stocks to be eligible for short selling and margin trading are given in Table 3.1. 
 
3.3.2 Sample Data  
 
The sample span of this study is eight years from 31/03/2006 to 31/03/2014. Although six 
batches and several small changes have been taken in the designated list since its first 
announcement, we only adopt the first batch of 90 stocks as our research focus. The decision 
is made with consideration of the most representativeness of the original 90 stocks and 
sufficient length of data duration, which is particularly crucial for time series analysis. The 
daily adjusted closing price of the first batch of 90 constituent stocks including all stocks of the 
Shanghai 50 Index and the Shenzhen 40 Index are collected.  
 
However, only data of 32 stocks out of the 90 stocks on the initially designated list is adopted. 
Four issues leading to the significant data loss need to be explained: Firstly, due to the late 
foundation of the Chinese equity markets, 30 stocks lack data in an earlier stage of our sample 
period. With the fact that both the SSE and the SZSE are founded in the early of 1990s, 30 
stocks have not been listed on the relevant exchange at the start date of our sample span. These 
firms became listed subsequently in the following two and half years (see Appendix 3.3). To 
keep sample duration for individual stocks same, the 30 stocks are removed out of our sample. 
Secondly, 11 stocks among the remaining 60 stocks in the first batch have been deleted at least 
once during our sample span of the continuous reform implementation (see Appendix 3.1). To 
maintain data continuity and to avoid data contamination, we exclude the stock’s data once it 
has been deleted from the designated list, no matter whether it rejoins the list in a later batch 
or not. Thirdly, two of the remaining 49 stocks delisted during our sample range.  
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Fourthly, 15 out of the rest 47 stocks have abnormal data, which is mainly caused by high 
frequencies of non-trading days. This feature of the Chinese data can be explained by two 
reasons: 1) there are less annual transaction days in the Chinese stock markets. This is 
particularly because Chinese stock exchanges are not only closed at weekends, but in main 
national holidays (such as the Labour Day in May and the national day in Oct), which normally 
lasts 3-7 days; 2) the listed stocks in Chinese exchanges seems more likely to be suspended 
due to firm’s operation issues. The two reasons lead to strings of zeros appearing in the log 
difference of the 47 stocks' time series of daily price data. The descriptive statistics of the 15 
stocks with the heaviest frequency of non-trading days tend to be abnormal, and all of them 
obtains no convergence in GARCH regression.  
 
The information for rules and regulations of the dual introduction scheme is collected from the 
official websites of the SSE and the SZSE. The data of daily adjusted closing price, total market 
capitalisation, free float market capitalisation, the number of public floats, daily trading volume, 
daily turnover and daily price fluctuation of all stocks in both Shanghai Stock Exchange A-
Share Index and Shenzhen Stock Exchange A-Share Index for our treatment and control groups 
are obtained from the WIND database. 
 
3.3.3 Control Group Selection 
 
As one of the existing studies about China’s 2010 reform, Sharif et al. (2013) adopt similar 
characteristics matching to select control stocks for the 90 designated stocks. Following 
procedures taken by Boulton et al. (2010), the authors first require matched candidates belong 
to the same industry. Then for all A-shares listed in the SSE and the SZSE, they calculate the 
same measures adopted by Boulton et al. (2010), including the mean market value, closing 
stock price, volatility of daily return and daily turnover. However, these variables are not in 
line with Chinese regulators’ requirements for designated stocks for short selling and margin 
trading. Obviously, there are significant differences between the chosen criteria for selecting 
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shortable/marginable stocks in China and selecting stocks for short sales bans in the U.S. 
markets. A simple adotion of the same factors in various settings seems lack of consideration. 
 
Following Sharif et al. (2013), we apply similar characteristics matching to select control 
stocks, but with the selection criteria stemmed from the requirements stipulated by the CSRC 
and regulators of the two exchanges. First, a few requirements for the qualification of eligible 
stocks for short selling and margin trading are set by the CSRC and the SSE regulators. These 
items can be check at Table 3.1. Another fact about the designated list is that it completely 
covers stocks in the Shanghai 50 Index and the Shenzhen 40 Index. With much earlier 
implementation dates than the 2010 dual introduction, we understand that the two indices are 
not particularly constructed for the reform. But we still choose to consider inclusion 
requirements of both indices when conduct the control group selection since the later batches 
of stocks being added to the designated list are also from similarly relevant indices. The index 
construction documents of the two indices clearly state their stock selection requirements. 
Table 3.1 summarises all pertinent requirements that a common stock must meet or exceed to 
be eligible for short selling and margin trading under the 2010 reform. 
 
With reference to the basic requirements for designated stocks promulgated by the CSRC, and 
index inclusion criteria for both the Shanghai 50 Index and the Shenzhen 40 Index, we adopt 
following variables as selection criteria to implement our similar characteristics matching: total 
market capitalisation, free float market capitalisation, daily trading volume, the number of 
public floats, daily turnover and the daily price. The variable daily turnover is included because 
of the high liquidity requirement by the CSRC. Since collected data of each variable are daily 
data, the time series of each variable is converted into a daily average over the 250 trading days 
prior to the listing date 12th Feb 2010.  
 
3.3.4 Descriptive Statistics  
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The descriptive statistics of the remaining 32 stocks together with its control counterparts are 
separately provided in Panel A, A1 and Panel B, B1 of Appendix 3.4. The comparative analysis 
is done with the pre-event and post-event estimates of the constructed time series. Among all 
32 treatment stocks, 13 of them are from the Shanghai 50 Index, and the rest 19 stocks are from 
the Shenzhen 40 Index. Four industrial portfolios based on related industries and one general 
portfolio includes all 32 object shares are constructed according to the portfolio approach. The 
descriptive statistics of the treatment times series and their control counterparts are respectively 
represented in A2, A3 and B2, B3 of Appendix 3.4. Besides the analysis of the industrial 
portfolios and the all-share portfolio, comparisons based on individual stocks are also 
performed. As mentioned in McKenzie et al. (2001), analysis of stock indices is useful in 
assessing market-wide impacts, but effects on the underlying can be dissipated across stock 
constituents in the index, making the true effect hardly to be detected. The influence of short 
selling and margin trading on feedback trading and volatility dynamics might be more 
noticeable at the individual stock level.  
 
The descriptive statistics of the 32 adopted stocks together with their control counterparts are 
represented in Appendix 3.4. The daily stock returns are calculated as the logarithmic 
difference 𝑅𝑡 = 100 × 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑡/𝑃𝑡−1). The statistics including the mean return, the minimum 
and the maximum return, the standard deviation, skewness, excess kurtosis, the Jarque-Bera 
statistic, the Ljung–Box statistics LB(12), the ARCH test, the JOINT test, together with serial 
correlations at different lags are reported. Table 3.2 is used to provide descriptive summaries 
of key statistics with the percentage of significance.  
 
With the statistical results concerning the data’s distributional pattern, we can easily see that 
the return distributions of our adopted stocks departure from normality. More than half of 
stocks display significant skewness, and all stocks show significantly excess kurtosis in both 
groups. The non-normal return distributions is also strongly supported by the significant JB 
statistics of all the time series analysed. Although only a little more than half of the results of 
the Ljung-Box χ2 statistics for 12 lags of individual stocks display significance, the significant 
LB(12) are found for most indices returns, except for the financial portfolios in both treat and 
control groups. This indicates significant temporal dependencies in the first moment of 
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portfolio returns distribution. The results of ARCH statistics for both groups show complete 
significance. The results of the JOINT test of individual stocks rarely show significant 
asymmetries in conditional volatility, which suggests that the basic GARCH model may even 
fit A-share returns data better than the more complicated asymmetric ones. Moreover, a simple 
autoregressive model AR(5) is estimated and reported in Appendix 3.4. The coefficient results 
of serial correlation at different lags t =1, 2, 3, 4, 5 show different levels of significance. For 
the serial correlation at lag 1, 28.13% treatment stocks and 37.50% control stocks have positive 
coefficient results. This indicates that to some extent, positive feedback trading exists in stock 
returns in the A-share market. Nevertheless, further investigation is required to examine the 
extent of interaction between serial correlations and volatility. 
 
Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics   
Percentage of Significance Skew Kurt JB LB(12) ARCH JOINT 
Serial correlation 
at lag 1 
Panel A: Treatment Group       
Individual Stocks (32) 65.63% 100.00% 100.00% 56.25% 100.00% 15.63% 28.13% 
Industrial Portfolios (4) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 75.00% 100.00% 25.00% 0.00% 
All-share Index (1) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Panel B: Control Group       
Individual Stocks (32) 59.38% 100.00% 100.00% 68.75% 100.00% 25.00% 37.50% 
Industrial Portfolios (4) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 75.00% 100.00% 75.00% 0.00% 
All-share Index (1) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
Notes: The sample period is from 31/03/2004 to 31/03/2014. The observations of each time series are 1942. The percentage of 
statistical significance in this table includes statistics with significance at the levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. Details of all related 
statistics is presented at Appendix 3.4. 
 
3.4 Methodology 
 
3.4.1 The Baseline Model  
 
The heterogeneous trader model 
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Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) model heterogeneous behaviour of two types of investors, smart 
money traders who make their investment decisions within a rational mean-variance 
framework, and feedback traders who react to previous price changes rather than making 
investment decisions on the fundamentals. The demand for stocks held by smart money traders 
(𝑆𝑡) is determined by a mean-variance model: 
 
                                                                𝑆𝑡 =
(𝐸𝑡−1𝑅𝑡 –𝛼)
𝜇𝜎𝑡
2                                                       (3.1) 
 
Where 𝐸𝑡−1𝑅𝑡  denotes the expectation on stock return in period t, 𝛼 is the risk-free rate. The 
𝜇𝜎𝑡
2  is the risk premium, modelled as a positive function of the stock price’s conditional 
variance 𝜎𝑡
2 and the coefficient of risk aversion 𝜇. 
 
The relative holdings of feedback traders (𝐹𝑡) are determined by the following equation: 
 
                                                                 𝐹𝑡 = 𝛾𝑅𝑡−1                                                           (3.2) 
   
Where 𝑅𝑡−1 denotes return in the previous period. The value of 𝛾 captures the type and degree 
of feedback trading behaviours: 𝛾 > 0 refers to the case of positive feedback trading, which 
means buying stocks after price increases and selling stocks after price declines.  𝛾 < 0 
indicates negative feedback trading, which is in line with the common ‘buy low-sell high’ 
strategy. It is noteworthy that feedback trading behaviour of either type has the impact of 
moving price away from its fundamental value. Hence, if the introduction of short selling and 
margin trading promote feedback trading behaviour among the designated stocks, further 
regulations may need to be considered by market regulators. 
 
Market clearing requires that all stocks are held by: 
 
                                                         𝑆𝑡 + 𝐹𝑡 = 1                                                                  (3.3)                                                                                               
 
Together with equation (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) and an assumption of rational expectations, this 
implies: 
 
                                                   𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 − 𝛾𝜇𝜎𝑡
2𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                                       (3.4)                      
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Where 𝜀𝑡  stands for a zero-mean residual, and all other terms are defined as above.  
 
In a market with both smart money traders and feedback traders, the return equation contains 
an additional term 𝑅𝑡−1, which implies that stock returns display autocorrelations. The pattern 
of autocorrelation in the stock returns depends on the type of feedback trading captured by the 
value of  𝛾 . With 𝛾 > 0, stock returns are negatively autocorrelated and positive feedback 
trading is involved; while with 𝛾 < 0, stock returns are positively autocorrelated and negative 
feedback trading is involved instead. The extent to which the stock returns autocorrelation 
varies with is closely related to the level of stock price volatility 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2. 
 
With further consideration of autocorrelation caused by market frictions, equation (3.4) can be 
modified to an empirical version: 
 
                                          𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + (𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝜎𝑡
2)𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                                 (3.5a)                                         
 
Where 𝑅𝑡 denotes the returns of individual stock in day t, and 𝜎𝑡
2 is the conditional variance of 
returns. In order to accommodate non-normalities, the residual is assumed to follow a 
Student's t-distribution. The coefficient 𝜑0 captures unconditional autocorrelation induced by 
potential market frictions, such as thin-trading, nonsynchronous trading and transaction costs 
(Bohl et al. 2013). The coefficient 𝜑1 = −𝛾𝜇  presents the conditional autocorrelation caused 
by feedback trading, which is closely related to the level of volatility in stock returns. A 
significantly negative (positive) value of 𝜑1  implies a phenomenon of positive (negative) 
feedback trading. The conditional positive feedback trading is the core concern here since it 
amplifies price deviations from its fundamental in times of high conditional variance, which 
may lead to market downturns as a result.  
 
GARCH-type models 
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To take into account volatility clustering and ARCH effects, equation (3.5a) is jointly estimated 
with GARCH-type models. GARCH models are employed to study changes in price volatility 
in terms of nonsynchronous trading, conditional heteroscedasticity in returns, and asymmetric 
responses to the positive and negative news. Following Chau et al. (2014), rather than adopting 
a particular type of univariate GARCH model, extensive specification tests are taken to 
determine the most appropriate model among three versions of GARCH models, including the 
standard symmetric GARCH model (Bollerslev 1986), the asymmetric exponential GRACH 
model (Nelson 1991) and the asymmetric GJR-GARCH model (Glosten 1993). 
 
GARCH:  
                                     𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2                                                            (3.6a) 
 
EGARCH: 
                                    log (𝜎𝑡
2) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
|𝜀𝑡−1|
𝜎𝑡−1
+ 𝛾
𝜀𝑡−1
𝜎𝑡−1
+ 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝜎𝑡−1
2 )                          (3.7a) 
 
GJR-GARCH: 
                                    𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾𝑋𝑡−1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2                                        (3.8a) 
 
The extensive tests including the log-likelihood function (log L), Akaike information criterion 
(AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian criterion (BIC) are conducted to select the most appropriate 
model for adopted time series data (see Appendix 3.5.A and B). The results of both AIC and 
BIC show that the basic GARCH (1, 1) is the best performing model for all adopted series, 
while the statistics of log L indicates that GJR-GARCH is the second prior one. Thus, we adopt 
a combined model of the heterogeneous trader model with GARCH (1, 1) as our baseline model, 
and apply the GJR-GARCH (1, 1) later as a robustness test.  
 
3.4.2 The Two-period Approach 
 
                                       𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + (𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝜎𝑡
2)𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                                    (3.5a)  
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                                       𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2                                                            (3.6a) 
 
The models described in equations (3.5a) and (3.6a) are estimated for both the pre-event and 
post-event periods and estimated coefficients of them are compared. With the consideration 
that factors other than the dual introduction event may also affect the concerned coefficients in 
our analysis, t-tests on the significance of differences in 𝜑1 between the treatment and the 
control groups are performed.  
 
The heterogeneous trader model is used to analyse our first hypothesis that the degree of 
feedback trading is reduced by the eligibility of short selling and margin trading. With a 
voluminous literature claiming that positive feedback trading exists in the Chinese A-share 
market, we expect that the market environment is with significantly positive feedback trading 
before our study event, 𝜑1 < 0. Our second hypothesis is that stock price volatility decreases 
when short selling and margin trading are allowed. The coefficients 𝛼1 and β in GARCH (1, 1) 
model of equation (3.6a) describe the features of the conditional volatility of returns. By using 
GARCH-type models, we can not only investigate the question whether the level of volatility 
among the designated stocks is decreased but also examine structural changes in volatility in 
terms of the rate of information flows and volatility persistence. If the dual introduction leads 
to an improvement in information flow and a moderation in the impacts of feedback traders 
and other noise traders as expected, reductions in the value of 𝛼0, β, 𝛾 , 𝜑0, and in the absolute 
value of  𝜑1, together with an increase in the coefficient 𝛼1 would be observed.  
 
The estimation results of five key coefficients 𝜑0, 𝜑1, α0, α1, β are reported in Appendix 3.6.A 
and B. To allow a distinction to be drawn between negative feedback trading and positive 
feedback trading, results are reported separately for coefficient 𝜑1, of which the positive value 
𝜑1  (positive) represent negative feedback trading, and the negative value 𝜑1 (negative) stands for 
positive feedback trading. The estimated parameters along with the P-values of the 
nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis statistics, which examines whether the coefficients in the pre-
event period are significantly different from that in the post-event period, and the t-statistics on 
the equality of the estimated coefficients between the treatment and control groups are also 
reported. 
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3.4.3 The Heaviside Indicator Approach   
 
In our empirical analysis, three different approaches with respective advantages are conducted 
to estimate the time series of return  𝑅𝑡. Following Antoniou et al. (2005), we firstly modify 
the baseline model with Heaviside indicators. To formally test the hypothesis that changes in 
𝜑0 and 𝜑1 after the introduction are statistically significant, we add the Heaviside indicator 
function to both the return and the variance equations of the baseline model: 
 
          𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + [𝜑0,1𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑0,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡) + (𝜑1,1𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑1,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡)) 𝜎𝑡
2 ] 𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡           (3.5b) 
  
          𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼0,1 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼0,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡) + [𝛼1,1 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼1,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡)]𝜀𝑡−1
2  + [𝛽1 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽2(1 − 𝐼𝑡)]𝜎𝑡−1
2     (3.6b)                  
 
Where 𝐼𝑡 is the Heaviside indicator function taking value one before the introduction date and 
zero afterwards. The two extended models given by equation (3.5b) and (3.6b) enable us to use 
the full sample data to conduct the regression analysis, which would greatly improve data 
utilization efficiency. Also, the Heaviside indicators added allow us to investigate changes 
happened in each concerned coefficient in the variance equation before and after the 
introduction. The following hypotheses can be tested directly: H0,1 : 𝜑0,1 = 𝜑0,2, H0,2 : 𝜑1,1 =
𝜑1,2, H0,3 : 𝛼0,1 = 𝛼0,2, H0,4 : 𝛼1,1 = 𝛼1,2, and H0,5 : 𝛽1 = 𝛽2. The estimated parameters along 
with Wald statistics for  H0,1, H0,2, H0,3, H0,4 and H0,5, and t-statistics for the equality of the 
feedback trading model coefficients between the treatment and the control group are reported 
in Appendix 3.7.A and 3.7.B.  
 
 
3.4.4 The Differentiated Impact Model 
 
We investigate the separate impact of short selling and margin trading on feedback trading 
behaviour by studying the impact differences of the dual introduction conditional on positive 
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and negative historical returns. A combination of the heterogeneous trader model with 
Heaviside indicators and basic GARCH (1, 1) model with an event dummy help us to achieve 
the purpose. In the spirit of Gulen and Mayhew (2000), a multiplicative dummy is adopted to 
study the changes in volatility levels caused by the introduction of short selling and margin 
trading:  
                               
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + {𝜑0,1
+ 𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑0,2
+ (1 − 𝐼𝑡) + [𝜑1,1
+ 𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑1,2
+ (1 − 𝐼𝑡)]𝜎𝑡
2}𝑅𝑡−1
+ + {𝜑0,1
− 𝐼𝑡 +
           𝜑0,2
− (1 − 𝐼𝑡) + [𝜑1,1
− 𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑1,2
− (1 − 𝐼𝑡)]𝜎𝑡
2}𝑅𝑡−1
− +𝜀𝑡                                      (3.5c)                
 
           𝜎𝑡
2 = (1 + 𝛼𝐿𝐷𝑡)(𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 )                                                               (3.6c) 
 
Where the dummy variable 𝐷𝑡  is equal to one when the introduction is in place and zero 
otherwise. The main focus of our study is parameter φ1,2
+  and φ1,2
− , which distinctly represents 
the level of conditional feedback trading after the dual introduction dependent on historical 
positive and historical negative returns. Since the fact that short selling dominates margin 
trading following negative historical returns while margin trading becomes more prevailing 
with the positive historical returns, we link short selling to the changes related to negative 
returns and link margin trading to the other to investigate the different impact of short selling 
and margin trading on feedback trading behaviour. Similar to the previous derivation, a positive 
sign of the estimates of φ1,2
+  or φ1,2
−  suggests occurrence of negative feedback trading, while 
the case of negative sign implies a degree of positive feedback trading.  
 
The estimation results along with the P-values of Kruskal-Wallis statistics, Wald statistics and 
t-statistics are reported in Appendix 3.8.A and B. The nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis statistics 
and Wald statistics are adopted to examine whether the coefficients of individual time series in 
the pre-period are significantly different from that in the post-period. The t-statistics of 
parametric t-test that examine the equality of the estimated coefficients in the post-period 
between the treatment and control groups are shown in the rightmost column.  
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3.4.5 Robustness Tests  
 
The Heaviside indicator approach with different window specifications 
 
Further estimations are undertaken to check the robustness of our results. In regard to the 
sample range, a two-year window and a three-year window either side of the introduction event 
are adopted to compare with the original four-year window. From the findings of Chau et al. 
(2008) which study the impact of the introduction of Universal Stock Futures on underlying 
market dynamics, we understand that the qualitative findings related to feedback trading for 
two-year and four-year window are generally consistent, but in some cases, there might be 
differences in the significance of the results on the unconditional volatility α0. It argues that 
with a two-year window, the post-event α0 might be insignificantly different from its pre-event 
value. The estimated parameters for both the treatment and control groups of all-share index 
along with the p-values of Kruskal-Wallis statistics and Wald statistics are reported in 
Appendix 3.9.A and B. 
 
Estimation results of asymmetric GARCH-type model 
 
With the recognition that the best performing model among three presented GARCH-type 
models for our data is the basic GARCH (1,1) model, we use the second best-fit model GJR-
GARCH (1,1) indicated by the log-likelihood ratio statistic to test the robustness of our results 
(see Appendix 3.5.A and 3.5.B). The GJR-GARCH version of the Heaviside indicator approach 
is:   
 
      𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + [𝜑0,1𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑0,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡) + (𝜑1,1𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑1,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡)) 𝜎𝑡
2 ] 𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                 (3.5b) 
 
 𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼0,1 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼0,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡) + [(𝛼1,1 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼1,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡)]𝜀𝑡−1
2 + [(𝛾1 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛾2(1 − 𝐼𝑡)]𝑋𝑡−1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 
                  [(𝛽1 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽2(1 − 𝐼𝑡)]𝜎𝑡−1
2                                                                                                 (3.6d) 
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With an additional asymmetry coefficient γ, the GJR-GARCH version of the feedback trading 
model with Heaviside indicators allows for asymmetric responses of volatility to news 
innovations. The estimated parameters for both the treatment and the control groups of 
industrial portfolios along with the Wald statistics and t-statistics are reported in Appendix 
3.10. 
 
3.5 Empirical Results 
 
According to the approaches elaborated above, three sets of regressions are conducted to 
address three research questions regarding the impact of the introduction of short selling and 
margin trading on feedback trading and stock volatility dynamics. Appendix 3.6.A and B 
present the immediate and calculated GARCH estimation results of the baseline model for 
individual stocks, industrial portfolios and all-share index in the pre-event and post-event 
periods; Appendix 3.7.A and B present the immediate and calculated GARCH estimates of the 
Heaviside indicator approach for individual stocks and industrial portfolios; Appendix 3.8.A 
and B present the immediate and calculated GARCH estimation results for individual stocks, 
industrial portfolios and all-share index of the differentiated impact model conditional on 
positive and negative historical returns. In terms of robustness tests, Appendix 3.9.A and B 
present GARCH estimates of the Heaviside indicator approach and the differentiated impact 
model of the all-share index with 2- and 3-year estimation window; Appendix 3.10 presents 
GJR-GARCH estimates of the Heaviside indicator approach for industrial portfolios. For all 
appendix tables, the empirical results for both the treatment and control groups are reported. 
With Appendices 3.6 - 3.10 being attached at the end of our research, we use Tables 3.3 - 3.5 
in the main body of the text to provide more concise and informative information of the main 
empirical findings. 
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3.5.1 GARCH Estimation Results of the Two-period Approach 
 
With an application of sub-sample data, Appendix 3.6.A reports GARCH estimates of the two-
period approach both for industrial portfolios and the all-share index. Appendix 3.6.B presents 
summarised GARCH estimation results for 32 individual stocks and four industrial portfolios. 
Specifically, A1 and B1 are the calculated mean values of key coefficient estimates, while A2 
and B2 present the percentage of individual time series for which each coefficient is statistically 
significant. Here, Table 3.3 summarises the information of the percentage of significant 
coefficients for individual stocks and industrial portfolios from Appendix 3.6.A and 3.6.B. 
 
Feedback trading 
 
Table 3.3 first comes along with the two parameters governing the autocorrelation of stock 
returns, 𝜑0  and 𝜑1, which are the direct indicator of unconditional correlation and conditional 
feedback trading, respectively. In terms of the constant component of autocorrelation 𝜑0, a 
significant decrease is observed for both the treatment and control groups, which indicates a 
clear reduction in the unconditional serial correlation for both groups. Especially for the 
treatment time series, all significant pre-event values of 𝜑0 turn into insignificant after the 
introduction event. The calculated results of individual stocks in Panel A provide the most 
revealing evidence. Compared to a decrement of 3.13% in the percentage of significant 
coefficients in control group, a six-fold decrement of 18.75% demonstrates among 32 
designated stocks. Besides, immediate GARCH estimates in Appendix 3.6.A show that all pre-
event coefficients of industrial portfolios and all-share index for the treatment group are 
positive values. Hence, we conclude that the introduction event of short selling and margin 
trading decreases positive unconditional autocorrelations among designated stocks. It is 
noteworthy that in the heterogeneous feedback trading model, a distinction must be recognised 
between parameters 𝜑0 and 𝜑1. Rather than parameter 𝜑1, which decreases solely due to the 
moderation of feedback trading behaviour, the parameter 𝜑0 is designed to capture possible 
nonsynchronous trading, market frictions and inefficiencies (Antoniou et al. 2005). Therefore, 
here by 𝜑0, we can see a promoting effect of the dual introduction on the market efficiency. 
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The parameter of most interest in the study is 𝜑1 , which captures the interaction between 
conditional variance and autocorrelation. To draw a distinction between positive and negative 
feedback trading, the results of 𝜑1 are divided into two categories by the sign of the estimates. 
From the table, it is clearly seen that no changes occur in the coefficient 𝜑1(positive) between the 
pre-event and post-event periods for both study groups. This indicates an unchanged level of 
negative feedback trading among investors around the event. However, the results show an  
 
Table 3.3 The two-period approach: percentage of significant coefficients of GARCH 
estimates 
  
𝜑0 
𝜑1 α0 α1 β 
 𝜑1 (positive) 𝜑1 (negative) 
  Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- Post- 
Panel A: Individual Stocks (32)              
Treatment  18.75% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 9.38% 0.00% 18.75% 31.25% 84.38% 84.38% 100.00% 96.88% 
Control 9.38% 6.25% 3.13% 3.13% 0.00% 0.00% 18.75% 21.88% 90.63% 68.75% 100.00% 100.00% 
Panel B: Industrial Portfolios (4)                 
Treatment  75.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 25.00% 25.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 75.00% 
Control 50.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 50.00% 25.00% 100.00% 75.00% 100.00% 75.00% 
Notes: This table shows the percentage of significant coefficients of GARCH estimates of the baseline model for the treatment and control 
groups in the pre-event and post-event periods corresponding to Appendix 3.6.A and 3.6.B. Panel A and B present the result of 32 individual 
stocks and 4 industrial portfolios, respectively. In particular, the estimated mean equation is given by equation (3.5a) as:𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 +
(𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝜎𝑡
2)𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡. The variance equation is given by equation (3.6a) as: 𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 . All results are presented at a 
significance level of 10%.   
 
entirely different situation between the treatment and control groups in terms of the coefficient 
𝜑1(negative). While a value of 0.00% in the percentage of significant coefficients of 𝜑1 (negative) 
keeps unchanged for all control time series, substantial reductions in 𝜑1(negative) are observed for 
all treatment time series. As the 90 designated stocks selected by the CSRC and exchange 
regulators for short selling and margin trading are the largest blue-chip stocks with the highest 
liquidity in Chinese A-share market, we thus know that more intensified positive feedback 
trading are involved with large capitalisation stocks before the 2010 introduction event. The 
eligibility of short selling and margin trading reduces the level of positive feedback trading 
among these large-capitalisation stocks substantially. With Kruskal-Wallis test on the equality 
of the pre-event and post-event coefficients, we can see a significant decrement in the mean 
value of 𝜑1 (negative) of individual treatment stocks in Appendix 3.6.B, Panel A, which again 
confirms the finding. We are thus confident to say that the dual introduction of short selling 
and margin trading leads to a substantially lower level of conditional positive feedback trading 
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among investors. This is deemed to enhance financial stability, because that a reduction in 
feedback trading behaviour implies a moving towards fundamental values in the stock prices.    
 
Volatility 
 
The impact of the dual introduction on stock returns volatility is firstly assessed by a 
comparison of the unconditional volatility coefficient α0 in the pre-event and post-event periods. 
From Table 3.3 Panel A, we see that compared to a small increase of 3.13% among control 
stocks, the treatment stocks exhibit a quadruple increment of 12.5% in the percentage of 
significant coefficients of α0, which implies a substantial augment of unconditional volatility 
among designated stocks. Also, in Panel B, with an unchanged percentage of significant 
coefficients in the coefficient α0 among the treatment portfolios, a more substantial reduction 
among control portfolios is seen in Panel B. These mixed results lead to a conclusion that the 
introduction event of short selling and margin trading has no advantages in terms of moderating 
unconditional volatility.  
 
One of the greatest interests in our study is the changes in the news coefficient α1 before and 
after the study event, which would provide an indication of whether the informational 
efficiency is improved by the eligibility of short selling and margin trading. The results of 
Appendix 3.6.A, Panel B indicate a general decreasing trend in parameter α1 in the all-share 
indices of both study groups. Unlike its control counterpart, a significant value of α1 of the all-
share index is observed for the treatment group after the dual introduction. This implies that 
the reduction in the news coefficients is not caused by the introduction event. Instead, the 
eligibility of short selling and margin trading keep the impact of the most recent innovation on 
stock volatility at a relatively steady level. The summarised estimation results at both stock and 
portfolio levels in Table 3.3 are consistent with this finding. It shows substantial reductions in 
the percentage of significant coefficients of α1 for control stocks and portfolios, while results 
of α1 for the treatment group keep unchanged. Although our case shows that the post-event 
news has less impact than the pre-event news, there is no evidence that the introduction of short 
selling and margin trading reduces the informational efficiency. Instead, the two newly 
introduced mechanisms help the treatment stocks to remain their informational efficiency not 
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as negatively responsive as their control counterparts. This result highlights the necessity of 
the control group analysis in our paper, which ensures no inappropriate inferences and policy 
recommendations are reached concerning the impact of short selling and margin trading. 
 
In Table 3.3, the changes in the coefficient of volatility persistence, β, exhibit a similar trend 
in the treatment and control groups around the introduction event. Only a small difference is 
shown in the individual stocks level, of which the treatment group exhibits a slight decrease by 
3.12% in the percentage of significant coefficient of β after the introduction, compared with an 
unchanged level in its control counterpart. This indicates that the old news has less impact on 
returns volatility among the 32 designated stocks. With immediate GARCH estimates, 
Appendix 3.6.A shows a similar increasing trend in the coefficient of volatility persistence 
between the treatment and control indices before and after the event, except for the case of 
General and Services in the treatment group, which decreases from a significant level of 0.8397 
to -0.2122. In general, the increments in the value of β of the treatment portfolios are smaller 
than its control counterparts. Appendix 3.6.B, Panel A presents a contrast result in the mean 
value of β of industrial portfolios for the treatment group, which decrease from a level of 0.9033 
to 0.6609. However, this result could be directly caused by the strange case of General and 
Services in industrial treatment portfolios. Thus, there is no evidence that the introduction of 
short selling and margin trading augments volatility persistence, which is commonly 
considered as an adverse factor to the market stabilisation. The introduced two mechanisms 
even make a downward trend in the level of volatility persistence. 
 
3.5.2 GARCH Estimation Results of the Heaviside Indicator Approach 
 
Appendix 3.7.A and B report GARCH estimation results of the model of Heaviside indicator 
approach described by equation (3.5b) and (3.6b) using a whole-sample data. Because that no 
convergence is obtained in GARCH regression for the treatment all-share index, Appendix 
3.7.A only reports immediate GARCH estimates for four portfolios based on related industries. 
Appendix 3.7.B presents calculated GARCH estimation results of the Heaviside indicator 
approach for 28 individual stocks and four portfolios. Similarly, since three treatment stocks 
and one control obtain no convergence under the certain sub-iterations limit in the process of 
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GARCH regression, only results of 28 stocks are available. Table 3.4 presents the key measure, 
the percentage of significant coefficients from Appendix 3.7.B. Due to the possibility of 
neutralisation effect in the measure of mean value, it is only provided as a reference indicator 
in the appendix.  
 
Feedback trading 
 
In keeping with the results of ϕ0 for the treatment group in the baseline model, Table 3.4 shows 
a downward trend in the percentage of significance coefficients of 𝜑0 for all treatment time 
series. At both stock and portfolio levels, the coefficient values of 𝜑0  decrease substantially, 
which indicates decreased autocorrelations after the introduction event. However, results are 
not identical for the control group. Unlike a consistent downward trend in the baseline model, 
an increase of 7.14% in the percentage of significant coefficients of 𝜑0 is observed among 28 
control stocks. It is noted that in Appendix 3.7.A, all significant 𝜑0   for control portfolios 
remains positive but become insignificant after the introduction event, however, 𝜑0  turns into 
negative for three out of four portfolios in the treatment group, and one of the negatives is 
statistically significant. This means that positive autocorrelations among the treatment objects 
decrease much greater than its control counterparts, and the eligibility of the two introduced 
mechanisms may have a potential to increase negative autocorrelations in stock returns. In a 
later analysis of results of the differentiated impact model, we will see that this adverse 
potential is mainly derived from short selling rather than margin trading. In this case, we only 
conclude that the introduction event of short selling and margin trading decrease unconditional 
positive autocorrelations in stock returns, which is consistent with the results obtained from the 
baseline model.  
 
Turning to the key coefficient of feedback trading 𝜑1 , results are also presented in two 
categories divided by positive and negative signs, which represent changes in negative and 
positive feedback trading accordingly. In consistence with results of the baseline model, no 
changes are observed in the coefficient 𝜑1(positive) for both treatment and control groups. The 
dual introduction thus shows no favourable effect of lowering the level of negative feedback 
trading among investors. The results related to positive feedback trading is also in agreement 
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Table 3.4 The Heaviside indicator approach: percentage of significant coefficients of GARCH 
estimates 
  𝜑0 
𝜑1 α0 α1 β 
 𝜑1 (positive) 𝜑1 (negative) 
  𝜑0,1 𝜑0,2 𝜑1,1 𝜑1,2 𝜑1,1 𝜑1,2 α0,1 α0,2 α1,1 α1,2 β1 β2 
Panel A: Individual Stocks (28)            
Treatment  21.43% 3.57% 0.00% 0.00% 14.29% 7.14% 28.57% 25.00% 92.86% 71.43% 100.00% 100.00% 
Control 7.14% 14.29% 3.57% 3.57% 3.57% 10.71% 17.86% 28.57% 92.86% 64.29% 100.00% 85.71% 
Panel B: Industrial Portfolios (4)                 
Treatment  75.00% 25.00% 0.00% 0.00% 75.00% 0.00% 50.00% 25.00% 100.00% 75.00% 100.00% 75.00% 
Control 50.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 25.00% 0.00% 25.00% 25.00% 100.00% 50.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Notes: This table summarises the calculated GARCH estimates of the Heaviside indicator approach for the treatment and control 
groups corresponding to Appendix 4.7.A and B. In particular, the estimated mean equation is given by equation (3.5b) as:  𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 +
𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + [𝜑0,1𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑0,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡) + (𝜑1,1𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑1,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡)) 𝜎𝑡
2 ] 𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  .The variance equation is given by equation (6b) as: 𝜎𝑡
2 =
𝛼0,1 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼0,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡) + [𝛼1,1 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼1,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡)]𝜀𝑡−1
2  + [𝛽1 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽2(1 − 𝐼𝑡)]𝜎𝑡−1
2 .Panel A and B present the percentage of individual 
time series for which each key coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level of 28 individual stocks and four industrial 
portfolios, respectively.  
 
with the baseline model. In contrast to a reduction of 7.14% in the percentage of significant 
coefficients of 𝜑1 (negative) among treatment stocks, an equivalent growth is seen in the control 
group. The results of industrial portfolios in Panel B suggest further support. With immediate 
GARCH estimates of 𝜑1 , Appendix 3.7.A shows the situation much clearer. The negative 
values of all four treatment portfolios decrease, and three of them turn into positive numbers 
after the introduction event. And three significant values in the pre-period become insignificant. 
These empirical results suggest a clear reduction in the level of positive feedback trading 
among the treatment portfolios. For the control portfolios, although the significantly negative 
value of Basic Materials portfolio turns into insignificantly positive, the values of the other two 
portfolios change from positive into negative after the introduction. From the above results of 
the Heaviside indicator approach, we find that the degree of positive feedback trading is 
reduced by the two mechanisms, identifying with the outcome obtained from the baseline 
model which processes regressions with sub-period data.    
 
Volatility 
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Regards to the coefficient of unconditional volatility α0, Table 3.4 shows a different result from 
Table 3.3 of the baseline model at the individual stock level. In contrast to an increase in the 
percentage of significant coefficients among control stocks, a small decline of 3.57% is 
observed among the treatment stocks. Besides, the portfolio-level results in Panel B show a 
25.00% decline among the treatment portfolios, while there is an unchanged figure for the 
control group. Since mixed results are obtained concerning the percentage of significant 
coefficients between the two models, the impact of the dual introduction of short selling and 
margin trading on unconditional volatility in stock returns becomes inconclusive. 
 
Table 3.4, Panel A and B show very similar estimation results of the news coefficient α1 with 
Table 3.3. The reductions take place in the percentage of significant coefficients of α1 for both 
individual treatment stocks (from 92.86% to 71.43%) and portfolios (100% to 75%) are smaller 
than its control counterparts (92.86% to 64.29% and 100% to 50%, respectively). Although a 
downward trend in the news coefficient being observed for all the time series in our study 
groups, it is clear to see that the decrement occurs in α1 among designated stocks is smaller 
than the unlisted stocks. The dual introduction of short selling and margin trading thus supports 
the informational efficiency of stocks in the treatment group. 
 
In consistence with the estimation results from the baseline model, a similar downward trend 
in the coefficient of volatility persistence β is found after the introduction event for both the 
treatment and control indices. However, results of the percentage of significant coefficients of 
β in Table 3.4, Panel A present a contrast finding to the baseline model. The percentage of 
significant coefficients of β for the 28 treatment stocks keeps unchanged at 100% level, while 
a reduction from 100% to 85.71% is found among the control stocks. Nevertheless, results at 
the portfolio level show a smaller percentage of significant coefficients in the treatment group 
after the introduction. There thus no clear pattern can be drawn from the changes in the measure 
of volatility persistence around the introduction event.  
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3.5.3 The Impact Differences between Short Selling and Margin Trading on Feedback 
Trading Behaviour 
 
As the third research question of the paper, we attempt to investigate the separate impacts on 
feedback trading brought about by each mechanism introduced. With the differentiated impact 
model, the research objective is achieved by studying the impact differences of the dual 
introduction dependent on negative and positive historical returns respectively. Appendix 
3.8.A and B report GARCH estimation results of the differentiated impact model conditional 
on positive and negative historical returns for both study groups with whole-sample data. Being 
derived from Appendix 3.8.A and B, calculated results of the percentage of significant 
coefficients are reported both at the stock and portfolio level in Table 3.5. 
 
Short selling 
 
As it is widely believed that short selling dominates margin trading under the bearish sentiment, 
we connect short selling transactions with the changes related to negative historical returns. 
Two notations with a negative superscript sign shown in Table 3.5, 𝜑0
− and 𝜑1
−, are parameters 
indicating the impact of short selling on unconditional and conditional autocorrelations in 
returns. With regard to the unconditional autocorrelation 𝜑0
−, a greater reduction in percentage 
of significant coefficients around the introduction event is found among control stocks at both 
the stock and portfolio level. Thus, it is likely that unconditional autocorrelation in stock returns 
increases on the onset of short selling.  
 
The parameter of conditional feedback trading 𝜑1
− , which indicates the impact of short selling 
on the interaction between conditional variance and autocorrelations, is of the most interest in 
the study. In Appendix 3.8.A, no significant estimate of 𝜑1
− is found for all industrial and 
general indices in both the pre-event and post-event periods. This implies a very low probability 
of feedback trading dependent on negative historical returns. Turning to Table 3.5, Panel A, 
compared to an unchanged level in the treatment group, a substantial fall of 9.37% is seen in 
percentage significant coefficients in 𝜑1
− (positive) among control stocks after the introduction 
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event, which implies a reduction in conditional negative feedback trading among control stocks. 
This finding implies that short selling shows no positive impact on moderating the degree of 
negative feedback trading among designated stocks. Regarding the indicator of positive 
feedback trading 𝜑1
− (negative), opposite results are found between the treatment and control 
stocks. The percentage of significant coefficients of 𝜑1
− (negative) experience an augment from 
3.13% to 9.38% for the treatment stocks, while its counterparts in control group remain 
unchanged. This suggests that designated shortable stocks are likely to experience a higher 
level of positive feedback trading. 
 
Table 3.5 The differentiated impact model: the percentage of significant coefficients of 
GARCH estimates 
 MT SS Vol 
  𝜑0
+ 𝜑1
+ 𝜑0
− 
𝜑1
− (positive) 
𝜑1
− 
𝛼𝐿  𝜑1
+ (positive) 𝜑1
+ (negative) 𝜑1
− (positive) 𝜑1
− (negative) 
 𝜑0,1
+  𝜑0,2
+  𝜑1,1
+  𝜑1,2
+  𝜑1,1
+  𝜑1,2
+  𝜑0,1
−  𝜑0,2
−  𝜑1,1
−  𝜑1,2
−  𝜑1,1
−  𝜑1,2
−  
Panel A: Individual Stocks (32)                    
Treatment  43.75% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 9.38% 6.25% 21.88% 18.75% 3.13% 3.13% 3.13% 9.38% 56.25% 
Control 34.38% 12.50% 12.50% 9.38% 6.25% 6.25% 31.25% 12.50% 12.50% 3.13% 6.25% 6.25% 40.63% 
Panel B: Industrial Portfolios (4)                   
Treatment  100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 25.00% 0.00% 25.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 25.00% 
Control 75.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 25.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 25.00% 
 Notes: This table summarises the calculated GARCH estimates of the differentiated impact model for the treatment and control groups 
corresponding to Appendix 3.8.A and B. In particular, the estimated mean equation is given by equation (3.5c) as: 𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 +
{𝜑0,1
+ 𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑0,2
+ (1 − 𝐼𝑡) + [𝜑1,1
+ 𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑1,2
+ (1 − 𝐼𝑡)]𝜎𝑡
2}𝑅𝑡−1
+ + {𝜑0,1
− 𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑0,2
− (1 − 𝐼𝑡) + [𝜑1,1
− 𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑1,2
− (1 − 𝐼𝑡)]𝜎𝑡
2}𝑅𝑡−1
− +𝜀𝑡. The variance 
equation is given by equation (6c) as: 𝜎𝑡
2 = (1 + 𝛼𝐿𝐷𝑡)(𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 ). Panel A and B separately presents the results of 32 
individual stocks and 4 industrial portfolios. All results are presented at a significance level of 10%. 
 
Margin trading  
 
Since when it comes to bullish sentiment, margin trading becomes more prevalent than short 
selling, a link between margin trading and changes bound up with positive historical stock 
returns is established. In Table 3.5, notations with a positive superscript sign, 𝜑0
+  and 𝜑1
+, are 
coefficients indicating the impact of margin trading on unconditional and conditional 
autocorrelations in stock returns. Appendix 3.8.A shows that except for the case of General and 
services index, all significantly positive estimates of 𝜑0
+ of industrial and all-share indices in 
the treatment group reduce to an insignificant value in the post-event period. This implies a 
moderated level of unconditional autocorrelations among designated stocks. The general 
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results of 𝜑0
+ for control group also exhibit a declining trend, but with a much smaller 
decrement. In particular, the value of 𝜑0 
+  of control all-share index remains a significantly 
positive value after the introduction event, which indicates an occurrence of unconditional 
positive autocorrelations. These findings are summarised and reported in Table 3.5, Panel B as 
well. In Panel A, the percentage of significant coefficients of 𝜑0
+
 (positive) of 32 treatment stocks 
dramatically reduces from 43.75% to 0.00%, while the control estimate decreases by 25.13%, 
with a remainder of 12.50%. Therefore, the designated stocks eligible for margin trading 
conditional on positive returns involve less unconditional autocorrelations in stock returns, 
which is indicative of an enhancement in market stability.  
 
The coefficient of conditional feedback trading on positive historical returns 𝜑1
+ indicates the 
impact of margin trading on the interaction between conditional volatility and autocorrelations. 
As no results of 𝜑1
+ 
(positive) of the time series in the treatment group show significance in both 
the pre-event and post-event periods in Table 3.5, we ignore comparison between the two study 
groups. Switching to the figures related to 𝜑1
+  (negative), a larger decline is observed for the 
treatment group at the individual stock level in Panel A. In comparison of the unchanged level 
of 6.25% in the control group, a drop from 9.38% to 6.25% in the percentage of significant 
coefficients of 𝜑1
+
 (negative) appears among the treatment stocks. In Appendix 3.8.B, the mean 
value of 𝜑1
+ (negative) of 32 treatment stocks for the treatment group shares a similar declining 
trend with its control counterparts but with a smaller decrement, which implies a lesser increase 
in the degree of positive feedback trading among the designated stocks. The result can be 
directly explained as that the dual introduction of short selling and margin trading reduces the 
level of positive feedback trading following on a positive stock return, which essentially 
suggests that margin trading exerts an inhibiting effect on positive feedback trading.  
 
This finding to some extent agrees with the conclusion obtained by Chang et al. (2013). 
Although the term positive feedback trading is not mentioned, the paper finds that rather than 
identify trends, Chinese margin traders seem only capture very short-term undervaluation, and 
there is no evidence that they do it in a consistently rational way. This implies that Chinese 
margin traders have no potential role of being positive feedback traders. In the paper of Wang 
(2011) which focuses on the issue of the eligibility of margin trading on trade informativeness 
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and market liquidity, finds that the ban lifting of margin trading leads to more information-
based trading in Chinese domestic markets. Since margin traders are informed traders who are 
more likely to make investment decisions on their own private information rather than follow 
market trends, the activities of margin traders would not exacerbate the degree of positive 
feedback trading behaviour. Rather, since more information is contained in margin trading 
activities than normal long buying, margin traders help to enhance informational efficiency. 
Thus, the Hypothesis 3b that the introduction of margin trading moderates the degree of 
positive feedback cannot be rejected. Our finding again overthrows the traditional judgement 
that margin traders are noisy traders in the stock market.  
 
The level of volatility  
 
From estimates of αL of the all-share index in Appendix 3.8.A, a significant decline is seen for 
the treatment index compared to an insignificant value for the control group. The calculated 
percentage of significant coefficients of individual stocks in Panel A, Table 3.5 provides further 
support to this finding. The percentage of the significance of αL for 32 treatment stocks is 
56.25%, which is obviously higher than the 40.63% in control group. In contrast to findings of 
Wang (2011), which documents an increased volatility after the dual introduction with a 
measure of variance ratio, we obtain the same result as Sharif et al. (2013) and Chang et al. 
(2013) that the level of volatility in stock returns is reduced by short selling and margin trading. 
With the daily high and low price divided by the high price as the volatility measure, Chang et 
al. (2013) study the issue further by adopting trade volume data of short selling and margin 
trading to study the separate change related to the two mechanisms in volatility. Their results 
indicate that intensified short selling produces higher intraday volatility while margin trading 
activities lead to a substantial reduction in both the level of volatility and intraday volatility, 
which is six times bigger than the increase caused by short selling. This implies a combined 
reducing impact of the two mechanisms on stock returns volatility, which is also consistent 
with our finding. However, a reduction in the volatility level is not necessarily a good thing, a 
more detailed analysis is required.  
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From the seminal paper of Ross (1989), it is acknowledged that increased volatility could be a 
result of greater information flows, but not necessarily derived from destabilising speculation. 
With reference to previous findings of the key coefficients related to volatility dynamics α0, α1, 
β, a reduction in the volatility level after the 2010 introduction can be attributed to declines in 
both coefficients α0 and α1. With inconclusive impact on α0, the results of the base model and 
the Heaviside approach provide direct evidence that the treatment stocks decrease less in α1, 
and decrease more in β. We thus deduce that the greater decline shown in the total level of 
returns volatility among the treatment stocks is due to a greater decrease in the coefficient of 
volatility persistence β. It is to say that the introduction of short selling and margin trading 
imposes a promoting effect on the impact of the recent innovations on returns volatility and an 
inhibiting effect on the impact of the old news as the same time, both of which would result in 
an enhancement in the informational efficiency in the market. 
 
3.5.4 Robustness Tests 
 
 The Heaviside indicator approach with different window specifications 
 
To test the robustness of the results to different window specifications around the introduction 
event, we re-estimate the Heaviside indicator model and the differentiated impact model using 
2- and 3-year windows. It is expected that tighter window will provide a more rigorous test to 
the changes story in feedback trading and volatility dynamics of the event. Appendix 3.9.A and 
B presents GARCH estimates of the Heaviside indicator approach and the differentiated impact 
model of both treat and control all-share indices with 2- and 3-year estimation window, 
respectively.  
 
In general, the results reported in Appendix 3.9.A remain qualitatively the same when the 3-
year windows are used. The post-event estimates of α0 and α1 show as insignificant for both 
the treatment and control indices, which are not reduced by the introduction event. The 
estimates of 2-year window show some extent of differences to our 4-year results in ϕ0 and 
volatility related coefficients α0, α1, β. With a similar trend with the control group, the treatment 
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index decreases more in the news coefficient. All these differences in volatility and ϕ0 between 
the 2-year and the 4-year windows can be explained as that time is needed for a new practice 
to be familiarized. This is especially crucial for an immature market with a low 
level of financial literacy. In fact, the daily transaction data of short selling and margin trading, 
which is available in the official websites of the two stock exchanges, show that the trade 
volume of short selling and margin trading for the first batch of 90 designated stocks is 
strikingly low at the first six months of the reform. The estimates of the differentiated impact 
model with the 2- and the 3-year windows in Appendix 3.9.B indicate qualitatively consistent 
results. Again, changes in the magnitude of 3-year window estimates show a clearer pattern of 
the introduction’s impact on feedback trading, regardless of conditional on positive or negative 
historical returns.   
 
Estimation results of other GARCH-type models 
 
It is well known that the volatility process in stock returns often exhibits asymmetries. As 
mentioned above, this effect can be studied with the Glosten (1993) asymmetric GJR-GARCH 
model, which is regarded as the second prior model for our research by three information 
criteria. Appendix 3.10 gives the GJR-GARCH estimates of the Heaviside indicator approach 
of four industrial portfolios. As a result, this robustness check broadly confirms our previous 
findings as the significance of differences in all key coefficients remains unchanged. The 
estimates of the asymmetry coefficient γ in the pre-event and post-event periods for both the 
treatment and control portfolios demonstrate insignificant values, which is in agreement with 
the results of the JOINT test that volatility asymmetry is scarce among our object shares. It is 
noticeable that all post-event estimates of the treatment portfolios get a smaller value than its 
control counterparts. And compared to the rising tendency in the control group, three out of 
four treatment portfolios experience a fall. This indicates that no intensified volatility 
asymmetry in stock returns is caused by the introduction of short selling and margin trading. 
This finding is exactly opposite to evidence from the Hong Kong market, from which an 
undermining impact of short selling on asymmetric responses to innovations is found (Henry 
and McKenzie 2006). To some extent, our finding is identical to evidence from the Taiwanese 
market, which experiences noticeably increased asymmetry in volatility when short selling 
restrictions are in place (Bohl et al. 2012). Given the results of additional tests undertaken, the 
general conclusions discussed earlier appear to be robust.  
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3.6 Conclusions 
 
To improve the domestic stock markets towards greater liquidity, versatility, sophistication and 
stabilisation, Chinese regulators initiate two long-awaited but controversial practices all at once. 
An overnight ban lifting over a designated list of stocks for short selling and margin trading in 
China’s 2010 reform provides us with a unique opportunity to conduct event analysis. The 
paper examines the impact of short selling and margin trading on feedback trading behaviour 
and stock volatility dynamics. With a combination of the heterogeneous trader model and 
GARCH model, we highlight the conditional nature of return persistence stemming from 
feedback trading behaviour.  
 
A unanimous conclusion is obtained from results of the baseline model and the extended model 
with Heaviside indicators. The dual introduction of short selling and margin trading leads to a 
clear reduction in unconditional positive autocorrelations and a substantially lower level of 
positive feedback trading, both of which are considered to be conducive to enhance financial 
market stability. Further, we explore the different impacts of short selling and margin trading 
on feedback trading behaviour by investigating the coefficient indicators conditional on 
positive and negative historical returns. The striking results which contrast to our initial 
hypotheses are found. The empirical estimates suggest that the designated stocks eligible for 
short selling experience an increase in both unconditional autocorrelations and positive 
feedback trading conditional on negative historical returns. While when it comes to negative 
historical returns which are more likely to be involved with intensive margin trading, 
substantial declines in both unconditional negative autocorrelation and positive feedback 
trading are found. Therefore, compared to short selling, margin trading tends to be more 
favourable to stock market’s stabilisation. 
 
With regards to the changes demonstrate in volatility, a significant reduction in the level of 
stock returns volatility is observed after the dual introduction. However, a similar trend 
simultaneously displays among the treatment and control stocks. Since factors other than the 
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introduction event might also affect the key coefficients in our model, control groups are 
constructed for each individual treatment stocks and portfolios. The detailed GARCH estimates 
prove that our considerations are not uncalled for. It indicates that for both the treatment and 
control groups, the increase occurs only in the unconditional volatility, rather than the news 
coefficient and the volatility persistency. As results of the two-period approach, the designated 
stocks increase more in unconditional volatility compared to control stocks, which indicates no 
advantages of the two introduced mechanisms. However, the facts that the designated stocks 
decrease less in the news coefficients and more in the volatility persistency implies that short 
selling and margin trading, in fact, play a supporting role in informational efficiency rather 
than lead to any volatility exacerbation.  
 
In all, our results show that the dual introduction of short selling and margin trading contribute 
to a moderated level of unconditional positive autocorrelations and conditional positive 
feedback trading behaviour. And there is no evidence that the two mechanisms destabilise the 
stock markets by increasing the volatility persistence in stocks returns. Rather, the findings 
generally agree the view that the two mechanisms support the informational efficiency and help 
stabilise the stock markets. However, the aggravating impact of short selling on conditional 
positive feedback trading should not be ignored. And this point, in fact, has been paid close 
attention by Chinese regulators. The rigorous requirements for the qualification of investors 
who are eligible for short selling and margin trading have been aggressively reiterated by the 
CSRC in recent months. The findings of this paper would not only provide important policy 
implications for Chinese regulators but worldwide regulators who are trapped in a struggle with 
the issues of short sales constraints or margin requirements. Nevertheless, we realise that the 
different impact of short selling and margin trading on feedback trading, returns volatility and 
related issues of China’s 2010 reform can be studied further with stricter analysis by adopting 
the data of transaction activities of each mechanism. 
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3.7 Appendices 
 
Appendix 3.1 Listing adjustments of stocks eligible for short selling and margin trading 
 
 
From the start date of the reform to the end date of our sample range (31/03/2010 - 31/03/2017), 
six major batches of policy adjustment extend the number of stocks eligible for short selling 
and margin trading from a total number of 90 to 950. Along with these batches, several 
additions and deletions to the originally designated list are made. The following table reports 
statistics on the occurrence of these events. The effective date is the day on which a list of 
designated stocks eligible for short selling and margin trading takes effect. The disclosure date 
is the day on which the original list or the revised list is announced by the exchange regulators 
of SSE or SZSE. The following columns show the number of stocks added to or deleted from 
the list by certain date in SSE or SZSE separately. The total number of stocks remaining on the 
list on each event time is indicated in the last column.  
 
Effective  
Date 
Disclosure  
Date 
    Shanghai Stock Exchange Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Total 
Added Deleted Sub-total Added Deleted Sub-total 
31/03/2010 12/02/2010 50  50 40  40 90 
01/07/2010 21/06/2010 4 -4 50 1 -1 40 90 
29/07/2010 16/07/2010 1 -1 50   40 90 
05/12/2011 25/11/2011 130  180 58  98 278 
31/01/2013 25/01/2013 120  300 102  200 500 
06/03/2013 05/03/2013  -1 299   200 499 
07/03/2013 07/03/2013   299  -1 199 498 
29/03/2013 
28/03/2013  -1 298   199 497 
29/03/2013   298  -1 198 496 
02/05/2013 26/04/2013  -1 297   198 495 
03/05/2013 02/05/2013  -1 296   198 494 
16/09/2013 06/09/2013 104  400 102  300 700 
28/03/2014 27/03/2014  -1 399   300 699 
01/04/2014 31/03/2014  -1 398   300 698 
29/04/2014 29/04/2014   398 
 -1 299 697 
05/05/2014 30/04/2014  -2 396   299 695 
22/09/2014 12/09/2014 104  500 101  400 900 
04/12/2014 04/12/2014   500  -1 399 899 
11/02/2015 10/02/2015  -1 499   399 898 
31/03/2015 30/03/2015  -1 498   399 897 
23/04/2015 22/04/2015  -1 497   399 896 
29/04/2015 28/04/2015  -1 496   399 895 
04/05/2015 30/04/2015  -2 495   399 894 
01/12/2015 
30/11/2015  -1 494   399 893 
01/12/2015   494  -1 398 892 
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Appendix 3.1 (continued) 
 
 
Effective  
Date 
Disclosure  
Date 
Shanghai Stock Exchange Shenzhen Stock Exchange  
Added Deleted Sub-total Added Deleted Sub-total 
Total 
 
11/03/2016 10/03/2016  -1 493   398 891 
21/03/2016 18/03/2016   493  -1 397 890 
22/03/2016 21/03/2016  -1 492   397 889 
25/03/2016 24/03/2016  -1 491   397 888 
11/04/2016 08/04/2016   491  -1 396 887 
12/04/2016 11/04/2016  -1 490   396 886 
20/04/2016 20/04/2016   490  -2 394 884 
29/04/2016 28/04/2016  -1 489   394 883 
03/05/2016 29/04/2016  -1 488  -2 392 880 
04/05/2016 04/05/2016   488  -3 389 877 
25/10/2016 25/10/2016   488  -1 388 876 
12/12/2016 02/12/2016 40 -3 525 37  425 950 
17/01/2017 16/01/2017  -1 524   425 949 
20/03/2017 19/03/2017  -1 523   425 948 
28/03/2017 27/03/2017  -1 522   425 947 
29/03/2017 28/03/2017  -1 521   425 946 
30/03/2017 29/03/2017  -1 520   425 945 
31/03/2017 30/03/2017  -1 519   425 944 
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Appendix 3.2 Major indices in mainland China 
 
Equity Index Code Profile Information 
No. of 
Stocks  
Starting 
Time 
Shanghai Stock Exchange 
Shanghai Stock Exchange A-Share Index 000002.SH 
A capitalisation-weighted index tracks the daily price 
performance of all A-shares listed on the SSE that are 
restricted to local investors and qualified institutional 
foreign investors. 
      858 
constituents 
21/02/1992 
Shanghai Stock Exchange 180 Index  000010.SH 
 
A free float-weighted index tracks the daily price 
performance of the 180 most representative A-share stocks 
listed on the SSE.  
      180 
constituents 
01/07/2002 
Shanghai Stock Exchange 50 Index 000016.SH 
It consists of 50 most representative A-share stocks from 
SSE.  
 
The objective is to reflect the complete picture of those good 
quality large enterprises, which are most influential in 
Shanghai security market. 
       50 
constituents 
02/01/2004 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange A-Share Index 399107.SZ 
A capitalisation-weighted index tracks the daily price 
performance of all A-shares listed on the SZSE which are 
restricted to local investors and qualified institutional 
foreign investors.  
897 
constituents 
04/10/1992 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange 40/Component 
Index 
399001.SZ 
 
A Capitalisation-weighted index consists of the 40 top 
companies that issue A-shares on SZSE. 
  
40 
constituents 
05/05/1995 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange 100 Index 399004.SZ 
It consists of 100 representative A-share stocks with largest 
free float market capitalisation and the most actively traded 
stocks A-share stocks listed on the SZSE. 
100 
constituents 
31/12/2002 
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Appendix 3.3 The first batch of 90 designated stocks of short selling and margin trading：company profile and listing adjustments  
No. Code Stock Name Industry IPO Date 
Date of Listing Adjustments 
Deleted Re-joined Re-deleted 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (50) 
SH01 600000 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank Co., Ltd.  Banks 10/11/1999    
SH02 600005 Wuhan Iron and Steel Company Limited  Industrial Metals & Mining 03/08/1999    
SH03 600015 Hua Xia Bank Co., Limited  Banks 12/09/2003    
SH04 600016 China Minsheng Banking Corp., Ltd.  Banks 19/12/2000    
SH05 600018 Shanghai International Port (Group) Co., Ltd.  Industrial Transportation 20/07/2000 01/07/2010 16/09/2013  
SH06 600019 Baoshan Iron and Steel Co., Ltd.  Industrial Metals & Mining 12/12/2000    
SH07 600028 China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation  Oil & Gas Producers 08/08/2001    
SH08 600029 China Southern Airlines Company Limited  Travel & Leisure 25/07/2003 01/07/2010 05/12/2011  
SH09 600030 CITIC Securities Co., Ltd.  Financial Services 06/01/2003    
SH10 600036 China Merchants Bank Co., Limited  Banks 09/04/2002    
SH11 600048 Poly Real Estate Group Co., Ltd.  Real Estates Investment & Services 31/07/2006*    
SH12 600050 China United Network Communications Limited  Mobile Telecommunications 09/10/2002    
SH13 600089 TEBA Co., Ltd.  Electronic & Electrical Equipment 18/06/1997    
SH14 600104 SAIC Motor Corporation Limited  Automobiles & Parts 25/11/1997    
SH15 600320 Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries CO., LTD Industrial Engineering 21/12/2000 01/07/2010 05/12/2011 31/01/2013 
SH16 600362 Jiangxi Copper Co., Ltd.  Industrial Metals & Mining 11/01/2002    
SH17 600383 Gemdale Corporation  Real Estates Investment & Services 12/04/2001    
SH18 600489 Zhongjin Gold Corporation, Limited Mining 14/08/2003    
SH19 600519 Kweichow Moutai Co., Ltd.  Beverages 27/08/2001    
SH20 600547 Shandong Gold Mining Co., Ltd.  Mining 28/08/2003    
SH21 600550 Baoding Tianwei Baobian Electric Co., Ltd.  Electronic & Electrical Equipment 28/02/2001 31/01/2013   
SH22 600598 Heilongjiang Agriculture Company Limited  Food Producers 29/03/2002 01/07/2010 05/12/2011 28/03/2014 
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SH23 600739 Liaoning Chengda Co., Ltd.  General Retailers 20/08/1996    
SH24 600795 GD Power Development Co., Ltd.  Electricity 18/03/1997    
SH25 600837 Haitong Securities Company Limited  Financial Services 24/02/1994    
SH26 600900 China Yangtze Power Co., Ltd.  Electricity 18/11/2003    
SH27 601006 Daqin Railway Co., Ltd.  Industrial Transportation 01/08/2006*    
SH28 601088 China Shenhua Energy Company Limited  Mining 09/10/2007*    
SH29 601111 Air China Limited  Travel & Leisure 18/08/2006*    
SH30 601166 Industrial Bank Co., Ltd.  Banks 05/02/2007*    
SH31 601168 Western Mining Co., Ltd.  Industrial Metals & Mining 12/07/2007*    
SH32 601169 Bank of Beijing Co., Ltd.  Banks 19/09/2007*    
SH33 601186 China Railway Construction Corporation Limited   Construction & Materials 10/03/2008*    
SH34 601318 Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd.   Life Insurance 01/03/2007*    
SH35 601328 Bank of Communications Co., Ltd.  Banks 15/05/2007*    
SH36 601390 China Railway Group Limited  Construction & Materials 03/12/2007*    
SH37 601398 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited Banks 27/10/2006*    
SH38 601600 Aluminium Corporation of China Limited  Industrial Metals & Mining 30/04/2007*    
SH39 601601 China Pacific Insurance (Group) Co., Ltd.  Life Insurance 25/12/2007*    
SH40 601628 China Life Insurance Company Limited  Life Insurance 09/01/2007*    
SH41 601668 China State Construction Engineering Corporation Limited  Construction & Materials 29/07/2009*    
SH42 601727 Shanghai Electric Group Company Limited Industrial Engineering 05/12/2008* 29/07/2010 05/12/2011 31/01/2013 
SH43 601766 China South Locomotive and Rolling Stock Corporation Industrial Engineering 18/08/2008*    
SH44 601857 PetroChina Company Limited  Oil & Gas Producers 05/11/2007*    
SH45 601898 China Coal Energy Company Limited  Mining 01/02/2008*    
SH46 601899 Zijin Mining Group Co., Ltd.  Mining 25/04/2008*    
SH47 601919 China COSCO Holdings Company Limited  Industrial Transportation 26/06/2007* 29/03/2013   
SH48 601939 China Construction Bank Corporation  Banks 25/09/2007*    
SH49 601958 Jinduicheng Molybdenum Co., Ltd.  Industrial Metals & Mining 17/04/2008*    
SH50 601988 Bank of China Limited  Banks 05/07/2006*    
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Shenzhen Stock Exchange (40) 
SZ01 000001 Shenzhen Development Bank Co., Ltd. / Ping An Bank Co., Ltd. Banks 23/08/1991    
SZ02 000002 China Vanke Co., Ltd  Real Estates Investment & Services 26/08/1991    
SZ03 000024 China Merchants Property Development Co., Ltd Real Estates Investment & Services 07/06/1993 01/12/2015   
SZ04 000027 Shenzhen Energy Group Co., Ltd.  Electricity 03/09/1993 05/12/2011 31/01/2013  
SZ05 000039 China International Marine Containers (Group) Co., Ltd General Industrials 08/04/1994    
SZ06 000060 Shenzhen Zhongjin Lingnan Nonfemet Co., Ltd. Industrial Metals & Mining 23/01/1997    
SZ07 000063 ZTE Corporation  Technology Hardware & Equipment 18/11/1997    
SZ08 000069 Shenzhen Overseas Chinese Town Co., Ltd  Travel & Leisure 10/09/1997    
SZ09 000157 Changsha Zoomlion Heavy Industry Science and Technology Co., Ltd Industrial Engineering 12/10/2000    
SZ10 000338 Weichai Power Co., Ltd.  Industrial Engineering 30/04/2007*    
SZ11 000402 Financial Street Holding Co., Ltd  Real Estates Investment & Services 26/06/1996    
SZ12 000527 GD Midea Holding Co., Ltd. Household Goods & Home Construction 12/11/1993 31/01/2013   
SZ13 000538 Yunnan Baiyao (Group) Co., Ltd  Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 15/12/1993    
SZ14 000562 Hong Yuan Securities Co., Ltd  Financial Services 02/02/1994    
SZ15 000568 Luzhou Lao Jiao Co., Ltd  Beverages 09/05/1994    
SZ16 000623 Jilin Aodong Medicine Industry Croup Co., Ltd. Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 28/10/1996    
SZ17 000630 Tonling Nonferrous Metal Group Stock Co.,Ltd Industrial Metals & Mining 20/11/1996    
SZ18 000651 Gree Electric Appliances, Inc. of Zhuhai  Household Goods & Home Construction 18/11/1996    
SZ19 000652 Tianjin Teda Co., Ltd  General Industrials 28/11/1996 31/01/2013   
SZ20 000709 Hebei Iron and Steel Co., Ltd  Industrial Metals & Mining 16/04/1997    
SZ21 000729 Beijing Yanjing Brewery Co., Ltd.  Beverages 16/07/1997    
SZ22 000768 Xi’an Aircraft International Corporation  Aerospace & Defense 26/06/1997    
SZ23 000783 Changjiang Securities Co., Ltd.  Financial Services 31/07/1997    
SZ24 000792 Qinghai Salt Lake Potash Co., Ltd.  Chemicals 05/09/1997    
SZ25 000800 Faw Car Co., Ltd  Automobiles & Parts 18/06/1997    
SZ26 000825 Shanxi Taigang Stainless Steel Co., Ltd  Industrial Metals & Mining 21/10/1998 31/01/2013 16/09/2013  
SZ27 000839 Citic Guoan Information Industry Co., Ltd  Technology Hardware & Equipment 31/10/1997    
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Notes: The time range of our sample is 31/03/2004 to 31/03/2016. While the SSE opened on 19/12/1990 and the SZSE started its operation on 03/07/1991, the relatively late foundation of stock exchanges 
in China renders some firms appear on the stock market at a considerably late time. * indicates that the stock has a later going public date than the start date of our sample span. 
 
SZ28 000858 Wuliangye Yibin Co., Ltd  Beverages 27/04/1998    
SZ29 000878 Yunnan Copper Industry Co., Ltd  Industrial Metals & Mining 02/06/1998    
SZ30 000895 Henan Shuanghui Investment and Development Co., Ltd.  Food Producers 10/12/1998    
SZ31 000898 Angang Steel Company Limited  Industrial Metals & Mining 26/12/1997 29/03/2013   
SZ32 000932 Hunan Valin Steel Co., Ltd. Industrial Metals & Mining 03/08/1999 01/07/2010   
SZ33 000933 Henan Shen Huo Coal Industry and Electricity Power Co., Ltd  Industrial Metals & Mining 01/09/1999    
SZ34 000937 Jizhong Energy Resources Co., Ltd.  Mining 09/09/1999    
SZ35 000960 Yunnan Tin Co., Ltd.  Industrial Metals & Mining 21/02/2000    
SZ36 000983 Shanxi Xishan Coal and Electricity Power Co., Ltd  Mining 26/07/2000    
SZ37 002007 Hualan Biological Engineering Inc.  Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 25/06/2004*    
SZ38 002024 Suning Appliance Co.,Ltd.  General Retailers 21/07/2004*    
SZ39 002142 Bank of Ningbo Co., Ltd  Banks 19/07/2007*    
SZ40 002202 Xinjiang Goldwind Science and Technology Co.,Ltd Alternative Energy 26/12/2007*    
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Appendix 3.4 Descriptive statistics of daily stock returns  
 
Panel A: 32 Treatment Stocks             
 
Mean Mini Max S.D. Skew  Kurt     JB LB(12) ARCH JOINT 
Serial correlationship at lag 
     1   2   3   4   5 
A1：Individual Stocks (32)            
SH02 0.018 -10.572 9.631 1.223 0.097* 1.781*** 260.008*** 13.777 30.441*** 1.510 0.027 -0.015 0.025 0.001 0.034 
SH03 0.010 -10.589 9.595 1.280 -0.061 2.205*** 394.949*** 10.131 46.440*** 2.129 0.026 0.000 -0.005 0.004 -0.005 
SH04 0.017 -10.536 9.623 0.989 0.077 1.646*** 221.255*** 11.641 39.812*** 3.568 0.024 -0.013 0.008 0.001 0.037 
SH06 0.031 -10.596 9.598 1.335 1.111*** 12.412*** 12865.674*** 11.913 56.493*** 1.099 0.025 0.003 0.036 0.027 0.031 
SH07 0.047 -10.563 9.561 1.345 0.285*** 2.662*** 599.879*** 21.466** 58.464*** 13.508* 0.047 0.012 0.018 0.013 0.009 
SH09 0.023 -10.554 9.570 1.302 0.040 2.724*** 601.063*** 23.369*** 49.081*** 3.207 0.054 0.013 0.033 0.011 0.004 
SH10 0.028 -10.544 9.531 0.990 0.326*** 1.882*** 321.230*** 16.156* 61.914*** 7.107* 0.032 -0.003 0.003 0.004 0.012 
SH14 0.010 -10.588 9.611 1.238 0.178*** 1.635*** 226.605*** 17.812*** 58.390*** 0.992 0.025 -0.068 0.019 0.018 -0.007 
SH16 0.005 -10.567 9.636 1.277 0.121** 2.186*** 391.447*** 15.148* 105.070*** 35.585*** 0.047** -0.028 0.037** 0.034 0.006 
SH18 -0.039 -10.602 9.625 0.985 -0.248*** 1.347*** 166.782*** 19.447** 56.357*** 2.591 0.024** -0.051** 0.004 0.055** -0.026 
SH19 0.030 -10.524 9.537 0.986 0.316*** 2.886*** 706.580*** 22.998*** 36.442*** 3.257 0.026 -0.015 0.005 -0.008 -0.018 
SH23 -0.002 -10.562 9.621 1.172 -0.058 1.070*** 93.842*** 15.276* 67.241*** 3.302 0.030 0.003 0.019 -0.003 0.002 
SH24 0.017 -10.536 9.587 1.277 0.139** 2.365*** 459.107*** 14.843* 129.442*** 8.179** 0.047** -0.013 0.029 -0.004 -0.024 
SZ02 0.023 -10.569 9.584 1.281 0.133** 2.098*** 361.946*** 12.727 24.277*** 4.785 0.029 -0.005 0.010 0.027 -0.002 
SZ03 -0.003 -10.551 9.562 0.995 -0.099* 1.034*** 89.689*** 7.036 18.271*** 3.658 0.013 -0.024 0.004 -0.004 -0.022 
SZ06 -0.007 -10.572 9.580 1.204 -0.224*** 2.589*** 558.857*** 14.094 48.897*** 0.332 0.040* 0.002 0.032 0.005 -0.027 
SZ08 0.001 -10.566 9.552 1.199 -0.031 1.244*** 125.603*** 14.581 52.596*** 4.224 0.038* 0.006 -0.011 -0.047** -0.027 
SZ11 0.003 -10.536 29.845 1.002 0.447*** 6.532*** 3518.252*** 13.270 13.744*** 2.742 0.036 -0.027 -0.001 0.008 -0.036 
SZ13 0.048 -10.536 14.823 1.316 0.666*** 4.379*** 1695.772*** 27.232*** 21.275*** 0.297 0.023 -0.060*** -0.022 -0.010 -0.038* 
SZ15 0.018 -10.557 9.595 1.261 0.288*** 2.339*** 469.729*** 17.081** 49.995*** 4.661 0.025 -0.055** 0.004 0.018 -0.019 
SZ17 0.007 -10.576 9.581 1.174 0.039 0.913*** 68.062*** 15.310* 31.833*** 0.608 0.033 -0.010 0.042* 0.044* -0.005 
SZ18 0.019 -10.583 9.561 1.172 0.231* 1.225*** 138.904*** 27.128*** 16.766*** 0.747 0.012 -0.073*** -0.024 0.022 -0.005 
SZ21 0.011 -10.567 32.980 1.012 1.419*** 18.333*** 27848.260*** 10.245 4.614** 4.144 0.027 -0.022 0.004 0.011 -0.033 
SZ25 0.011 -10.582 15.374 0.999 0.298*** 1.180*** 141.617*** 19.917** 53.887*** 5.275 0.018 -0.058** 0.025 0.027 -0.007 
SZ27 -0.014 -10.576 9.578 1.258 0.011 1.464*** 173.526*** 8.267 12.595*** 6.418* 0.023 -0.030 0.029 0.020 -0.014 
SZ28 0.017 -10.536 9.549 1.220 0.044 1.358*** 149.926*** 14.565 28.976*** 4.661 0.019 -0.028 0.015 0.017 -0.005 
SZ29 0.011 -10.584 9.590 1.203 0.069 1.511*** 186.299*** 13.582 71.812*** 4.776 0.048** 0.017 0.021 0.023 -0.008 
SZ33 -0.018 -10.551 9.583 1.192 -0.198*** 0.997*** 93.330*** 16.740* 22.582*** 1.201 0.044* -0.005 0.013 0.028 -0.017 
SZ35 0.007 -10.550 9.560 1.150 0.011 0.730*** 43.236*** 20.613** 46.008*** 2.340 0.044* -0.014 0.039* 0.035 -0.014 
SZ36 -0.001 -10.548 9.574 0.996 0.039 1.049*** 89.587*** 14.830* 44.329*** 0.239 0.047** -0.012 -0.010 0.022 -0.047* 
SZ37 0.023 -10.545 9.553 0.981 0.142** 1.504*** 189.596*** 14.402 23.064*** 0.303 0.021 -0.042* -0.016 -0.028 -0.006 
SZ38 0.019 -10.550 9.599 0.993 0.117** 1.241*** 129.068*** 20.171** 78.559*** 1.721 0.030 -0.038* 0.004 0.011 -0.016 
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A2：Industrial Portfolios (4)                         
Basic Materials (12) -0.013 -10.308 9.530 1.130 -0.223*** 0.653*** 50.626*** 29.714*** 46.197*** 1.655 0.022 -0.009 0.046** 0.052** 0.006 
Consumer Goods (7) -0.022 -9.666 9.531 1.158 -0.233*** 0.872*** 79.188*** 23.177*** 35.021*** 5.372 0.018 -0.042* 0.037 0.015 -0.020 
Financial (7) -0.003 -10.191 9.546 1.192 -0.112* 1.151*** 111.422*** 12.290 27.242*** 4.207 0.021 -0.002 0.013 0.002 0.009 
General and Services (6) -0.025 -9.872 9.519 1.000 -0.373*** 0.913*** 112.559*** 29.539*** 81.275*** 6.727* 0.020 -0.030 0.048** 0.030 0.012 
A3：All-share Index (1) 
32 Index -0.028 -10.056 9.532 1.188 -0.347*** 1.132*** 142.678*** 30.986*** 37.603*** 4.478 0.019 -0.020 0.052** 0.040* 0.010 
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Appendix 3.4 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: 32 Control Stocks            
 
Mean Mini Max S.D. Skew Kurt     JB LB(12) ARCH JOINT 
Serial correlations at lag 
 1    2   3   4   5 
A1：Individual Stocks (32)            
SH02 -0.013 -10.645 9.646 1.168 -0.079 1.391*** 158.747*** 11.007 81.596*** 0.533 0.022 -0.028 0.028 0.031 0.034 
SH03 -0.033 -10.665 17.508 0.955 -0.011 4.473*** 1619.678*** 14.859* 66.629*** 0.911 0.029 -0.019 0.020 0.027 -0.006 
SH04 -0.017 -10.588 9.659 1.302 -0.090 1.911*** 298.207*** 11.406 20.073*** 4.104 0.062*** -0.019 0.007 0.027 -0.007 
SH06 0.015 -10.604 9.591 1.255 0.195*** 1.758*** 262.573*** 20.270** 84.198*** 1.352 0.055** -0.014 0.047** 0.0439* -0.012 
SH07 -0.020 -10.562 39.727 0.970 1.504*** 22.805*** 42817.302*** 6.662 2.957* 5.341 0.033 0.010 0.008 0.015 -0.013 
SH09 -0.024 -10.638 9.614 1.214 -0.176*** 1.578*** 211.754*** 20.949** 51.424*** 1.166 0.031 0.016 0.002 0.007 -0.054** 
SH10 -0.021 -10.600 9.593 1.205 -0.196*** 1.149*** 119.406*** 14.883* 34.526*** 1.527 0.025 -0.031 0.018 0.015 -0.013 
SH14 -0.014 -10.573 9.580 1.216 -0.013 1.543*** 192.712*** 8.152 38.113*** 1.857 0.007 -0.039* -0.009 0.001 0.001 
SH16 0.005 -10.567 9.636 1.277 0.121** 2.186*** 391.447*** 15.148* 105.070*** 35.585*** 0.047** -0.026 0.036 0.039 0.008 
SH18 -0.040 -10.602 9.625 0.986 -0.248*** 1.346*** 166.782*** 19.447** 56.357*** 2.591 0.024 -0.052** 0.004 0.055** -0.026 
SH19 -0.074 -10.587 9.598 1.409 -0.224*** 3.906*** 1251.343*** 26.678*** 46.205*** 5.052 0.023 -0.089*** 0.006 -0.001 -0.024 
SH23 -0.028 -10.567 9.580 1.240 -0.246*** 1.285*** 153.333*** 12.209 40.815*** 1.549 0.021 -0.028 0.034 -0.007 -0.017 
SH24 -0.002 -10.570 9.585 0.982 0.216*** 4.379*** 1567.278*** 14.481 60.705*** 2.126 0.032 -0.040* 0.024 0.042* -0.024 
SZ02 -0.003 -10.621 9.629 1.255 0.009 2.045*** 338.661*** 14.435 76.414*** 5.677 0.023 -0.013 -0.011 -0.005 -0.020 
SZ03 -0.003 -10.661 9.675 1.265 0.044 2.027*** 333.318*** 21.694*** 65.145*** 7.513* 0.042* -0.006 0.002 -0.001 -0.020 
SZ06 -0.001 -10.584 9.577 1.158 0.035 0.975*** 77.308*** 33.558*** 68.175*** 3.360 0.034 -0.039* 0.049** 0.040* 0.001 
SZ08 -0.015 -10.658 9.633 1.288 -0.056 1.815*** 267.835*** 11.220 25.136*** 5.676 0.021 -0.032 0.026 0.006 -0.047** 
SZ11 -0.022 -10.578 10.026 1.246 -0.199*** 2.001*** 336.977*** 16.106* 69.818*** 7.697* 0.050** -0.024 -0.009 0.001 -0.020 
SZ13 -0.009 -10.563 18.083 0.976 0.193*** 3.193*** 837.538*** 19.369** 66.413*** 2.708 0.057** -0.026 0.015 0.011 -0.019 
SZ15 -0.025 -10.578 14.280 1.321 0.035 3.280*** 871.383*** 27.213*** 27.213*** 72.846*** 0.047* 0.031 0.033 0.041* -0.063*** 
SZ17 0.008 -10.585 9.663 1.331 0.412*** 3.695*** 1160.345*** 20.977** 59.939*** 0.822 0.036 -0.038* 0.019 0.040 0.013 
SZ18 -0.009 -10.592 9.568 0.973 -0.030 1.341*** 145.949*** 25.661*** 50.135*** 0.995 0.017 -0.057** 0.041* -0.042* -0.032 
SZ21 -0.018 -10.581 9.659 1.178 -0.037 0.981*** 78.394*** 22.825*** 53.789*** 9.874** 0.029 -0.026 -0.028 0.031 -0.049** 
SZ25 -0.009 -10.580 9.685 1.389 0.240*** 3.813*** 1195.178*** 32.673*** 110.615*** 12.957*** 0.084*** -0.083*** 0.046** -0.006 0.013 
SZ27 -0.035 -10.607 9.605 0.987 -0.351*** 1.559*** 236.775*** 4.422 47.150*** 8.359** 0.018 -0.001 -0.003 -0.008 -0.024 
SZ28 -0.020 -10.576 9.605 1.282 -0.071 1.626*** 215.814*** 17.971** 37.634*** 7.863** 0.046** -0.025 0.021 -0.014 -0.021 
SZ29 0.003 -10.611 10.159 1.224 0.212*** 2.879*** 685.499*** 6.357 57.812*** 2.238 0.010 0.006 0.014 0.020 -0.002 
SZ33 -0.010 -10.605 9.601 1.131 -0.148*** 0.845*** 65.044*** 11.584* 76.699*** 1.755 0.018 0.008 -0.008 0.034 0.033 
SZ35 0.018 -10.574 9.589 1.187 0.130** 1.335*** 149.756*** 14.830* 64.072*** 2.344 0.038* -0.007 0.005 0.044* -0.039* 
SZ36 0.004 -10.579 9.555 1.210 0.023 1.140*** 105.392*** 14.904* 42.571*** 0.478 0.046** -0.028 0.017 0.033 0.003 
SZ37 0.009 -10.553 9.581 0.990 0.104* 1.334*** 147.658*** 21.105* 48.166*** 0.421 0.034 -0.059*** 0.004 -0.028 -0.036 
SZ38 -0.018 -10.661 9.733 1.294 -0.062* 2.180*** 386.146*** 23.138*** 120.133*** 5.057 0.044* -0.027 0.023 0.020 -0.017 
  
75 
 
A2：Industrial Portfolios (4)                         
Basic Materials (12) -0.067 -10.544 9.519 1.188 -0.633*** 1.130*** 233.424*** 21.596** 71.876*** 7.855* 0.011 -0.002 0.043* 0.051** 0.014 
Consumer Goods (7) -0.103 -10.062 9.553 1.250 -0.872*** 1.802*** 509.240*** 15.058* 68.871*** 6.392* 0.021 -0.026 0.021 0.023 0.009 
Financial (7) -0.064 -10.556 9.545 1.190 -0.629*** 1.076*** 222.072*** 13.537 41.175*** 5.954 0.019 -0.010 0.026 0.021 -0.024 
General and Services (6) -0.054 -9.039 8.206 0.993 -0.661*** 1.707*** 377.679*** 28.381*** 94.920*** 11.762*** 0.023 -0.029 0.045** 0.034 -0.015 
A3：All-share Index (1) 
32 Index -0.104 -9.872 9.543 1.245 -0.859*** 1.688*** 469.757*** 21.364** 75.666*** 11.162** 0.012 -0.009 0.045* 0.036 0.008 
Notes: Summary statistics of daily stock returns of designated stocks eligible for short selling and margin trading (Panel A) and its control counterparts (Panel B) are provided. Mean, Min, Max, S.D., Skew, 
Kurt and JB are the sample mean, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness, excess kurtosis and Jarque-Bera normality test, respectively. LB(12) is the Ljung-Box χ2 statistics for 12 lags calculated 
for stock returns. ARCH is the Lagrange Multiplier test for ARCH effects and distributed as χ2 with one degree of freedom. The JOINT test is a test initiated by Engle and Ng (1993) for potential asymmetries 
in conditional volatility. Serial correlation at lag t (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) represents autocorrelation relationships of individual return series. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
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Appendix 3.5.A Results of specification tests for three GARCH-type models 
 
No. 
GARCH(1,1) EGARCH(1,1) GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
log L AIC BIC log L AIC BIC log L AIC BIC 
SH02 -4245.6241 2.0213 2.0442 -4527.3624 2.0234 2.0492 -4243.6591 2.0223 2.0481 
SH03 -4464.4499 2.0494 2.0724 -4579.0761 2.0515 2.0773 -4459.8654 2.0504 2.0763 
SH04 -4239.4550 1.8224 1.8454 -4371.6865 1.8245 1.8503 -4238.7771 1.8234 1.8493 
SH06 -3978.2937 1.7522 1.7752 -4237.0998 1.7543 1.7802 -3976.7359 1.7533 1.7791 
SH07 -4091.5451 1.8080 1.8310 -4285.3175 1.8101 1.8360 -4088.2600 1.8091 1.8349 
SH09 -4767.2792 2.2959 2.3189 -4884.2077 2.2980 2.3238 -4769.0125 2.2969 2.3228 
SH10 -4235.4278 1.8352 1.8582 -4388.2086 1.8373 1.8632 -4235.3453 1.8363 1.8621 
SH14 -4715.5011 2.2099 2.2329 -4807.1178 2.2120 2.2379 -4714.7807 2.2110 2.2368 
SH16 -4921.3874 2.5802 2.6031 -5081.4536 2.5823 2.6081 -4921.2685 2.5812 2.6070 
SH18 -4848.8541 2.5130 2.5360 -5014.7126 2.5151 2.5410 -4848.7501 2.5141 2.5399 
SH19 -4197.6130 1.6399 1.6629 -4237.5310 1.6420 1.6679 -4197.4985 1.6410 1.6668 
SH23 -5044.3257 2.5594 2.5824 -5174.6879 2.5615 2.5873 -5045.6363 2.5604 2.5863 
SH24 -4081.0835 1.7621 1.7851 -4271.6376 1.7642 1.7901 -4081.9969 1.7632 1.7890 
SZ02 -4574.8985 2.1142 2.1371 -4696.7629 2.1163 2.1421 -4575.4226 2.1152 2.1410 
SZ03 -4961.1457 2.4155 2.4385 -5038.6261 2.4176 2.4435 -4961.0549 2.4166 2.4424 
SZ06 -4958.1233 2.4915 2.5144 -5098.6430 2.4936 2.5194 -4958.6944 2.4925 2.5183 
SZ08 -4822.7498 2.3174 2.3403 -4915.1792 2.3195 2.3453 -4823.3325 2.3184 2.3442 
SZ11 -4517.1989 2.1705 2.1935 -4690.6932 2.1726 2.1984 -4517.1247 2.1715 2.1974 
SZ13 -4234.1447 1.7382 1.7612 -4300.1712 1.7403 1.7661 -4231.4526 1.7392 1.7651 
SZ15 -4566.7602 2.0564 2.0794 -4636.9024 2.0585 2.0843 -4566.9739 2.0574 2.0833 
SZ17 -4901.0218 2.4177 2.4407 -5015.6130 2.4198 2.4456 -4901.4667 2.4187 2.4446 
SZ18 -4536.5913 1.9812 2.0042 -4611.6731 1.9833 2.0092 -4536.5622 1.9823 2.0081 
SZ21 -4307.1922 1.9232 1.9461 -4414.9554 1.9253 1.9511 -4306.9097 1.9242 1.9500 
SZ25 -4946.7739 2.4166 2.4395 -5048.9009 2.4186 2.4445 -4946.2303 2.4176 2.4434 
SZ27 -4846.6434 2.3835 2.4064 -4962.1189 2.3855 2.4114 -4847.1890 2.3845 2.4103 
SZ28 -4466.2302 1.9959 2.0189 -4566.2108 1.9980 2.0238 -4466.4487 1.9969 2.0228 
SZ29 -4915.5824 2.5161 2.5391 -5090.1571 2.5182 2.5440 -4916.6676 2.5171 2.5430 
SZ33 -4927.0301 2.3910 2.4140 -5007.5781 2.3931 2.4189 -4927.2760 2.3920 2.4179 
SZ35 -5130.4613 2.6448 2.6678 -5260.9422 2.6469 2.6728 -5130.0000 2.6459 2.6717 
SZ36 -4833.9800 2.3603 2.3833 -4974.9689 2.3624 2.3882 -4833.8063 2.3613 2.3872 
SZ37 -4536.6786 1.9919 2.0149 -4574.0459 1.9940 2.0198 -4534.0765 1.9929 2.0188 
SZ38 -4709.4044 2.1786 2.2015 -4788.6672 2.1806 2.2065 -4709.3884 2.1796 2.2054 
Notes: Log L, AIC and BIC are the log-likelihood function, Akaike information criterion and Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
respectively. Figures in bold represent the best performing model of the stock based on certain information criteria. Figures 
in shading indicate that no convergence can be obtained of the stock during regression of specific GARCH-type model. 
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Appendix 3.5.B Best performance GARCH specifications based on log L, AIC and BIC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
No. log L         AIC        BIC 
SH02 GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SH03 GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SH04 GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SH06 GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SH07 GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SH09 GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SH10 GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SH14 GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SH16 GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SH18 GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SH19 GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SH23 GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SH24 GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SZ02 GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SZ03 GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SZ06 GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SZ08 GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SZ11 GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SZ13 GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SZ15 GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SZ17 GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SZ18 GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SZ21 GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SZ25 GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SZ27 GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SZ28 GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SZ29 GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SZ33 GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SZ35 GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SZ36 GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SZ37 GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
SZ38 GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
Total GJR-GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) 
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Appendix 3.6.A The two-period approach: GARCH estimation results  
 
            
  𝜑0 𝜑1 α0 α1 β t-Test 
  Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- Post- 𝜑1 (Post-) 
Panel A: Industrial Portfolios                0.453 
Basic Materials (12) 
          
Treatment  
0.1615** 
(2.224) 
-0.0083 
(-0.074) 
-0.0108* 
(-1.672) 
0.0054 
(0.140) 
0.1248 
(1.314) 
0.0462 
(1.541) 
0.0748*** 
(3.756) 
0.0326*** 
(2.779) 
0.9126*** 
(34.473) 
0.9497*** 
(50.888)  
Control 
0.1445** 
(2.361) 
-0.0106 
(-0.096) 
-0.0058 
(-1.387) 
0.0172 
(0.549) 
0.1889 
(1.168) 
0.0360 
(0.794) 
0.1178*** 
(2.968) 
0.0236* 
(1.720) 
0.8741*** 
(18.628) 
0.9652*** 
(37.979)  
Consumer Goods (7) 
          
Treatment  
0.1267** 
(2.128) 
0.0119 
(0.087) 
-0.0110 
(-1.506) 
-0.0134 
(-0.218) 
0.0917 
(1.556) 
0.0549 
(1.322) 
0.0712*** 
(3.466) 
0.0276** 
(2.564) 
0.9158*** 
(35.164) 
0.9465*** 
(36.188)  
Control 
0.1137* 
(1.955) 
0.0691 
(0.606) 
-0.0047 
(-1.206) 
-0.0024 
(-0.067) 
0.3159* 
(1.737) 
0.1506* 
(1.664) 
0.1399*** 
(3.365) 
0.0421** 
(2.559) 
0.8457*** 
(16.710) 
0.9040*** 
(21.426)  
Financial (7) 
          
Treatment  
0.0499 
(0.735) 
-0.0504 
(-0.328) 
-0.0043 
(-0.633) 
0.0050 
(0.105) 
0.0592 
(0.975) 
0.0632 
(1.224) 
0.0480*** 
(3.195) 
0.0206** 
(2.132) 
0.9452*** 
(48.678) 
0.9594*** 
(44.305)  
Control 
-0.0096 
(-0.121) 
0.5574 
(0.900) 
0.0032  
(0.539) 
-0.1775 
(-0.195) 
0.1039 
(0.743) 
0.0800 
(0.714) 
0.0605* 
(1.830) 
0.0162     
(0.756) 
0.9315*** 
(21.551) 
0.9591*** 
(17.512)  
General and Services (6) 
          
Treatment 
0.2096*** 
(2.997) 
0.0500 
(0.379) 
-0.0153** 
(-1.960) 
-0.0103 
(-0.178) 
0.2369** 
(2.492) 
3.0321*** 
(3.075) 
0.1268*** 
(5.027) 
-0.0386* 
(-1.719) 
0.8397*** 
(25.278) 
-0.2122 
(-0.553)   
Control 
-0.0283 
(-0.449) 
0.0445 
(0.297) 
0.0023  
(0.327) 
-0.0067 
(-0.080) 
0.1186* 
(1.845) 
0.0344 
(1.064) 
0.1205*** 
(4.029) 
0.0223* 
(1.806) 
0.8711*** 
(26.769) 
0.9576*** 
(33.045)  
Panel B:  All-share Index       
Treatment  
0.1183* 
(1.874) 
-0.1064 
( -0.706) 
-0.0111* 
(-1.667) 
0.0369 
(0.538) 
0.0998* 
(1.916) 
0.0313 
(1.345) 
0.0865*** 
(4.279) 
0.0189** 
(2.058) 
0.9014*** 
(37.982) 
0.9670*** 
(58.497)  
Control 
0.0959* 
(1.683) 
0.1282 
(0.754) 
-0.0041 
(-1.025) 
-0.0343 
(-0.513) 
0.1875 
(1.237) 
0.0397 
(0.911) 
0.1268** 
(2.461) 
0.0204 
(1.478) 
0.8683*** 
(15.350) 
0.9636*** 
(33.451)  
Notes: This table presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the baseline model for treatment and control groups of both industrial portfolios and the all-share index in the pre- and post- periods. The sub-
sample range is 31/03/2004 - 30/03/2010 and 31/03/2010 - 31/03/2016 respectively. The number of observations for the pre-period is 1459 and is 1458 for the post-period. (Since no convergence is obtained in 
the GARCH regression for the financial portfolio in control group, the estimated results are not reported with consideration of inaccuracy.)  
In particular, the estimated mean equation is given by equation (3.5a) as: 𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + (𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝜎𝑡
2)𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡. The variance equation is given by equation (6a) as: 𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 . 
Errors are assumed to follow the student’s t distribution that allows for fat fails. The estimated t-statistics are shown in parentheses.  
The values of related test statistics are also reported. The t-value of t-test that examines the equality of the estimated coefficients of conditional feedback trading in the post-period between treatment and control 
groups for four industrial portfolios is shown in the rightmost column. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
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Appendix 3.6.B The two-period approach: summarised GARCH estimation results 
 
  
𝜑0 
𝜑1 α0 α1 β t-Test 
 𝜑1 (positive) 𝜑1  (negative) 
  Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- Post- 𝜑1 (negative, Post-) 
Panel A: Individual Stocks (32)                     -1.248 
A1: Mean Value of Key Coefficients            
Treatment  0.0726 0.0144 0.0008 0.0084 -0.0194 -0.0038 0.2845 0.3109 0.0854 0.0359 0.8975 0.9014  
  <0.007>***  <0.003>***  <0.000>***  <0.064>*  <0.000>***  <0.002>***  
Control -0.0057 -0.0217 0.0027 0.0172 -0.0053 -0.0046 0.4489 0.3357 0.0898 0.0565 0.8896 0.8917  
  <0.809>  <0.004>***  <0.019>**  <0.383>  <0.000>***  <0.327>  
A2: Percentage of Significant Coefficients           
Treatment  18.75% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 9.38% 0.00% 18.75% 31.25% 84.38% 84.38% 100.00% 96.88%  
Control 9.38% 6.25% 3.13% 3.13% 0.00% 0.00% 18.75% 21.88% 90.63% 68.75% 100.00% 100.00%  
Panel B: Industrial Portfolios (4)                   -1.968 
B1: Mean Value of Key Coefficients            
Treatment  0.1369 0.0008 0.0000 0.0052 -0.0104 -0.0118 0.1281 0.7991 0.0802 0.0106 0.9033 0.6609  
Control 0.0551 0.0343 0.0027 0.0172 -0.0053 -0.0046 0.1817 0.0737 0.1097 0.0294 0.8806 0.9423  
B2: Percentage of Significant Coefficients           
Treatment  75.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 25.00% 25.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 75.00%  
Control 50.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 50.00% 25.00% 100.00% 75.00% 100.00% 75.00%  
Notes: This table summarises the GARCH estimation results of the baseline model for treatment and control groups of both individual stocks and industrial portfolios in the pre-event and 
post-event periods. The sample details and same basic estimation techniques are given in Appendix 3.6.A. The calculated mean values of coefficient estimates of 32 individual designated 
stocks are presented in A1 of Panel A, while the calculated estimation results of 4 industrial portfolios and its counterpart control stocks are presented in B1 of Panel B. A2 and B2 present 
the percentage of individual time series for which each key coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level.  
In particular, the estimated mean equation is given by equation (3.5a) as:  𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + (𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝜎𝑡
2)𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡. The variance equation is given by equation (6a) as: 𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 +
𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 . 
The P-values of the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis statistics <show in angle brackets> examines whether the coefficients of individual stocks in the pre-period are significantly different 
from the post-period. The t-statistics that test on the equality of the estimated coefficients of conditional positive feedback trading in the post-period between treatment and control groups 
for four industrial portfolios and 32 individual stocks are shown in the rightmost column. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
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Appendix 3.7.A The Heaviside indicator approach: GARCH estimation results for industrial portfolios 
 
  𝜑0 𝜑1 α0 α1 β t-Test 
  𝜑0,1 𝜑0,2 𝜑1,1 𝜑1,2 α0,1 α0,2 α1,1 α1,2 β1 β2 𝜑1,2 
Basic Materials (11)     1.221 
Treatment  
     0.2126*** 
       (2.638) 
-0.0095 
 (-0.099) 
-0.014** 
 (-2.062) 
0.0084 
(0.242) 
0.2627 
(1.280) 
0.0355  
(1.555) 
0.0824*** 
(3.173) 
0.0277** 
(2.186) 
0.8914*** 
(20.895) 
0.9572*** 
(52.225)  
  <3.185>*  <0.404>  <1.157>  <3.544>*  <1.811>  
Control 
     0.1899*** 
       (3.138) 
0.0021 
(0.022) 
-0.008* 
 (-1.958) 
0.0152 
(0.590) 
0.2947 
(1.436) 
0.0222  
(0.379) 
0.1107*** 
(3.171) 
0.0201 
 (0.843) 
0.8661*** 
(17.720) 
0.9725*** 
(23.844)  
  <2.822>*  <0.792>  <1.285>  <3.546>*  <2.023>  
Consumer Goods (6)           
Treatment  
0.1485** 
(2.477) 
0.0084 
(0.056) 
-0.0125* 
 (-1.771) 
-0.0103 
 (-0.157) 
0.1104* 
(1.658) 
0.0472  
(1.038) 
0.0690*** 
(3.603) 
0.0270** 
(2.016) 
0.9129*** 
(35.023) 
0.9511*** 
(31.180)  
  <0.730>  <0.001>  <0.508>  <3.280>*  <0.811>  
Control 
0.1441** 
(2.331) 
0.0575 
(0.508) 
-0.006 
 (-1.285) 
-0.000  
(-0.007) 
0.3135* 
(1.697) 
0.1461** 
(1.984) 
0.1184*** 
(3.211) 
0.0449*** 
(2.901) 
0.8463*** 
(16.182) 
0.9090*** 
(26.682)  
  <0.508>  <0.031>  <0.628>  <3.139>*  <0.863>  
Financial (6)            
Treatment  
0.0557 
(0.865) 
-0.0553 
 (-0.347) 
-0.0046 
 (-0.734) 
0.0078 
(0.146) 
0.0886 
(1.108) 
0.0446 
 (1.482) 
0.0486*** 
(2.982) 
0.0160* 
 (1.715) 
0.9448*** 
(46.162) 
0.9671*** 
(54.401)  
  <0.425>  <0.054>  <0.22>  <2.689>  <0.55>  
Control 
-0.001 
(-0.014) 
0.6462 
(0.842) 
0.0026  
(0.437) 
-0.2059  
(-0.837) 
0.1398 
(0.861) 
0.0448 
 (0.184) 
0.0628** 
(2.059) 
0.0083 
 (0.250) 
0.9265*** 
(21.685) 
0.9774*** 
(9.057)  
  <0.686>  <0.714>  <0.093>  <1.547>  <0.189>  
General and Services (5)           
Treatment  
0.2321*** 
(3.295) 
-0.1030* 
(-0.828) 
-0.0170** 
 (-2.236) 
0.0551 
(0.953) 
0.2734** 
(2.349) 
3.3853*** 
(4.832) 
0.1233*** 
(4.664) 
-0.0351  
(-1.136) 
0.8387*** 
(22.323) 
-0.3809  
(-1.310)  
  <5.715>**  <1.526>  <19.663>***  <14.237>***  <17.777>***  
Control 
0.0024 
(0.039) 
0.0392 
(0.294) 
0.0005  
(0.086) 
-0.003  
(-0.054) 
0.1343 
(1.422) 
0.0341  
(0.763) 
0.1119*** 
(3.510) 
0.0230 
 (1.141) 
0.8696*** 
(23.335) 
0.9581*** 
(22.435)  
   <0.063>   <0.004>   <0.669>   <5.935>**   <2.036>   
Notes: This table presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the Heaviside indicator approach for both treatment and control groups of industrial portfolios. The sample range is 31/03/2006 - 
31/03/2014, and the number of observations is 1942. The same basic estimation techniques are given in Appendix 3.6.A. 
In particular, the estimated mean equation is given by equation (3.5b) as:  𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + [𝜑0,1𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑0,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡) + (𝜑1,1𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑1,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡)) 𝜎𝑡
2 ] 𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡. The variance equation is given by equation 
(3.6b) as: 𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼0,1 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼0,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡) + [𝛼1,1 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼1,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡)]𝜀𝑡−1
2  + [𝛽1 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽2(1 − 𝐼𝑡)]𝜎𝑡−1
2         
The following hypotheses on the equality of the estimates of five key coefficients in the pre- and post-period are tested by Wald statistics, which are reported in the angle brackets <>: H0,1 : 𝜑0,1 = 𝜑0,2, 
H0,2 : 𝜑1,1 = 𝜑1,2, H0,3 : 𝛼0,1 = 𝛼0,2, H0,4 : 𝛼1,1 = 𝛼1,2, and H0,5 : 𝛽1 = 𝛽2. The t-statistics that tests on the equality of the estimated coefficients of conditional feedback trading in the post-period 
between treatment and control groups for four portfolios is shown in the rightmost column. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
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Appendix 3.7.B The Heaviside indicator approach: summarised GARCH estimation results 
 
  
𝜑0 
𝜑1 𝛼0 α1 β t-Test 
 𝜑1 (positive) 𝜑1 (negative) 
  𝜑0,1 𝜑0,2 𝜑1,1 𝜑1,2 𝜑1,1 𝜑1,2 α0,1 α0,2 α1,1 α1,2 β1 β2 
𝜑1,2 
(negative) 
Panel A: Individual Stocks (28)                         
A1: Mean Value of Key Coefficients            
Treatment  0.0733 0.0201 0.0009 0.0109 -0.0042 -0.0219 0.3464 0.6521 0.0888 0.0308 0.8911 0.8236 -1.095 
  <0.028>**  <0.002>***  <0.000>***  <0.015>***  <0.000>***  <0.001>***  
Control 0.0039 -0.0183 0.0029 0.0095 -0.0032 -0.0144 0.5569 0.5282 0.0949 0.0613 0.8805 0.8234  
  <0.577>  <0.018>**  <0.041>**  <0.302>  <0.001>***  <0.658>  
A2: Percentage of Significant Coefficients            
Treatment  21.43% 3.57% 0.00% 0.00% 14.29% 7.14% 28.57% 25.00% 92.86% 71.43% 100.00% 100.00%  
Control 7.14% 14.29% 3.57% 3.57% 3.57% 10.71% 17.86% 28.57% 92.86% 64.29% 100.00% 85.71%  
Panel B: Industrial Portfolios (4)                      
B1: Mean Value of Key Coefficients            
Treatment  0.1622 -0.0399 0.0000 0.0238 -0.0121 -0.0103 0.1838 0.8782 0.0808 0.0089 0.8970 0.6237 0.879 
Control 0.0839 0.1863 0.0016 0.0153 -0.0073 -0.0701 0.2206 0.0618 0.1010 0.0241 0.8771 0.9543  
B2: Percentage of Significant Coefficients            
Treatment  75.00% 25.00% 0.00% 0.00% 75.00% 0.00% 50.00% 25.00% 100.00% 75.00% 100.00% 75.00%  
Control 50.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 25.00% 0.00% 25.00% 25.00% 100.00% 50.00% 100.00% 100.00%  
Notes: This table summarises the GARCH estimation results of the Heaviside indicator approach for treatment and control groups of both individual stocks and industrial portfolios. The sample 
details are given in Appendix 3.7A, and the same basic estimation techniques are in Appendix 3.6.A. The calculated mean values of coefficient estimates of 28 individual designated stocks are 
presented in A1 of Panel A, while the calculated estimation results of four industrial portfolios and its control counterparts are presented in B1 of Panel B. A2 and B2 present the percentage of 
individual time series for which each key coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level.  
In particular, the estimated mean equation is given by equation (3.5b) as:  𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + [𝜑0,1𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑0,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡) + (𝜑1,1𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑1,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡)) 𝜎𝑡
2 ] 𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡. The variance equation is given by 
equation (3.6b) as: 𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼0,1 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼0,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡) + [𝛼1,1 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼1,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡)]𝜀𝑡−1
2  + [𝛽1 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽2(1 − 𝐼𝑡)]𝜎𝑡−1
2         
The P-values of the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis statistics <show in angle brackets> examines whether the calculated coefficients of individual stocks in the pre-period are significantly different 
from the post-period. The t-statistics that test on the equality of the estimated coefficients of conditional positive feedback trading in the post-period between treatment and control groups for four 
industrial portfolios and 28 individual stocks are shown in the rightmost column. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
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Appendix 3.8.A The differentiated impact approach: GARCH estimation results 
 
  𝜑0
+ 𝜑1
+ 𝜑0
− 𝜑1
− 
𝛼𝐿 
t-Test 
  𝜑0,1
+  𝜑0,2
+  𝜑1,1
+  𝜑1,2
+  𝜑0,1
−  𝜑0,2
−  𝜑1,1
−  𝜑1,2
−  𝜑1,2
+  𝜑1,2
−  
Panel A: Industrial Portfolios                 0.006 0.063 
Basic Materials (12)           
Treatment  
0.4072*** 
(3.96) 
0.1061 
(0.847) 
-0.0173 
(-1.627) 
-0.0014 
(-0.040) 
-0.1707 
(-1.067) 
-0.0604 
(-0.552) 
0.0036 
(0.238) 
-0.0016 
(-0.050) 
-0.0197 
(-1.609)   
  <0.539>  <7.734>***  <0.000>  <0.956>    
Control 
0.4504*** 
(4.744) 
0.1821 
(1.390) 
-0.0163 
(-1.801) 
0.0125 
(0.415) 
-0.1308*** 
(-2.766) 
-0.1196 
(-1.223) 
0.0034 
(0.497) 
0.0073 
(0.254) 
-0.0137** 
(-2.461)   
  <2.943>*  <37.978>***  <0.0143>  <2.649>    
Consumer Goods (7)           
Treatment  
0.3556***  
(3.947) 
-0.1200 
(-0.816) 
-0.0209 
(-1.476) 
0.0670 
(1.215) 
-0.1180 
(-1.167) 
0.1379 
(0.824) 
-0.0007 
(-0.053) 
-0.0906 
(-1.398) 
-0.0167 
( -1.488)   
  <1.114>  <10.017>***  <3.092>*  <0.935>    
Control 
0.3314*** 
(3.364) 
0.0441 
(0.336) 
-0.0110 
(-1.157) 
0.0187 
(0.574) 
-0.0740 
(-0.749) 
0.0402 
(0.309) 
-0.0008 
(-0.113) 
-0.0068 
(-0.217) 
-0.0267 
(-1.547)   
  <0.000>  <6.901>***  <0.285>  <0.565>    
Financial (7)            
Treatment  
0.2659** 
(2.494) 
0.0935 
(0.593) 
-0.0178 
(-1.448) 
-0.0199 
(-0.425) 
-0.2141** 
(-1.813) 
-0.1716 
(-1.185) 
0.0117 
(0.950) 
0.0224 
(0.536) 
-0.0159 
(-1.671)   
  <1.213>  <7.632>***  <0.382>  <2.317>    
Control 
0.0771 
(0.743) 
0.2724 
(1.353) 
0.0057 
(0.635) 
-0.0814 
(-1.554) 
-0.1435 
(-1.059) 
0.2376 
(1.023) 
0.0066 
(0.626) 
-0.0759 
(-1.200) 
-0.0200 
(-1.259)   
  <0.012>  <1.490>  <0.004>  <0.003>    
General and Services (6)           
Treatment  
0.4093*** 
(3.437) 
0.4151 
(1.508) 
-0.0312* 
(-1.760) 
-0.0990 
(-1.028) 
-0.0158 
(-0.119) 
-0.1361 
(-1.019) 
-0.0019 
(-0.137) 
0.0177 
(0.488) 
-0.0420 
(-1.368)   
  <2.551>  <5.775>*  <1.098>  <1.726>    
Control 
0.2079*** 
(2.601) 
0.1285 
(0.872) 
-0.0076 
(-0.643) 
-0.0041 
(-0.065) 
-0.2483** 
(-2.340) 
-0.0734 
(-0.655) 
0.0154 
(1.020) 
0.0139 
(0.295) 
-0.0226 
(-1.476)   
   <0.955>  <11.187>***  <0.046>  <1.324>      
Panel B:  All-share Index         -0.684 0.210 
Treatment  
0.4376*** 
(4.484) 
0.0484 
(0.263) 
-0.0270** 
(-1.981) 
0.0149 
(0.199) 
-0.2794** 
(-2.377) 
-0.1378 
(-0.932) 
0.0136 
(0.919) 
0.0108 
(0.177) 
-0.0190* 
(-1.760)   
  <0.528>  <21.028>***  <0.001>  <3.551>*    
Control 
0.4232*** 
(4.558) 
0.2458*  
(1.808) 
-0.0162* 
(-1.772) 
-0.0194 
(-0.494) 
-0.1824* 
(-1.723) 
-0.0864 
(-0.538) 
0.0054 
(0.604) 
0.0015 
(0.031) 
-0.0177 
(-1.313)   
  <2.018>  <14.837>***  <0.097>  <2.343>    
Notes: This table presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the differentiated impact model conditional on positive and negative historical returns for treatment and control groups of both industrial portfolios and the all-share index. The 
sample details are given in Appendix 3.7.A., and the same basic estimation techniques are in Appendix 3.6.A.  
In particular, the estimated mean equation is given by equation (3.5c) as: 𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + {𝜑0,1
+ 𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑0,2
+ (1 − 𝐼𝑡) + [𝜑1,1
+ 𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑1,2
+ (1 − 𝐼𝑡)]𝜎𝑡
2}𝑅𝑖𝑡−1
+ + {𝜑0,1
− 𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑0,2
− (1 − 𝐼𝑡) + [𝜑1,1
− 𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑1,2
− (1 − 𝐼𝑡)]𝜎𝑡
2}𝑅𝑡−1
− +𝜀𝑡 . The variance equation is given 
by equation (3.6c) as:  𝜎𝑡
2 = (1 + 𝛼𝐿𝐷𝑡)(𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 )                                      
Wald statistics are reported in the angle brackets <>, which examine the following hypotheses:  H0,1 :  𝜑
+
0,1 = 𝜑
+
0,2, H0,2 : 𝜑
+
1,1 = 𝜑
+
1,2, H0,3 : 𝜑
−
1,1 = 𝜑
−
1,2, and H0,4 : 𝜑
−
1,1 = 𝜑
−
1,2. The t-statistics that test on the equality of the estimated 
coefficients of conditional feedback trading conditional on positive and negative historical returns in the post-period between treatment and control groups are shown separately in the rightmost column. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
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Appendix 3.8.B The differentiated impact approach: summarised GARCH estimation results 
 
  𝜑0
+ 𝜑1
+ 𝜑0
− 𝜑1
− 
𝛼𝐿 
t-Test 
 𝜑1
+ (positive) 𝜑1
+ (negative) 𝜑1
− (positive) 𝜑1
− (negative) 
 𝜑0,1
+  𝜑0,2
+  𝜑1,1
+  𝜑1,2
+  𝜑1,1
+  𝜑1,2
+  𝜑0,1
−  𝜑0,2
−  𝜑1,1
−  𝜑1,2
−  𝜑1,1
−  𝜑1,2
−  
𝜑1,2
+  
(negative) 
𝜑1,2
−  
(negative) 
Panel A: Individual Stocks (32)                     
A1: Mean Value of Key Coefficients          
  
Treatment  0.1449 0.0351 0.0052 0.0096 -0.0054 -0.0168 -0.0370 -0.0099 0.0047 0.0188 -0.0068 -0.0219 -0.0257 3.466*** 0.013 
  <0.000>***  <0.165>  <0.004>***   <0.485>  <0.001>***  <0.001>***  
  
Control 0.0549 -0.0034 0.0062 0.0122 -0.0066 -0.0197 -0.0932 -0.0222 0.0057 0.0176 -0.0048 -0.0220 -0.0353   
  <0.072>*  <0.001>***  <0.071>*   <0.028>**  <0.002>***  <0.035>**  
  
A2: Percentage of Significant Coefficients              
  
Treatment  43.75% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 9.38% 6.25% 21.88% 18.75% 3.13% 3.13% 3.13% 9.38% 56.25% 
  
Control 34.38% 12.50% 12.50% 9.38% 6.25% 6.25% 31.25% 12.50% 12.50% 3.13% 6.25% 6.25% 40.63%   
Panel B: Industrial Portfolios (4)                         
B1: Mean Value of Key Coefficients            
  
Treatment  0.3595 0.1237 0.0000 0.0671 -0.0218 -0.0401 -0.1298 -0.0575 0.0077 0.0200 -0.0013 -0.0461 -0.0235 0.054 -0.475 
Control 0.2668 0.1568 0.0057 0.0157 -0.0116 -0.0427 -0.1494 0.0212 0.0085 0.0106 -0.0009 -0.0414 -0.0207   
B2: Percentage of Significant Coefficients              
  
Treatment  100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 25.00% 0.00% 25.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 25.00%   
Control 75.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 25.00% 0.00% 50.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 25.00%   
Notes: This table summarises the GARCH estimation results of the differentiated impact model conditional on positive and negative historical returns for treatment and control groups of both individual stocks and industrial 
portfolios. The sample details are given in Appendix 3.7.A., and the same basic estimation techniques are in Appendix 3.6.A. The calculated mean values of coefficient estimates of 32 individual designated stocks are presented 
in A1 of Panel A, while the calculated estimation results of four industrial portfolios and its control counterparts are presented in B1 of Panel B. A2 and B2 present the percentage of individual time series for which each key 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level.  
In particular, the estimated mean equation is given by equation (3.5c) as: 𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + {𝜑0,1
+ 𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑0,2
+ (1 − 𝐼𝑡) + [𝜑1,1
+ 𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑1,2
+ (1 − 𝐼𝑡)]𝜎𝑡
2}𝑅𝑖𝑡−1
+ + {𝜑0,1
− 𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑0,2
− (1 − 𝐼𝑡) + [𝜑1,1
− 𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑1,2
− (1 − 𝐼𝑡)]𝜎𝑡
2}𝑅𝑡−1
− +𝜀𝑡. The 
variance equation is given by equation (3.6c) as:  𝜎𝑡
2 = (1 + 𝛼𝐿𝐷𝑡)(𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 ).          
The P-values of the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis statistics <show in angle brackets> examines whether the calculated coefficients of individual stocks in the pre-period are significantly different from the post-period. The 
t-statistics that test on the equality of the estimated coefficients of conditional positive feedback trading conditional on positive and negative historical returns in the post-period between treatment and control groups for four 
industrial portfolios and 32 individual stocks are shown separately in the rightmost column. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
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Appendix 3.9.A The Heaviside indicator approach for all-share index with 2- and 3-year estimation window: GARCH estimation results 
 
            
    𝜑0 𝜑1 α0 α1 β 
   𝜑0,1 𝜑0,2 𝜑1,1 𝜑1,2 α0,1 α0,2 α1,1 α1,2 β1 β2 
Panel A: 2-year window                   
Treatment   
0.1716* 
(1.754) 
0.0293 
(0.129) 
-0.0137  
(-1.309) 
-0.0147 
 (-0.163) 
0.0886 
(1.134) 
0.0389 
(1.011) 
0.0748*** 
(3.113) 
0.0200 
(1.433) 
0.9151*** 
(32.145) 
0.9633*** 
(42.089) 
   <0.314>  <0.000>  <0.241>  <3.415>*  <1.349> 
Control  
0.1617* 
(1.720) 
0.1713 
(0.732) 
-0.0085  
(-1.286) 
-0.0354  
(-0.521) 
0.1281 
(1.075) 
0.1843 
(1.329) 
0.1080*** 
(2.645) 
0.0431* 
(1.930) 
0.8828*** 
(20.421) 
0.9011*** 
(17.880) 
   <0.001>  <0.156>  <0.080>  <1.958>  <0.071> 
Panel B: 3-year window                   
Treatment   
0.1724** 
(2.090) 
-0.1151 
 (-0.567) 
-0.0132  
(-1.594) 
0.0399 
(0.405) 
0.1564 
(1.263) 
0.0211 
(1.226) 
0.0774*** 
(3.164) 
0.0129 
(0.821) 
0.9046*** 
(25.921) 
0.9762*** 
(46.074) 
   <1.764>  <0.291>  <1.013>  <4.188>**  <2.250> 
Control  
0.1367** 
(2.264) 
0.0636 
(0.343) 
-0.0052  
(-1.173) 
-0.0131  
(-0.205) 
0.3626 
(1.289) 
0.0619 
(0.586) 
0.1235*** 
(3.243) 
0.0249 
(0.935) 
0.8432*** 
(14.673) 
0.9535*** 
(15.686) 
      <0.131>   <0.014>   <0.730>   <4.089>**   <1.254> 
Notes: This table presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the Heaviside indicator approach for both treatment and control groups of all-share index with 2- and 3-year 
estimation window. For the 2-year window regression, the sample range is 01/04/2008- 30/03/2012 and the number of observations is 975. For the 3-year window regression, 
the sample range is 02/04/2007- 29/03/2013 and the number of observations is 1460. 
In particular, the estimated mean equation is given by equation (3.5b) as: 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + [𝜑0,1𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑0,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡) + (𝜑1,1𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑1,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡)) 𝜎𝑡
2 ] 𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡. The variance 
equation is given by equation (3.6b) as: σt
2 = α0,1 It + α0,2(1 − It) + [(α1,1 It + α1,2(1 − It)]εt−1
2  + [(β1 It + β2(1 − It)]σt−1
2 .  
Wald statistics reported in the angle brackets <> examine the following hypotheses: H0,1 : 𝜑0,1 = 𝜑0,2, H0,2 : 𝜑1,1 = 𝜑1,2, H0,3 : 𝛼0,1 = 𝛼0,2, H0,4 : 𝛼1,1 = 𝛼1,2, and H0,5 : 
𝛽1 = 𝛽2. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
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Appendix 3.9.B The differentiated impact approach for all-share index with 2- and 3-year estimation window: GARCH estimation 
results 
 
      𝜑0+ 𝜑1+ 𝜑0− 𝜑1− 𝛼𝐿 
      𝜑0,1+  𝜑0,2+  𝜑1,1+  𝜑1,2+  𝜑0,1+  𝜑0,2+  𝜑1,1+  𝜑1,2+  
Panel A: 2-year window          
Treatment   
0.3705*** 
(2.946) 
-0.0211  
(-0.082) 
-0.0201  
(-1.081) 
0.025 
(0.313) 
-0.0906  
(-0.577) 
0.0207 
(0.093) 
-0.0034  
(-0.174) 
-0.0321  
(-0.404) 
-0.0099  
(-0.761) 
    <0.012>  <4.985>**  <0.232>  <0.320>  
Control   
0.3622*** 
(2.612) 
0.0093 
(0.047) 
-0.0074  
(-0.523) 
0.0231 
(0.531) 
-0.1039  
(-0.590) 
0.2098 
(0.947) 
-0.0041 
 (-0.337) 
-0.0518 
 (-0.980) 
-0.0071 
 (-0.385) 
    <0.364>   <3.249>*  <0.992>  <0.022>  
Panel B: 3-year window                 
Treatment   
0.4456*** 
(3.273) 
-0.0731  
( -0.360) 
-0.0233 
 (-1.347) 
0.0595 
(0.768) 
-0.2318  
(-1.579) 
-0.1324 
 (-0.705) 
0.0087 
(0.488) 
-0.0005  
(-0.007) 
-0.0136 
 (-1.221) 
    <0.036>  <9.746>***  <0.262>  <1.399>  
Control   
0.3996*** 
(3.466) 
0.0134 
(0.071) 
-0.0104 
 (-1.002) 
0.035 
(0.676) 
-0.1427 
 (-1.083) 
0.0329 
(0.183) 
0.0009 
(0.097) 
-0.0282  
(-0.550) 
-0.0209 
 (-0.904) 
       <0.004>   <7.236>***   <0.686>   <0.496>   
Notes: This table presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the differentiated impact model conditional on positive and negative historical returns for both treatment and 
control groups of the all-share index with 2- and 3-year estimation window. The sample details are given in Appendix 3.9.A., and the same basic estimation techniques are in 
Appendix 3.6.A. 
In particular, the estimated mean equation is given by equation (3.5c) as:   𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + {𝜑0,1
+ 𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑0,2
+ (1 − 𝐼𝑡) + [𝜑1,1
+ 𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑1,2
+ (1 − 𝐼𝑡)]𝜎𝑡
2}𝑅𝑡−1
+ +
{𝜑0,1
− 𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑0,2
− (1 − 𝐼𝑡) + [𝜑1,1
− 𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑1,2
− (1 − 𝐼𝑡)]𝜎𝑡
2}𝑅𝑡−1
− +𝜀𝑡 . The variance equation is given by equation (3.6c) as:   𝜎𝑡
2 = (1 + 𝛼𝐿𝐷𝑡)(𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 ).              
Wald statistics reported in the angle brackets <>  examine the following hypotheses:  H0,1 :  𝜑
+
0,1
= 𝜑+
0,2
, H0,2 : 𝜑
+
1,1
= 𝜑+
1,2
, H0,3 : 𝜑
−
1,1
= 𝜑−
1,2
, and H0,4 : 𝜑
−
1,1
= 𝜑−
1,2
. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
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Appendix 3.10 The Heaviside indicator approach for industrial portfolios: GJR-GARCH estimation results 
 
               
    𝜑0 𝜑1 α0 α1 γ β t-Test 
    𝜑0,1 𝜑0,2 𝜑0,1 𝜑0,2 α0,1 α0,2 α1,1 α1,2 γ1 γ2 β1 β2 𝜑1,2 
Basic Materials (12)                     1.307 
Treatment   
0.2537*** 
(2.771) 
-0.0189 
(-0.200) 
-0.0163** (-
2.460) 
0.0124 
(0.369) 
0.4418 
(1.336) 
0.0306 
(1.481) 
0.0633*** 
(2.680) 
0.0181 
(1.66) 
0.0493 
(0.928) 
0.0194 
(1.628) 
0.8621*** 
(15.476) 
0.9589*** 
(54.250)  
   <4.313>  <0.704>  <1.520>  <2.831>*  <0.298>  <2.566>  
Control  
0.1889*** 
(3.014) 
0.1259 
(0.709) 
-0.0073* 
 (-1.818) 
-0.0051 
(-0.164) 
0.3510 
(1.255) 
0.2367 
(0.232) 
0.0991*** 
(3.182) 
0.0095 (0.204) 
0.0332 
(0.697) 
0.0501 
(0.343) 
0.8521*** 
(14.721) 
0.9084 
(3.309) 
 
   <0.097>  <0.004>  <0.010>  <2.983>*  <0.012>  < 0.037>  
Consumer Goods (7)              
Treatment   
0.1538** 
(2.536) 
0.058 
(0.937) 
-0.0128*  
(-1.804) 
-0.0235 
(-1.324) 
0.1169 
(1.577) 
0.2210 
(0.450) 
0.0627*** 
(3.288) 
-0.0269 
(-0.373) 
0.0112 
(0.396) 
0.1415 
(0.831) 
0.9115*** 
(37.402) 
0.8515*** 
(3.486)  
   <1.119>  <0.276>  <0.050>  <1.435>  <0.626>  <0.064>  
Control  
0.1494** 
(2.418) 
0.0478 
(0.560) 
-0.0065 
(-1.373) 
0.0047 
(0.205) 
0.3269* 
(1.874) 
0.3854 
(0.988) 
0.1021** 
(2.528) 
-0.0529 
(-1.037) 
0.0229 
(0.510) 
0.1482 
(1.349) 
0.8450*** 
(17.828) 
0.8326*** 
(5.750)  
 
  <0.954>  <0.229>  <0.021>  <5.651>**  <1.176>  <0.007>  
Financial (7)             
Treatment   
0.0622 
(0.959) 
-0.0517  
(-0.273) 
-0.0049  
(-0.895) 
0.0067 
(0.102) 
0.1181 
(0.803) 
0.0452 
 (-0.895) 
0.0435*** 
(3.143) 0.0152 (1.939) 
0.0154 
(0.419) 
0.0012 
(0.082) 
0.9385 
(27.669) 
0.9671 
(41.053)  
   <0.311>  <0.031>  <0.194>  <3.162>*  <0.106>  <0.388>  
Control  
-0.0152  
(-0.180) 
0.6213 
(0.944) 
0.0035 
(0.586) 
-0.1970 
(-0.882) 
0.1114 
(0.591) 
0.0619 
(0.192) 
0.0709** 
(2.497) 0.0086 (0.279) 
0.0155 
(0.562) 
0.0025 
(0.142) 
0.9308*** 
(20.594) 
0.9703*** 
(7.193)  
   <0.929>  <0.809>  <0.012>  <2.043>  <0.252>  <0.064>  
General and Services (6)              
Treatment   
0.2442*** 
(3.912) 
-0.0981  
( -0.778) 
-0.0167*** 
(-2.665) 
0.0532 
(0.893) 
0.3310*** 
(2.728) 
3.4042*** 
(3.069) 
0.0942*** 
(5.552) 
-0.0372  
(-1.002) 
0.0698 
(1.443) 
0.0020 
(0.043) 
0.8219*** 
(21.226) 
-0.3874  
(-0.840)  
   <5.753>**  <1.373>  <7.603>***  <11.190>***  <0.943>  <6.757>  
Control  
-0.0082  
(-0.158) 
0.064 
(0.504) 
0.001 
(0.142) 
-0.0156 
(-0.227) 
0.1004 
(1.319) 
0.0346 
(0.275) 
0.1355*** 
(4.212) 
0.0034  
(0.139) 
-0.044* 
(-1.649) 
0.0253 
(0.682) 
0.8801*** 
(29.269) 
0.9620 
(8.621)  
     <0.276>  <0.056>  <0.129>  <14.606>***  <2.126>  <0.496>  
Notes: This table presents the GJR-GARCH estimates of the Heaviside indicator approach for both treatment and control groups of industrial portfolios. The sample details are given in Appendix 3.7.A, and the same basic 
estimation techniques are in Appendix 3.6.A.  
In particular, the estimated mean equation is given by equation (3.5b) as:     𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + [𝜑0,1𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑0,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡) + (𝜑1,1𝐼𝑡 + 𝜑1,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡)) 𝜎𝑡
2 ] 𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡. The variance equation is given by equation (3.6d) as:  𝜎𝑡
2 =
𝛼0,1 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼0,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡) + [(𝛼1,1 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼1,2(1 − 𝐼𝑡)]𝜀𝑡−1
2 + [(𝛾1 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛾2(1 − 𝐼𝑡)]𝑋𝑡−1𝜀𝑡−1
2  + [(𝛽1 𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽2(1 − 𝐼𝑡)]𝜎𝑡−1
2 .  
The following hypotheses on the equality of the estimates of six key coefficients in the pre- and post-period are tested by Wald statistics, which are reported in the angle brackets <>: H0,1 : 𝜑0,1 = 𝜑0,2, H0,2 : 𝜑1,1 = 𝜑1,2, 
H0,3 : 𝛼0,1 = 𝛼0,2, H0,4 : 𝛼1,1 = 𝛼1,2, H0,5 : 𝛾1 = 𝛾2, and H0,6 : 𝛽1 = 𝛽2. The t-statistics that test on the equality of the estimated coefficients of conditional feedback trading in the post-period between treatment and control 
groups for four portfolios are shown in the rightmost column. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
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Chapter 4: Short-selling and Margin-trading Activities, Feedback Trading and 
Stock Returns Volatility 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
4.1.1 Motivation 
 
When financial crisis and market collapse comes, short selling and margin trading always 
intrigue debatable arguments among regulators, academics, and investors. As credit trades, 
short sellers and margin traders are usually blamed for causing massive declines, panic selling 
and unusual return growth. To deal with downturns in the market at the peak of crisis or to 
stabilise the market when it shows a sign of overheating, financial regulators frequently turn to 
restrictions on these two types of mechanisms, sometimes even impose bans. On the other hand, 
the existing literature mostly suggests that short selling is a necessary tool to correct the 
mispricing when prices drift away from its fundamental values, and both of short selling and 
margin trading contribute to the efficient function of stock markets (Saffi and Sigurdsson 2010, 
Bris et al. 2007, Chang et al. 2007, Beber and Pagano 2013, Chang et al. 2014; Wei and Li 
2016). Most of the research concludes that constraints on short selling lead to decreased 
liquidity and a higher level of volatility, both of which are detrimental to the market quality. 
 
With more rigorous attitude towards short selling and margin trading around the world, Chinese 
authorities at its first time approve trades on margin in the domestic stock markets. On March 
31, 2010, the China Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC) formally launched the long-
awaited pilot scheme of short selling and margin trading in the A-share market. A designated 
list of 90 blue-chip stocks on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE) starts to be eligible for short-selling and margin-trading transactions. The 
uniqueness of this event is that short selling and margin trading are introduced at the same time. 
As an event study, Chapter 3 analyses the impact of the dual introduction on feedback trading 
behaviour and stock returns volatility among object stocks. With separate activity data of these 
  
88 
 
two mechanisms, this chapter aims to distinguish the impacts between short selling and margin 
trading on feedback trading and volatility. Besides, we further explore that whether the 
different groups’ trading behaviour of margin investors, i.e., retail and institutional traders, 
makes different impact on feedback trading and returns volatility.  
 
4.1.2 Gaps and Contributions 
 
Except for the most recent literature which can get access to a higher frequency data under reg-
SHO, previous US-focused studies can only adopt monthly data of short-selling activity. While 
previous literature of short selling and margin trading typically considered US data, our 
research adopts the daily information of short selling and margin trading of Chinese A-shares. 
As the Chinese stock market is a major financial market in the burgeoning Asian region, its 
study would provide an interesting alternative perspective to the previous US-centric studies. 
This study contributes to the academic literature in the following ways: 
 
First, we extend the literature by studying the distinct impacts of short-selling and margin-
trading activity on feedback trading behaviour. Despite the interests of short selling and margin 
trading in recent years, there is little evidence in the literature on what short sellers and margin 
traders do. Diether et al. (2009a) investigate trading strategies adopted by short sellers in the 
US, finding that short-selling activity is strongly positive to previous returns. This indicates 
that short sellers trade on short-term price overreactions. Our paper studies the issue from 
another perspective. With daily data of short-selling activity, we aim to see whether the activity 
level of short selling causes changes to the degree of feedback trading behaviour. As for the 
literature of margin trading, we are the first to study the relationship between margin-trading 
activity and feedback trading behaviour.  
 
Second, our study extends the literature of volume-price relationship with activities of short 
selling and margin trading. The positive relationship between spot-trading volume and stock 
price volatility is well-documented in the equity literature. Chordia and Swaminathan (2000) 
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provide evidence that the relationship between past stock returns and stock trading volume is 
attributed to the rate at which the stock incorporates information. Henry and McKenzie (2006) 
claim that the volume-price relationship, the relationship between stock price volatility and 
trading volume is nonlinear and asymmetric, and one important source of this asymmetry arises 
from activities of traders in the market who engages in short selling. In their paper, the question 
about whether the volume-price relationship responds differently to short-selling activity is 
tested at the very first time. The relationship between stock price volatility and short-sales 
volume in the Hong Kong stock market is investigated. However, three dummy variables are 
adopted to study the presumed relationship. This approach makes the results of their work 
general, leaving a pronounced gap in the literature. With the daily activity of short selling 
(margin trading), we are the first paper that investigates the long-horizon impact of the daily 
activity of short selling (margin trading) on stock returns volatility. 
 
Third, we further study the impact differences between the trading activity of retail margin 
investors3 and that conducted by institutional margin investors on feedback trading behaviour 
and stock returns volatility. A large body of literature documents that retail and institutional 
investors react differently to past price performance, and their trading involves momentum and 
contrarian strategies. Our study extends the literature by focusing retail and institutional 
investors’ trading on certain types of trading mechanisms - short selling and margin trading.  
 
4.1.3 Research Questions 
 
Our study aims to investigate the relationships between short-selling (margin-trading) activity, 
feedback trading behaviour and stock returns volatility with the event of 2010 dual introduction 
of short selling and margin trading in the Chinese stock market. The accessibility of several 
types of activity data of trades on margin enables us to investigate the relationships further. 
The research questions are as follows: 
 
                                                 
3 Margin investors infer to investors who make investment on a margin account. They are either short sellers or 
margin traders in the Chinese A-share market in the current study. 
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Question 1: Whether and to what extent the level of short-selling activity influences the degree 
of feedback trading and the level of stock returns volatility? 
Question 2: Whether and to what extent the level of margin-trading activity influences the 
degree of feedback trading and the level of stock returns volatility? 
Question 3: Whether and to what extent the relative ratio of short-selling to margin-trading 
activities influences the degree of feedback trading and the level of stock returns volatility? 
Question 4: Do short-selling and margin-trading activities conducted by retail investors affect 
feedback trading behaviour and stock returns volatility differently from that conducted by 
institutional investors?  
 
The major findings of this study are summarised as follows. We find no evidence that activity 
of short selling (margin trading) increases positive feedback trading among studied stocks and 
market indices, but we document an increasing impact of short-selling activity on negative 
feedback trading. As for stock returns volatility, short-selling activity seems to have a slightly 
decreasing impact on volatility, while margin-trading activity has a significantly increasing 
impact. After being scaled by margin-trading activity, the results of short-selling activity on 
feedback trading and returns volatility keep unchanged. The number of margin account 
separately opened by retail and institutional investors has no significant impact on feedback 
trading during stable and bullish periods. When the growth rate of account number held by 
institutional investors is greater than their counterparts, the level of returns volatility decreases. 
During downturns and crash periods, the participation of retail margin investors leads to a 
higher level of negative feedback trading in the market.  
 
The rest of the study is organised as follows. The next section briefly discusses the literature 
of the relationships between the activity of short selling (margin trading), feedback trading and 
stock returns volatility. Section 4.3 describes the data set and Section 4.4 describes the 
methodology adopted. Section 4.5 presents the empirical findings and discusses these findings. 
Results of robustness tests are also given in this section. Section 4.6 concludes the study. 
 
4.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
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4.2.1 Short-selling Activity, Margin-trading Activity and Feedback Trading 
 
Delong et al. (1990) argue that the strategy of positive feedback trading is irrational, which 
leads to significant deviations in stock prices. On the contrary, some argue that traders need a 
certain amount of time to absorb new information in the market, so the current market price 
does not reflect all information. In this case, the positive feedback trading behaviour among 
investors may be rational. Badrinath and Wahal (2002) find that when the positive feedback 
behaviour leads to price deviations from its fundamental value, the rational arbitrageurs correct 
this bias with the help of negative feedback strategy, and the positive feedback traders cannot 
arbitrage from trading anymore. However, it is generally believed that both strategies of 
positive feedback trading and negative feedback trading are irrational since both of them could 
cause price deviations from a stock’s fundamental value. 
 
Short-selling activity and feedback trading 
 
In the academic literature, short sellers are widely viewed as informed traders (e.g., Dechow et 
al. 2001, Christophe et al. 2010, Karpoff and Lou 2010, Shkilko et al. 2012, Engelberg et al. 
2012, Kecskés et al. 2013). With the initial model of Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), the 
informedness of short sellers has been extensively examined. Dechow et al. (2001) find that 
short sellers are able to use information beyond low fundamental-to-price ratio, which directly 
implies temporary stock overpricing. The evidence manifests that short sellers avoid shorting 
stocks with low fundamental-to-price ratio when the low ratio is attributable to momentarily 
low fundamentals. This result is consistent with the hypothesis of Lakonishok et al. (1994) that 
naive traders are likely to be over-optimistic about the future returns of stocks with low 
fundamental-to-price ratios. In addition to the ability to predict future stock performance, 
Diether et al. (2009b) discover that short sellers are able to recognise transient market 
overreactions. All these evidences indicate that short sellers are sophisticated traders who play 
a critical role in keeping stock prices in line with fundamentals.  
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While Diether et al. (2009a) show that short sellers are contrarian traders in both 
contemporaneous and past returns, Blau et al. (2010) find that short selling increases on large 
down days and decreases on large up days suggesting that during extreme market movements, 
short sellers tend to follow the crowd. In chapter 3, we have examined the introduction of short 
selling on feedback trading behaviour. In this chapter, however, with daily data of short-selling 
activity, we aim to explore the relationship between the magnitude of short-selling activity and 
feedback trading behaviour. Since short sellers are widely accepted as informed traders in 
previous literature, we conjecture that daily short-selling activity contains useful information 
about the stock’s fundamental value. Thus, we here propose that short-selling activity decrease 
positive feedback trading rather than increase it. 
 
Margin-trading activity and feedback trading 
 
Due to the relatively high costs of margin transactions, margin traders receive similar 
comments as to short sellers. Both of these two types of investors are considered as 
sophisticated traders in stock markets. However, the literature in margin-trading activity is very 
rare. With weekly data of margin transactions at firm-level, Hirose et al. (2009) study the 
Japanese market and document that margin traders follow positive feedback trading for small-
firm stocks while follow negative feedback trading for large-firm stock. The study object of 
our study is the 90 blue-chip stocks designated in the pilot scheme of margin transactions. Thus, 
we propose that margin-trading activity in the current A-share market should lead a lower level 
of positive feedback trading behaviour among investors. Building on the above arguments, we 
propose the empirical hypothesis as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Short-selling activity inhibits positive feedback trading behaviour. 
Hypothesis 1b: Margin-trading activity inhibits positive feedback trading behaviour. 
 
4.2.2 Short-selling Activity, Margin-trading Activity and Stock Returns Volatility 
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Positive feedback trading behaviour can induce autocorrelations and increase volatility in stock 
returns. If a large number of market participants are involved in positive feedback trading 
strategies, stock prices will deviate markedly and persistently from their fundamental values. 
Recent studies present evidence of positive feedback trading (i.e., buying during market 
upsides and selling during market declines) in developed stock markets. Koutmos and Saidi 
(2001) find positive feedback trading existing in emerging stock markets as well, but mostly 
during market declines. During bearish periods, stock returns autocorrelations become negative, 
and volatility rises substantially. The volatility level is in all cases higher during market 
declines, suggesting that feedback trading behaviour may be partially responsible. As 
mentioned in the previous section, we argued that both short-selling and margin-trading 
activities decrease positive feedback trading behaviour. Thus, we are reasonable to speculate 
that the activities of these two mechanisms would lead to a lower level of volatility in stock 
returns.  
 
Short-selling activity and stock returns volatility 
 
We now consider the short selling literature. As one of the essential links in the chain of 
financial innovations, short selling is viewed as an indispensable mechanism of the stock 
market. Short-selling transactions not only prominently promotes liquidity of the stock 
exchanges, but also provides an efficient channel for price discovery. Miller (1977) shows that 
when short sales ban exists and market traders hold heterogenous beliefs, traders without 
corresponding advanced information of the stock are not able to reflect pessimism into the 
stock price. In consistent with Miller (1977), Hong and Stein (2003) find that short sales 
constraints make the information absorbing progress in stock prices much slower. For this 
reason, stock prices cannot fully reflect the market information, especially the negative ones. 
Further, Bris et al. (2007) find that after the lifting of the short sales ban, the negative 
information is much easier to be reflected into stock prices and the frequency of stock crash is 
lower. Although these studies do not provide direct evidence between the relationship of short-
selling and stock returns volatility, we can see the implications behind these findings clearly: 
taking the long view, short-selling activity would not lead to raises in the volatility level.   
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A branch of literature studies the relationship between short sales bans/restrictions and stock 
returns volatility. They find evidence that short sales ban/restrictions would not help inhibit 
volatility increasing in stock returns, especially during the decline periods (e.g., Ho 1996; 
Scheinkman and Xiong 2003; Boulton and Braga-Alves 2010; Bohl et al. 2012). However, two 
studies find the contrary findings in the Hong Kong market. Henry and McKenzie (2006) and 
Chang et al. (2007) document that after the ban lifting of short selling on a list of stocks, the 
market exhibits greater returns volatility and volatility asymmetry. Only a few of studies 
investigate the relationship between short-selling activity and volatility. Liao and Yang (2005) 
investigate the relationship between short selling and stock prices in the Taiwanese stock 
markets, and they find a long-term stable cointegration between short-selling transactions and 
the stock index. Short selling mechanism does not exacerbate the volatility of the stock market. 
Using daily short sales data in the Turkish market, Sobaci et al. (2014) find increased short-
selling activity is associated with decreased volatility under the unconditional volatility proxy. 
These studies argue that short sellers are informed traders who can provide efficient 
information to the market price, and in the long-run, it would help market stability. In our work, 
we adopt the conditional measure of volatility, and we propose that short-selling activity has a 
negative relationship with the volatility level. 
 
Margin-trading activity and stock returns volatility 
 
Studies focus on margin-trading activity and stock returns volatility are rare. In the literature, 
however, a branch of work studies the relationship between margin introduction and stock 
returns volatility. Seguin (1990) studies the addition of OTC issues to the marginable list, 
finding that even though margin eligibility has produced an extra 30％ volume, both volatility 
and noise decrease. Seguin and Jarrell (1993) document that marginable stocks in NASDAQ 
decreased less than their counterparts during the 1987 crash, and claim that margin-trading 
activity conduces to market stabilisation even during the market downturns. While Alexander 
et al. (2004) find no significant impact of margin introduction on volatility, the flow of 
information, liquidity, and market depth all have been improved substantially upon the 
introduction. Due to its potential role of speculation involvement, margin trading has been 
viewed as a destabilising mechanism in traditional wisdom. But all extant empirical studies 
seem to take the side of margin trading. We thus propose that there is a negative relationship 
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between margin-trading activity and stock returns volatility. Therefore, we propose the 
hypothesis as the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Short-selling activity has a negative relationship with stock returns volatility. 
Hypothesis 2b: Margin-trading activity has a negative relationship with stock returns 
volatility. 
 
4.2.3 Margin Account Ownership, Feedback Trading and Stock Returns Volatility 
 
Scholars are often intrigued by the trading behaviour of retail and institutional investors in the 
financial markets. There is a plenty of evidence shows that previous price performance brings 
strong impacts on how retail and institutional investors trade. The existing studies show that 
retail and institutional investors systemically exhibit different reactions to previous price 
performance and in the degree to which they follow positive feedback trading or negative 
feedback trading strategies. In this section, we study this issue by concentrating the research 
objects only with margin investors (short sellers and margin traders). 
 
 
Retail margin investors, feedback trading and stock returns volatility 
 
In finance literature, retail investors have long been considered as noise traders. Tons of studies 
investigate the trading behaviour of retail investors from various perspectives, and many of 
them argue that retail investors are less informed and usually trade for non-informational 
reasons. For example, Barberis and Xiong (2009) demonstrate that the disposition effect is one 
of the most robustly key facts about trading behaviour of retail investors4. Ng and Wu (2007) 
study the Chinese stock markets to analyse the trading behaviour of 4.74 million individual and 
institutional investors across Mainland China. Their results show that only trading activities of 
                                                 
4 The disposition effect refers to the tendency of market investors to sell stocks that have increased in value, 
while keeping stocks whose price has declined. 
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institutions and wealthiest individuals can affect future stock’s trend, but Chinese retail 
investors at large have no predictive power for future stock returns.  
 
To my best knowledge, only one study in the literature of margin trading and short selling has 
investigated the relationship between retail margin investors (including margin traders and 
short sellers) and their trading strategies. With weekly data of Japanese stocks at both stock-
level and market-level analysis, Hirose et al. (2009) find that retail margin traders exhibit 
positive feedback trading, and this finding is strongly significant for small-firm stocks. But no 
evidence is shown that retail short sellers follow positive feedback trading. From the above 
argument and empirical findings, we conjecture that individual margin investors are less 
informed/sophisticated traders who are more vulnerable to market trends compared to their 
institutional counterparts. Thus, we propose that there is a positive relationship between trading 
activities of retail margin investors and positive feedback trading/stock returns volatility. 
  
Institutional margin investors, feedback trading and stock returns volatility 
 
The literature of the U.S. market indicates that institutions are more prudent investors and are 
more likely to invest in large-cap and high-liquid shares, and they exhibit a clear preference for 
stocks with low volatility (e.g., Arbel et al. 1983; Falkenstein 1996; Han and Kumar 2008). 
However, the findings of the relationship between institutional trading and positive feedback 
trading have mixed results.  Grinblatt et al. (1995) document that 77% mutual funds are partial 
momentum traders, buying stocks that are past winners, but most of them did not sell past losers. 
Whereas Lakonishock et al. (1992) find that pension managers do not strongly follow feedback 
trading strategies. But one general perception is that institutional investors are rational traders 
compared to their retail counterparts, as institutions are more likely to have more information 
channels for future changes in stocks’ values (e.g., Grinblatt and Titman 1989, 1993; Daniel et 
al. 1997; Nofsinger and Sias 1999; Wermers 1999, 2000; Chen et al. 2000; Chen et al. 2001; 
Bennett et al. 2003; Boehmer and Kelley 2009). 
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There are also a few of papers focus on the Chinese market. Ng and Wu (2007) analyse the 
trading behaviour of 4.74 million retail and institutional investors across Mainland China. Their 
results indicate that Chinese institutional investors are momentum traders, whereas less-
wealthy retail investors at large are contrarian investors. Besides, a small group of wealthiest 
retail investors tend to behave like institutions when purchase stocks, and behave like less-
wealthy individuals when sell.  However, Li and Wang (2010) find a negative relationship 
between institutional trading and volatility in the domestic markets. And they document 
institutional investors do not systematically adopt the positive feedback trading strategy. In 
brief, Chinese institutional investors are as prudent as their U.S. counterparts, and more likely 
to invest in large-cap and less-risky stocks. 
 
The most recent empirical literature of short selling in the U.S. assumes that short-selling 
activity depends on stock ownership by mutual funds and institutions (e.g., D’avolio 2002, 
Asquith et al. 2005, Nagel 2005, Kot 2014). These works assume either that most shares of 
lendable stocks are from institutional owners or that the number of institutions holding a 
particular stock is a proxy for heterogeneous expectations. There are very few studies have 
covered the issue of the strategies adopted by institutional margin investors. Boehmer et al. 
(2008) find that around 75 percent of short sales are executed by institutional investors, while 
retail investors only represent less than 2% in the U.S. market. They argue that since the 
majority of short sellers in the market are institutions, short sellers as a group are supposed to 
be more sophisticated traders. With data from the Taiwanese stock markets, Lin and Lin (2014) 
document that institutional margin traders exhibit positive feedback trading in large declines 
and price rises. Although the empirical results about our study question seem somewhat mixed, 
we still get enough reasons to consider institutional investors at large are well-informed and 
more sophisticated than their retail counterparts. We thus develop our third hypotheses as 
follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: The retail margin investors have an increasing impact on positive feedback 
trading behaviour and stock returns volatility. 
Hypothesis 3b: The institutional margin investors have a decreasing impact on positive 
feedback trading behaviour and stock returns volatility. 
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4.3 Data 
 
4.3.1 Sample Data 
 
The introduction date of short selling and margin trading to the Chinses A-share market is 
31/03/2010. The sample range of short-selling and margin-trading activities data in this study 
is four years from 31/03/2010 to 31/03/2014. Although activity data is in available to early 
2016, we chose to exclude the crash time in the A-share market of 2015 to 2016, and keep the 
sample window as the same in the first empirical chapter. Four types of activity data of short 
selling and margin trading are adopted. The activity data of short selling includes: (1) the short 
interest/the (circulated) market value and (2) the short-sales value/total trading value, while for 
margin trading, they are (3) the margin interest/the (circulated) market value and (4) the 
margin-loans value/total trading value, are obtained from the WIND database. The daily   
adjusted closing price and total market capitalisation of all stocks list in the A-share market 
including the first batch of 90 designated stocks are collected from Datastream.  
 
However, only the data of 76 stocks on the originally designated list is used. Two issues cause 
this significant data loss. Firstly, 13 stocks among 90 stocks in the first batch have been deleted 
at least once during our sample span of the continuous reform implementation (see Appendix 
4.1). In order to maintain data continuity and to avoid data contamination, the data of those 
stocks are excluded once it has been deleted from the designated list, no matter whether it re-
joins the list in a later batch or not. Besides, one stock in Shenzhen Stock Exchange delisted 
from the stock market, so no more trading data is available. Thus, we have daily data of 76 
individual stocks adopted. 
 
4.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
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Among all 76 treatment stocks, 43 of them are from the Shanghai 50 Index and the rest 33 are 
from the Shenzhen 40 Index. As mentioned in McKenzie et al. (2001), analysis of stock indexes 
is useful in assessing market-wide impacts, but effects on the underlying can be dissipated 
across stock constituents in the index, making the true effect hardly to be detected. Hence, the 
influence of short selling and margin trading on feedback trading and volatility dynamics might 
be more noticeable at the individual stock level. Thus, we carry on the investigation with 
individual stock data. Also, the portfolio index (SS & MT Index) and the market level index 
(A-share Index) is used. With the development of the introduction scheme of short selling and 
margin trading in 2010, the total number of stocks on the designated list for the two newly 
introduced mechanisms have been expanded from 90 stocks to 900 stocks by 22/09/2014. As 
an equally-weighted portfolio, the SS & MT Index, which contains all shortable and marginable 
stocks at the moments is calculated for this study.  
 
The descriptive statistics of the remaining 76 stocks together with two indexes are separately 
provided in Appendix 4.1. The daily stock returns are calculated as the logarithmic difference 
Rt = 100 × ln(Pt/Pt−1). The statistics of individual stocks including the mean return, the 
minimum and maximum return, the standard deviation, skewness, excess kurtosis, the Jarque-
Bera statistic, the Ljung–Box statistics LB(10), the ARCH test, together with the JOINT test 
are reported in Panel A in Appendix 4.1. Table 4.1 in the main body of the text is used to 
provide descriptive summaries of individual stock returns data with both the average value and 
the percentage of significance. Panel B and C are the immediate descriptive statistics for the 
two indexes.  
 
With statistical results concerning the shape of the distribution of the data, we can easily see 
that the distributions of adopted stock returns departure from normality. More than half of 
stocks display significant skewness, and all stocks show significantly excess kurtosis in both 
groups. The conclusion of non-normal returns distribution is also strongly supported by 
significant JB statistics of all stocks. Although only less than one-third results of the Ljung-
Box χ2 statistics for ten lags for individual stocks display significance, significant LB(10) are 
found for both two indexes returns. This indicates significant temporal dependencies in the first 
moment of portfolio returns distribution. The results of ARCH statistics for both individual 
stocks and indexes returns show a level 100% significance, which implies that there are still 
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temporal dependencies in the higher moment of the return distribution. The results of the 
JOINT test show that only 15.79% individual stocks show significant asymmetries in 
conditional volatility, which suggests that the basic GARCH model fit the Chinese stock 
returns data even better than the more complicated asymmetric ones. This can be supported by 
the insignificant results at the portfolio and market level. A common understanding is that 
feedback trading behaviour leads to autocorrelations of stock returns. To examine its legitimacy, 
a simple autoregressive model AR(5) is estimated and reported. The coefficient results of serial 
correlations at different lags are quite low, but the result with lag t =1 shows the highest level 
of significant autocorrelations in stock returns series (27.63%). Nevertheless, further 
investigation is required to examine the extent of interaction between serial correlations and 
volatility. 
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics of daily stock returns 
        
 
Skew Kurt JB LB(10) ARCH JOINT 
Serial corr  
at lag 1 
A：Individual Stocks (76)        
Percentage of Significance  65.79% 100.00% 100.00% 39.47% 100.00% 15.79% 27.63% 
B：Portfolio Level (1)        
 SS & MT Portfolio -0.870*** 3.961*** 1135.793*** 12.296* 46.972*** 3.317 0.018 
C：Market Level (1)        
A-share Index  -0.595*** 1.701*** 261.511*** 14.336** 159.201*** 1.308 0.013 
Notes: The sample period is from 31/03/2010 to 31/03/2014. The observations of each time series are 1456. The percentage 
of statistical significance in this table includes statistics with significance at the levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. Details of all 
related statistics are presented in Appendix 4.1. 
 
 
Table 4.2 shows the basic summary statistics of daily short-selling and margin-trading activities, 
with four different measures presented. It is easy to notice that the trading amount of margin 
trading is obviously larger than that of short selling. At the individual stock level, the mean 
value of the short turnover is 1.823%, while for margin turnover is 10.839%. At the index level, 
the total daily short turnover is minor at 0.745%, while the total daily margin turnover is more 
than eight times of its counterpart at 6.098%. 
 
 
To study the fourth question, monthly data of the number of margin account opened by retail 
and institutional investors are collected from the WIND database. The statistics of monthly 
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ownership of margin account are presented in Table 4.3. We use the number of margin account 
separately owned by retail and institutional investors to see whether the number differences of 
these two types of account influence feedback trading behaviour and stock volatility in a 
different way. It is known that the number of observations is supposed to be sufficient for 
GARCH-type estimation; however, in terms of this data type, only 68 observations can be used 
 
 Table 4.2 Summary statistics of daily short-selling and margin-trading activities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The sample period of short-selling and margin-trading activities is from 31/03/2010 to 
31/03/2014. The observations of each time series are 1456. The original data of the four ratio measures 
at individual stock level is downloaded directly from WIND database, while the ratios at portfolio level 
are calculated by the author. 
 
 
 
Sample period 31/01/2011 - 31/03/2016 Observations 68 
  Mean Min Max S.D. 
A：Retail Investors     
The final total account 2,529,966  49,200  7,528,404  2,093,700  
The newly opened account 123,237  6,743  723,262  131,085  
B：Institutional Investors        
The final total account 5,293  277  12,917  3,515  
The newly opened account 263  40  890  180  
Notes: The sample range of monthly ownership of margin account is from 31/01/2011 to 31/03/2016. 
The observations of each time series are 68. For each type of margin account, two types of data are 
available, which are both presented in the table.  
 
 
    Mean Min Max S.D. 
A：Individual Stocks (76)         
A1: Short-selling Activities         
The short interest ratio (%) 0.020% 0.000% 0.086% 0.019% 
The short-sales ratio (%) 1.823% 0.000% 14.402% 2.174% 
A2：Margin-trading Activities         
The margin interest ratio (%) 1.971% 0.001% 7.501% 1.670% 
The margin-loans ratio (%) 10.839% 0.000% 42.669% 8.000% 
B：SS & MT Portfolio (1)         
B1: Short-selling Activities         
The short interest ratio (%) 0.010% 0.000% 0.029% 0.008% 
The short-sales ratio (%) 0.745% 0.000% 3.627% 0.729% 
B2：Margin-trading Activities         
The margin interest ratio (%) 1.334% 0.000% 4.721% 1.288% 
The margin-loans ratio (%) 6.098% 0.002% 19.258% 5.207% 
Table 4.3 Statistics of monthly ownership of margin account  
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Table 4.4 Statistics of daily degree of participation in margin transactions  
     
Sample period 24/05/2015 - 31/03/2016 Observations 222 
  Mean Min Max S.D. 
Retail Investors 3,903,175 3454057 4,068,000 147,686 
Institutional Investors 7435 6151 8361 605 
Notes: The sample range of daily degree of participation in margin transactions is from 24/05/2011 
to 31/03/2016. The observations of each time series are 222. 
 
since the very start of short selling and margin trading to the current date. We thus adopt a daily 
dummy variable to measure the relative account number between the two different groups of 
investors. Nevertheless, in a later robustness test, we adopt daily data of degree of participation 
of retail investors and institutional investors in margin transactions, which is presented in Table 
4.4. Although the sample period is only available for ten months, the observations are 222, 
which is sufficient for a GARCH regression. 
 
4.4 Methodology 
 
4.4.1 The Baseline Model 
 
Like the first empirical chapter, the heterogenous model (Sentana and Wadhwani 1992) is 
adopted as the baseline model in this chapter. With the results of GARCH specification 
presented in Appendix 4.2.A and 4.2.B, a combination of the heterogeneous trader model and 
the basic GARCH (1,1) model is used: 
 
                                         𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + (𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝜎𝑡
2)𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                                   (4.1a)      
 
                                         𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2                                                        (4.1b) 
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4.4.2 Short-selling and Margin-trading Activities 
 
To study the impact of short-selling (margin-trading) activity on feedback trading behaviour 
more precisely, in this study we apply activity data of each type of margin transactions into the 
original feedback trading model as in (4.2a). The coefficient 𝜑0  presents unconditional 
autocorrelations induced by potential market frictions. The coefficient 𝜑1 = −𝛾𝜇  captures the 
conditional autocorrelations caused by feedback trading, which is linked closely to the level of 
volatility in stock returns. A significantly negative value of 𝜑1  implies a phenomenon of 
positive feedback trading, while a significantly positive one implies negative feedback trading. 
The conditional positive feedback trading is what we focus in this study, since it amplifies price 
deviations from its fundamental in times of high conditional variance, which could lead to 
market depression as a result.  𝜑2  is the conditional autocorrelations associated to margin 
activities.  
 
Schwert (1990) initiates a model involving an iterative procedure that allows for unbiased 
estimation of daily standard deviations conditional on observable variables. To evaluate 
relationships between futures trading activity and stock price volatility, Bessembinder and 
Seguin (1992) include several activity variables to the standard deviation equation of Schwert’s 
model, for instance, the spot-trading volume, the futures trading volume and the open interest 
of futures trading. Similar to Bessembinder and Seguin (1992), we integrate trading activity 
elements of short selling (margin trading) to the variance equation as in (4.2b): 
 
                           𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + (𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝜎𝑡
2 + 𝜑2𝐴𝑡−1𝜎𝑡
2)𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                              (4.2a) 
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                         𝜎𝑡
2 = (1 +  𝛾𝐴𝑡−1)(𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 )                                               (4.2b) 
 
Where the 𝐴𝑡−1 denotes the activity of short selling (margin trading) at t-1. Taking short selling 
for instance, a significantly negative 𝜑2 means that short-selling activity brings about more 
feedback trading behaviour, while a significantly positive 𝛾 indicates a higher level of stock 
volatility along with short-selling trades.  
 
4.4.3 The Relative Importance of Short-selling and Margin-trading Activities  
 
In this model, the variable of the activity level of short selling (margin trading) is replaced by 
a relative ratio of short turnover to margin turnover, which suggests the relative trading 
magnitude of short selling to margin trading. The model, therefore, is written as:  
 
                          𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + [𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝜎𝑡
2 + 𝜑2
𝑆𝑆𝑡−1
𝑀𝑇𝑡−1
𝜎𝑡
2] 𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                            (4.3a) 
                              
                         𝜎𝑡
2 = (1 +  𝛾
𝑆𝑆𝑡−1
𝑀𝑇𝑡−1
)(𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 )                                              (4.3b) 
 
Where the 
𝑆𝑆𝑡−1
𝑀𝑇𝑡−1
 is the relative change of short turnover to margin turnover at t-1. A 
significantly negative 𝜑2 indicates that short-selling activity leads to more positive feedback 
trading behaviour. A significantly positive 𝛾  indicates that a higher level of short-selling 
activity increases the volatility level in stock returns. 
 
Further, the impacts of short-selling (margin-trading) activity on feedback trading and returns 
volatility are investigated at three different levels in our study: the individual stock level, the 
portfolio level which covers all eligible transactions of shortable (marginable) stocks at the 
moment, and the market level which contains but is not limited to all designated shortable 
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(marginable) stocks. Almost all studies in the literature that examine short selling and its impact 
on the stock market is at the individual stock level. And the consensus is short sellers are 
contrarian traders. There have been only a few studies which attempted to analyse such 
relationship at market level. This is quite surprising because aggregate shorting may be a better 
indicator of short-selling activity in the market. As emphasised by Lamont and Stein (2004), it 
is true that under certain situations some stocks could be difficult to go short, but it is not 
necessary to be the same case for others. The authors construct aggregate measures of short 
selling and investigate their relationships with the market return. Their results demonstrate that 
total short interest is negatively correlated with the market index. Since Lamont and Stein (2004) 
use low-frequency data, questions arise regarding the extent to which the results reflect 
implications of short-selling activity to the market. To improve this data disadvantage, Lynch 
et al. (2014) investigate whether aggregate short-sales contain information about future market 
returns with daily shorting data. They also find that short sellers trade with the market but not 
against. The conclusions of both studies are intriguing as they reveal that short sellers in the 
aggregate are not contrarian traders. This finding is in sharp contradiction with suggestions of 
cross-sectional studies. The substantial differences between implications of the cross-sectional 
and aggregate-level studies about short selling highlight the need for further analysis in this 
issue. 
 
4.4.4 Margin Account Ownership 
 
The margin account in the Chinese stock market is currently designed to do margin trading, 
short selling, and normal stock transactions as normal stock accounts. However, unlike the 
margin rules in Japanese and Taiwanese stock markets, where cash deposit is a compulsory 
part of margin, the whole margin can be structured only with securities collateral under the 
margin regulations in the A-share market. Besides, an individual investor who wants to apply 
for a margin account is required to own a normal stock account firstly. After at least six-month 
investment experience with normal stocks via normal account, he then is allowed to apply for 
a parallel margin account, which is used as an account mainly for short-selling and margin-
trading transactions. It is worthy to note that margin investors are required to keep their normal 
account even after they have opened the margin one. In this case, if any of them want to do 
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normal stock trading as the same time with short selling and margin trading, they will normally 
carry on normal stock trading via the normal account rather than the margin one. 
 
To study the fourth research question, we integrate the element of the margin account number 
of different groups into the baseline model. In this model, a dummy variable is adopted to 
suggest the relative account number of retail to institutional investors. The model is written as:  
 
                𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + [𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝐷𝑡−1𝜎𝑡
2 + 𝜑2(1 − 𝐷𝑡−1)𝜎𝑡
2]𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                        (4.4a) 
                              
              𝜎𝑡
2 = (𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 )[1 + 𝛾1𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛾2(1 − 𝐷𝑡−1)]                                (4.4b) 
 
Where the 𝐷𝑡−1 is equal to one, when the growth number of retail account is greater than that 
of institutional account, and zero otherwise. The turnover of account measures of retail 
investors and institutional investors are calculated and used. 
 
4.4.5 Robustness and Alternative Measures 
 
Estimation results of asymmetric GARCH-type model 
 
Further estimations are undertaken to check the robustness of our results. Besides the basic 
GARCH (1,1) model, the log-likelihood ratio statistic indicates that GJR-GARCH (1,1) is the 
second prior model for our study (see Appendix 4.2.A and B). The GJR-GARCH version of 
the feedback trading model with short-selling (margin-trading) activity is:    
 
                      𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + (𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝜎𝑡
2 + 𝜑2𝐴𝑡−1𝜎𝑡
2)𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                                     
(4.5a)  
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                         𝜎𝑡
2 = (1 +  𝛿𝐴𝑡−1)(𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾𝑋𝑡−1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 )                              (4.5b) 
 
 
With an additional asymmetry coefficient γ, the GJR-GARCH version of the feedback trading 
model with short-selling (margin-trading) activity allows for asymmetric responses of volatility 
to news innovations. The estimated parameters for individual stocks and the two indices along 
with t-statistics are reported in Table 4.9. 
 
 
Degree of participation in margin transactions 
 
As for the margin account ownership model, we use the number of margin account owned by 
retail and institutional investors to see whether the difference in these two groups’ margin 
accounts influences feedback trading behaviour and stock volatility differently. But for the 
monthly data of the number of the margin account, only 68 observations can be applied to the 
GARCH model during our sample range. We thus, in the robustness test, adopt daily data of 
degree of participation of retail investors and institutional investors in margin transactions to 
study the fourth research question further. Although the sample period of this data is only 
available for ten months, the observations are 222, which are sufficient for a GARCH 
regression. The estimated parameters for both the SS&MT index and the A-share index, along 
with t-statistics are reported in Table 4.10. 
 
4.5 Empirical results 
 
4.5.1 Evidence on Feedback Trading 
 
As can be seen in Table 4.5, the regression results of the basic feedback trading model show 
no significant feedback trading behaviour among the majority of the studied 76 blue-chip 
stocks (94.74%). Only 3.95% of the studied stocks show significantly positive feedback trading, 
while 1.32% stocks show negative feedback trading. Besides, neither the regression results of 
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the SS & MT Index nor the A-share Index display significance in the coefficient of feedback 
trading. Lakonishok et al. (1992) find some evidence of positive feedback trading in small 
stocks, but no evidence in the large ones, which usually take large proportion in the institutions’ 
preferred holdings. One of the most obvious reasons for their finding is that window dressings 
are undertaken by fund managers. Fund managers tend to dump losers among small stocks 
rather than large stocks to dress up their portfolios, since sponsors are believed to be less 
sensitive to holdings of poor performing large stocks than to holdings of its small stock 
counterparts. Our results share the same rationale with Lakonishok’s finding. Although it is 
well known that domestic Chinese stock market is a retail-dominated market, the rationale 
behind is not changed. In unstable investment environments, retail and institutional investors 
both tend to keep their positions in large leading stocks rather than small stocks, due to the 
stability that large stocks can provide. No surprisingly, then, almost no significant feedback 
trading behaviour among our studied blue-chip stocks are found. 
 
 Table 4.5 The baseline model at different levels: GARCH estimation results   
 
A: Individual stocks (76) 𝜑1 
  insig% -% +% 
Percentage of Significance 94.74% 3.95% 1.32% 
B: Portfolio Level (1)    
SS & MT Index 0.0052 (0.667) 
C: Market Level (1)    
A-share Index 0.0065 (0.806) 
Notes: The estimated mean equation is given by equation (4.1a) as:   𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + (𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝜎𝑡
2)𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡; 
The variance equation is given by equation (4.1b) as:    𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 . The estimated t-statistics 
are shown in parentheses. The percentage of statistical significance in this table presents statistics with 
significance at 10% level.  
 
4.5.2 Short-selling and Margin-trading Activities 
 
Being identical to our findings in the baseline model, the regression results of 𝜑1 with four 
measures of margin activities in Table 4.6.A show that the majority of stocks (84.21% - 96.05%) 
has no significant feedback trading behaviour. This finding, however, is inconsistent with 
findings in previous feedback trading studies of the general Chinese A-share market. By 
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studying five stock indices, Sutthisit et al. (2012) document significant positive feedback 
trading effect in the Shanghai A-share, the Shenzhen A- and B-share, and the Hong Kong H-
share markets, but not in the Hong Kong red-chip stocks5. Their evidence suggests that positive 
feedback trading behaviour is strong in markets where retail investors constitute the majority, 
which is consistent with prior findings in other emerging and developed markets. Given red-
chip H-share is an institution-dominated market, no significant positive feedback trading is 
found. This implies that different investor structure can cause different trading behaviour. As 
mentioned in the above section, the different share component of blue-chip stocks in our 
research may lead to different trading behaviour among investors.  
 
In terms of short-selling activity, we find that short selling has an increasing impact on the 
degree of negative feedback trading, and a potentially decreasing impact on positive feedback 
trading among stocks at the same time. Although a percentage of 65.79% stocks shows 
insignificance on 𝜑2 with the measure of the scaled short interest, a percentage of 30.26% 
stocks, as the second conspicuous value, has a significantly positive 𝜑2  conditioning on 
insignificant 𝜑1.  Similarly, a total percentage of 18.42% stocks is found positively significant 
on 𝜑2 with the measure of short turnover. These regression results imply that short-selling 
activity has a moderate increasing impact on negative feedback trading. Besides, for both 
measures of short-selling activity, there are only stocks with a significantly positive value of 
𝜑2 conditioning on significantly negative 𝜑1. This further suggests that short-selling activity 
adds an opposing effect on the originally positive feedback trading exists among the studied 
stocks. Turning to Table 4.6.B, we can see that with the measure of short turnover, the 
estimated 𝜑2 of both indices show a significant positive value, which also implies an increasing 
impact on negative feedback trading.  
 
Koutmos (2014) points out that the current literature of feedback trading has largely ignored 
negative feedback trading strategy. In general, the negative feedback trading strategy is a 
                                                 
5 Red-chip stocks are the stocks of companies based in mainland China but are incorporated internationally and 
listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. In 1992, Hong Kong-based economist Alex Tang coined the term “red 
chip” by substituting “blue chip” with the word red, which refers to the colour of the national flag of China.  
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pattern of contrarian investment behaviour. Like positive feedback trading, which theoretically 
drives stock price further from its fundamental value, the negative feedback trading behaviour 
also makes the market more volatile, since it is not a strategy based on the company’s 
fundamentals. Our results show that short-selling activity leads to a higher level of negative 
feedback trading behaviour among studied stocks, which should be taken seriously by the 
regulator. For individual investors, negative feedback trading can refer to a pattern of behaviour 
in which a passive outcome, such as carrying on a losing trade, makes an investor start 
questioning his own skills and discourages him from continuing the trade. The positive 
relationship between short-selling activity and negative feedback trading in our study reveals 
that Chinese short sellers are still less experienced in the mechanism of short selling, and even 
worse, in an unmatured margin markets. To deal with it, a well-established trading system and 
sound regulations, and good supports of financial education to new investors in margin trades 
from the regulator side are essential. These can help investors maintain confidence and avoid 
falling into a negative feedback trading loop even when they are executing a losing trade. 
 
As for the results of margin trading, a total percentage of 9.18% stocks shows significantly 
positive feedback trading on 𝜑2 with the scaled margin interest, while only 1.32% stocks show 
significantly negative feedback trading. With the measure of margin turnover, a percentage of 
9.21% stocks has a negative 𝜑2 , conditioning on positive 𝜑1  and a percentage of 3.95% 
conditioning on insignificant 𝜑1. In comparison, only one stock out of 76 shows significantly 
negative feedback trading. These results may imply that margin-trading activity has a moderate 
decreasing impact on negative feedback trading and a moderate increasing impact on positive 
feedback trading. With the measure of margin loan value at portfolio level in Table 4.6.B, the 
coefficient 𝜑2 of feedback trading behaviour turns to be insignificant, and there is no evidence 
showing that margin-trading activity increases positive feedback trading at the index level. Our 
results of margin-trading activity are mixed with different levels of data. 
 
Regards to the impact of short-selling activity on stock returns volatility, short-selling activity 
seems to have a decreasing impact on volatility. With both measures of short selling, a 
percentage of 52.63% - 55.26% stocks having a significant negative value of γ. With the 
measure of short sale value at portfolio level in A, Table 4.6.B, a significantly negative value  
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Table 4.6.A The activity model at individual stock level: Percentage of significant 
coefficients of GARCH estimation results   
 
A: Short-selling Activity (76) insig% -% +%  
The short interest ratio 
𝜑1 96.05% 2.63% 1.32%  
𝜑2 
insig% -% +% insig% -% +% insig% -% +%  
65.79%   30.26%    2.63%     1.32%  
γ 40.79% 52.63% 6.58% 
The short-sales ratio 
(The short turnover) 
𝜑1 92.11% 2.63% 5.26%  
𝜑2 
insig% -% +% insig% -% +% insig% -% +%  
77.63%   14.47%    2.63% 1.32%   3.95%   
γ 32.90% 55.26% 11.84%  
B: Margin-trading Activity (76) insig% -% +%  
The margin interest ratio 
𝜑1 89.47% 5.26% 5.26%  
𝜑2 
insig% -% +% insig% -% +% insig% -% +%  
85.53% 2.63% 1.32% 2.63% 2.63%   1.32% 3.95%    
γ 6.58% 1.32% 92.11%  
The margin-loans ratio  
(The margin turnover) 
𝜑1 84.21% 3.95% 11.84%  
𝜑2 
insig% -% +% insig% -% +% insig% -% +%  
80.26% 3.95%   2.63%   1.32% 2.63% 9.21%    
γ 40.79% 5.26% 53.95%  
Notes: The estimated mean equation is given by equation (4.2a) as:  𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + (𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝜎𝑡
2 + 𝜑2𝐴𝑡−1𝜎𝑡
2)𝑅𝑡−1 +
𝜀𝑡; The variance equation is given by equation (4.2b) as:  𝜎𝑡
2 = (1 +  𝛾𝐴𝑡−1)(𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 ). The percentage of 
statistical significance in this table presents statistics with significance at the 10% level. 
  
Table 4.6.B The activity model at portfolio and index level 
Notes: The estimated mean equation is given by equation (4.2a) as: 𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + (𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝜎𝑡
2 +
𝜑2𝐴𝑡−1𝜎𝑡
2)𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡; The variance equation is given by equation (4.2b) as:  𝜎𝑡
2 = (1 +  𝛾𝐴𝑡−1)(𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 +
𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 ). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
       𝜑1 𝜑2       γ 
A: Short-selling Activity (2)         
The short interest ratio 
SS & MT 
-0.0027  
(-0.299) 
0.0143  
(1.301) 
-0.0010  
(-0.231) 
A-share 
-0.0034  
(-0.324) 
0.0140 
 (1.229) 
-0.0034  
(-0.904) 
The short-sales ratio 
(The short turnover) 
SS & MT 
-0.0012  
(-0.464) 
0.0002*** 
(2.583) 
-0.0001**  
(-1.960) 
A-share 
-0.0003  
(-0.096) 
0.0001** 
(2.366) 
-0.0002  
(-0.909) 
B: Margin-trading Activity (2)         
The margin interest ratio 
SS & MT 
-0.0083  
(-1.254) 
-0.0001  
(-1.013) 
0.0015** 
(2.182) 
A-share 
-0.0202  
(-0.344) 
0.0001  
(0.517) 
0.0043*** 
(5.804) 
The margin-loans ratio  
(The margin turnover) 
SS & MT 
0.0175*** 
(2.587) 
0.0000  
(0.701) 
0.0004*** 
(4.263) 
A-share 
-0.0022  
(-0.418) 
0.0000  
(1.238) 
0.0004  
(1.312) 
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of γ also support this finding. With a percentage of 92.11% stocks and a percentage of 40.79% 
stocks have significantly positive values of γ with the two different measures respectively in 
B, Table 4.6.A, we can see an increasing impact of margin-trading activity on the volatility 
level of stock returns. This finding is supported by both the portfolio and market level 
estimates in B, Table 4.6.B, of which three out of four estimated results show a significant 
positive value of γ. In Chapter 3, with the data of stock prices, we find that the dual introduction 
of short selling and margin trading has a combined reducing impact on the level of stock 
returns volatility. By adopt separate activity data of short selling and margin trading, we now 
gain more detailed insight into the issue, knowing that it is short selling which reduces the 
level of stock returns volatility, whereas margin trading, in fact, has an increasing impact on 
volatility.   
 
 
4.5.3 The Relative Importance of Short Selling and Margin Trading  
 
As the same to the findings in previous models, the regression results of 𝜑1  of the two 
measures in the relative model show that most of the stocks have no significant feedback 
trading. Only a small amount of stocks shows positive feedback trading (2.63%-3.95%) and 
very few of them are involved with negative feedback trading (1.32%). 
 
The relative importance of short selling and margin trading is expressed by a relative ratio of 
short-selling activity to margin-trading activity. With this ratio, we can examine whether the 
relative change in activities between the two mechanisms will have certain impacts on feedback 
trading and stock returns volatility. As the short-selling component is placed as the numerator, 
we add the relative ratio into the original feedback trading model to study whether an increase 
(decrease) in the level of short-selling activity compared to margin-trading activity will influence 
feedback trading and stock returns volatility in a certain way. From the results of both measures 
of the relative ratio in Table 4.7.A, we can see when the relative level of short-selling activity 
changes, there are slight increases in negative feedback trading (10.53% - 27.63%), whereas only 
a percentage of 1.32% - 2.63% stocks display positive feedback trading. However, no significant 
impact on feedback trading behaviour is observed when we do regressions at the portfolio and 
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Notes: The estimated mean equation is given by equation (4.3a) as: 𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + [𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝜎𝑡
2 +
𝜑2
𝑆𝑆𝑡−1
𝑀𝑇𝑡−1
𝜎𝑡
2] 𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡; The variance equation is given by equation (4.3b) as: 𝜎𝑡
2 = (1 +  𝛾
𝑆𝑆𝑡−1
𝑀𝑇𝑡−1
)(𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 +
𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 ). The percentage of statistical significance in this table presents statistics with significance at the 10% 
level.   
 
 
Notes: The estimated mean equation is given by equation (4.3a) as: 𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + [𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝜎𝑡
2 +
𝜑2
𝑆𝑆𝑡−1
𝑀𝑇𝑡−1
𝜎𝑡
2] 𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡; The variance equation is given by equation (4.3b) as: 𝜎𝑡
2 = (1 +  𝛾
𝑆𝑆𝑡−1
𝑀𝑇𝑡−1
)(𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 +
𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 ). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the trend of short-selling and margin-trading activities from 31/03/2010 to 
31/03/2016. To avoid data contamination, we only adopt activities data from 31/03/2010 to 
31/03/2014 in the main regressions of the study, excluding the crash period in the A-share market 
market level in Table 4.7.B. In all, we can say that the relative importance of short selling and 
margin trading has no impact on positive feedback trading behaviour.  
 
Table 4.7.A The relative importance of short selling and margin trading at individual stock 
level: Percentage of significant coefficients of GARCH estimation results   
 
The relative activity of short selling and margin trading (76) insig% -% +% 
Short interest/margin interest 
𝜑1 96.05% 2.63% 1.32% 
𝜑2 71.05% 1.32% 27.63% 
γ 53.95% 44.74% 1.32% 
The short turnover/the margin turnover 
𝜑1 94.74% 3.95% 1.32% 
𝜑2 86.84% 2.63% 10.53% 
γ 30.26% 67.11% 2.63% 
Table 4.7.B The relative importance of short selling and margin trading at portfolio and index 
level: GARCH estimation results  
      
      
The relative activity of short selling and margin trading (2) 𝜑1 𝜑2 γ 
Short interest/margin interest 
SS & MT 
0.0066  
(0.766) 
-0.0066  
(-1.274) 
-0.0081  
(-1.364) 
A-share 
0.0077*  
(1.650) 
-0.0169  
(-1.121) 
-0.0119  
(-1.373) 
The short turnover/the margin turnover 
SS & MT 
-0.0001  
(-0.011) 
0.0004  
(0.791) 
-0.0008  
(-0.687) 
A-share 
0.0037  
(0.624) 
0.0008  
(0.909) 
-0.0012  
(-1.027) 
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during 2015-2016. From the figure, we can clearly see that during the crash period, margin-
trading activity fluctuates more frequently than in the normal period, while the activity of short 
selling fell sharply immediately after the start of the crash in early June 2015 and remains at a 
 
Figure 4.1 Short-selling and margin-trading activities and conditional return autocorrelations 
 
Notes: The red and blue line represents activities of short selling and margin trading, respectively. The black line 
represents the conditional autocorrelations of the SS & MT Index, ρ = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝜎𝑡
2, extracted from the basic feedback 
trading model given by equation (4.1a) and (4.1b). 
 
very low volume level. A rough positive relationship between short-selling activity and the 
conditional return autocorrelations can be seen in the normal period, while no obvious 
relationship between margin-trading activity and the conditional return autocorrelations is 
observed. This supports the findings we obtain in Table 4.5, that short-selling activity may lead 
to an increasing level of negative feedback trading behaviour, while there is no consistent 
evidence that margin-trading activity exacerbates the level of feedback trading among studied 
stocks. 
 
4.5.4 Retail and Institutional Ownership of Margin Account 
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Financial researchers are often intrigued by the trading behaviour of retail and institutional 
investors. Recent accessibility of proprietary data provides researchers more opportunities to 
study the issues empirically. A large body of prior research document that retail and 
institutional investors react differently to past price performance and to some degree they 
follow momentum and contrarian strategies. Our study extends the literature by focusing retail 
and institutional investors trading on certain types of trading activities - short selling and 
margin trading; in other words, we aim to explore that whether trading activities of retail short 
sellers and margin traders impose impacts on feedback trading and stock returns volatility 
differently with their institutional counterparts.  
 
Notes: The estimated mean equation is given by equation (4.4a) as:   𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + [𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝐷𝑡−1𝜎𝑡
2 + 𝜑2(1 −
𝐷𝑡−1)𝜎𝑡
2]𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡; The variance equation is given by equation (4.4b) as:   𝜎𝑡
2 = (𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 )[1 + 𝛾1𝐷𝑡−1 +
𝛾2(1 − 𝐷𝑡−1)]. 
 
With the data of retail and institutional ownership of margin accounts, we investigate the 
impacts of retail (institutional) margin activities on feedback trading and stock returns volatility.  
The results of 𝜑1  and 𝜑2 in Table 4.8 show that the relative importance of the two types of 
account has no significant impact on feedback trading behaviour. In the previous literature of 
common stock trading, Lakonishok et al. (1992) document that pension managers do not pursue 
destabilising practices like positive feedback trading; while Grinblatt et al. (1995) find that 77% 
of mutual funds are momentum investors in the U.S. market.  Our results show no evidence 
that retail (institutional) margin investors in China use feedback trading strategy. This finding 
might partially due to the feature of the designated stocks currently available for trading. 
 
With a significantly negative value of γ2 at the portfolio level, it implies that when the growth 
rate of account number held by institutional investors is greater than their retail counterparts, 
the volatility level decreases. Li and Wang (2010) investigate the short-run relationship 
between institutional trading and stock returns volatility in the retail-dominated A-share market. 
Table 4.8 The account model at portfolio and market level: GARCH estimation results 
  𝜑0 
𝜑1  
(retail) 
𝜑2  
(institutional) 
γ1 
(retail) 
γ2  
(institutional) 
SS & MT Port  -0.0039 (-0.103) 0.0066 (0.808) 0.0058 (0.742) 0.0088 (0.360) -0.0214* (-1.873) 
A-share Index 0.0052 (0.099)       0.0048 (0.168) 0.0066 (0.846) -0.0138 (-0.703) -0.0017 (-0.170) 
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They argue that it is the impact of informational and non-informational institutional trades 
determines the relationship between returns volatility and institutional trading. And the 
relationship is negative when informational trading by institutional investors prevails. Since 
institutional investors are rationally better-informed investors, institutional trading tends to be 
negatively related to stock returns volatility. Consistent with this hypothesis, the current trading 
of institutional short sellers and margin traders at a list of designated stocks seems to be 
informational to the A-share market.  
 
Figure 4.2 The number of margin account and conditional return autocorrelations 
Notes: The red and blue line represents the number of margin account owned by retail and institutional investors, 
respectively. The black line represents the conditional autocorrelations of the SS & MT Index, ρ = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝜎𝑡
2, implied 
by the basic feedback trading model in equation (4.1a) and (4.1b). 
 
With monthly data of the number of the margin account, no obvious relationship between the 
newly opened account number held by retail (institutional) investors and the conditional return 
autocorrelations is observed in Figure 4.2. To check the legitimacy of these results, further 
investigations with data of a higher frequency is needed.  
 
4.5.5 Robustness Tests 
 
Estimation results of asymmetric GARCH-type model 
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From Appendix 4.2.A and B, the log-likelihood ratio statistics show us that the asymmetric 
GJR-GARCH model is the second prior model for our study. To test the robustness of the 
results of the original activities model of short selling and margin trading, the GJR-GARCH 
version of the feedback trading model with short-selling (margin-trading) activity are adopted.    
 
Table 4.9A and Table 4.9.B show that the robustness check confirms our previous findings. As 
for short selling, we find consistent results at all levels that short-selling activity has an 
increasing impact on the degree of negative feedback trading, and a potentially decreasing 
impact on positive feedback trading among designated stocks. A percentage of 46.97% - 81.58% 
stocks demonstrate a lower level of stock return volatility together with short-selling activity. 
As for the results of margin-trading activity at individual level, a total percentage of 10% -
10.45% stocks show significantly positive feedback trading, while a percentage of only 1.43% 
- 1.49% stocks show significantly negative feedback trading. Compared to the original level of 
feedback trading behaviour with 𝜑1, we may say that margin-trading activity has a moderate 
decreasing impact on negative feedback trading and a moderate increasing impact on positive 
feedback trading. However, with the measures at portfolio and market level in Table 4.9.B, all 
results of the feedback trading coefficient 𝜑2 are insignificant. Again, our results of margin-
trading activity are mixed with different levels of data. We can only conclude that no evidence 
is shown that margin-trading activity increases positive feedback trading. The level of stock 
returns volatility is significantly increased by margin-trading activity, which is consistent to 
our findings in previous sections. 
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Table 4.9.A The activity model at individual stock level: Percentage of significant coefficients 
of GJR-GARCH estimation results   
 
Notes: The estimated mean equation is given by equation (4.5a) as:  𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + (𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝜎𝑡
2 + 𝜑2𝐴𝑡−1𝜎𝑡
2)𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡; 
The variance equation is given by equation (4.5b) as:  𝜎𝑡
2 = (1 +  𝛾𝐴𝑡−1)(𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝜅𝑋𝑡−1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 ). Except for 
the data of short interest, only a limited number of time series of other types of activity data can obtain convergence by 
GJR-GARCH model: 66 stocks receive convergence for the data of short sale value, 70 stocks for the data of margin interest, 
and 67 stocks for the margin loan value. The percentage of statistical significance in this table presents statistics with 
significance at the 10% level. 
 
From Table 4.10, we notice that there are significantly positive coefficients of ϕ1 at both 
portfolio and market level, which indicates a presence of contrarian trading among retail 
margin investors. As for common stock trading, Odean (1998, 1999) and Barber & Odean 
(2000) document that retail investors generally demonstrate a strong preference for selling 
winners and holding losers, except in December when tax-driven selling becomes prevalent. 
Besides, Sutthisit et al. (2012) test all indices that measure Chinese stock markets but find no 
significant positive feedback trading behaviour in the Hong Kong Red chip market. For all 
other markets, including A-share, B-share and common H-share, it documents a positive return 
autocorrelation during less volatile periods, while a negative one during periods of high 
volatility. This sign reversal implies that the feedback trading styles in the Chinese markets 
may vary with different market participant structures and market volatility levels. Thus, the 
A: Short-selling Activity (76) insig% -% +%  
The short interest ratio 
ϕ1 93.42% 3.95% 2.63%  
ϕ2 
insig% -% +% insig% -% +% insig% -% +%  
76.32%   17.11% 2.63%   1.32% 2.63%      
γ 13.16% 81.58% 5.26% 
The short-sales ratio 
(The short turnover)  
ϕ1 90.91% 1.52% 7.58%  
ϕ2 
insig% -% +% insig% -% +% insig% -% +%  
80.30%   10.61%    1.52% 6.06% 1.52%     
γ 31.82% 46.97% 21.21%  
B: Margin-trading Activity (76) insig% -% +%  
The margin interest ratio 
ϕ1 92.86% 2.86% 4.29%  
ϕ2 
insig% -% +% insig% -% +% insig% -% +%  
84.29% 7.14% 1.43% 1.43%   1.43% 1.43% 2.86%    
γ 8.57% 0.00% 91.43%  
The margin-loans ratio 
(The margin turnover)  
ϕ1 89.55% 0.00% 10.45%  
ϕ2 
insig% -% +% insig% -% +% insig% -% +%  
83.58% 4.48% 1.49%      4.48% 5.97%    
γ 46.27% 4.48% 49.25% 
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different results of this robustness test and our original regressions might because that the new 
type of data is obtained from a crash period. Consistent to our finding in section 4.5.4, no 
significant impact of institutional trading of short selling and margin trading on feedback 
trading is found. As for the impact on volatility, the results show that even during the crash 
period, there is no evidence that margin activities conducted by Chinese retail (institutional) 
investors increase the volatility level of the stock market. 
 
Notes: The estimated mean equation is given by equation (4.5a) as: 𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + (𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝜎𝑡
2 +
𝜑2𝐴𝑡−1𝜎𝑡
2)𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡; The variance equation is given by equation (4.5b) as: 𝜎𝑡
2 = (1 +  𝛾𝐴𝑡−1)(𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 +
𝜅𝑋𝑡−1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 ). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 
Table 4.10 Degree of participation in short selling and margin trading at portfolio and 
market level: GARCH estimation results 
      
 
𝜑0 
𝜑1  
(retail) 
𝜑2 
(institutional) 
γ1 
(retail) 
γ2 
(institutional) 
SS & MT Index -0.1785 (-0.836) 0.0273** (2.008) 0.0138 (0.832) 
0.1185 
(0.912) 
-0.0013 (-0.028) 
A-share Index -0.1647 (-0.964) 0.0245** (2.157) 0.0115 (0.990) 
0.1108 
(0.998) 
-0.0008 (-0.020) 
Notes: The estimated mean equation is given by equation (4.10a) as:   𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝜎𝑡
2 + [𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝐷𝑡−1𝜎𝑡
2 +
𝜑2(1 − 𝐷𝑡−1)𝜎𝑡
2]𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 ; The variance equation is given by equation (4.10b) as :   𝜎𝑡
2 = (𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜀𝑡−1
2 +
𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2 )[1 + 𝛾1𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛾2(1 − 𝐷𝑡−1)]. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.9.B The activity model at portfolio and index level 
 
      𝜑1 𝜑2 γ 
A: Short-selling Activity (2)         
The short interest scaled by the market 
value 
SS & MT 
-0.0037  
(-0.465) 
0.0031*  
(1.735) 
-0.0013*  
(-1.667) 
A-share 
-0.0046  
(-0.464) 
0.0142 
 (1.276) 
-0.0048  
(-1.123) 
The short sale value scaled by total 
trading value (The short turnover) 
SS & MT 
-0.0036  
(-1.368) 
0.0001 
(0.660) 
-0.0001*  
(-1.694) 
A-share 
-0.0024  
(-0.516) 
0.0001 
(0.953) 
0.0002  
(0.831) 
B: Margin-trading Activity (2)         
The margin interest scaled by the market 
value 
SS & MT 
-0.0045  
(-1.611) 
0.0001 
(1.175) 
0.0010** 
(2.413) 
A-share 
-0.0261  
(-1.595) 
0.0001  
(1.384) 
0.0027** 
(2.440) 
The margin loan value scaled by total 
trading value (The margin turnover) 
SS & MT 
0.0068 
(1.156) 
0.0001  
(1.569) 
0.0002*** 
(4.450) 
A-share 
-0.0010  
(-1.630) 
0.0001  
(0.336) 
0.0002***  
(4.065) 
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Degree of participation in margin transactions 
 
We adopt a higher frequency type of data to check the robustness of the account ownership 
model. With daily data of the degree of participation in margin transactions, we further 
investigate the impact differences between retail and institutional investors’ trading activities 
on margin. It needs to be pointed out that the sample period of this data type is only available 
from 24/05/2015 to 31/03/2016, during which a sever stock crash happened in the Chinese A-
share market. This characteristic of the data may be one of the reasons that we obtain different 
results from previous findings. 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
 
From March 2010, a designated list of 90 leading stocks in the SSE and the SZSE start to be 
eligible for transactions of short selling and margin trading in the Chinese A-share market. 
After five major listing adjustments, the total number of shortable and marginable stocks had 
grown from 90 to 900 by the end of March 2016. The relationships between margin activities, 
feedback trading behaviour and stock returns volatility become interesting to explore. In this 
study, we first examine whether greater short-selling (margin-trading) activity (open interest 
and volume) is associated with greater positive feedback trading and stock returns volatility. 
Then, we investigate the difference between the impact of margin activities of retail and 
institutional investors on feedback trading behaviour and stock returns volatility. 
 
There is no evidence showing that activity of short selling (margin trading) increases positive 
feedback trading among studied stocks. However, we document an increasing impact of short-
selling activity on negative feedback trading behaviour. As for the impact on stock returns 
volatility, margin-trading activity has a significant increasing impact on volatility, while short-
selling activity seems to have a slightly decreasing impact. After being scaled by margin-
trading activity, our results of short-selling activity on feedback trading and volatility keep 
unchanged. Although evidence shows that neither activity of short selling nor that of margin 
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trading increase positive feedback trading behaviour in the market, an increased level of 
negative feedback trading by short-selling activity is far from being a beneficial thing to the 
market. Being the opposite of what most investors do, negative feedback strategy normally 
helps make the market less volatile. But in the final analysis, negative feedback trading is not 
a fundamental-based strategy, which involves evaluation of a security’s intrinsic value. In a 
retail-dominated market like China, to reduce behaviour of simply applying negative feedback 
strategy and help investors keep confidence even when they are carrying on a losing trade, 
public financial education of how to develop rational trading plans would be helpful. The recent 
rules and regulations that simply suppressing short selling have been shown to have a 
detrimental rather than beneficial impact on markets. To better stock market stabilisation in the 
A-share market, margin trading seems should be paid more attention in terms of volatility 
control than short selling. In an emerging market like China, system defects in trading 
mechanisms and financial regulations are obvious. The behaviour of illegal transactions like 
inside information leakage often slips below regulator's radar. The introduction of margin 
trading itself might be beneficial to the market, but lax-regulated margin trading activity could 
be a problem. 
 
The number of margin account separately opened by retail and institutional investors has no 
significant impact on feedback trading behaviour during stable and booming periods. When the 
growth rate of account number held by institutional investors is greater than their counterparts, 
the level of stock returns volatility decreases. This implies that institutional investors on margin 
trades in the Chinese stock market are better informed than their retail counterparts. During 
bearish and crash periods, we document that the participation of retail margin investors leads 
to a higher level of negative feedback trading in the market. As analysed above, retail investors 
who are less financial educated than professional institutional investors tend to conduct more 
irrational trades and bring uncertainty to the market. Our findings have obvious policy 
implications. 
 
As an extension to our previous empirical work in Chapter 3, this study investigates the impact 
of short-selling and margin-trading activity on feedback trading and stock returns volatility, 
separately. With more precise data of each mechanism’s activity, the distinctive impact of short 
selling and margin trading on feedback trading and returns volatility has been studied further. 
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There are surely limitations of the current study. Since GARCH-type models have been 
extensively applied in the study, data loss stemming from the nonconvergence issue may cause 
our empirical results to deviate from the facts. Other volatility measures which can prevent this 
type of issue to happen should be considered. Our sample data has a few drawbacks. We study 
the different impact of retail and institutional margin investors with indirect monthly data of 
the margin account number opened by these two types of investors. A study with more detailed 
and lower-frequency activity data of different kinds of short-selling and margin-trading 
investors in other markets would be an addition to the literature. 
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4.7 Appendices   
 
Appendix 4.1 Descriptive statistics of daily stock returns 
                                  
  
        Mean    Min Max S.D. Skew Kurt       JB LB(10) LB2(10)   ARCH JOINT 
Serial correlation at lag 
  1 2 3 4 5 
A1：Individual Stocks (76)                             
SH01 0.043 -10.558 9.564 1.394 0.173*** 2.905*** 490.734*** 8.469 6.054 20.597*** 0.631 0.049* 0.003 0.026 -0.001 -0.013 
SH02 0.014 -10.631 9.601 1.163 -0.052 1.198*** 76.670*** 10.931 18.220** 230.801*** 2.947 0.019 -0.009 -0.006 -0.012 -0.003 
SH03 0.018 -10.563 9.545 1.344 0.122** 2.702*** 423.284*** 8.286 9.539 17.402*** 1.520 0.054** 0.038 -0.009 0.007 -0.008 
SH04 0.047 -10.525 9.544 1.379 0.337*** 3.185*** 598.724*** 9.361 11.213 14.823*** 4.029 0.043 -0.006 0.012 0.016 -0.014 
SH06 0.025 -10.579 9.598 1.334 0.627*** 8.794*** 4370.547*** 4.660 2.436 187.265*** 0.150 0.006 0.002 0.009 0.028 -0.011 
SH07 0.027 -10.581 9.563 1.287 0.188*** 2.943*** 490.687*** 7.102 12.343* 40.502*** 6.895* 0.036 -0.014 0.007 0.008 -0.024 
SH09 0.056 -10.550 9.570 1.410 0.322*** 2.235*** 316.496*** 21.735*** 12.235* 59.426*** 3.713 0.075*** 0.008 0.005 0.017 0.014 
SH10 0.035 -10.440 9.554 0.970 0.376*** 3.175*** 624.037*** 12.999* 8.084 33.076*** 2.624 0.035 0.005 0.022 0.049* -0.029 
SH11 0.011 -10.599 9.565 0.994 0.044 1.479*** 127.515*** 11.706 21.110*** 12.639*** 7.971** 0.034 -0.013 -0.019 0.007 -0.041 
SH12 0.031 -10.598 9.625 1.230 0.390*** 2.331*** 341.733*** 7.722 6.909 90.894*** 1.142 0.025 -0.013 -0.015 0.021 -0.020 
SH13 -0.010 -10.552 9.572 0.988 0.008 1.862*** 201.636*** 9.528 4.729 43.504*** 4.470 0.026 -0.009 0.012 0.000 0.009 
SH14 0.004 -11.086 9.550 0.995 0.088 1.652*** 156.815*** 17.816** 12.032* 13.869*** 3.197 0.007 -0.083*** -0.012 0.009 -0.030 
SH16 0.008 -10.567 9.555 1.211 0.125* 1.350*** 112.006*** 13.054* 14.698** 159.771*** 8.270** 0.041 -0.024 -0.003 0.043 -0.029 
SH17 0.001 -10.575 9.569 0.991 -0.116* 1.567*** 145.074*** 5.964 5.999 56.43*** 1.758 0.013 0.021 -0.028 0.010 -0.011 
SH18 0.021 -10.586 9.599 0.994 0.365*** 2.695*** 453.450*** 11.936 2.442 116.118*** 1.473 0.047* 0.004 0.012 -0.015 0.002 
SH19 0.006 -10.528 9.533 0.992 -0.025 2.793*** 469.402*** 11.342 11.320 4.154** 2.186 0.032 -0.040 0.013 -0.011 -0.009 
SH20 0.019 -11.046 9.558 0.997 0.194*** 3.317*** 592.133*** 13.043* 5.379 123.397*** 1.503 0.050* 0.015 0.041 0.005 -0.008 
SH23 0.005 -10.548 9.555 0.996 0.050 1.793*** 173.859*** 12.807* 4.581 56.515*** 0.597 0.039 -0.005 0.002 0.035 -0.021 
SH24 0.024 -13.643 9.637 1.277 0.192*** 3.669*** 717.025*** 9.960 4.151 147.288*** 3.132 0.041 0.020 -0.030 0.019 0.046 
SH25 0.054 -10.553 9.576 1.395 0.282*** 2.332*** 337.281*** 18.912*** 13.687* 50.352*** 1.353 0.084*** 0.001 0.010 -0.012 0.011 
SH26 0.024 -11.575 7.522 1.223 0.024 2.021*** 215.143*** 5.376 10.098 62.488*** 4.139 0.010 -0.006 -0.017 0.007 0.030 
SH27 0.018 -13.966 9.549 1.292 -0.071 3.914*** 877.811*** 14.502** 4.828 106.316*** 2.080 0.022 -0.028 -0.017 -0.048* -0.023 
SH28 0.000 -10.547 9.549 1.341 0.007 3.681*** 809.012*** 6.967 4.023 108.669*** 4.699 0.022 -0.038 0.000 0.018 0.019 
SH29 0.025 -10.573 9.595 1.002 0.341*** 2.294*** 324.077*** 11.177 8.059 133.190*** 1.718 0.031 0.004 -0.026 0.028 -0.011 
SH30 0.033 -10.586 9.579 0.968 0.360*** 2.814*** 494.810*** 14.839** 9.037 19.677*** 0.925 0.024 0.011 0.009 -0.005 0.016 
SH31 0.000 -10.562 9.560 1.000 -0.052 1.163*** 78.305*** 11.288 10.654 158.146*** 2.906 0.030 -0.020 -0.007 0.029 -0.009 
SH32 0.032 -10.522 9.575 1.338 0.375*** 3.475*** 698.392*** 4.543 7.707 20.699*** 0.583 0.021 -0.006 0.001 0.004 0.018 
SH33 0.027 -10.558 9.569 1.297 0.347*** 3.492*** 728.269*** 13.041* 4.867 162.578*** 1.601 0.054** 0.011 0.001 0.045* 0.029 
SH34 0.021 -10.540 9.545 0.983 0.092 1.861*** 200.503*** 12.444* 9.443 25.871*** 0.262 0.039 0.000 -0.045* 0.038 -0.014 
SH35 0.026 -10.600 9.625 1.420 0.207*** 4.581*** 1174.247*** 13.955* 7.131 38.499*** 6.412*   0.063** 0.017 0.031 0.012 -0.048* 
SH36 0.024 -10.576 9.588 1.283 0.161** 3.081*** 532.448*** 20.746*** 5.013 195.523*** 2.810 0.055** 0.005 0.023 0.047* 0.029 
SH37 0.034 -10.513 9.531 1.393 -0.474*** 6.928*** 2393.047*** 4.963 1.526 88.524*** 1.371 0.031 -0.011 0.007 0.034 -0.006 
SH38 0.019 -10.596 9.623 0.992 0.447*** 2.706*** 463.170*** 12.345* 6.445  136.833*** 2.506 0.044 0.014 0.022 0.016 -0.030 
SH39 0.017 -10.544 9.526 1.243 0.191*** 1.478*** 139.453*** 11.770 6.449 15.499*** 4.655 0.032 -0.012 -0.055** 0.024 -0.002 
SH40 0.028 -10.544 9.563 1.300 0.394*** 2.506*** 408.365*** 13.170* 6.064 41.148*** 2.333 0.051* 0.004 -0.035 0.048* -0.016 
SH41 0.055 -10.569 9.605 1.291 0.457*** 2.407*** 365.047*** 10.894 4.830 88.024*** 3.670 0.035 0.011 -0.015 0.028 0.034 
SH43 0.057 -10.575 9.607 1.299 0.522*** 3.799*** 848.708*** 15.579** 8.397 210.494*** 1.659 0.057** -0.009 0.006 0.005 0.043 
SH44 0.014 -10.524 9.564 1.353 0.266*** 4.211*** 1024.369*** 7.722 13.465* 56.968*** 9.481** 0.039 -0.003 0.008 -0.002 -0.025 
SH45 0.012 -10.763 9.573 1.280 0.259*** 3.183*** 600.481*** 5.288 6.390 203.424*** 4.302 0.038 -0.004 0.024 0.013 0.026 
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Notes: Summary statistics of daily returns of individual stocks eligible for short selling and margin trading are presented in the first batch, A1; the SS and MT index which is calculated with all shortable and marginable stocks at the moment with a 
changing number from 90 to 900 stocks during our sample range is presented in A2; and the market index which contains all listed stocks in the A-share market including all shortable and marginable stocks ever on the designated list for short selling 
and margin trading are provided in A3. Mean, Min, Max, S.D., Skew, Kurt and JB are the sample mean, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness, excess kurtosis and Jarque-Bera normality test, respectively. LB(10) and LB2(10) are the 
Ljung-Box χ2 statistics for ten lags calculated for stock returns. ARCH is the Lagrange Multiplier test for ARCH effects and distributed as χ2 with 1 degree of freedom. The JOINT test is a test initiated by Engle and Ng (1993) for potential asymmetries 
in conditional volatility. Serial correlation at lag t (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) represents autocorrelation relationships of individual return series. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
SH46 0.034 -10.616 9.623 0.996 0.468*** 3.056*** 562.236*** 20.153*** 5.939 132.139*** 3.480 0.067** 0.038 0.023 0.001 0.040 
SH48 -0.009 -10.577 9.566 1.439 -1.034*** 9.995*** 5643.890*** 5.197 2.613 160.677*** 1.192 0.042 0.010 -0.009 0.029 -0.009 
SH49 -0.004 -10.564 9.609 1.244 0.098 2.234*** 299.533*** 10.514 10.228 166.387*** 5.691 0.056** -0.017 -0.006 -0.001 -0.014 
SH50 0.017 -11.629 9.658 1.425 -0.538*** 8.792*** 4044.123*** 8.063 2.399 94.108*** 1.632 0.029 -0.005 0.007 0.006 -0.013 
SZ51 0.052 -10.655 9.589 1.365 0.414*** 2.700*** 439.202*** 7.131 14.288** 20.883*** 1.640 0.035 0.021 0.007 0.017 -0.033 
SZ52 0.032 -10.520 9.549 0.986 0.212*** 1.912*** 212.573*** 7.031 13.672* 43.993*** 3.072 0.034 -0.034 -0.022 0.017 -0.028 
SZ53 0.011 -11.528 9.571 0.997 0.028 1.461*** 106.618*** 10.385 12.899* 5.255** 1.785 0.024 0.018 -0.003 -0.008 -0.035 
SZ55 0.004 -10.559 9.558 0.993 0.001 1.525*** 136.976*** 7.397 8.139 61.395*** 2.476 0.025 0.001 -0.025 -0.016 0.023 
SZ56 0.010 -10.566 9.580 1.002 0.060 2.367*** 323.848*** 13.364* 17.047** 140.544*** 13.086*** 0.054* 0.008 0.014 -0.005 -0.033 
SZ57 -0.010 -10.600 9.619 0.998 -0.178*** 1.714*** 178.207*** 12.150* 11.071 40.082*** 16.177*** 0.039 -0.072*** 0.034 -0.024 -0.002 
SZ58 -0.002 -10.756 9.582 1.001 -0.011 1.721*** 166.509*** 11.487 5.368 73.782*** 0.841 0.024 -0.008 0.007 -0.062** -0.039 
SZ59 0.010 -10.596 9.613 0.979 0.328*** 2.535*** 398.715*** 9.334 4.404 53.435*** 0.434 0.048* 0.012 -0.008 0.027 -0.007 
SZ60 0.006 -10.546 9.575 1.002 0.066 1.339*** 106.810*** 7.207 4.743 77.754*** 0.493 0.035 -0.012 0.026 -0.031 0.028 
SZ61 0.009 -10.548 9.594 0.976 0.028 1.858*** 190.527*** 11.664 13.406* 164.536*** 3.802 0.062** -0.014 0.012 -0.001 -0.009 
SZ63 0.026 -10.538 9.536 0.993 0.464*** 2.860*** 535.529*** 12.131* 6.635 59.195*** 4.040 0.004 -0.077*** -0.006 0.017 -0.013 
SZ65 -0.006 -13.607 9.548 0.998 -0.289*** 2.785*** 478.259*** 16.385** 1.911 90.703*** 2.889 0.016 -0.072*** -0.004 0.020 -0.047 
SZ66 0.002 -10.565 9.554 0.995 -0.109* 1.993*** 238.217*** 10.978 3.277 49.466*** 0.496 0.052** 0.007 -0.015 0.022 0.019 
SZ67 0.020 -10.476 9.646 1.179 0.216*** 1.533*** 126.828*** 7.490 8.179 26.104*** 7.528* 0.045 0.004 -0.019 0.006 -0.001 
SZ68 0.026 -15.746 9.546 0.993 0.310*** 1.579*** 165.662*** 14.712** 8.843 69.309*** 1.415 0.013 -0.055** -0.020 -0.012 -0.021 
SZ70 0.027 -10.651 9.726 1.006 0.316*** 2.689*** 406.607*** 7.827 4.450 194.145*** 6.278* 0.036 -0.009 0.040 0.002 0.041 
SZ71 -0.009 -10.564 9.563 0.997 0.046 1.767*** 181.099*** 9.161 10.545 201.345*** 4.566 0.029 -0.045* 0.008 0.006 -0.014 
SZ72 0.012 -10.556 9.577 0.995 0.125* 1.316*** 104.324*** 8.077 7.702 142.499*** 2.793 0.037 -0.001 -0.015 -0.022 -0.008 
SZ73 0.013 -10.595 9.620 0.967 0.074 2.244*** 289.016*** 17.870** 6.671 86.662*** 3.079 0.081*** 0.017 0.008 0.001 -0.028 
SZ74 -0.026 -10.555 9.547 0.996 -0.311*** 2.140*** 284.433*** 11.192 9.705 41.829*** 8.643** 0.046* -0.037 -0.015 0.047* 0.015 
SZ75 0.015 -10.616 9.581 1.207 0.313*** 2.050*** 270.992*** 15.241** 5.331 137.141*** 2.316 0.022 -0.049* 0.027 0.003 0.011 
SZ77 -0.006 -10.546 9.586 1.250 0.125* 1.506*** 125.554*** 10.760 17.449** 7.448*** 3.499 0.018 -0.038 0.037 -0.007 -0.032 
SZ78 -0.002 -10.554 9.531 0.996 0.005 1.834*** 192.388*** 18.040** 18.856*** 109.560*** 5.593 0.008 -0.080*** -0.003 0.025 0.008 
SZ79 0.011 -10.573 9.559 0.993 0.107 1.891*** 196.325*** 15.999** 12.947* 96.724*** 7.920** 0.069** 0.032 -0.005 0.038 -0.042 
SZ80 -0.013 -10.548 9.554 0.996 -0.178** 2.473*** 321.997*** 15.540** 16.919** 117.051*** 16.847*** 0.047* -0.050* -0.014 0.031 -0.032 
SZ83 -0.015 -10.599 9.583 0.999 -0.115* 1.782*** 187.009*** 14.712** 6.826 73.450*** 0.404 0.035 -0.025 -0.015 0.031 0.003 
SZ84 -0.010 -10.549 9.568 0.998 -0.110* 1.153*** 80.685*** 8.961 10.618 81.216*** 0.323 0.032 -0.048* -0.005 0.013 0.018 
SZ85 0.010 -10.569 9.561 1.176 0.053 0.962*** 52.253*** 17.095** 6.675 175.737*** 1.818 0.043 -0.001 0.041 0.026 -0.024 
SZ86 -0.009 -10.570 9.610 0.998 -0.020 1.657*** 162.894*** 8.432 10.182 116.843*** 3.503 0.035 -0.034 -0.026 0.021 0.015 
SZ87 -0.012 -10.558 9.573 0.995 -0.084 1.995*** 237.333*** 12.652* 7.608 89.604*** 5.574 0.030 -0.042 0.009 -0.039 -0.017 
SZ88 0.012 -10.564 9.599 0.989 0.033 1.432*** 120.028*** 8.937 6.778 92.256*** 3.389 0.029 -0.019 0.010 0.003 0.013 
SZ89 0.016 -10.543 9.551 1.428 0.152** 3.677*** 800.513*** 8.796 11.693 13.415*** 1.716 0.029 0.014 0.013 -0.008 -0.062** 
SZ90 0.007 -10.558 9.614 0.996 0.208*** 1.907*** 224.541*** 7.383 5.350 50.015*** 0.245 0.031 0.000 -0.003 0.009 -0.009 
A2：Portfolio Level (1) 
SS & MT -0.052 -12.844 6.488 1.002 -0.870*** 3.961*** 1135.793*** 12.296* 6.363 46.972*** 3.317 0.018 -0.033 0.029 0.011 0.032 
A3：Market Level (1) 
A-share -0.051 -10.205 8.294 1.212 -0.595*** 1.701*** 261.511*** 14.336** 11.263 159.201*** 1.308 0.013 -0.012 0.025 0.032 0.028 
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Appendix 4.2.A Results of specification tests for three GARCH-type models 
 
         
Name 
GARCH (1,1) EGARCH (1,1) GJR-GARCH (1,1) 
log L AIC BIC log L  AIC BIC log L AIC BIC 
SH01 -2795.8739 1.4950 1.5254 -2847.0530 1.4980 1.5322 -2794.9720 1.4965 1.5307 
SH02 -2638.9710 1.8933 1.9257 -2808.0001 1.8965 1.9330 -2638.7660 1.8949 1.9314 
SH03 -2919.5711 1.6188 1.6491 -2959.9303 1.6217 1.6558 -2919.2462 1.6202 1.6543 
SH04 -2730.8858 1.5045 1.5353 -2784.6311 1.5075 1.5422 -2730.5510 1.5060 1.5406 
SH06 -2603.4376 1.6858 1.7170 -2763.8747 1.6888 1.7240 -2601.9203 1.6873 1.7225 
SH07 -2572.4667 1.3318 1.3629 -2643.7400 1.3348 1.3698 -2571.0864 1.3333 1.3683 
SH09 -3292.9832 2.1010 2.1309 -3333.5935 2.1038 2.1375 -3292.9782 2.1024 2.1361 
SH10 -2748.0413 1.3472 1.3771 -2798.2128 1.3501 1.3837 -2748.0381 1.3487 1.3823 
SH11 -3391.6092 2.1802 2.2103 -3426.4233 2.1831 2.2170 -3391.5752 2.1817 2.2155 
SH12 -2833.2626 1.7534 1.7841 -2940.4741 1.7564 1.7910 -2833.2404 1.7549 1.7895 
SH13 -3173.5131 1.9142 1.9443 -3224.6236 1.9171 1.9510 -3173.3489 1.9156 1.9495 
SH14 -3060.9553 1.7910 1.8216 -3078.1490 1.7939 1.8284 -3060.9376 1.7924 1.8269 
SH16 -3291.6628 2.0624 2.0919 -3385.7784 2.0652 2.0985 -3290.9264 2.0638 2.0970 
SH17 -3298.1788 2.1158 2.1461 -3342.6034 2.1187 2.1528 -3296.4141 2.1173 2.1513 
SH18 -3141.3856 1.9730 2.0031 -3226.0083 1.9759 2.0098 -3141.3126 1.9744 2.0083 
SH19 -2980.1607 1.4192 1.4484 -2993.2580 1.4220 1.4549 -2979.3797 1.4206 1.4535 
SH20 -2969.9368 2.1225 2.1548 -3050.9306 2.1256 2.1621 -2969.9194 2.1240 2.1604 
SH23 -3065.7650 2.1208 2.1528 -3122.4514 2.1240 2.1600 -3065.7090 2.1224 2.1584 
SH24 -2571.2586 1.7105 1.7431 -2639.3613 1.7137 1.7504 -2570.7588 1.7121 1.7487 
SH25 -3301.4230 2.1112 2.1411 -3347.2556 2.1141 2.1478 -3301.4224 2.1127 2.1463 
SH26 -2130.9716 0.8205 0.8531 -2190.8971 0.8237 0.8604 -2125.6012 0.8221 0.8587 
SH27 -2665.2312 1.4911 1.5215 -2785.0799 1.4940 1.5283 -2664.5997 1.4925 1.5268 
SH28 -2899.4543 1.6004 1.6298 -2994.1012 1.6032 1.6364 -2898.6310 1.6018 1.6349 
SH29 -3066.5907 2.0555 2.0862 -3201.8072 2.0585 2.0931 -3066.2225 2.0570 2.0916 
SH30 -2964.4025 1.6463 1.6762 -3015.0816 1.6492 1.6828 -2964.4023 1.6477 1.6813 
SH31 -3151.6957 2.0268 2.0572 -3251.0661 2.0297 2.0639 -3151.6055 2.0282 2.0624 
SH32 -2734.2088 1.5714 1.6028 -2784.3827 1.5745 1.6098 -2734.1854 1.5729 1.6082 
SH33 -2975.0529 2.0152 2.0456 -3122.4144 2.0181 2.0523 -2974.8654 2.0167 2.0508 
SH34 -2947.0612 1.6323 1.6627 -2982.8056 1.6352 1.6695 -2945.4123 1.6338 1.6680 
SH35 -2502.4937 1.4146 1.4458 -2589.0671 1.4176 1.4528 -2501.9275 1.4161 1.4512 
SH36 -2871.9826 2.0347 2.0659 -3018.5992 2.0377 2.0729 -2871.9623 2.0362 2.0713 
SH37 -2143.8239 0.9819 1.0142 -2214.6891 0.9850 1.0214 -2140.9300 0.9835 1.0197 
SH38 -3137.7836 2.1026 2.1331 -3232.5019 2.1055 2.1399 -3137.6570 2.1040 2.1384 
SH39 -3155.7893 1.7397 1.7691 -3188.4386 1.7425 1.7756 -3155.7348 1.7411 1.7742 
SH40 -3015.9820 1.7290 1.7587 -3103.7231 1.7319 1.7653 -3015.9211 1.7305 1.7637 
SH41 -2711.3154 1.7389 1.7703 -2821.0314 1.7419 1.7773 -2711.2237 1.7404 1.7758 
SH43 -2969.5231 2.0950 2.1266 -3073.4276 2.0980 2.1336 -2969.5166 2.0965 2.1320 
SH44 -2242.0459 1.1330 1.1637 -2412.4307 1.1361 1.1705 -2241.2213 1.1346 1.1690 
SH45 -2989.9701 1.9656 1.9959 -3126.3920 1.9685 2.0026 -2989.9480 1.9671 2.0011 
SH46 -2819.5142 1.8301 1.8615 -2922.2013 1.8331 1.8686 -2819.1848 1.8316 1.8670 
SH48 -2250.5993 1.2073 1.2391 -2356.8061 1.2104 1.2462 -2249.6834 1.2088 1.2446 
SH49 -3406.3722 2.2185 2.2480 -3505.7427 2.2214 2.2546 -3405.8903 2.2199 2.2531 
SH50 -2105.1130 1.2016 1.2347 -2225.7919 1.2048 1.2422 -2104.3259 1.2032 1.2405 
SZ51 -2838.8574 1.7421 1.7736 -2894.1778 1.7452 1.7806 -2838.7767 1.7437 1.7790 
SZ52 -2918.7139 1.7470 1.7783 -2959.3368 1.7501 1.7853 -2917.0337 1.7485 1.7837 
SZ53 -2868.0763 2.0920 2.1260 -2886.2156 2.0953 2.1337 -2865.6175 2.0936 2.1319 
SZ55 -3409.6324 2.1672 2.1970 -3461.4131 2.1701 2.2036 -3409.5983 2.1687 2.2021 
SZ56 -3366.1837 2.3453 2.3756 -3483.6757 2.3482 2.3823 -3365.9356 2.3467 2.3808 
SZ57 -3317.1598 2.0897 2.1198 -3359.0620 2.0926 2.1265 -3316.9124 2.0912 2.1250 
SZ58 -3134.3868 2.0221 2.0531 -3186.3021 2.0251 2.0600 -3134.1929 2.0236 2.0584 
SZ59 -3154.4569 1.9785 2.0086 -3232.4619 1.9814 2.0153 -3154.0437 1.9799 2.0138 
SZ60 -3205.1945 1.9137 1.9434 -3274.9283 1.9165 1.9500 -3205.1291 1.9151 1.9485 
SZ61 -2870.1957 1.8649 1.8963 -2953.1168 1.8679 1.9033 -2869.0866 1.8664 1.9017 
SZ63 -2934.5104 1.4899 1.5195 -2971.5691 1.4927 1.5261 -2929.2353 1.4913 1.5246 
SZ65 -3149.9006 1.8097 1.8394 -3189.1718 1.8125 1.8459 -3148.7104 1.8111 1.8445 
SZ66 -3313.4049 2.0625 2.0921 -3381.9530 2.0653 2.0987 -3313.3535 2.0639 2.0972 
SZ67 -2860.3890 2.0972 2.1312 -2895.1523 2.1006 2.1389 -2860.3648 2.0989 2.1371 
SZ68 -3064.3351 1.8247 1.8551 -3119.3998 1.8276 1.8618 -3064.1661 1.8262 1.8603 
SZ70 -2769.1641 1.8880 1.9203 -2881.9001 1.8912 1.9276 -2765.4386 1.8896 1.9259 
SZ71 -2858.1079 1.5926 1.6228 -2942.1041 1.5955 1.6296 -2858.0864 1.5941 1.6281 
SZ72 -3371.9763 2.2893 2.3193 -3473.1203 2.2921 2.3260 -3369.1162 2.2907 2.3245 
SZ73 -3333.2576 2.2489 2.2793 -3380.0933 2.2518 2.2861 -3333.2418 2.2503 2.2846 
SZ74 -3237.0797 2.0926 2.1230 -3293.9207 2.0955 2.1298 -3236.9882 2.0941 2.1283 
SZ75 -3485.7808 2.3446 2.3744 -3565.3004 2.3475 2.3810 -3485.4185 2.3461 2.3795 
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Notes: Log L, AIC and BIC are the log-likelihood function, Akaike information criterion and Schwarz Bayesian Criterion respectively. Figures 
in bold represent the best performing model of the stock based on certain information criteria. Figures in shading indicate that no convergence 
can be obtained of the stock during regression of certain GARCH-type model. 
SZ77 -3078.9580 2.1469 2.1789 -3135.8527 2.1501 2.1861 -3078.9547 2.1485 2.1845 
SZ78 -2882.6450 1.5629 1.5934 -2926.0680 1.5658 1.6001 -2882.6412 1.5643 1.5986 
SZ79 -3052.5720 2.1116 2.1434 -3117.3762 2.1147 2.1505 -3051.6687 2.1131 2.1489 
SZ80 -2666.6163 1.6654 1.6986 -2692.0418 1.6687 1.7060 -2665.0665 1.6671 1.7043 
SZ83 -3377.6025 2.2356 2.2658 -3437.8043 2.2385 2.2725 -3377.6000 2.2371 2.2710 
SZ84 -3456.9091 2.2428 2.2727 -3507.7707 2.2456 2.2793 -3456.9077 2.2442 2.2778 
SZ85 -3337.7808 2.3947 2.4259 -3422.2686 2.3978 2.4328 -3337.7806 2.3962 2.4313 
SZ86 -3323.8368 2.0961 2.1257 -3402.0393 2.0990 2.1323 -3323.2862 2.0975 2.1308 
SZ87 -3216.5546 1.9204 1.9500 -3268.2681 1.9232 1.9566 -3216.5534 1.9218 1.9551 
SZ88 -3386.9886 2.2668 2.2968 -3466.1910 2.2697 2.3034 -3386.5172 2.2682 2.3019 
SZ89 -3009.8506 1.7531 1.7829 -3074.5898 1.7560 1.7895 -3009.8412 1.7545 1.7881 
SZ90 -3371.8875 2.1464 2.1761 -3432.8992 2.1492 2.1827 -3371.4614 2.1478 2.1812 
SS & MT -2698.9419 1.2219 1.2511 -2787.7059 1.2247 1.2576 -2697.8915 1.2233 1.2562 
A-share -2602.3076 1.1856 1.2148 -2715.1483 1.1884 1.2213 -2601.9675 1.1870 1.2199 
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Name log L AIC BIC 
SH01 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH02 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH03 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH04 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH06 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH07 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH09 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH10 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH11 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH12 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH13 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH14 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH16 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH17 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH18 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH19 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH20 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH23 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH24 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH25 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH26 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH27 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH28 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH29 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH30 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH31 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH32 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH33 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH34 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH35 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH36 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH37 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH38 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH39 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH40 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH41 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH43 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH44 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH45 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH46 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH48 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH49 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SH50 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ51 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ52 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ53 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ55 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ56 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ57 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ58 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ59 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ60 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ61 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
    Appendix 4.2.B Best performance GARCH specifications based on log L, AIC and BIC 
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SZ63 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ65 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ66 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ67 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ68 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ70 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ71 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ72 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ73 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ74 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ75 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ77 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ78 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ79 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ80 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ83 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ84 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ85 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ86 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ87 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ88 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ89 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
SZ90 GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1，1) GARCH (1,1) 
Total GJR-GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1,1) GARCH (1,1) 
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Chapter 5: The Determinants of Short-selling and Margin-trading Activities 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
      5.1.1 Motivation 
 
There is a widespread literature which documents that short sellers and margin traders are 
integral to the efficient functioning of financial markets with both theoretical and empirical 
evidence. While most financial regulators agree that trades on margin have an important role 
to play in ensuring market efficiency, many of them do not hesitate to ban or make restrictions 
on transactions of short selling and margin trading during financial crises6. These conflicting 
ideas are most likely to stem from a lack of understanding about what motivates short sellers 
and margin traders to make their investment decisions, and whether their motivations are 
fundamentals-related.  
 
The conventional wisdom treats short sellers and margin traders as sophisticated investors who 
incur relatively high transaction costs. Short sellers attempt to sell shorts and subsequently 
repurchase temporarily overvalued securities to make profits, while margin traders borrow 
                                                 
6 As the market situation worsened and stock prices fell sharply in the 2008 financial crisis, governments around 
the world turned to the same scapegoat, short selling. Commencing in the US on July 15, 2008, the US regulators 
announced an emergency order banning naked short selling on 19 large financial firms. Later on September 18, 
the SEC prohibited all shorting in nearly 800 financial stocks. At the next day on September19, the UK FSA 
launched a ban targeting both covered and naked short selling at 34 financial stocks. Bans in other markets 
followed soon: Australia, Taiwan and Korea banned short selling on all stocks; Canada, Norway, Ireland, 
Denmark, Russia, Pakistan and Greece banned short selling on leading financial stocks; France, Italy, Portugal, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Austria and Belgium banned naked shorting on leading financial stocks; and Japan 
banned naked short selling on all stocks. To tackle the European debt crisis in 2010-2011, similar bans are 
reintroduced in France, Belgium, Italy, and Spain. On May 19, 2010, the German BaFin extended naked short 
sales bans on government bond and CDS market. As regards margin trading, regulators tend to show different 
understandings about leverage with an occurrence of market routs. In the 2015 Chinese stock market turbulence, 
China’s regulators attempted to prevent further build-up of leverage in the stock market similar to the borrowing 
binge that took place earlier this year. In Nov 2015, the CSRC doubled margin requirements to 100 percent as 
another move to limit financial leverage in the stock market. 
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undervalued shares from brokers and pay them back after selling the borrowed securities. There 
is overwhelming evidence show that short sellers successfully identify securities that 
subsequently underperform the market price (e.g. Figlewski and Webb 1993; Asquith and 
Meulbroek 1996; Atken et al. 1998; Dither et al. 2009b; Engelberg et al. 2012). Margin trading, 
however, remains a common but relatively understudied status in the literature. A recent paper 
by Ladley et al. (2016) suggests that margin trading adopted by retail investors are not able to 
make profits but leads to significantly lower skewed returns. They point out that retail margin 
traders’ investment behaviour is more likely to be motivated by short-term hedonic returns.  
However, the motivations of margin-trading activities are still waiting to be thoroughly studied.  
 
To examine the role of short sellers and margin traders in financial markets, this study attempts 
to investigate the determinants of short-selling and margin-trading activities together. By 
identifying information sources of short sellers and margin traders’ trading advantages, our 
study would also have important implications for financial regulators and policymakers, 
particularly for an emerging market like China. 
 
      5.1.2 Gaps and Contributions 
 
The study aims to investigate the determinants of short selling and margin trading respectively. 
Taking together with control variables, the firm-level determinants of short-selling (margin-
trading) activity include past short-selling (margin-trading) activities, past stock returns, stock 
returns volatility, financial ratios, ex-dividend date events, industry classifications, insider 
trading events, stock analyst recommendations, block trading events, whereas the market-level 
factors include past market performance and investor sentiment. We provide crucial additional 
insights on the nature of information advantages that lead to abnormal returns earned by short 
sellers and margin traders. Our findings further allow novel inferences about how short sellers 
and margin traders contribute to price discovery and market efficiency. Generally, this study 
makes three major contributions to the current literature: 
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Firm-specific factors 
 
Our first contribution is that we introduce several additional firm-specific factors to the 
determinants of short-selling (margin-trading) activity. The additional firm-specific factors 
include industry, insider trading events, stock analyst recommendations, and block trading 
events. Furthermore, we study the difference between the relationship of positive information 
and short-selling activities and that of negative information and short-selling activities.  
 
First, we consider industry classification as a potential factor impacting short-selling and 
margin-trading activities. Financial analysts often divide the stock market into ten to eleven 
sectors, of which companies having unique dynamics compete with each other directly. In our 
study, we generally distinguish our sample stocks by financial stocks and non-financial stocks. 
This consideration is because that the financial stocks arguably has more power to indicate 
current market conditions. In the 2008 financial crisis, the financial sector experienced one of 
the hardest blow with companies such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers filing for 
bankruptcy. After an influx of regulatory rectification and structural reconstruction, the 
financial sector gradually grows stronger. Economists often associate the overall health of an 
economy with the health status of its domestic financial sector. If financial companies are weak, 
there would be a detrimental influence on the average consumer. Therefore, we argue that short 
sellers and margin traders, who bear relatively high costs when making their investment, are 
likely to pay more attention to financial stock than to stocks in other industries.  
 
Second, we identify insider trading events as a potential factor which may affect the trading 
activities of short sellers (margin traders). A small branch of studies in short selling literature 
focuses on the relationship between short positions and publicly available information. Several 
extant papers examine short selling behaviour in the context of a specific type of corporate 
news event. Karpoff and Lou (2010) examine short-selling positions in firms that are 
investigated for financial misconduct and find that short sellers generally anticipate public 
announcements of investigations. Christophe et al. (2004) study short-selling activity around 
earnings announcements. They find evidence that short sellers are informed traders who can 
profit from these events. Similarly, Daske et al. (2005) and Boehmer et al. (2010) look at short 
sales around management forecast and earnings announcements. While Daske et al. (2005) find 
  
132 
 
no evidence that short selling transactions concentrate prior to bad news events, Boehmer et al. 
(2010) find some evidence of anticipation, and it documents that a significant fraction of 
information advantage of short sellers comes from trading around these events. Nagel (2005) 
investigates the cash-flow changes implied by a vector autoregressive model and finds an 
asymmetric effect on returns. It indicates that short sellers help incorporate news into stock 
prices when the short-selling transaction is not constrained.  
 
The above-mentioned literature shed light on a subset of this paper’s sample of determinants. 
While most of the previous studies identify patterns in short selling around a handful of firm 
fundamental events, our paper aims to uncover patterns in short sellers’ activity around a wider 
range of firm-specific factors. Doing so allows us to speak more generally about short sellers’ 
investment behaviour of certain stocks. Chen et al. (2016) show that Chinese short sellers trade 
more intensely than other traders prior to the news of insider selling, while margin traders trade 
more heavily prior to insider purchasing. However, Blau and Wade (2012) point out that we 
cannot say that short seller (margin traders) are informed if there is a similar magnitude of 
increase prior to insider purchasing (insider selling). We should also find a negative 
relationship between insider purchasing (insider selling) and short selling (margin trading) to 
draw the conclusion. Rather than focus on short sales positions prior to insider trading, we 
extend Chen et al. (2016) to examines the magnitude of short-selling (margin-trading) activity 
after insider trading events from both selling and purchasing sides.  
 
Third, we are the first study to consider stock analyst recommendations as information sources 
to short sellers (margin traders). Financial analysts play an important part in information 
transfers in the financial markets. The extant literature suggests that stock analyst 
recommendations and reports have at least short-term investment value (e.g., Stickle 1995, 
Womack 1996, Krische and Lee 2000, Barber et al. 2001, Jegadeesh et al. 2004, Green 2006, 
Barber et al. 2010). Specifically, the stock analyst recommendations, as indirect evidence of 
the changes in firm fundamentals, is identified as the main factor in our study. We take stock 
analyst recommendations as the main factor to study the determinants of short-selling and 
margin-trading activities. The previous studies, which examine the relationship between stock 
analyst recommendations and short selling, focus on the question whether short positions in 
the days leading up to analyst downgrades is abnormally high. Christophe et al. (2010) 
investigate the magnitude and significance of short positions prior to analyst downgrades. Their 
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findings support that short sellers are informed traders who exploit profitable opportunities by 
receiving tips from analysts of brokerage firms. However, Blau and Wade (2012) criticize this 
result by pointing out that observing abnormal short-selling activity prior to analyst 
downgrades is not equivalent to that short sellers are informed in advance, unless short 
positions are abnormally low prior to upgrades. Inspired by this idea, we investigate the link 
between stock analyst recommendations and short-selling (margin-trading) activity from both 
directions of downgrade and upgrade. 
 
Fourth, block trade events are examined as another potential factor to short-selling (margin-
trading) activity. Kraus and Stoll (1972) examine whether the price effects accompanying block 
trades can be ascribed to a change in the underlying value of a stock, which is called 
information effect; or to a temporary deviation of prices, which is called distribution effect. In 
their study, blocks are classified into three groups: those that traded below the price prior to 
the block (minus tick), those that traded at a price equal to the price prior to the block (zero 
tick) and those that traded at a price above the price prior to the block (plus tick). For plus tick 
blocks, the evidence indicates that price effects reflect changes in the underlying value of the 
stock. While the results from minus tick blocks show some form of distribution effect. Within 
the day, closing price showed a significant average reversal of the block trade price. This result 
indicates that the majority block trades with minus tick cannot change the fundamental value 
of a stock. A significant relationship is supposed to be found between plus tick blocks and the 
two mechanisms studied in our study, while no significant link should be found between minus 
tick blocks and the two mechanisms.  
 
Market-level factors 
 
Our second major contribution is that we consider an additional factor, the investor sentiment, 
to the determinants of short-selling (margin-trading) activity at market-level. The relationship 
between investor sentiment and short-selling (margin-trading) activity is examined. A large 
amount of literature has documented that investor sentiment affects stock prices (e.g. 
FisherKenneth 2000; Brown and Cliff 2004; Baker and Wurgler 2007). Our paper, however, 
initially establishes the link between investor sentiment and trading activities on margin. 
McKenzie and Henry (2012) adopt two macro factors, the lagged market returns and the 3-
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month HK-US interest rate differential, to study the determinants of short sales positions. We 
extend their work not only by examining a considerable number of new factors at both firm-
level and market-level, but also using several measures to each factor, which is new in the field 
of literature. In our study, investor sentiment is proxied by three different measures: (1) 
Consumer confidence index (CCI); (2) Market trading volume, which is measured by daily 
market turnover; and the (3) IPO number, which is measured by the number of newly listed 
shares in the A-share market. 
 
Determinants of margin-trading activity 
 
Our third contribution to the current literature is that we initially investigate the determinants 
of margin-trading activity at both firm-specific and market-level. Given the importance of 
margin trading to the integrity of stock markets, little is known about the motivations of their 
investment behaviour. In March 2010, the CSRC introduced the two mechanisms, short selling 
and margin trading, all together into the Chinese stock markets. As both mechanisms are using 
leveraged positions trading on the margin account, regulatory policies regarding these two 
mechanisms are synchronous and highly related. After stock price crash happened in 2015, 
participants in the Chinese stock markets start to point their spearhead at trading activities on 
margin. Short selling and margin trading are considered as misused speculation means, 
especially when these two mechanisms are in an immature investment environment with 
obvious regulatory deficiencies like the A-share market. The market participants in the A-share 
market argue that short sellers and margin traders are better-informed investors, who likely 
possess inside information that is inaccessible to the public. Besides, short selling and margin 
trading share many similarities from both trading mechanism and investor characteristics. It is 
thus meaningful for us to take this chance to study the two mechanisms with comparisons. 
 
      5.1.3 Research Questions 
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In all, the purpose of our study is to provide an empirical assessment of the determinants of 
short selling and margin trading in an emerging market. The research questions are as follows: 
 
Question 1: Whether and how the firm-specific factors and the market-level factors influence 
short-selling activity? 
Question 2: Whether and how the firm-specific factors and the market-level factors influence 
margin-trading activity? 
 
5.2 Literature Review 
 
      5.2.1 Remarks on Short Sellers 
 
We start from a specific question: Are short sellers information processors or manipulators? 
Before the most recent financial crisis, economists generally viewed short sellers and margin 
traders as important contributors to efficient stock prices. The theoretical work by Miller (1977) 
argues that when short selling is constrained, assets tend to be overvalued. Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1987) strengthen this idea, pointing out that a market without short selling needs 
longer time to incorporate negative information into prices. In the past decades, plenty of 
empirical studies stressing on different issues provide strong support for these claims 
(Senchack and Starks, 1993; Aitken et al., 1998; Desai et al., 2002; Cohen et al., 2008; 
Boehmer et al., 2008). However, attitudes toward short selling changed dramatically when the 
financial crisis comes. Short sellers were heavily blamed for active trading right before the fall 
of stocks. Even financial economists seem less sure of efficiency advantages brought in by 
short sellers. Goldstein and Guembel (2008) find that opportunistic short sellers drive share 
prices down, thereby destroying firm value. 
 
Are short sellers advanced information processors, or are they in fact manipulators? The answer 
to the question hinges on identifying the information that short sellers possess. If short sellers 
act only on information about firm fundamentals, then it is hard to charge them as manipulators. 
Previous literature finds that heavier shorting leads to lower returns in the future and worsening 
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firm fundamentals. But it does not answer the essential question of whether or how much of 
short sellers’ ability to generate excess returns come from information related to firm 
fundamentals. That is the focus of this study. To be more specific, we investigate and quantify 
the sources of short sellers’ information advantage by combining a seven-year panel of A-share 
short sales order data. Together with direct factors and three main factors, institutional trading 
activities, stock analyst ratings and insider trading, which are indirect evidence of the changes 
in firm fundamentals, we aim to see whether information advantage of short sellers can be 
attributed to these two types of publicly available information. Our findings can help financial 
regulators, investors and economists further understand the sources of excess returns made by 
short sellers. 
 
The past three decades have seen a significant increase in the degree of short selling activity 
on equity markets. Buying long is the most prevalent method of investment in the stock 
market.  This has many reasons, but the best one is that the market pays quite well over 
time.  Short selling is simply the reverse of buying long, but with an important difference: short 
sellers must pay interests on borrowed shares. Diamond and Verrechia (1987) suggest that 
short-sellers will not trade unless they expect the price to fall enough to compensate them for 
the additional costs and risks of shorting. Short selling is not only more expensive but also 
riskier than establishing a long position. As believed, short sellers are therefore more likely to 
be better informed than are investors with long positions. Short sales could occur for a myriad 
of reasons, but only one of which is a belief by short seller: the share is overvalued relative to 
its fundamentals. Thus, much of the extant literature focuses on the information content of short 
sale. Studies including Desai et al.  (2002), Arnold, et al. (2005), and Boehmer et al. (2008) 
document that short interest conveys bearish information of the underlying security because 
short sellers have information advantages. On the other hand, a popular perspective from Wall 
Street suggests that short sales are a bullish market indicator due to the nature of short selling. 
 
There are other studies examining how information of firm fundamentals is related to short 
selling activity. Firms with low ratios of fundamentals, such as earnings-to-price and book-to-
market values, are known to have lower future returns. Given the well-documented predictive 
ability of these ratios, it provides a natural starting point for investigating the information 
sources of short-sellers. Dechow et al. (2001) document that short-sellers position themselves 
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in the stock of such firms, and cover their positions as the ratios revert to the mean.  Christophe 
et al. (2004) show that abnormal short sales prior to negative earnings announcements are 
negatively related to future returns and argue that short sellers can predict the negative news in 
earnings announcements. On the contrary, several studies document that short sellers are 
unable to predict negative announcements but instead increase short positions in response to 
announcements (e.g., Daske et al., 2005; Blau and Pinegar, 2010). Engelberg et al. (2012) 
collect news articles to investigate how short sellers process publicly available information. 
They find that short sellers are more skilled and efficient information processors, who trade 
more actively and profitably after news announcements. Boehmer et al. (2012) study the issue 
concentrating on three types of news: earning news, analyst recommendations and analyst 
forecasts. They show evidence that short sellers significantly anticipate forthcoming news 
related to a firm’s earnings. This suggests that short sellers are not only skilled information 
processors but also have information advantages. By adopting both direct and indirect news 
related to fundamentals, our study aims to explore the determinants of short selling activity 
from a comprehensive point of view. 
 
      5.2.2 The Relationship between Short Selling and Margin Trading  
 
The purpose of our study is to investigate the determinants of short-selling and margin-trading 
activities respectively. In the extant literature, the determinants of short selling have been 
studied by a few studies, while the literature on margin trading is rather limited. Can the 
determinants of short selling and margin trading be studied together? There are two reasons 
why we can: Firstly, the nature of the trading structure of the two allow us to do so. Although 
with opposite trading directions, both transactions of short selling and margin trading involve 
leveraged positions taken in a trader’s margin account. Due to leveraged positions used and 
more trading participants involved, traders of these two mechanisms need to bear substantial 
extra costs. And for this reason, short sellers and margin traders are widely considered as 
informed investors who might own private channel of information related to firm’s 
fundamentals. 
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Secondly, the literature in both fields document that these two types of trades contain advanced 
information (e.g., Figlewski and Webb 1993, Aitken et al. 1998, Arnold et al. 2005, Bris et al. 
2007, Huang and Wu 2009, Diether et al. 2009, Shyu et al. 2017; Mayhew et al. 1995). Take 
margin trading as an example, Alexander et al. (2004) find that after the level of margin 
requirements decline, increased margin eligibility generates more leverage opportunities for 
informed traders who are with finite wealth. With an increase in the information content of 
trades, the market quality, therefore, is improved. In a broad sense, the motivations of short 
selling and margin trading can be distinguished by firm-level and market-level reasons. Table 
5.1 lists all the potential determinants of short-selling and margin-trading activities. 
 
      5.2.3 Firm-specific Independent Factors 
 
Industry classifications 
 
In economics, the term sector is often used to present an essential part of the national economy. 
And the levels of disclosure in corporate reports are not likely to be identical across all sectors. 
Investors who want to build exposure to a specific sector can use various investment vehicles 
to achieve their asset allocation goals. Compared to the sector, another narrower term is 
industry, which denotes a business section that is trading similar services and goods in direct 
competition with each other. Markets are segregated into independent sectors using either 
Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS), Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) or 
Thomson Reuters Business Classification (TRBC). According to industry classification of 
TRBC7, our study generally distinguishes our sample stocks by financial stocks and non-
                                                 
7  The Thomson Reuters Business Classification is an up-to-date industry classification system launched by 
Thomas Reuters. This market-based classification system covers 72,000 public companies and 2.4 million private 
companies globally from 130 countries. TRBC is composed of five levels of hierarchical structure, and the highest 
level is the economic sector. There are total ten economic sectors under TRBC, including basic materials, energy, 
industrials, cyclical consumer goods and services, non-cyclical consumer goods and services, financials, 
healthcare, technology, telecommunications services, utilities. Each company is allocated to an industry, which 
belongs to an industry group, then the business sector, which is a subsection of an overall economic sector.   
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financial stocks. Under the economic sector financials of TRBC, there are eight industry group: 
banking services, investment banking and investment services, diversified financial services, 
insurance, real estate operations, residential and commercial REITs, collective investments and 
holding companies. By this principle, we divide our sample stocks into the two categories. 
 
There are two reasons why the financial sector or industries is a distinctive factor for us to 
investigate the determinants of short-selling and margin-trading activities. Firstly, financial 
companies are powerful to indicate the general market conditions. If financial companies are 
in poor financial condition, there would be an adverse impact on the ordinary consumption. 
Financial firms provide loans for businesses, mortgages to homeowners and insurance to 
consumers. If these activities are depressed, it stunts growth in all other relevant fields like 
small business, real estate and stock markets. As high transaction cost bearers, short sellers and 
margin traders are likely to pay more attention to financial stocks rather than others. Secondly, 
the financial sector in China has experienced rapid development in the past decade, during 
which the time range of our sample overlaps. In 2007, the industries of real estate and financial 
services become the most important tax pillars in the domestic economy. In the later year 2015, 
due to the government’s encouragement to public investments, other financial industries like 
the investment bank and collective funds are further expanded in the economy. With data from 
the Chinese A-share market, we thus expect a positive relationship between the financial 
feature of stocks and short-selling (margin-trading) activity. 
 
Insider trading events 
 
The primary reason for investors using the strategy of short selling is speculation. The results 
of a survey of NYSE in 1947 show that approximately two-thirds of short selling was 
speculative (McDonald and Baron 1973). In this case, the traditional view of short sellers’ 
trading on negative and presumably inside information about a firm’s prospects may not be 
valid. Instead, Francis et al. (2005) show evidence that short sellers are more likely to trade on 
misperceptions held by the market about the fundamentals of a firm. Except for straightforward 
accounting data in a firm’s financial statements, other ways of public news releases could also 
show a hint of the future trend of stock price. In this study, we examine the relationship between 
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one certain type of informational events, insider trading, and short-selling (margin-trading) 
activity. 
 
Investors in the stock markets usually watch insider purchases and sales of their own firm’s 
stocks closely because these trades may reveal inside information. Khan and Lu (2013) 
consider short sellers as informed market participants and investigate potential sources of their 
information. They find significant increases in short positions immediately before large insider 
sales, but not before small insider sales. The explanation of the abnormal increase in short 
positions is consistent with the front-running hypothesis facilitated by earlier leakage of 
information. Chakrabarty and Shkilko (2013) study short-selling activities related to both 
insider sales and purchases. They find abnormally positive short selling accompanies insider 
sales, and abnormally negative short selling accompanies insider purchases. They posit that the 
superior timing of short sellers is consistent with two reasons: monitoring of order flows and 
obtaining price-relevant information from brokerage firms that execute insider sales. 
 
With a sample of 446 stocks during 2010 to 2014, Chen et al. (2016) study the link between 
insider trading and trades on margin in China. With measures of abnormal trading, they find 
abnormal short-selling and margin-trading activities both before and after events of insider 
trading. But in a latter panel regression, the findings become inconsistent. Although abnormal 
high levels of short positions prior to insider sales is observed, no significant relationship is 
found for post-event short activity. Also, the relationship between margin trading and insider 
purchases become significantly negative. The overall empirical results turn to be 
uninterpretable. Also, they only study the relationships between short selling with insider sales, 
and margin trading with insider purchase. With reference to Blau and Wade (2012), we cannot 
say that short seller (margin traders) are informed if there is a similar magnitude of increase 
prior to insider purchasing (insider selling). Only with evidence that there is a negative 
relationship between insider purchasing (insider selling) and short selling (margin trading), we 
can draw the conclusion. Our study aims to complement Chen et al. (2016) by studying the 
links between the two mechanisms and both directions of insider trading events. Thus, we 
expect a negative (positive) relationship between insider purchases and post-event short-selling 
(margin-trading) activity, while a positive (negative) one between insider sales and post-event 
short-selling (margin-trading) activity. 
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Stock analyst recommendations 
 
Information dissemination in the financial markets is of significant interest to both regulators 
and financial scholars. It has been well established in the literature that analyst 
recommendations predict future returns. Stickel (1995) and Womack (1996) find that 
favourable (unfavourable) changes in analyst recommendations are accompanied by positive 
(negative) returns at the time of the announcement. Despite bias with eight variables that have 
predictive powers for future returns, analyst recommendations show incremental predictive 
power for stock returns (Krische and Lee 2000). Barber et al. (2001) document that buying 
stocks with the most favourable consensus recommendations, along with daily portfolio 
rebalancing to analyst recommendation changes, can yield annual gross returns greater than 
four percent. Barber et al. (2010) further find that both rating levels and changes in analyst 
ratings predict future unexpected earnings. Although inconsistency exists between analysts’ 
recommendations, the predictive power of those ratings reflects at least partially analysts' 
ability to generate valuable private information. 
 
A branch of literature has studied the relationship between short selling and analyst 
recommendations. Francis et al. (2005) find that analysts revise downward earnings forecasts 
more severely for firms with unexpected high levels of short positions. This evidence suggests 
that short sellers are able to exploit the market’s misperception of firm fundamentals. With a 
sample of 670 downgrades of Nasdaq stocks, Christophe et al. (2010) find abnormal activity 
levels of short selling prior to the release of analyst downgrades. The increased short sales are 
significantly related to the subsequent stock price reacting to downgrades. This finding is 
consistent with the theory in Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) that short sellers are informed 
traders who can profit by trading shares before the negative information reaches the public. 
Christophe et al. (2010) name their finding as ‘the informed front-running hypothesis’, arguing 
that short sellers receive tips from their brokerages about the upcoming analyst downgrades. 
Boehmer et al. (2012) study the sources of short sellers’ informational advantage. Similarly, 
heavier shorting is observed the week before analyst downgrades. Shorting predictability 
remains after controlling for analyst recommendations, signifying that short sellers know more 
than stock analysts about firm fundamentals. 
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While Blau and Wade (2012) question this conclusion that no evidence of a declining short-
selling pattern is found prior to analyst upgrades. Engelberg et al. (2012) find that a substantial 
portion of short sellers’ trading advantage comes from their superior ability to analyse public 
information. As short sellers are considered taking better use of public information, we should 
examine the link between analyst recommendations and short-selling activity from both 
perspectives. Along with the idea of Blau and Wade (2012), we examine the relationship 
between stock analyst ratings and short-selling (margin-trading) activity from both sides of 
downgrade and upgrade. By this way, we can seek further insights into the predictive value of 
analyst recommendations, enhancing our understanding of how they are employed by different 
market participants as part of their investment strategy. We propose that short sellers and 
margin traders take stock analyst recommendations as one source of their information to make 
their final investment decisions. Thus, we expect that a decline (an increase) occurs in the level 
of short-selling (margin-trading) activity after an analyst upgrade, while an increase (a decline) 
occurs after an analyst downgrade. 
 
Block trading events 
 
A block trade in stock markets is a significant order often placed by institutional investors for 
sale or purchase of a large number of securities in the normal course of the auction market8.  
There is a buyer and A seller in each trade, while a block is purchased or sold is an ambiguous 
concept. The value of blockage discount rate can be both positive and negative. The majority 
blocks, however, trade on a negative discount rate (Kraus and Stoll 1972). It is the difference 
between the market value of a stock and its sale price when transacted under a block trade. 
Negotiated by the involved institutional investors, blockage discount rate of intraday orders of 
the same stock can be different, since it incorporates many factors as market liquidity, the size 
of the trade, and even negotiation issues. A positive blockage discount rate implies the 
transacted stock is highly coveted by investors, while a significant negative rate indicates 
unpopularity of the stock among investors. As in fact, the blockage discount rate reflects the 
                                                 
8 In the US, a block of securities will typically consist of 10,000 shares or debt securities valued over $200,000. 
As for the minimum requirement of block trade in the Chinese stock markets, it must be consisted of at least 
300,000 shares or debt securities valued over RMB2,000,000. 
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demand and supply status of a stock, we, therefore, adopt it as a sentiment indicator to 
individual stocks.  
 
Kraus and Stoll (1972) investigate the extent to which block trading taken by institutional 
investors contributes to or detracts from market efficiencies. They examine whether the price 
effects accompanying block trades can be ascribed to a change in the underlying value of a 
stock, which is called information effect; or to a temporary deviation of prices, which is called 
distribution effect. In their study, blocks are classified into three groups: those that traded below 
the price prior to the block (minus-tick), those that traded at a price equal to the price prior to 
the block (zero-tick) and those that traded at a price above the price prior to the block (plus-
tick). For plus-tick blocks, the evidence indicates that price effects reflect changes in the 
underlying value of the stock. While the results from minus tick blocks show some form of 
distribution effect. Within the day, closing price showed a significant average reversal of the 
block trade price. Therefore, the majority block trades cannot change the fundamental value of 
a stock. As widely-considered advanced traders, short sellers and margin traders may able to 
identify this fact.  If so, no significant links would be found between minus tick blocks and the 
two mechanisms focused in our study. We then expect a negative (positive) relationship 
between plus-tick blocks and short-selling (margin-trading) activity, whereas a positive 
(negative) one between minus-tick blocks and short-selling (margin-trading) activity. 
 
      5.2.4 Firm-specific Control Factors 
 
Previous margin activities 
 
In addition to stock returns, previous short-selling (margin-trading) activity itself could be a 
factor which determines the current level of short interest (margin interest). Given the evidence 
of serial correlation in Appendix 5.2, we expect a negative relationship between previous and 
current short-selling activities.  
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Regarding margin trading, margin debt rises and falls with markets. The basis of margin traders 
for making loans against equities naturally increases when the value of that portfolio goes up. 
Margin debt declines when the value of that underlying collateral goes down. That is how 
margin works. Since inertia is well-acknowledged and common in stock returns, a positive 
relationship is expected between previous and the current level of margin purchases. 
 
 
Previous stock performance 
 
We may differentiate fundamental traders and technical traders by that the latter typically apply 
some forms of trading rules to historical price performance to make investing decisions.  
Diether et al. (2009) provide evidence that intensified short-selling activities normally follow 
positive stock returns in the expectation of a price fall in the next period. A positive feedback 
trader, however, would extrapolate any trend into the next period. As such, short sellers make 
transactions following a price fall with the expectation of another negative return in the next 
period. However, empirical results of feedback trading behaviour of margin traders are mixed. 
Hirose et al. (2009) document that margin traders in Japan follow positive feedback trading 
behaviour for small-firm stocks and negative feedback trading behaviour for large firm stocks. 
Although all our 90 sample stocks are blue-chip stocks with the largest capitalisation among 
the A-share stocks, with the results of Chapter 4 we predict a positive relationship between the 
historical stock returns and margin-loans positions. Thus, we expect a positive relationship 
between the lagged stock returns and short-selling (margin-trading) activity. 
 
Firm-level volatility 
 
The stock risks may also be an important factor of short-selling and margin-trading activities. 
Firstly, it may motivate short sales aimed at reducing exposure to market risk through hedging. 
Also, it indicates the heterogeneity of investors’ beliefs about the value of a stock, which can 
induce growing transactions of both short-selling and margin-trading activities. Since share 
specific-risk cannot be directly observed, a proxy variable must be adopted. A few candidates 
exist in this context, including option implied volatilities, historical volatility, GARCH 
estimates and intraday trading range. As options trading is currently unavailable in the Chinese 
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stock markets, we adopt two volatility measures with slightly different definitions, historical 
volatility and intraday trading range, to see which of them is more relevant to our dependent 
variables. The former risk is defined as the standard deviation of recent days’ price changes, 
while the latter is the difference between the highest price and the lowest price of a stock on a 
day. For the historical volatility measure, we expect a negative relationship of it with either of 
our dependent variables, since a period of volatility may suggest an unsteady trend of future 
prices. In this case, investing in short-selling and margin-trading positions would be much 
riskier than the steady period, and the costs of short selling and margin trading would be too 
high. For intraday measure the trading range, we anticipate a positive relationship between 
firm-specific risks and short selling, while a negative one with margin trading. 
 
Financial ratios 
 
A large body of evidence demonstrates that ratios of fundamental value to market value 
systematically predict future stock returns. These ratios compare estimates of intrinsic values 
based on accounting data to observed market prices. They range from simple data such as 
earnings per share (EPS) and book-to-market values (e.g., Fama and French, 1995; Lakonishok 
et al., 1994) to ratios based on more sophisticated valuation models (e.g., Ohlson, 1995; 
Frankel and Lee, 1998; Dechow et al., 1999). In a rational expectations model as Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1987), new information of an asset could be quickly and accurately impounded 
into the price. The positive information will lead stock price to rise, while any negative 
information leads price to fall. Given the well documented predictive ability of these ratios 
with respect to future stock returns, they provide a natural starting point for investigating the 
trading strategies of short sellers and margin traders. 
 
Dechow et al. (2001) and Christophe et al. (2004) argue that firms with low ratios of 
fundamentals are known to have systematically lower future stock returns. Thus, investors may 
monitor firms’ fundamentals and sell stocks when their fundamentals decline. The literature 
suggests that the relevant set of fundamentals may include dividend yield (DY), earnings per 
share (EPS), the price-to-book ratio (PTBR). We then use these ratios of a firm’s fundamental 
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value as potential motivations of short-selling and margin-trading activities. We expect a 
negative (positive) relationship between corporate financial indicators and short-selling 
(margin-trading) activity. Thus, for the first two measures, DY and EPS, a negative (positive) 
relationship with short-selling (margin-trading) activity is anticipated. The price-to-book ratio 
attempts to find the value of a company by comparing the stock price of a firm to its accounting 
value. This ratio is used to identify undervalued or overvalued stocks by taking the market 
value and dividing it by book value. If the ratio is above 1 then the share is overvalued; if it is 
less than one, the share is undervalued. Thus, a positive (negative) relationship is anticipated 
between PTBR and short-selling (margin-trading) activity. 
 
Ex-dividend date  
 
The dividend payments may have a significant impact on the decision process of short sellers 
since more costs may occur if a short selling transaction is accompanied by dividend payments. 
During the process of dividend distribution, there are three key dates, which are the record date, 
the ex-dividend date and the final payment date. The record date is the cut-off date when a firm 
determines whether their shareholders are eligible to receive a dividend. The shareholders who 
are on record will then be entitled to receive the dividend declared by the firm. Next to the 
record date is the ex-dividend date, anyone who holds stocks immediately before this date is 
entitled to a dividend. In other words, an investor will not receive the dividend on and after this 
date. Under the mechanism of short selling, investors not only have to pay back the borrowed 
equities but also give back the dividend payments occur during the entire transaction period. 
As for margin traders, things go opposite. We thus expect a positive (negative) relationship 
between the ex-dividend date and short-selling (margin-trading) activity. 
 
 
      5.2.5 Market-level Independent Factors 
 
Investor sentiment 
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Investor sentiment, defined broadly, is a belief about future cash flows and investment risks 
that are not justified by the facts at hand. A large amount of literature documents that investor 
sentiment affects stock prices (e.g., FisherKenneth 2000; Brown and Cliff 2004), but no 
consensus is reached about how to measure investor sentiment and quantify the effects. Baker 
and Wurgler (2007) list candidate measures of investor sentiment, including “surveys; mood 
proxies; retail investor trades; mutual fund flows; trading volume; premia on dividend-paying 
stocks; closed-end fund discounts; option implied volatility; first-day returns on initial public 
offerings (IPOs); volume of initial public offerings; new equity issues; and insider trading.” 
With consideration of their relevance and data availability, we choose three measures for the 
investor sentiment in the A-share market. The first one is consumer confidence index; the 
second one is market trading volume, which is proxied with market turnover; and the third one 
is IPO volume, which is proxied with the number of newly listed shares in the A-share market. 
Shen and Yu (2013) explore the role of investor sentiment in the pricing of a broad set of 
macro-related risk factors. Qiu and Welch (2004) suggest that the consumer confidence based 
measure can robustly explain the small-firm return spread and the return spread between stocks 
held disproportionately by retail investors and those held by institutional investors. Their 
evidence supports the view that investor sentiment plays a role in financial markets, and 
especially it is related to stock returns. Short selling is the practice of going short of borrowed 
stock with the expectation that the stock price will soon fall, allowing short sellers to purchase 
it back for a profit. More short selling transactions are expected to be taken when investors 
believe that the stock market is recessing, since a bearish status of the stock market is closely 
related to future stock returns. Under a bear market, investors tend to hold more shorting 
positions to make profits. We thus expect a negative (positive) relationship between bullish 
investor sentiment and short-selling (margin-trading) activity. 
 
      5.2.6 Market-level Control Factor 
 
Stock market performance 
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Another possibility is that technical traders may base their decisions on general market 
movements rather than those of individual stocks, in which case short-selling and margin-
trading activities may be related to previous market returns. The nature of these relationships, 
however, is not clear. Lamont and Stein (2004) find that total amount of short positions moves 
counter market trends, that is, short-selling activity falls as the market approaches its peak. This 
evidence could be taken as support for the view that the market can remain irrational longer 
than a trader can remain solvent (McKenzie and Henry 2012). While Asensio (2001) argues 
that a bull market could be a fertile ground for short sellers. As such, short sales positions may 
increase as a market approaches its peak and these positions would profit from the correction. 
Unlike short sellers who are typical contrarian traders, margin traders tend to be momentum 
traders in investing. Therefore, a positive relationship is expected between short-selling 
(margin-trading) activity and bullish past market performance. 
 
 
5.3 Data  
 
      5.3.1 Sample Data 
 
While the previous literature has typically considered US data, in this study, daily information 
of short selling and margin trading of Chinese A-shares is used. Brent et al. (1990) 
hypothesized that short sales is induced by speculation, arbitrage and taxation issues 
surrounding the deferment of capital gains. Using US data from 1974 to 1986, they test each 
of these three factors in turn. A major limitation of Brent et al. (1990) arises from its adoption 
of monthly data on open short interest. Since the majority of short-sales volume is attributed to 
short-term investing strategies, using monthly data has obvious deficiencies for the study to 
capture the effect of daily trading strategies of short selling.  
 
Only from the millennium has a higher frequency investigation about the topic of the 
determinants of short selling been forthcoming. Diether et al. (2009) employ daily data of the 
first quarter of 2005 of a cross-section of 2185 US equities. They find that short sellers in the  
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US are contrarian traders and tend to sell shorts following a price increase.  The Chinese stock 
market is a major financial market in the burgeoning Asian region, and its study provides an 
interesting alternative perspective to the previous US-centric studies. While previous US 
studies mostly adopt monthly data, except for the more recent literature that has got access to 
higher frequency data made available under regulation-SHO, daily activity data of short selling 
and margin trading are available in the A-share market in China.  
 
Our study objects are supposed to be the 90 designated stocks in the first launch of China’s 
2010 reform of short selling and margin trading. However, only 73 stocks on the originally 
designated list are adopted in the study. There are three issues causing this significant data loss: 
First, 13 stocks in the first batch have been deleted at least once during our sample range of the 
continuous reform implementation. To maintain data continuity and avoid data contamination, 
data of those stocks are excluded once it is deleted from the designated list. Second, three stocks 
in Shenzhen Stock Exchange delisted from the stock market, so no more trading data of this 
stock is available. Third, the stock SZ000933 becomes under special treatment and has no more 
data of margin transactions from 17/01/2017. Therefore, we adopt short-selling and margin-
trading data of remaining 73 individual stocks on the designated list. 
 
The sample period is seven years from 31/03/2010 to 31/03/2017. Daily data of short-sales 
value (SSV), margin-loans value (MLV), short-sales ratio (SSR) and margin-loans ratio (MLR) 
are adopted9. Besides, the information of industry classifications of individual stocks, analyst 
recommendations, insider trading events, block trading and IPO volume is downloaded from 
WIND database. The daily stock data of historical volatility, dividend yield, earnings per share 
and price-to-book ratio are sourced from Datastream. Other daily data of individual stock and 
the A-share market, including closing price, market price and market turnover are gathered 
over the same period. The information of ex-dividend date is from the website of NetEase 
Finance, and the CCI data is obtained from Eastmoney. 
 
                                                 
9 The short-sales ratio (SSR) is defined as the ratio of short-sales value to trading value, while the margin-loans 
ratio (MLR) is defined as the ratio of margin-loans value to trading value. 
  
150 
 
For measures without real daily data, we apply dummies to capture their impacts on short-
selling and margin-trading activities. The ex-dividend date of individual stocks measured with 
a date dummy DEx-dividend date is added to the model (McKenzie and Henry 2012). As for the 
measure of industrial type, we adopt the dummy variable DFinancials to capture the financial 
feature of individual stocks. The insider trading events are measured with three dummy 
variables in our study: DInsider trading, DInsider purchase and DInsider sale. An insider trading event 
is good (bad) news if an insider buys (sells) stocks of his own firm (Chen et al. 2016). DInsider 
trading is one if either insider purchase or insider sale occurs at day t. 
 
The financial press has long argued that analysts are reluctant to issue unfavourable investment 
information because they fear harming the potential interest of investment banking, losing 
informational access to management, and possible negative influences of future trading 
commissions (McNichols and O'Brien 1997). The academic literature generally suggests that 
these forces cause analysts to bias their true predictions toward more optimistic views. In China, 
avoiding negative sense in stock analyst ratings is particularly apparent. The data of analyst 
ratings of individual stocks and related analyst reports in details are available in Wind database. 
We use a 7-year data collection of all recommendations of 73 stocks made by analysts from 
influential brokerages in the A-share market. There are seven scales in the rating in our data of 
stock analyst recommendations, from negative to positive including sell, weak hold, neutral, 
hold, advise, accumulate, and buy. We group these scales into three general categories: 
downgrade, which contains sell and weak hold; neutral, which contains neutral and hold; and 
upgrade, which contains advise, accumulate and buy. Three dummy variables: DAnalyst rating, 
DAnalyst upgrade and DAnalyst downgrade are adopted in the study. DAnalyst upgrade (DAnalyst 
downgrade) is one if analyst upgrade (analyst downgrade) of the stock occurs in recent two days, 
otherwise it is zero. DAnalyst rating is one if either analyst upgrade or analyst downgrade occurs 
in recent two days. 
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Table 5.1 Potential Determinants of Short-selling and Margin-trading Activity 
 
          
Determinants Data Expected relationships 
Level Genre No. Factors examined Variables Type Frequency Sources SS MT 
Firm-level 
Control  
1 Previous activities on margin Lagged short-sales ratio Real Daily Wind +  
    (Lagged margin-loans ratio) Real Daily Wind  + 
2 Previous stock performance Lagged stock returns Real Daily Wind + - 
3 Firm-level volatility Historical volatility Real Daily Datastream - - 
    Trading range Real Daily Wind + - 
4 Financial ratios Dividend yield Real Daily Datastream - + 
    Earnings per share Real Daily Datastream - + 
    Price-to-book ratio Real Daily Datastream + - 
5 Ex-dividend date DEx-dividend date Dummy Daily NetEase Finance + - 
Independent  
6 Industry type DFinancials Dummy Daily Wind + + 
7 Insider trading events DInsider trading Dummy Daily Wind √ √ 
  DInsider purchase Dummy Daily Wind - + 
  DInsider sale Dummy Daily Wind + - 
8 Analyst recommendations DAnalyst rating Dummy Daily Wind √ √ 
  DAnalyst upgrade Dummy Daily Wind - + 
    DAnalyst downgrade Dummy Daily Wind + - 
9 Block trades DLagged block order Dummy Daily Wind √ √ 
    DLagged plus-tick order Dummy Daily Wind - + 
  DLagged minus-tick order Dummy Daily Wind + - 
Market-level 
Control  10 Previous market performance Lagged market returns Real Daily Wind + + 
Independent 
11 Investor Sentiment DConsumer confidence index Dummy Monthly Eastmoney - + 
  Market turnover Real Daily Wind - + 
   IPO volume Real Daily Wind - + 
Notes: This table summarises the factors and their corresponding variables, which are potential determinants of short-selling and margin-trading activities. The rightmost two columns list the expected relationships between the two dependent variables, short-
selling (margin-trading) activities, and the examined variables separately. A plus sign ‘+’ indicates a positive relationship between the dependent variable and certain independent variable, while a minus sign ‘-’ indicates a negative one between the two. √ 
denotes a significant relationship between the dependent variable and the factor examined at the 10% level.  
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Following Kraus and Stoll (1972)’s approach, we count the total number of each type of block 
trades daily. A single securities trade on the A-share market can be executed as a block trade 
if its trading volume is no less than 300,000 shares or the trading value is no less than RMB 2 
million (Shenzhen stock exchange, 2016). The separate analyses are conducted for trades over 
RMB 2 million on minus ticks and plus ticks. Since the block trade discount rate is different 
by each order, we then apply the information as dummy variables:  DLagged block order, DLagged 
plus-tick order and DLagged minus-tick order. The reason we use lagged data of block traders is that 
block trades are only approved and conducted during the after-hours trading period in the A-
share market. In this case, the impact of block trading events is deferred to the second day’s 
trading activities on margin. DLagged block order is one if either plus-tick order or minus-tick 
order occurs on the previous day. 
 
      5.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics of daily stock returns, short-selling and margin-trading activities of 
the 73 stocks are provided separately in Appendix 5.1. The statistics including the mean, the 
minimum and the maximum return, the standard deviation, and the Jarque-Bera statistic are 
reported in Panel A. The stock returns are calculated with the logarithmic difference equation, 
𝑅𝑡 = 100 × 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑡/𝑃𝑡−1). The mean return of 12 out of 73 stocks are negative, and the lowest 
returns are -0.027 for SZ24 and -0.012 for SH48. The significant JB statistics of all analysed 
time series strongly support the non-normality of return distributions. Panel B and C are mean 
values of daily short-selling and margin-trading activities. The two data types of original short-
selling activities are short-sales value and short interest, while the data of original margin 
trading activities are margin-loans value and margin interest. The unit of the four measures is 
ten thousand Chinese yuan. The average value of daily short sales among studied stocks is 
1,536.175, while the average value of daily margin loans is around seven times of its short-
selling counterpart at 10,311.441. The mean of short interest is 1,292.674, while the mean of 
margin interest is 148,854.886. As we can see from the above comparisons, the trading 
activities of short selling are much lesser than margin trading in the Chinese A-share market 
during our study period.   
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Figure 5.1 presents a plot of the total value of daily short sales and margin loans across all 73 
object stocks as well as the A-share Index. As can be seen, the A-share market experiences a 
quite stable period for the first four sample year. After a short period of dramatic increase 
peaking at ¥7,200 on June 2015, the index declines sharply to a relatively higher level than the 
original and remains steady. The changes in the index’s trend are important, as it suggests that 
the analysis results of our study are taken across a range of different market conditions. 
 
Figure 5.1 Total Short sales and margin loans across sample stocks and A-share Index 
Notes: The black line represents the A-share Index. The orange and grey columns represent activities of short selling 
and margin trading, respectively.  
 
  
After the introduction of the two mechanisms in 2010, activities of short selling and margin 
trading remains a rather low level during the adaptive phase of the first two years.  It is 
noticeable that activities of both margin loans and short sales increase significantly along with 
the coming of a bull market.  Under the bearish market, margin loans decline sharply while 
short sales keep an increasing trend, which is consistent with the notion that short-selling 
activities move counter-cyclically (Lamont and Stein 2004).  
 
Figure 5.2 plot the total value of daily short sales and margin loans across 22 financial stocks 
and 51 non-financial stocks of our sample. Although the number of financial stocks in our 
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sample is at least two times lesser than non-financial stocks, the total trading amount of short 
selling and margin trading across financial stocks are much higher than its counterparts, 
especially during times of volatility. This indicates that financial stocks are more attractive to 
short sellers and margin traders in the Chinese A-share market.  
 
Figure 5.2 Total Short sales and margin loans of 22 financial stocks and 51 non-financial stocks 
Notes: The black line represents the A-share Index. The orange and grey columns separately represent daily activities of 
short selling and margin trading across 22 financial stocks included in our sample. 
 
 
Notes: The black line represents the A-share Index. The orange and grey columns separately represent daily activities of 
short selling and margin trading across 51 non-financial stocks included in our sample.  
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Some stock investors tend to make trading decisions based on previous trades. Similarly, one 
possible strategy adopted by short sellers and margin traders is to trade stocks based on the 
previous levels of short interest or margin interest. Appendix 5.2 shows autocorrelations of 
daily short-selling and margin-trading activities up to the fifth order separately in panel A and 
panel B. Since short sellers have to close their shorting positions by buying the stock back, the 
short-sales volume would become an indicator of the future demand of a stock. Similarly, the 
margin-loans volume would be a signal of the declining price soon, since margin traders must 
sell current holdings to pay off the borrowed cash. However, it can be clearly seen from the 
table that both autocorrelations of short-sales value and margin-loans are consistently positive 
and significant for each stock. The evidence of our study supports the view that both short 
sellers and margin traders tend to acquire information from previous margin activities. 
 
As market risk is an essential factor influencing securities pricing, short-selling (margin-trading) 
activities across our studied stocks may have positive correlations. This is because where the 
market is bearish, both stock prices and margin-trading activities are expected to decline, and 
speculative short selling may increase. While when a bullish market comes, both stock prices 
and margin-trading activities tend to grow, and short-selling activities may decrease as a result. 
Appendix 5.3 presents the correlation matrices for daily short-sales value data and daily 
margin-loans value data separately in panel A and B. As can be seen, the estimates of both 
types of transaction are quite high. The average value of the correlation coefficient of short-
sales across sample stocks is 0.737, while for margin-loans is at a relatively lower coefficient 
at 0.706. No instance of negative correlations is observed. This evidence indicates that general 
market conditions play a significant role in determining the level of margin activities in the A-
share market. This issue is considered in more details in the following section. 
 
5.4 Methodology 
 
5.4.1 Hierarchical Panel Regression 
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Following Diether et al. (2009), a pooled regression approach is adopted to estimate the 
functional relationship of the determinants of short selling (margin trading). By taking the 
model in equation (1), McKenzie and Henry (2012) study the determinants of short selling by 
distinguishing factors to information-based and non-information-based factors, which includes 
past stock performance, past short selling activity, risk, company fundamentals, ex-dividend 
date, and market returns and short selling.  However, our study attempts to identify the potential 
determinants of short-selling and margin-trading activities by distinguishing investors’ 
motivations to firm-specific and market-wide factors. All factors listed in Table 5.1 are added 
to the equation (1) to see whether they are significant determinants to short-selling (margin-
trading) activity in the Chinese stock markets.  
 
As shown in Table 5.1, some examined factors are proxied by a number of different variables. 
Following McKenzie and Henry (2012), our study conducts a hierarchical approach to the 
model design. The hierarchical approach to modelling touches on issues which are currently 
being developed in the general-to-specific modelling literature (Campos et al. 2005).  Owing 
to potential problems with multicollinearity, each variable is tested in turn and a parsimonious 
model of short-selling (margin-trades) activity is constructed. As a final regression in the study, 
a model which brings all the significant variables together from the previous analysis is 
established. In this case, the short-selling (margin-trading) activity has its specified function of 
statistically significant variables.  
 
Besides, we examine the determinants of margin activities by adopting three sub-regressions 
of each test: the general regression, the regression focusing on positive information, and the 
regression focusing on negative information. The main difference between these three sub-
regressions is due to three events factors considered in our study: insider trading events, stock 
analyst recommendations and block trades.   
 
The generic determinants model of short-selling (or margin-trading) activity is specified as: 
 
                                             𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                             (5.1) 
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Or 
 
                                                   𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                              (5.2) 
 
Where 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 (𝑀𝑇𝑖𝑡) is the logarithm of short-sales value (margin-loans value) for stock i on day 
t. X is a vector of j independent variables that theory suggests determining the level of short-
selling (margin-trading) activity. 𝛼s are parameters to be estimated, and the error term 𝜀𝑡~N 
(0,1).  
 
As for the main tests, we choose the scaled data of short-selling and margin-trading activities, 
short-sales ratio and margin-loans ratio to do the regressions. Although the complete time range 
of these data is seven years from 31/03/2010 to 31/03/2017, in the main regressions we only 
adopt five years and three months’ data from 04/01/2012 to 31/03/2017. This is because of that 
during the first two years after the introduction of short selling and margin trading in China, 
there is a quite small volume of trading on margin and many of the data are discontinuous, 
which would lead to spurious estimated results. 
 
5.4.2 Robustness Tests 
 
Early studies into the information content of short sales could not establish a significant 
relationship (Figlewski, 1981; Brent et al., 1990; Figlewski and Webb, 1993; and Woolridge 
and Dickinson, 1994). Asquith and Muelbroek (1996) argue that the principal reason for this 
failure is because the level of short selling was too small to be of consequence. It is important 
for us to consider the level of short-sales volume relative to the market in which they are traded. 
Thus, we adopt activities data of short-sales ratio and margin-loans ratio during the period 
04/01/2012 to 31/03/2017 as our main regressions. In addition to the main tests, we conduct 
another two groups of robustness tests for the determinants of short selling and margin trading. 
Firstly, we use the original activity data of short selling and margin trading, short-sales value 
and margin-loans value, to see if there are any differences between the results. Secondly, with 
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SSR and MLR data from 31/03/2010 to 31/03/2017, we extend the original time range from 
five years and three months to seven years. 
 
5.5 Empirical results 
 
As mentioned before, we argue that short-selling (margin-trading) activity is a function of 
various factors at both firm and market level. Equation (5.1) and (5.2) show a standardized 
form of the pooled testing equation in which many of these factors are proxied by different 
variables. To prevent multicollinearity issue, we test each variable in turn. In this case, a 
parsimonious model of short-selling (margin-trading) activity at the end is chosen as the final 
regression of the test. For regressions of our main test, we adopt the scaled data, the short-sales 
ratio (margin-loans ratio) as the dependent variable. And the time range of the data is five years 
and three months from 04/01/2012 to 31/03/2017. 
 
5.5.1 Determinants of Short-selling Activity 
 
As a starting point for our analysis, the cross-sectional results from estimating equation (5.1) 
for each individual stock are presented in Table 5.2. Based on event-based factors, three sub-
tables under Table 5.2 are reported in the main body. The results of the general regression, the 
results of the regression focusing on positive information, and the results of the regression 
focusing on negative information are reported in Table 5.2.A, Table 5.2.B and Table 5.2.C, 
respectively. We turn to the latter two tables when we discuss the results of event-based factors, 
otherwise, we focus on Table 5.2.A.  
 
The results of Table 5.2.A are from the general regression of the determinants of short-sales 
ratio. The first model estimates the relationship between the dependent variable and its own 
lag. As we can see from the first column, the coefficient of the lagged short-sales ratio is 
positive and highly significant. This result is consistent with our finding of the significantly 
  
159 
 
positive autocorrelations of short-selling activity in Appendix 5.2 Compared to the significant 
result 0.5083 in the Hong Kong market (McKenzie and Henry 2012), the estimated coefficient 
in our study is higher at 0.7443. This indicates that short-selling activity in mainland China 
shows high autocorrelation level, which may be due to the differences in market maturity and 
the development stage of this mechanism. The statistic of adjusted R-squared shows that the 
explanatory power of this model is 56 percent and the p-value of F-test shows strong 
significance.   
  
Where technical strategy is employed by investors in the market, past stock price may become 
an impact factor to the level of short-selling activity. To test this possibility, a one-period 
lagged return term is added to our second model. The estimated coefficient of the lagged return 
term is significantly positive, which is consistent with our expectation and the findings by 
McKenzie and Henry (2012). Diether et al. (2009a) find that short-selling activities normally 
increase following positive stock returns in the expectation of a price fall in the next period. In 
agreement with Dither et al. (2009a), our finding of the positive relationship between the 
lagged stock return and short-selling activity indicates that short sellers are typically contrarian 
traders. 
 
The firm-specific risk, which indicates the heterogeneity of investors’ views about the value of 
a stock is also an important factor in short-selling activities. We adopt two volatility measures 
with different focuses in the study. The first measure is historical volatility, which suggests the 
risk of the stock for recent days. From the third column, we can see a significantly negative 
coefficient of historical volatility. Being consistent with our expectation, the relationship 
between short-selling activity and historical volatility is negative. Since a higher historical 
volatility may suggest an unsteady trend of stock price movements, investing in short-sales 
positions would be too risky, and the transaction costs would be too high. A significantly 
positive coefficient is found for the intraday volatility measure trading range. This result is 
consistent with our previous expectation and the finding by McKenzie and Henry (2012). It 
indicates that stocks with higher risks exhibit higher levels of short-selling activities. Since the 
t-statistic of the former measure is higher, we keep historical volatility as the risk measure for 
further regressions.   
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The model is then augmented with variables of financial ratios. Firstly, the three variables 
chosen for our regression, dividend yield, earnings per share and the price-to-book ratio are 
tested in turn in the model. Then, the three variables are simultaneously included in the 
regression. A significantly negative coefficient is found for both DY and EPS, while for the 
PTBR, a significantly positive coefficient is found. All these results are consistent with our 
expectations and findings by McKenzie and Henty (2012). Our results provide evidence that 
short-selling activity intensifies when the fundamentals of a stock decline. We eventually keep 
EPS as the fundamental measure since it has the highest t-statistic and the adjusted R-squared 
value. 
 
The next factor to be included in the main regression is the event of the ex-dividend date. A 
dummy variable is adopted for this factor. An insignificant coefficient with a positive sign is 
found for the ex-dividend date dummy. Since on or after the ex-dividend date, short sellers can 
avoid paying any extra dividend payments to occur during the entire transaction period, we 
expect a positive relationship between the ex-dividend date and short-selling activity. Our 
estimated result, however, shows that there is possibly a positive relationship between the two 
as we expect, but short sellers in the Chinese A-share market seem do not consider the dividend 
issues as a key factor to their short-sales positions. 
 
Besides the control variables discussed above, we also add potential firm-specific factors which 
have never been examined in previous studies of the determinants of short-selling activity.  
Firstly, we extend our model with the factor of individual stock’s industry type. More 
specifically, we adopt a financial dummy to see whether short sellers pay more attention to 
stocks belong to the financial sector. As we can see from the table, a positive and significant 
coefficient of the financial dummy is found. This indicates that short sellers tend to have more 
short-sales positions on financial stocks than stocks in other sectors. As discussed in the 
literature, financial firms providing loans for businesses, mortgages to homeowners and 
insurance to consumers, suffice to predict the general market conditions. Besides, the financial 
sector plays increasingly more important role in the economy of China. Our results provide 
evidence that financial stocks are more attractive to short sellers due to their influential feature. 
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We also investigate the relationship between short-sales position and insider trading events. As 
an event factor, we introduce a date dummy to see whether its occurrence influences the level 
of short-selling activity. Besides a general regression of the event itself, we run two further 
regressions separately focusing on the event with positive information (insider purchase) and 
the event with negative information (insider sale). From Table 5.2.A, an insignificantly positive 
relationship is found between insider trading event and post-event short-selling activity. It 
seems further investigation of this factor is needed. By categorising the factor into another two 
sub-variables, we get the regression results in Table 5.2.B and Table 5.2.C. As can be seen, an 
insignificantly negative coefficient is found between insider purchase and the dependent 
variable, while a significantly positive one is found for insider sale. These results are consistent 
with our expectations and indicate that when short sellers make their investment decisions, they 
pay closer attention to insider sales than insider purchases. Chen et al. (2016) study the link 
between insider trading and short positions in the A-share market. Focusing on insider sales, 
they find abnormally high levels of short positions prior to insider sales, but no significant 
relationship is found for post-event short-selling activity. Our study provides further evidence 
that short sellers are not only capable of predicting the future trend of stock prices but are also 
sophisticated traders who can capture the information contained in insider sales.   
 
Another factor included in the model is stock analyst recommendations. Similar to insider 
trading events, we adopt three date dummies to investigate the relationship between analyst 
ratings and short-selling activity. First, a positive and significant coefficient is observed for the 
general factor analyst ratings in Table 5.2.A. Then we do two further regressions to find the 
reason why this coefficient is significant. As shown in Table 5.2.B and Table 5.2.C, a 
significant positive coefficient is found for analyst upgrade while an insignificant negative one 
is found for analyst downgrade. These results indicate that short sellers are more sensitive to 
analyst upgrades than analyst downgrades. And there will be intensified short-sales positions 
when a stock is upgraded by an analyst, which is inconsistent with our previous expectation. 
 
We propose that short sellers take stock analyst recommendations as one source of their 
information to make their final investment decisions. And we expect a decline occurs in the 
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level of short-selling activity after an analyst upgrade, since an analyst upgrade will exert a 
positive impact on the future trend of the stock prices. However, our regression results seem 
to be opposite to our hypothesis. This might because of the quality of analyst reporting varies 
widely in the current A-share market. Compared to well-regulated format in analyst ratings in 
the developed markets, the scaling systems in analyst ratings in China are extremely confusing. 
Rather than a uniformed scaling system in the developed markets, we have literally collected 
17 different versions of scales in the current A-share market during our data collection process. 
Although some of these scales are sharing the same meaning, analysts from different financial 
institutes and companies use different wordings. Besides, avoiding negative sense in stock 
analyst ratings is normal in China. The academic literature suggests that this force causes bias 
predictions by analysts that are more optimistic than the facts (McNichols and O'Brien 1997). 
With data of Nasdaq stocks, Christophe et al. (2010) find abnormal levels of short-sales 
positions prior to the release of analyst downgrades. The increased short positions are 
significantly related to the subsequent stock prices reacting to the downgrades. Boehmer et al. 
(2012) investigate the sources of short sellers’ informational advantage. A heavier level of short 
positions is observed the week before analyst downgrades, and the predictability of short-
selling activity remains after controlling for analyst ratings. Findings of these two studies 
signify that short sellers know more than stock analysts about firm fundamentals. And this 
could be a reason why we find a positive relationship between short selling and analyst 
upgrades.  
 
As the last firm-specific factor, we add block trades as a potential determinant of short-selling 
activity. First, a significantly positive coefficient is found for the general factor block trades in 
Table 5.2.A. This indicates that there is a relationship between block trading events and short-
sales positions. Then in Table 5.2.B and Table 5.2.C, a significantly positive relationship is 
observed between plus-tick orders and short-selling activity, while an insignificant negative 
one is observed for minus-tick orders. The result of minus-tick orders is consistent with our 
expectation. As the finding by Kraus and Stoll (1972), minus-tick blocks only have distribution 
effect but not make changes in the underlying value of the stock.  
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However, we obtain an inconsistent result with our expectation in terms of plus-tick blocks. 
Since the evidence provided by Kraus and Stoll (1972) showing that plus-tick orders influence 
the underlying value of the stock, we expected short sellers, as advanced traders in the market, 
can identify this fact and trade according to it. However, short sellers in the Chinese markets 
are contrarian to plus-tick trading activities. This is possibly because of the unregulated 
situation in the Chinese market. As we know, traders who can conduct heavy short positions 
and block trades are mainly institutional traders. And it is notorious in the A-share market, that 
institutions manipulate stock prices relying on their capital advantage. Thus, one possible 
explanation of the positive relationship found between plus-tick orders and short-selling 
activity is that short sellers are advanced traders who can identify the intrinsic impact of block 
trader activity.     
 
Besides idiosyncratic factors, we extend our model by adding potential factors with market-
wide information. The first factor considered is the past stock market performance. We adopt 
a one-period lagged date dummy for market stock return. As can be seen in Table 5.2.A, a 
significant and positive coefficient is found for the lagged market return term, which is 
consistent with the findings of McKenzie and Henry (2012). Asensio (2001) argues that a 
bullish market is a fertile ground for short sellers. However, short-sales positions may increase 
as a market approaching its peak. Our result suggests that short sellers employ contrarian 
trading as the dominant strategy and they rely on price reversals to make profits. 
 
Lastly, we add a group of variables related to investor sentiment to our model.  There are 
several studies documents that investor sentiment affects stock prices (e.g., FisherKenneth 
2000; Brown and Cliff 2004). It would be interesting to see whether investment sentiment will 
be a factor influencing the level of short-selling activity. Three variables including CCI,
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   Table 5.2.A The determinants of short-selling activity: general regression with short-sales ratio 
 
Notes: This table presents regression estimates of equation 𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 where the independent variable 𝑋𝑗𝑠 in each equation are specified in the leftmost column. The statistics of goodness-of-fit measures including R-squared, adjusted R-squared and p-value of F-test 
are shown at the bottom of the table. The column in shading is the final regression of the test. The t-statistics presented in parentheses are the t-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
respectively.   
   
Dependent variable: 
Ln(SSR) 
Regression in hierarchical approach 
C 
-0.0239*** 
(-5.50) 
-0.0209*** 
(-4.86) 
0.1538*** 
(6.12) 
-0.0299*** 
(-5.42) 
0.0989*** 
(3.50) 
0.2085*** 
(7.76) 
0.1636*** 
(6.48) 
0.1534*** 
(5.28) 
0.2085*** 
(7.76) 
0.2080*** 
(7.76) 
0.2077*** 
(7.76) 
0.2048*** 
(7.62) 
0.2110*** 
(7.84) 
0.1949*** 
(7.25) 
2.6897*** 
(18.61) 
0.4971*** 
(16.16) 
0.2252*** 
(8.35) 
2.0039*** 
(13.29) 
Ln(SSR(-1)) 
0.7443*** 
(314.08) 
0.7492*** 
(318.13) 
0.7481*** 
(317.11) 
0.7492*** 
(318.14) 
0.7476*** 
(316.55) 
0.7474*** 
(316.46) 
0.7478*** 
(316.84) 
0.7462*** 
(315.17) 
0.7474*** 
(316.45) 
0.7474*** 
(316.45) 
0.7474*** 
(316.45) 
0.7473*** 
(316.36) 
0.7476*** 
(316.42) 
0.7483*** 
(317.46) 
0.7413*** 
(310.64) 
0.7403*** 
(310.35) 
0.7462*** 
(315.88) 
0.7367*** 
(306.94) 
Ri(-1)  
0.0627*** 
(36.04) 
0.0630*** 
(36.81) 
0.0627*** 
(36.06) 
0.0627*** 
(36.01) 
0.0630*** 
(36.20) 
0.0630*** 
(36.18) 
0.0626*** 
(35.97) 
0.0630*** 
(36.20) 
0.0631*** 
(36.17) 
0.0630*** 
(36.20) 
0.0632*** 
(36.28) 
0.0632*** 
(36.28) 
0.0915*** 
(41.39) 
0.0908*** 
(41.11) 
0.0902*** 
(40.84) 
0.0914*** 
(41.39) 
0.0899*** 
(40.80) 
Historical volatility 
  
-0.4315*** 
(-7.06)  
-0.3906*** 
(-6.31) 
-0.4187*** 
(-6.85) 
-0.4593*** 
(-7.46) 
-0.3808*** 
(-6.09) 
-0.4186*** 
(-6.85) 
-0.4179*** 
(-6.83) 
-0.4175*** 
(-6.82) 
-0.4207*** 
(-6.88) 
-0.4262*** 
(-6.96) 
-0.4053*** 
(-6.63) 
-0.6907*** 
(-10.94) 
-0.8839*** 
(-13.49) 
-0.4321*** 
(-7.07) 
-0.9612*** 
(-14.54) 
Trading range 
   
0.0168*** 
(2.61)               
Dividend yield 
    
-0.0171*** 
(-4.24)   
-0.0254*** 
(-6.05)           
EPS 
     
-0.0603*** 
(-5.74)  
-0.0791*** 
(-7.22) 
-0.0634*** 
(-5.74) 
-0.0631*** 
(-5.74) 
-0.0604*** 
(-5.75) 
-0.0603*** 
(-5.74) 
-0.0614*** 
(-5.82) 
-0.0616*** 
(-5.86) 
-0.0519*** 
(-4.93) 
-0.0389*** 
(-3.69) 
-0.0593*** 
(-5.64) 
-0.0371*** 
(-3.52) 
Price-to-book ratio 
      
0.0002*** 
(3.67) 
0.0002*** 
(3.53)           
DEx-dividend date 
        
0.0100 
(0.17)          
DFinancials          
0.0495*** 
(5.23)    
0.0493*** 
(5.20) 
0.0462*** 
(4.88) 
0.0456*** 
(4.82) 
0.0491*** 
(5.19) 
0.0447*** 
(4.73) 
DInsider trading           
0.0294 
(0.71)        
DAnalyst rating            
0.0350*** 
(2.64)  
0.0425*** 
(3.20) 
0.0436*** 
(3.29) 
0.0411*** 
(3.10) 
0.0418*** 
(3.16) 
0.0418*** 
(3.16) 
DLagged block order 
            
0.0431* 
(1.65) 
0.0437* 
(1.65) 
0.0749*** 
(2.83) 
0.0709*** 
(2.68) 
0.0523** 
(1.97) 
0.0885*** 
(3.35) 
RM(-1)              
0.0639*** 
(20.60) 
0.0651*** 
(21.01) 
0.0670*** 
(21.64) 
0.0645*** 
(20.83) 
0.0673*** 
(21.78) 
CCI 
              
-0.0230*** 
(-17.56)   
-0.0144*** 
(-10.22) 
Market turnover                
-0.0004*** 
(-16.03)  
-0.0003*** 
(-10.18) 
IPO number 
                
-0.0329*** 
(-11.57) 
-0.0183*** 
(-6.26) 
R-squared  0.5630 0.5699 0.5702 0.5699 0.5703 0.5704 0.5703 0.5706 0.5704 0.5705 0.5704 0.5704 0.5706 0.5728 0.5749 0.5745 0.5735 0.5758 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5626 0.5695 0.5697 0.5696 0.5699 0.5700 0.5699 0.5702 0.5699 0.5701 0.5700 0.5700 0.5702 0.5724 0.5745 0.5740 0.5731 0.5754 
P-value of F test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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   Table 5.2.B The determinants of short-selling activity: regression on positive information with short-sales ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This table presents regression estimates of equation 𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 focusing on positive information events. The independent variable 𝑋𝑗𝑠 in each equation of our pooled testing 
are specified in the leftmost column. The statistics of goodness-of-fit measures including R-squared, adjusted R-squared and p-value of F-test are shown at the bottom of the table. The column in 
shading is the final regression of the test. The t-statistics presented in parentheses are the t-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.   
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Ln(SSR) 
Regression in hierarchical approach 
C 
0.2091*** 
(7.78) 
0.2050*** 
(7.62) 
0.2107*** 
(7.83) 
0.1949*** 
(7.25) 
2.6773*** 
(18.54) 
0.4968*** 
(16.15) 
0.2252*** 
(8.35) 
1.9905*** 
(13.22) 
Ln(SSR(-1)) 
0.7474*** 
(316.44) 
0.7473*** 
(316.34) 
0.7475*** 
(316.41) 
0.7483*** 
(317.42) 
0.7412*** 
(310.56) 
0.7402*** 
(310.27) 
0.7461*** 
(315.83) 
0.7366*** 
(306.86) 
Ri(-1) 
0.0630*** 
(36.20) 
0.0632*** 
(36.27) 
0.0634*** 
(36.33) 
0.0917*** 
(41.43) 
0.0910*** 
(41.15) 
0.0903*** 
(40.89) 
0.0917*** 
(41.43) 
0.0901*** 
(40.85) 
Historical volatility 
-0.4196*** 
(-6.86) 
-0.4210*** 
(-6.88) 
-0.4261*** 
(-6.96) 
-0.4056*** 
(-6.64) 
-0.6910*** 
(-10.94) 
-0.8840*** 
(-13.50) 
-0.4328*** 
(-7.08) 
-0.9610*** 
(-14.54) 
Trading range         
Dividend yield         
EPS 
-0.0602*** 
(-5.73) 
-0.0603*** 
(-5.74) 
-0.0610*** 
(-5.80) 
-0.0612*** 
(-5.83) 
-0.0510*** 
(-4.85) 
-0.0382*** 
(-3.62) 
-0.0587*** 
(-5.60) 
-0.0360*** 
(-3.42) 
Price-to-book ratio         
DEx-dividend date         
DFinancials    
0.0492*** 
(5.20) 
0.0466*** 
(4.93) 
0.0459*** 
(4.86) 
0.0492*** 
(5.20) 
0.0453*** 
(4.79) 
DInsider purchase 
-0.0744 
(-1.28) 
       
DAnalyst upgrade  
0.0349*** 
(2.60) 
 
0.0427*** 
(3.18) 
0.0435*** 
(3.25) 
0.0405*** 
(3.03) 
0.0421*** 
(3.14) 
0.0412*** 
(3.09) 
DLagged plus-tick order   
0.0918** 
(2.29) 
0.0920** 
(2.30) 
0.1165*** 
(2.92) 
0.1176*** 
(2.95) 
0.0977** 
(2.45) 
0.1298*** 
(3.25) 
RM(-1)  
  
0.0639*** 
(20.60) 
0.0650*** 
(21.01) 
0.0670*** 
(21.63) 
0.0646*** 
(20.83) 
0.0674*** 
(21.76) 
CCI     
-0.0229*** 
(-17.50) 
  
-0.0143*** 
(-11.14) 
Market turnover      
-0.0004*** 
(-16.05)  
-0.0003*** 
(-10.30) 
IPO number       
-0.0328*** 
(-11.55) 
-0.0182*** 
(-6.23) 
R-squared  0.5704 0.5704 0.5706 0.5728 0.5750 0.5745 0.5736 0.5758 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5699 0.5700 0.5702 0.5724 0.5745 0.5740 0.5731 0.5754 
P-value of F test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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   Table 5.2.C The determinants of short-selling activity: regression on negative information with short-sales ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This table presents regression estimates of equation 𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 focusing on negative information events. The independent variable 𝑋𝑗𝑠 in each equation of our pooled testing 
are specified in the leftmost column. The statistics of goodness-of-fit measures including R-squared, adjusted R-squared and p-value of F-test are shown at the bottom of the table. The column in 
shading is the final regression of the test. The t-statistics presented in parentheses are the t-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.   
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Ln(SSR) 
Regression in hierarchical approach 
C 
0.2068*** 
(7.70) 
0.2084*** 
(7.76) 
0.2123*** 
(7.89) 
0.1953*** 
(7.28) 
2.6647*** 
(18.46) 
0.4984*** 
(16.23) 
0.2258*** 
(8.39) 
1.9715*** 
(13.10) 
Ln(SSR(-1)) 
0.7474*** 
(316.41) 
0.7474*** 
(316.44) 
0.7476*** 
(316.35) 
0.7482*** 
(317.55) 
0.7413*** 
(310.70) 
0.7402*** 
(310.37) 
0.7461*** 
(315.95) 
0.7366*** 
(306.96) 
Ri(-1) 
0.0631*** 
(36.23) 
0.0630*** 
(36.20) 
0.0631*** 
(36.24) 
0.0912*** 
(41.26) 
0.0904*** 
(40.97) 
0.0898*** 
(40.72) 
0.0911*** 
(41.27) 
0.0895*** 
(40.67) 
Historical volatility 
-0.4157*** 
(-6.80) 
-0.4187*** 
(-6.85) 
-0.4292*** 
(-7.01) 
-0.3930*** 
(-6.644) 
-0.6762*** 
(-10.72) 
-0.8739*** 
(-13.36) 
-0.4205*** 
(-6.89) 
-0.9490*** 
(-14.38) 
Trading range         
Dividend yield         
EPS 
-0.0605*** 
(-5.75) 
-0.0604*** 
(-5.74) 
-0.0606*** 
(-5.74) 
-0.0606*** 
(-5.78) 
-0.0504*** 
(-4.81) 
-0.0374*** 
(-3.55) 
-0.0582*** 
(-5.55) 
-0.0353*** 
(-3.36) 
Price-to-book ratio         
DEx-dividend date         
DFinancials    
0.0499*** 
(5.28) 
0.0474*** 
(5.02) 
0.0465*** 
(4.93) 
0.0498*** 
(5.27) 
0.0459*** 
(4.87) 
DInsider sale 
0.0955* 
(1.67) 
  
0.1043* 
(1.83) 
0.1286** 
(2.26) 
0.1528*** 
(2.69) 
0.1239** 
(2.18) 
0.1671*** 
(2.94) 
DAnalyst downgrade  
-0.0027 
(-0.04) 
      
DLagged minus-tick order   
-0.0068 
(-0.20)      
RM(-1)  
  
0.0637*** 
(20.57) 
0.0650*** 
(21.98) 
0.0669*** 
(21.61) 
0.0644*** 
(20.81) 
0.0672*** 
(21.75) 
CCI     
-0.0228*** 
(-17.41) 
  
-0.0141*** 
(-10.00) 
Market turnover      
-0.0004*** 
(-16.08)  
-0.0003*** 
(-9.15) 
IPO number       
-0.0331*** 
(-11.63) 
-0.0185*** 
(-6.34) 
R-squared  0.5704 0.5704 0.5705 0.5726 0.5747 0.5742 0.5733 0.5756 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5700 0.5700 0.5701 0.5722 0.5743 0.5738 0.5729 0.5752 
P-value of F test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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market turnover and IPO volume are included in the model in turn. From Table 5.2., 
significantly positive coefficients are found for all three variables. After comparison between 
the t-statistics of the three variables and the adjusted R-squared values of the three regressions, 
we finally choose CCI as our explanatory variable. Our findings are consistent with what we 
expect before. Qiu and Welch (2004) provide evidence that investor sentiment plays a role in 
the trend of stock returns. As such, short selling is expected to be taken when investors believe 
that the stock market is recessing. 
 
The outcome of this hierarchical procedure generates the model presented in the fourth column 
on the right of Table 5.2., which bring all the significant factors together from previous analyses. 
With the sample of 73 stocks in the Chinese A-share market, short-selling activity is finally 
specified as a function of past short-selling activity, past stock returns, risk measured by the 
stock’s historical volatility, firm fundamentals proxied by EPS, industry type of the stock, 
insider sales, analyst upgrades, past plus-tick blocks, past market performance, and investment 
sentiment proxied by CCI. All three final estimated models have explanatory power of 57 
percent, with consistent coefficients retaining their significance.   
 
5.5.2 Determinants of Margin-trading Activity 
 
Similar to regressions done for short-selling activity in equation (5.1), the results of the 
hierarchical pooled regressions for margin-trading activity in equation (5.2) are presented in 
Table 5.3.  Based on event-based factors, three sub-tables under Table 5.3 are displayed in the 
main body. The results of the general regression, the results of the regression focusing on 
positive information, and the results of the regression focusing on negative information are 
reported in Table 5.3.A, Table 5.3.B and Table 5.3.C, respectively. We turn to the latter two 
tables when we discuss the results of event-based factors, otherwise, we focus on Table 5.3.A. 
 
Table 5.3.A presents the results of the general regression of the determinants of margin-loans 
ratio. The first model estimates the relationship between the dependent variable and its own 
one-period lag. As can be seen from the first column, the coefficient of the lagged margin-loans 
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ratio is significantly positive. This result is consistent with our finding of the significantly 
positive autocorrelations of margin-trading activity in Appendix 5.2. Compared to the 
significant result 0.7443 found for short selling, the estimated coefficient of lagged margin-
loans activity is slightly lower at 0.7266. This indicates that short selling shows a higher 
autocorrelation level than margin trading in A-share market, which might because of the 
difference in the nature of the two mechanisms. Since short selling requires a completely 
opposite trading strategy to normal stock trading, the domestic investors are possibly more 
familiar with margin trading than short selling. The statistic of the adjusted R-squared shows 
that the explanatory power of this model is 58 percent and the p-value of F-test shows strong 
significance.   
 
Next, a one-period lagged return term is added to our second model. The estimated coefficient 
of the lagged return term is significantly positive, which is consistent with our expectation. 
Hirose et al. (2009) study the Japanese stock market and find that margin traders are contrarian 
traders for small-firm stocks but contrarian traders for large-firm stocks. Since the 73 sample 
stocks adopted in our study are blue-chip stocks with the largest capitalisation among all A-
share stocks, we previously predict a negative relationship between the past stock returns and 
margin-trading activity. However, our results suggest that margin traders in the current Chinese 
market A-share market are momentum traders even for large-firm stocks. 
 
As the same to short selling, we extend the determinant model of margin trading with two 
volatility measures. The third column shows a significantly negative coefficient of historical 
volatility. Since a higher historical volatility suggests an unsteady trend of future stock price, 
a negative relationship between historical volatility and either of our two mechanisms is 
anticipated. Compared to the result of short selling, the magnitude of the estimated result of 
historical volatility is much larger for margin trading. This indicates that margin readers are 
more sensitive to stock volatility. They understand that investing in margin positions would be 
too risky and their transaction costs would be high. A significantly negative coefficient is also 
found for the intraday measure. This result is consistent with our previous expectation that 
margin-trading activity decreases when the stock becomes riskier. We keep historical volatility 
for further regressions, as it has a higher t-statistic. 
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  Table 5.3.A The determinants of margin-trading activity: general regression with margin-loans ratio 
 
Notes: This table presents regression estimates of equation 𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 where the independent variable 𝑋𝑗𝑠 in each equation are specified in the leftmost column. The statistics of goodness-of-fit measures including R-squared, adjusted R-squared and p-value of F-test 
are shown at the bottom of the table. The column in shading is the final regression of the test. The t-statistics presented in parentheses are the t-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level， 
respectively.   
 
Dependent variable: 
Ln(MLR) 
Regression in hierarchical approach 
C 
0.6847*** 
(116.35) 
0.6821*** 
(116.00) 
1.4780*** 
(107.62) 
0.6797*** 
(113.87) 
1.4677*** 
(102.51) 
1.4551*** 
(104.78) 
1.4759*** 
(107.45) 
1.4547*** 
(101.40) 
1.4556*** 
(104.81) 
1.4546*** 
(104.72) 
1.4558*** 
(104.80) 
1.4578*** 
(104.87) 
1.4533*** 
(104.61) 
1.4684*** 
(105.39) 
0.2631*** 
(5.53) 
1.3966*** 
(100.75) 
1.4683*** 
(105.30) 
0.6579*** 
(13.29) 
Ln(MLR(-1)) 
0.7266*** 
(318.74) 
0.7276*** 
(319.47) 
0.6520*** 
(258.45) 
0.7274*** 
(319.30) 
0.6519*** 
(258.38) 
0.6499*** 
(256.93) 
0.6514*** 
(257.97) 
0.6492*** 
(256.44) 
0.6498*** 
(256.89) 
0.6497*** 
(256.92) 
0.6498*** 
(256.93) 
0.6497*** 
(256.84) 
0.6502*** 
(256.73) 
0.6467*** 
(254.03) 
0.6337*** 
(245.34) 
0.6068*** 
(227.81) 
0.6467*** 
(253.92) 
0.6022*** 
(225.32) 
Ri(-1)  
0.0092*** 
(15.49) 
0.0077*** 
(13.35) 
0.0092*** 
(15.47) 
0.0078*** 
(13.42) 
0.0078*** 
(13.37) 
0.0077*** 
(13.36) 
0.0077*** 
(13.35) 
0.0078*** 
(13.37) 
0.0077*** 
(13.37) 
0.0078*** 
(13.40) 
0.0078*** 
(13.52) 
0.0077*** 
(13.30) 
0.0023*** 
(3.14) 
0.0017** 
(2.37) 
0.0006 
(0.82) 
0.0023*** 
(3.14) 
0.0004 
(0.50) 
Historical volatility 
  
-1.4956*** 
(-63.82)  
-1.4881*** 
(-63.02) 
-1.5160*** 
(-64.53) 
-1.4844*** 
(-63.14) 
-1.5066*** 
(-63.16) 
-1.5161*** 
(-64.53) 
-1.5163*** 
(-64.54) 
-1.5171*** 
(-64.55) 
-1.5157*** 
(-64.52) 
-1.5142*** 
(-64.42) 
-1.5256*** 
(-64.89) 
-1.4464*** 
(-61.26) 
-1.3318*** 
(-56.38) 
-1.5255*** 
(-64.88) 
-1.2995*** 
(-54.92) 
Trading range 
   
-0.0051** 
(-2.22)               
Dividend yield 
    
0.0035** 
(2.56)   
0.0007 
(0.48)           
EPS 
     
0.0386*** 
(10.79)  
 0.0391*** 
(10.46) 
 0.0386*** 
(10.80) 
 0.0387*** 
(10.81) 
 0.0387*** 
(10.81) 
 0.0386*** 
(10.79) 
 0.0382*** 
(10.65) 
 0.0384*** 
(10.74) 
0.0345*** 
(9.67) 
0.0235*** 
(6.59) 
 0.0385*** 
(10.74) 
0.0226*** 
(6.36) 
Price-to-book ratio 
      
-0.0001*** 
(-5.83) 
-0.0001*** 
(-5.82)           
DEx-dividend date 
        
-0.0569*** 
(-2.80)     
-0.0548*** 
(-2.71) 
-0.0435** 
(-2.16) 
-0.0607*** 
(-3.03) 
-0.0548*** 
(-2.70) 
-0.0538*** 
(-2.69) 
DFinancials          
0.0399*** 
(12.08)    
0.0402*** 
(12.16) 
0.0397*** 
(12.04) 
0.0399*** 
(12.20) 
0.0402*** 
(12.16) 
0.0397*** 
(12.15) 
DInsider trading           
0.0273* 
(1.94)   
0.0252* 
(1.79) 
0.0286** 
(2.05) 
0.0480*** 
(3.46) 
0.0252* 
(1.79) 
0.0464*** 
(3.35) 
DAnalyst rating            
-0.0189*** 
(-4.23)  
-0.0178*** 
(-3.97) 
-0.0182*** 
(-4.08) 
-0.0166*** 
(-3.74) 
-0.0178*** 
(-3.97) 
-0.0171*** 
(-3.87) 
DLagged block order 
            
0.0271*** 
(2.98) 
0.0280*** 
(3.09) 
0.0129 
(1.42) 
0.0105 
(1.17) 
0.0280*** 
(3.08) 
0.0050 
(0.56) 
RM(-1)              
0.0120*** 
(11.60) 
0.0120*** 
(11.64) 
 0.0106*** 
(10.36) 
0.0120*** 
(11.59) 
0.0108*** 
(10.64) 
CCI 
              
0.0116*** 
(26.49)   
0.0072*** 
(15.58) 
Market turnover                
 0.0003*** 
(45.80)  
0.0003*** 
(40.61) 
IPO number 
                
0.0002 
(0.21) 
0.0101*** 
(10.24) 
R-squared  0.5873 0.5884 0.6062 0.5884 0.6062 0.6067 0.6063 0.6069 0.6067 0.6068 0.6067 0.6068 0.6065 0.6072 0.6102 0.6162 0.6072 0.6174 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5869 0.5880 0.6059 0.5881 0.6059 0.6064 0.6060 0.6065 0.6064 0.6064 0.6064 0.6064 0.6062 0.6069 0.6099 0.6158 0.6069 0.6171 
P-value of F test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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           Table 5.3.B The determinants of margin-trading activity: regression on positive information with margin-loans ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This table presents regression estimates of equation 𝑀𝑇 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 focusing on positive information events. The independent variable 𝑋𝑗𝑠 in each equation of our pooled testing are 
specified in the leftmost column. The statistics of goodness-of-fit measures including R-squared, adjusted R-squared and p-value of F-test are shown at the bottom of the table. The column in shading is the 
final regression of the test. The t-statistics presented in parentheses are the t-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level respectively. 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Ln(MLR) 
Regression in hierarchical approach 
C 
1.4557*** 
(104.81) 
1.4580*** 
(104.88) 
1.4531*** 
(104.59) 
1.4683*** 
(105.39) 
0.2622*** 
(5.52) 
1.3962*** 
(100.72) 
1.4681*** 
(105.30) 
0.6578*** 
(13.30) 
Ln(MLR(-1)) 
0.6498*** 
(256.92) 
0.6496*** 
(256.81) 
0.6503*** 
(256.84) 
0.6468*** 
(254.12) 
0.6337*** 
(245.34) 
0.6068*** 
(227.83) 
0.6467*** 
(254.00) 
0.6022*** 
(225.33) 
Ri(-1) 
0.0078*** 
(13.36) 
0.0078*** 
(13.53) 
0.0077*** 
(13.24) 
0.0023*** 
(3.10) 
0.0017** 
(2.33) 
0.0006 
(0.77) 
0.0023*** 
(3.10) 
0.0003 
(0.45) 
Historical volatility 
-1.5167*** 
(-64.55) 
-1.5157*** 
(-64.52) 
-1.5146*** 
(-64.43) 
-1.5255*** 
(-64.90) 
-1.4458*** 
(-61.25) 
-1.3311*** 
(-56.36) 
-1.5255*** 
(-64.89) 
-1.2987*** 
(-54.89) 
Trading range         
Dividend yield         
EPS 
 0.0387*** 
(10.82) 
 0.0386*** 
(10.79) 
 0.0386*** 
(10.78) 
 0.0389*** 
(10.88) 
0.0347*** 
(9.73) 
0.0236*** 
(6.64) 
 0.0390*** 
(10.87) 
0.0226*** 
(6.38) 
Price-to-book ratio         
DEx-dividend date 
   
-0.0548*** 
(-2.70) 
-0.0434** 
(-2.15) 
-0.0605*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.0548*** 
(-2.70) 
-0.0536*** 
(-2.68) 
DFinancials    
0.0401*** 
(12.14) 
0.0398*** 
(12.11) 
0.0401*** 
(12.29) 
0.0401*** 
(12.14) 
0.0400*** 
(12.26) 
DInsider purchase 
0.0507** 
(2.57)   
0.0470** 
(2.38) 
0.0437** 
(2.23) 
0.0597*** 
(3.06) 
0.0469** 
(2.38) 
0.0581*** 
(2.98) 
DAnalyst upgrade  
-0.0202*** 
(-4.45)  
-0.0189*** 
(-4.17) 
-0.0192*** 
(-4.26) 
-0.0173*** 
(-3.87) 
-0.0189*** 
(-4.17) 
-0.0178*** 
(-3.98) 
DLagged plus-tick order   
0.0266* 
(1.93) 
0.0276** 
(2.00) 
0.0157 
(1.14) 
0.0106 
(0.78) 
0.0276** 
(2.00) 
0.0061 
(0.45) 
RM(-1)    
0.0120*** 
(11.57) 
0.0119*** 
(11.62) 
 0.0106*** 
(10.36) 
0.0120*** 
(11.57) 
0.0109*** 
(10.65) 
CCI 
    
0.0117*** 
(26.54)   
0.0072*** 
(15.59) 
Market turnover      
 0.0003*** 
(45.79)  
0.0003*** 
(40.57) 
IPO number 
      
0.0002 
(0.23) 
0.0102*** 
(10.29) 
R-squared  0.6067 0.6068 0.6065 0.6072 0.6103 0.6162 0.6072 0.6174 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6064 0.6065 0.6061 0.6068 0.6099 0.6158 0.6068 0.6171 
P-value of F test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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   Table 5.3.C The determinants of margin-trading activity: regression on negative information with margin-loans ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This table presents regression estimates of equation 𝑀𝑇 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 focusing on positive information events. The independent variable 𝑋𝑗𝑠 in each equation of our pooled testing are specified 
in the leftmost column. The statistics of goodness-of-fit measures including R-squared, adjusted R-squared and p-value of F-test are shown at the bottom of the table. The column in shading is the final regression 
of the test. The t-statistics presented in parentheses are the t-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.   
  
 
Dependent variable: 
Ln(MLR) 
Regression in hierarchical approach 
C 
1.4551*** 
(104.76) 
1.4552*** 
(104.79) 
1.4536*** 
(104.63) 
1.4672*** 
(105.45) 
0.2570*** 
(5.41) 
1.3947*** 
(100.75) 
1.4670*** 
(105.36) 
0.6547*** 
(13.23) 
Ln(MLR(-1)) 
0.6499*** 
(256.92) 
0.6498*** 
(256.83) 
0.6502*** 
(256.74) 
0.6466*** 
(254.32) 
0.6335*** 
(245.57) 
0.6065*** 
(227.94) 
0.6465*** 
(254.20) 
0.6020*** 
(225.47) 
Ri(-1) 
0.0077*** 
(13.37) 
0.0078*** 
(13.37) 
0.0078*** 
(13.40) 
0.0022*** 
(3.00) 
0.0016** 
(2.18) 
0.0005 
(0.62) 
0.0022*** 
(3.00) 
0.0002 
(0.28) 
Historical volatility 
-1.5160*** 
(-64.51) 
-1.5161*** 
(-64.53) 
-1.5150*** 
(-64.45) 
-1.5267*** 
(-64.98) 
-1.4468*** 
(-61.32) 
-1.3311*** 
(-56.37) 
-1.5266*** 
(-64.97) 
-1.2988*** 
(-54.91) 
Trading range         
Dividend yield         
EPS 
 0.0386*** 
(10.79) 
 0.0386*** 
(10.79) 
 0.0383*** 
(10.69) 
 0.0388*** 
(10.87) 
0.0345*** 
(9.70) 
0.0234*** 
(6.59) 
 0.0388*** 
(10.86) 
0.0224*** 
(6.33) 
Price-to-book ratio         
DEx-dividend date 
   
-0.0545*** 
(-2.69) 
-0.0431*** 
(-2.13) 
-0.0604*** 
(-3.01) 
-0.0544*** 
(-2.68) 
-0.0534*** 
(-2.67) 
DFinancials    
0.0400*** 
(12.12) 
0.0399*** 
(12.13) 
0.0402*** 
(12.33) 
0.0400*** 
(12.12) 
0.0401*** 
(12.31) 
DInsider sale 
-0.0007 
(-0.04)        
DAnalyst downgrade  
0.0328 
(1.58)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DLagged minus-tick order   
0.0258 
(0.23)      
RM(-1)    
0.0121*** 
(11.69) 
0.0121*** 
(11.74) 
 0.0107*** 
(10.49) 
 0.0121*** 
(11.69) 
0.0109*** 
(10.77) 
CCI 
    
0.0117*** 
(26.63)   
0.0073*** 
(15.62) 
Market turnover      
 0.0003*** 
(45.90)  
0.0003*** 
(40.65) 
IPO number 
      
0.0003 
(0.30) 
0.0101*** 
(10.25) 
R-squared  0.6067 0.6067 0.6065 0.6073 0.6104 0.6163 0.6073 0.6176 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6064 0.6064 0.6061 0.6070 0.6101 0.6160 0.6070 0.6172 
P-value of F test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Then the model is augmented with variables of financial ratios. As can be seen from Table 
5.3.A, a significantly positive coefficient is found for both DY and EPS, while a significantly 
negative one is found for the PTBR. All these estimated results are consistent with our 
expectations. Given the predictive ability of these ratios to the future returns, they become 
natural information resources for margin traders. Contrast to short-selling activity, our results 
show that margin-trading activity intensifies when the fundamentals of a stock improve. We 
keep EPS as the fundamental measure since it has the highest t-statistic and adjusted R-squared 
value. 
 
We next include the ex-dividend date to the main regression. A significant coefficient with a 
negative sign is found for the ex-dividend date dummy. As mentioned earlier, an investor who 
holds stocks immediately before the ex-dividend date is entitled to the stock dividend. The 
negative coefficient found indicates that margin-trading activity decreases at the ex-dividend 
date since no more advantage can be taken in terms of stock dividends. This finding is 
consistent with our hypothesis.  
 
Besides the control variables, we then extend the model with firm-specific independent factors.  
Firstly, we adopt a financial dummy to see whether margin traders pay more attention to stocks 
belong to the financial industries. As can be seen from the table, a significantly positive 
coefficient of the financial dummy is found. This indicates that financial stocks tend to have 
less margin-loans positions than stocks in other industries. As discussed in the literature section, 
financial firms having the economic function of providing loans for businesses, mortgages to 
homeowners and insurance to consumers. In this case, financial firms are competent to predict 
the general market conditions. Also, the financial industries play increasingly more significant 
role in the recent decade in domestic China. Because of their influence, financial stocks are 
more attractive to investors on margin, including both short sellers and margin traders.  
 
Next, we investigate the relationship between margin-loans position and insider trading event. 
As the same to short selling, we conduct three regressions with each event independent factor.  
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Besides a general regression of the event itself, we run two more regressions focusing on event 
with positive information and event with negative information separately. From Table 5.3.A, a 
significantly positive relationship is found between insider trading event and post-event 
margin-trading activity. By dividing the factor into two sub-variables, we get the regression 
results in Table 5.3.B and Table 5.3.C. A significantly positive coefficient is found between 
insider purchase and the dependent variable, while an insignificantly negative one is found for 
insider sale. These results are generally consistent to our previous expectations. Unlike short 
sellers, margin traders tend to pay more attention to insider purchases rather than insider sales. 
With a sample of 446 stocks, Chen et al. (2016) find abnormal margin-trading activities before 
and after insider purchases. But the relationship between margin trading and insider purchases 
become significantly negative in a further regression. The overall empirical results thus turn to 
be uninterpretable. Compared to the two-year size data adopted in Chen et al., we apply a 
longer time range of data and document a higher level of margin-trading activity when insider 
purchase occurs. However, margin traders show no difference to insider sales events.  
 
Another potential determinant, stock analyst ratings, is then examined. Firstly, a significantly 
negative coefficient is observed for the general factor in Table 5.3.A.  While a significantly 
negative coefficient is found for analyst upgrade in Table 5.3.B, an insignificant positive 
coefficient is found for analyst downgrade in Table 5.3.C. Similar to short sellers, margin 
traders in the A-share market are more sensitive to analyst upgrades than analyst downgrades. 
Being consistent with our hypothesis, more margin-loans positions will occur when a stock is 
upgraded by an analyst. It is fully documented in the literature that analyst recommendations 
predict future returns (i.e. Stickel 1995, Womack 1996, Krische and Lee 2000, Barber et al. 
2001). However, the analyst recommendations in the current Chinese market is not reliable as 
in the West. Our finding reveals that analyst recommendation, especially analyst upgrade, is a 
direct information source to margin traders during their investing process.  
 
As the last firm-specific factor, the block trading event is added to our model. Firstly, a 
significantly positive coefficient is found for the general factor in Table 5.3.A. Further 
regressions are taken to see this relationship in detail. Table 5.3.B shows a significantly positive 
coefficient for plus-tick orders, while in Table 5.3.C, an insignificant positive one is observed 
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for minus-tick orders. These results are consistent with our expectation. Kraus and Stoll (1972) 
document that plus-tick blocks have the price effect in the underlying value of the stock while 
minus-tick blocks only have distribution effect. Our finding suggests that margin traders take 
advantage of this fact by increasing their positions on margin when a plus-tick order occurs. 
 
Besides firm-specific factors, two market-level factors are also considered. The first factor is 
the past stock market performance. As can be seen in Table 5.2.A, a significantly positive 
coefficient is found for the lagged market return term. This finding is consistent with the 
perception that margin traders are momentum traders. Three measures of investor sentiment 
are added in turn to the model. The significant results for CCI and market turnovers in Table 
5.3.A show that investor sentiment is a factor influencing margin-loans positions. After a 
comparison between the t-statistics of the two variables and the adjusted R-squared values of 
the two regressions, market turnover is chosen as the explanatory variable of investor sentiment. 
These findings are consistent with our hypothesis that margin-trading activity intensifies when 
investor sentiment of the market becomes positive.  
 
The outcome of the hierarchical procedure yields the final model presented in the third column 
on the right of Table 5.3., which includes all the significant factors from previous analyses. 
With the sample of 73 designated stocks in the A-share market, margin-trading activity is 
eventually specified as a function of past margin-trading activity, past stock returns, risk 
measured by historical volatility, firm fundamentals proxied by EPS, the ex-dividend date, 
industry type of the stock, insider purchases, analyst upgrades, past plus-tick block orders, past 
market performance, and the investment sentiment proxied by market turnover. All three final 
regressions in Table 5.3 have explanatory power of 61 percent, with consistent coefficients 
retaining their significance.  
 
5.5.3 Robustness Tests  
 
Besides the main tests of short-selling and margin-trading activities, we conduct two groups of 
robustness tests for each of our dependent variables. First, we adopt the original activity data 
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without being scaled, short-sales value (SSV) and margin-loans value (MLV), to see if there is 
any difference between the results. Second, with SSR and MLR data from 31/03/2010 to 
31/03/2017, we extend the time range of the main tests from five years and three months to 
seven years. The regression results of robustness tests are in the Appendix. Appendix 5.5 and 
Appendix 5.6 show the estimated results of robustness test I for short selling and margin trading 
separately, while Appendix 5.7 and Appendix 5.8 show the results of robustness test II. We 
summarise the robustness results and compare them with the results of our main tests in Table 
5.4. 
 
From the results of short selling presented in Panel A, Table 5.4, we can see that the results of 
the two robustness tests are generally consistent with our main tests. However, there are still 
some small differences. Firstly, we can see that for the robustness test I, it finally chooses 
trading range as the risk measure, while both the other two tests choose the measure of 
historical volatility. This difference seems not critical since the sign and significance of both 
risk measures retain for all three tests. There is a significantly negative relationship between 
historical volatility and short selling while a significantly positive one for intraday volatility. 
Second, when we use a longer time range in robustness test II, the measure of financial ratios 
changes to DY, while the other two tests both adopt EPS. Again, this difference is not critical, 
since all results of the three measures of financial ratios retain consistent sign and significance 
(except for PTBR in robustness test II, which share the same sign with their counterparts, but 
no significance shows). For the factor of insider trading events, although slight differences are 
seen in the results’ significance level, we can speak confidently that there is a positive 
relationship between insider sales and short-sales positions. Similar to insider trading, results 
of the following two factors also have slight differences in the significance level of their results, 
which would not change our conclusions over the relationship between the two factors and 
short-selling activity. For the coefficient of past market returns, the robustness test II has an 
opposite sign to the results from the previous two tests. It is well known that between June 
2015 to June 2016, a severe crash happened in the
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Table 5.4 Summary of the results 
 
Notes: This table summarises the estimated results of three groups of regressions with different data type and time range for the determinants of short-selling and margin-trading activities. Panel A shows the findings of short-selling activities, while panel B shows the 
findings of margin-trading activates. Notations in shading indicate that corresponding variables are included in the final regression of each test. Three sub-regressions done respectively under each test, categorised as general regression, the regression focusing on 
positive events and the regression focusing on negative events. A plus sign ‘+’ indicates a positive relationship between the dependent variable and certain independent variable, while a minus sigh ‘-’ indicates a negative one between the two. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
 
 Panel A: SS Results Main test Robustness test I Robustness test II Panel B: MT Results Main test Robustness test I Robustness test II 
  SSR, 5 yrs and 3 mths SSV, 5 yrs and 3 mths SSR, 7 yrs  MLR, 5 yrs and 3 mths SSV, 5 yrs and 3 mths SSR, 7 yrs  
No. Expected SS Gen Pos Neg Gen Pos Neg Gen Pos Neg Expected MT Gen Pos Neg Gen Pos Neg Gen Pos Neg 
1 Ln(SS(-1)) + +*** +*** +*** LN(MT(-1)) + +*** +*** +*** 
2 Ri(-1) + +*** +*** +*** Ri(-1) + +*** +*** +*** 
3 Historical volatility - -*** -*** -*** Historical volatility - -*** -*** -*** 
 Trading range + +*** +*** +*** Trading range - -*** -** -*** 
4 Dividend yield - -*** -*** -*** Dividend yield + +*** +** +*** 
 EPS - -*** -*** -*** EPS + +*** +*** +*** 
 Price-to-book ratio + +*** + +*** Price-to-book ratio - -*** -*** -** 
5 DEx-dividend date + + + + DEx-dividend date - -*** -*** -* 
6 DFinancials + +*** +*** +*** DFinancials + +*** +*** +*** 
7 DInsider trading *** +   +**   +   DInsider trading *** +*   +   +*   
 DInsider purchase -  -   -   -  DInsider purchase +  +**   +   +  
 DInsider sale +   +*   +***   +** DInsider sale -   -   -   - 
8 DAnalyst rating *** +***   +***   +**   DAnalyst rating *** -***   -**   -***   
 DAnalyst upgrade -  +***   +***   +**  DAnalyst upgrade +  -***   -**   -***  
 DAnalyst downgrade +   -   -   - DAnalyst downgrade -   +   +*   +* 
9 DLagged block order *** +*   +***   +*   DLagged block order *** +***   +***   +***   
 DLagged plus-tick order -  +**   +***   +***  DLagged plus-tick order +  +*   +***   +*  
 DLagged minus-tick order +   -   -   - DLagged minus-tick order -   +   -   + 
10 RM(-1) + +*** +*** -*** RM(-1) + +*** +*** +*** 
11 CCI - -*** -*** -*** CCI + +*** +*** +*** 
 Market turnover - -*** -*** -*** Market turnover + +*** +*** +*** 
 IPO No. - -*** -*** -*** IPO No. + + + +* 
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A-share market. As discussed earlier, intensified short selling tend to be seen when the market 
price reaches its peak. Since robustness test II adopts a longer period with more stable time, it 
is reasonable for short sellers to adopt momentum trading strategy when market condition 
settles. Lastly, as the same to the results of stock risks and financial ratios, the difference in the 
results of investors sentiment is not critical. In terms of the estimated results of margin trading, 
although several places of difference are found in the significance level of results among the 
three groups of tests, no critical difference is found. 
 
From the results comparison table, we see that short-selling and margin-trading activities share 
almost all determinants expect for the factor of the ex-dividend date. Both short sellers and 
margin traders consider their own past activities and positively follow the previous trend. Short 
sellers are contrarian traders to both the previous stock returns and the past market returns, 
while margin traders are always momentum traders. Both short sellers and margin traders pay 
close attention to changes in EPS of a stock when they take margin positions. However, margin 
traders consider issues of dividend to make more profits, while short sellers are not concerned 
much. Financial stocks draw more attention from both short seller and margin traders, due to 
the pivotal role of financial sector in an economy. Both types of the traders consider the three 
event factors when they make an investment, while the focuses of them are quite different. 
Short sellers carry on transactions follow insider sales events, while margin traders buy long 
after insider purchases. In the Chinese A-share market, both traders trade against analyst 
recommendations on the market, due to the unreliability of the recommendations. Again, in 
terms of block trades, short sellers are contrarian traders while margin traders are momentum 
traders. As for the last factor of investor sentiment, short sellers decrease their positions when 
the investor sentiment becomes high, while margin traders do the opposite. 
 
5.6 Conclusions 
 
 
It is well acknowledged that short selling and margin trading contribute to the integrity of an 
efficient market. However, false perceptions of these two mechanisms still widely exist among 
financial regulators and common investors. When a financial crisis comes, regulators often turn 
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to bans and constraints on short selling and margin trading to stabilise the market. To eliminate 
false perceptions of the two mechanisms, figuring out what motivates short sellers and margin 
traders to make their investment decisions becomes crucial. The question whether they are 
motivated by fundamentals-related reasons or they are simply opportunistic traders is important.  
 
To examine the roles of short sellers and margin traders in financial markets, we investigate 
the determinants of short-selling activity and margin-trading activity separately from both firm 
and market perspective. Taking together with control variables, the firm-level determinants of 
short-selling (margin-trading) activity include past short-selling (margin-trading) activities, 
past stock returns, stock returns volatility, financial ratios, ex-dividend date events, industry 
classifications, insider trading events, stock analyst recommendations, block trading events, 
whereas the market-level factors include past market performance and investor sentiment.  
 
With pooled regressions of the hierarchical approach, we find that short-selling activity is 
significantly related to past short-selling activity, past stock returns, historical volatility, EPS, 
industry classification, insider sale, analyst upgrade, block plus-tick order, past market 
performance and CCI. While margin-trading activity is decided by past margin-trading activity, 
past stock returns, historical volatility, EPS, ex-dividend date event, industry classification, 
insider purchase, analyst upgrade and downgrade, block plus-tick order, past market 
performance and market turnover. These findings indicate that the motivations of activities of 
short sellers and margin trader are tightly fundament-related. Both of them are not simply 
opportunistic traders. However, compared to short sellers, margin traders are momentum 
traders at both individual stock level and the market level. This strategy adopted by margin 
traders may lead more uncertainty to the market. 
 
Our results provide crucial additional insights into the nature of information advantages that 
lead to abnormal returns earned by short sellers and margin traders. These findings further 
allow novel inferences about how short sellers and margin traders contribute to price discovery 
and market efficiency. By identifying information sources of short sellers and margin traders’ 
trading advantages, the study has important implications for financial regulators and 
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policymakers, particularly for an emerging market like China. Also, our findings could help 
the public have better understandings of short selling and margin trading. The two mechanisms 
should not be scapegoats when the market becomes depressed and unsettled.    
 
Our study extends the current literature of the determinants of short selling. And at the first 
time, we identify the determinants of margin trading. However, there are limitations of our 
study. It can be easily seen that the question of the determinants of short-selling and margin-
trading activity is an open topic. The factors considered in the current study is not only limited 
by our understanding of the current literature but also the market settings and the data 
accessibility. As a study of an emerging market, our results may not be perfectly applied to the 
same issue of the developed market. In domestic China, trades on margin currently only 
includes the two mechanisms studied in our study, while in more advanced markets, short 
selling and margin trading activities may also be affected by the trading of futures and options. 
The data accessibility in the A-share market also leads certain limitations to our study. The 
determinants of short-selling (margin-trading) activity conducted by different groups can be an 
interesting research topic.   
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5.7 Appendices   
 
Appendix 5.1 Descriptive statistics of stock returns, short-selling and margin-trading activities 
 
No. 
A: Stock returns B: Short-selling activities C: Margin-trading activities 
Mean Min Max S.D. JB 
Short-sales 
value Short interest Margin-loans value Margin interest 
SH01 0.035 -10.558 9.564 1.518 1234.895*** 4,844.750 2,786.192 21,720.668 419,401.793 
SH03 0.016 -10.563 9.545 1.455 1614.988*** 2,157.672 1,296.248 7,615.244 119,726.819 
SH04 0.055 -10.525 9.534 1.505 931.489*** 5,256.978 5,669.682 17,576.523 376,763.285 
SH06 0.025 -10.578 9.598 0.998 12632.694*** 554.446 425.551 4,871.287 71,867.043 
SH07 0.032 -10.580 9.563 1.373 777.262*** 676.686 665.349 13,449.116 180,608.980 
SH09 0.064 -10.549 9.570 1.490 703.174*** 10,386.990 4,263.748 56,922.881 753,660.162 
SH10 0.047 -10.440 9.554 1.439 1035.434*** 4,626.179 4,078.805 13,042.712 267,229.372 
SH11 0.022 -10.599 9.565 0.983 477.544*** 1,933.145 1,682.136 13,125.551 164,862.765 
SH12 0.060 -10.598 9.624 1.362 825.829*** 1,005.080 715.610 15,191.570 192,321.829 
SH13 -0.004 -10.552 9.571 0.972 360.127*** 970.923 594.965 8,092.509 125,393.547 
SH14 0.008 -11.086 9.550 0.976 1406.112*** 1,024.394 1,619.594 5,291.136 77,140.558 
SH16 0.015 -10.567 9.556 0.984 381.620*** 1,648.012 817.297 6,564.183 81,904.302 
SH17 0.008 -10.575 9.569 0.971 474.334*** 934.022 1,031.681 4,574.947 114,866.321 
SH18 0.025 -10.586 9.599 0.973 724.493*** 448.893 508.225 6,967.329 74,331.403 
SH19 0.015 -10.528 9.533 0.988 611.717*** 1,254.863 5,185.439 7,421.109 124,815.176 
SH20 0.026 -11.045 9.558 0.983 739.715*** 423.720 655.932 8,673.722 85,397.388 
SH23 0.012 -10.548 9.554 0.984 693.267*** 767.644 751.233 9,099.207 179,327.355 
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SH24 0.037 -13.642 9.637 1.456 3541.942*** 4,841.416 632.141 10,084.588 110,599.683 
SH25 0.047 -10.553 9.576 1.473 632.877*** 11,176.830 4,569.563 28,011.179 376,622.674 
SH26 0.033 -11.574 7.522 1.284 366.451*** 436.133 843.856 3,556.313 139,389.314 
SH27 0.032 -13.965 9.549 1.433 4038.600*** 918.784 884.877 6,554.424 121,006.778 
SH28 0.015 -10.547 9.548 1.428 2815.870*** 884.708 1,204.338 7,635.227 111,876.263 
SH29 0.027 -10.572 9.594 0.989 732.226*** 287.299 301.882 4,053.098 47,166.750 
SH30 0.044 -10.586 9.579 1.448 908.594*** 4,544.204 2,974.327 27,039.167 506,434.218 
SH31 -0.000 -10.561 9.569 0.997 178.634*** 296.630 338.439 4,231.384 67,153.504 
SH32 0.165 -10.522 9.574 1.304 1279.994*** 1,048.891 1,153.436 8,351.607 129,568.870 
SH33 0.031 -10.558 9.569 0.954 1365.181*** 1,120.584 946.190 11,670.068 121,922.253 
SH34 0.032 -10.539 9.544 1.381 454.625*** 6,039.501 4,637.545 48,476.580 910,727.190 
SH35 0.019 -10.599 9.624 1.539 2563.371*** 2,259.216 892.101 11,345.611 157,996.229 
SH36 0.029 -10.575 9.593 0.947 1420.294*** 1,478.317 1,225.798 13,014.021 119,636.480 
SH37 0.015 -10.513 9.531 1.575 6663.959*** 956.537 1,570.000 8,046.209 147,310.601 
SH38 0.016 -10.595 9.622 0.979 684.622*** 487.078 412.304 7,156.353 80,782.421 
SH39 0.010 -10.543 9.525 1.306 255.019*** 2,068.103 1,970.664 9,270.151 114,932.461 
SH40 0.033 -10.544 9.563 1.351 816.017*** 1,206.574 1,226.427 10,392.352 123,073.420 
SH41 0.085 -10.569 9.605 1.443 915.618*** 2,117.845 964.398 24,130.357 271,364.622 
SH43 0.074 -10.575 9.607 1.404 1897.251*** 1,218.494 891.464 14,645.273 162,275.679 
SH44 0.017 -10.524 9.563 1.424 1812.838*** 946.014 632.543 8,331.807 100,293.712 
SH45 0.019 -10.763 9.576 1.351 1204.202*** 218.670 248.615 3,409.352 39,042.537 
SH46 0.062 -10.616 9.646 1.465 5687.619*** 563.866 417.660 5,846.247 74,641.216 
SH48 -0.012 -10.576 9.566 1.594 12303.423*** 728.043 601.932 6,361.558 94,602.076 
SH49 -0.002 -10.563 9.608 1.312 708.955*** 283.084 352.670 2,915.524 44,641.720 
SH50 0.017 -11.628 9.658 1.628 10470.229*** 1,163.400 885.398 16,403.361 187,573.997 
SZ01 0.042 -10.655 9.588 1.443 816.546*** 2,304.460 1,353.166 12,440.834 228,317.613 
SZ02 0.046 -10.541 9.549 0.961 351.908*** 2,645.565 3,350.837 15,928.184 190,625.548 
SZ05 0.009 -10.559 9.558 0.999 2550.810*** 427.794 625.877 5,063.118 79,772.858 
SZ06 0.014 -10.565 9.580 0.994 1014.588*** 538.254 487.416 6,209.065 66,139.434 
SZ07 -0.004 -10.599 9.619 0.993 690.869*** 1,056.542 1,196.483 12,100.248 167,537.454 
SZ08 0.014 -10.755 9.581 0.995 4055.047*** 626.710 529.629 5,605.812 93,542.526 
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SZ09 0.014 -10.595 9.612 0.967 569.776*** 764.829 866.591 6,415.308 98,558.946 
SZ10 0.008 -10.545 9.575 0.999 195.385*** 860.107 1,277.463 5,292.381 89,349.425 
SZ11 0.021 -10.547 9.594 1.364 311.625*** 458.209 363.778 5,186.792 66,518.626 
SZ13 0.035 -10.537 9.536 0.986 732.057*** 713.791 2,582.454 3,478.112 67,253.053 
SZ15 0.003 -13.607 9.548 0.989 667.287*** 521.527 777.131 4,200.347 55,629.109 
SZ16 0.007 -10.564 9.554 0.993 1372.336*** 987.361 1,425.311 8,807.296 134,260.666 
SZ17 0.034 -10.476 9.646 1.302 488.798*** 290.445 389.631 3,530.427 46,988.478 
SZ18 0.034 -15.746 9.546 0.985 305.935*** 1,720.368 3,439.650 11,740.823 178,585.594 
SZ20 0.008 -10.651 9.726 1.406 6962.720*** 1,331.343 276.727 5,176.528 58,060.365 
SZ21 -0.001 -10.563 9.568 0.986 448.066*** 143.725 237.088 1,671.728 28,864.742 
SZ22 0.008 -10.555 9.576 0.979 251.424*** 1,059.166 1,030.804 9,158.053 94,182.024 
SZ23 0.020 -10.594 9.619 0.928 679.844*** 1,720.674 1,168.855 12,182.250 147,999.176 
SZ24 -0.027 -10.555 9.547 0.975 434.005*** 266.459 442.898 4,600.108 62,616.675 
SZ25 0.010 -10.615 9.581 0.992 807.928*** 1,005.080 715.610 15,191.570 192,321.829 
SZ27 -0.001 -10.572 9.667 1.289 207.796*** 302.098 399.864 10,670.255 127,043.206 
SZ28 0.009 -10.554 9.531 0.993 333.201*** 1,188.062 1,867.578 8,324.828 121,461.750 
SZ29 0.017 -10.573 9.558 0.983 542.485*** 196.824 321.330 4,093.708 41,456.743 
SZ30 -0.003 -10.547 9.561 1.327 517.665*** 641.061 1,603.934 3,408.152 48,875.238 
SZ34 -0.001 -10.549 9.594 0.992 113.806*** 382.306 304.573 3,029.675 36,546.305 
SZ35 0.016 -10.569 9.570 1.226 123.978*** 228.456 364.047 5,099.831 60,343.925 
SZ36 -0.003 -10.591 9.610 0.993 222.963*** 426.979 455.993 4,324.270 52,218.261 
SZ37 -0.006 -10.558 9.573 0.992 348.694*** 278.706 576.998 3,858.018 57,690.338 
SZ38 0.017 -10.563 9.598 1.299 241.987*** 1,819.350 1,471.519 23,285.319 266,202.629 
SZ39 0.022 -10.543 9.550 1.447 940.848*** 458.032 411.536 5,473.777 60,133.698 
SZ40 0.007 -10.558 9.614 0.983 465.304*** 571.870 524.157 6,056.866 77,057.699 
Notes: Summary statistics of daily returns of 73 individual stocks adopted are presented in Panel A; Means of short-selling and margin-trading activity measures are presented 
separately in Panel B and Panel C. Mean, Min, Max, S.D. and JB are the sample mean, minimum, maximum, standard deviation and Jarque-Bera normality test, respectively. 
The two measures of short-selling activities are short-sales value and short-sales ratio, while measures of margin trading activities are margin-loans value and margin-loans 
ratio. The unit of the four activity measures are ten thousand Chinese yuan. *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level. 
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Appendix 5.2 Autocorrelations of short-selling and margin-trading activities 
  
No. A: Autocorrelations of short-sales value at lag B: Autocorrelations of margin-loans value at lag 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
SH01 0.659* 0.475* 0.448* 0.418* 0.468* 0.696* 0.492* 0.483* 0.481* 0.480* 
SH03 0.662* 0.457* 0.425* 0.452* 0.479* 0.679* 0.472* 0.517* 0.515* 0.471* 
SH04 0.654* 0.479* 0.426* 0.420* 0.476* 0.677* 0.457* 0.450* 0.447* 0.448* 
SH06 0.685* 0.491* 0.451* 0.453* 0.493* 0.669* 0.464* 0.496* 0.482* 0.461* 
SH07 0.644* 0.461* 0.437* 0.380* 0.463* 0.724* 0.511* 0.513* 0.507* 0.505* 
SH09 0.754* 0.535* 0.516* 0.514* 0.528* 0.731* 0.508* 0.460* 0.457* 0.500* 
SH10 0.696* 0.475* 0.383* 0.368* 0.432* 0.675* 0.470* 0.489* 0.476* 0.473* 
SH11 0.686* 0.502* 0.466* 0.578* 0.494* 0.708* 0.495* 0.469* 0.457* 0.464* 
SH12 0.731* 0.516* 0.487* 0.499* 0.523* 0.696* 0.474* 0.492* 0.480* 0.463* 
SH13 0.642* 0.478* 0.466* 0.454* 0.455* 0.691* 0.505* 0.491* 0.453* 0.479* 
SH14 0.617* 0.41* 0.365* 0.386* 0.447* 0.696* 0.493* 0.507* 0.499* 0.481* 
SH16 0.667* 0.454* 0.466* 0.463* 0.475* 0.692* 0.477* 0.490* 0.498* 0.447* 
SH17 0.643* 0.439 0.412* 0.383* 0.409* 0.636* 0.423* 0.352* 0.342* 0.343* 
SH18 0.626* 0.443* 0.371* 0.373* 0.410* 0.682* 0.491* 0.426* 0.413* 0.455* 
SH19 0.578* 0.410* 0.413* 0.388* 0.391* 0.570* 0.387* 0.413* 0.387* 0.362* 
SH20 0.621* 0.647* 0.384* 0.379* 0.417* 0.684* 0.499* 0.426* 0.415* 0.468* 
SH23 0.656* 0.497* 0.399* 0.420* 0.456* 0.691* 0.469* 0.475* 0.455* 0.442* 
SH24 0.718* 0.515* 0.526* 0.501* 0.490* 0.713* 0.491* 0.453* 0.427* 0.472* 
SH25 0.731* 0.505* 0.427* 0.424* 0.494* 0.726* 0.489* 0.414* 0.421* 0.471* 
SH26 0.653* 0.451* 0.475* 0.473* 0.453* 0.663* 0.449* 0.385* 0.371* 0.364* 
SH27 0.653* 0.473* 0.477* 0.451* 0.449* 0.713* 0.502* 0.487* 0.457* 0.474* 
SH28 0.666* 0.491* 0.441* 0.434* 0.475* 0.748* 0.515* 0.480* 0.461* 0.493* 
SH29 0.681* 0.483* 0.433* 0.392* 0.466* 0.602* 0.383* 0.372* 0.379* 0.408* 
SH30 0.673* 0.496* 0.483* 0.488* 0.486* 0.703* 0.485* 0.510* 0.522* 0.482* 
SH31 0.671* 0.484* 0.468* 0.449* 0.489* 0.688* 0.478* 0.496* 0.491* 0.470* 
SH32 0.643* 0.466* 0.456* 0.460* 0.454* 0.670* 0.470* 0.511* 0.506* 0.483* 
SH33 0.763* 0.551* 0.514* 0.502* 0.540* 0.666* 0.465* 0.501* 0.459* 0.449* 
SH34 0.627* 0.470* 0.473* 0.468* 0.454* 0.713* 0.503* 0.528* 0.523* 0.491* 
SH35 0.757* 0.529* 0.388* 0.389* 0.417* 0.733* 0.516* 0.490* 0.487* 0.500* 
SH36 0.773* 0.557* 0.507* 0.497* 0.540* 0.674* 0.486* 0.483* 0.462* 0.470* 
SH37 0.547* 0.423* 0.405* 0.358* 0.355* 0.694* 0.469* 0.492* 0.485 0.456* 
SH38 0.729* 0.519* 0.511* 0.479* 0.496* 0.661* 0.466* 0.528* 0.504* 0.459* 
SH39 0.612* 0.444* 0.459* 0.452* 0.445* 0.700* 0.481* 0.471* 0.485* 0.483* 
SH40 0.665* 0.486* 0.458* 0.474* 0.470* 0.718* 0.484* 0.465* 0.481* 0.490* 
SH41 0.746* 0.537* 0.503* 0.496* 0.530* 0.677* 0.477* 0.500* 0.490* 0.470* 
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SH43 0.735* 0.506* 0.386* 0.372* 0.469* 0.701* 0.478* 0.468* 0.469* 0.441* 
SH44 0.661* 0.439* 0.458* 0.424* 0.456* 0.711* 0.507* 0.519* 0.509* 0.492* 
SH45 0.720* 0.516* 0.394* 0.399* 0.488* 0.727* 0.507* 0.420* 0.409* 0.479* 
SH46 0.669* 0.448* 0.377* 0.372* 0.415* 0.631* 0.403* 0.383* 0.349* 0.357* 
SH48 0.648* 0.481* 0.455* 0.425* 0.409* 0.689* 0.493* 0.520* 0.497* 0.489* 
SH49 0.657* 0.474* 0.466* 0.456* 0.455* 0.580* 0.397* 0.424* 0.435* 0.373* 
SH50 0.662* 0.506* 0.437* 0.328* 0.349* 0.731* 0.509* 0.473* 0.475* 0.505* 
SZ01 0.703*  0.507* 0.465* 0.464* 0.502* 0.687* 0.493* 0.486* 0.483* 0.495* 
SZ02 0.644* 0.463* 0.441* 0.446* 0.434* 0.685* 0.469* 0.424* 0.415* 0.432* 
SZ05 0.693* 0.490* 0.424* 0.426* 0.470* 0.644* 0.457* 0.454* 0.448* 0.440* 
SZ06 0.746* 0.537*  0.476* 0.469*  0.525* 0.717* 0.490* 0.487* 0.480* 0.476* 
SZ07 0.688*  0.502*  0.470* 0.466* 0.498* 0.728* 0.491* 0.460* 0.468* 0.501* 
SZ08 0.695* 0.494* 0.448* 0.431* 0.469* 0.702* 0.483* 0.480* 0.471* 0.469* 
SZ09 0.593* 0.423* 0.383* 0.394* 0.413* 0.667* 0.444* 0.470* 0.424* 0.407* 
SZ10 0.679* 0.486* 0.528* 0.472* 0.454* 0.733* 0.516* 0.491* 0.468* 0.506* 
SZ11 0.688* 0.499* 0.446* 0.438* 0.467* 0.663* 0.475* 0.453* 0.446* 0.432* 
SZ13 0.629* 0.455* 0.469* 0.432* 0.439* 0.684* 0.494* 0.477* 0.461* 0.470* 
SZ15 0.563* 0.403* 0.389* 0.350* 0.392* 0.654* 0.454* 0.490* 0.475* 0.457* 
SZ16 0.716* 0.530* 0.483* 0.487* 0.507* 0.719* 0.503* 0.477* 0.480* 0.507* 
SZ17 0.537* 0.364* 0.387* 0.379* 0.367* 0.608* 0.362* 0.365* 0.358* 0.314* 
SZ18 0.708* 0.512* 0.468* 0.455* 0.481* 0.684* 0.442* 0.483* 0.489* 0.449* 
SZ20 0.583* 0.402* 0.419* 0.348* 0.392* 0.573* 0.399* 0.444* 0.383* 0.422* 
SZ21 0.678* 0.513* 0.455* 0.424* 0.447* 0.718* 0.531* 0.490* 0.485* 0.511* 
SZ22 0.734* 0.545* 0.483* 0.478* 0.515* 0.681* 0.485* 0.479* 0.446* 0.466* 
SZ23 0.656* 0.415* 0.421* 0.435* 0.465* 0.688* 0.419* 0.391* 0.419* 0.446* 
SZ24 0.637* 0.486* 0.429* 0.420* 0.436* 0.685* 0.486* 0.492* 0.456* 0.461* 
SZ25 0.637* 0.472* 0.438* 0.437* 0.443* 0.676* 0.465* 0.429* 0.428* 0.451* 
SZ27 0.658* 0.472* 0.447* 0.441* 0.468* 0.714* 0.516* 0.485* 0.484* 0.495* 
SZ28 0.603* 0.445* 0.420* 0.387* 0.437* 0.708* 0.505* 0.475* 0.463* 0.478* 
SZ29 0.602* 0.438* 0.451* 0.420* 0.404* 0.721* 0.501* 0.469* 0.460* 0.448* 
SZ30 0.646* 0.475* 0.478* 0.476* 0.452* 0.704* 0.503* 0.496* 0.492* 0.500* 
SZ34 0.575* 0.408* 0.416* 0.413* 0.398* 0.632* 0.434* 0.435* 0.422* 0.399* 
SZ35 0.662* 0.475* 0.440* 0.423* 0.471* 0.719* 0.516* 0.485* 0.465* 0.473* 
SZ36 0.566* 0.398* 0.412* 0.405* 0.399* 0.681* 0.477* 0.469* 0.454* 0.450* 
SZ37 0.465* 0.456* 0.438* 0.397* 0.430* 0.655* 0.468* 0.437* 0.421* 0.443* 
SZ38 0.737* 0.539* 0.501* 0.491* 0.510* 0.753* 0.543* 0.459* 0.433* 0.449* 
SZ39 0.696* 0.498* 0.438* 0.441* 0.498* 0.674* 0.456* 0.470* 0.472* 0.445* 
SZ40 0.648* 0.503* 0.445* 0.450* 0.489* 0.734* 0.511* 0.473* 0.459* 0.507* 
    Notes: * denotes statistical significance at 5% level. 
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Appendix 5.3 Short-selling (margin-trading) correlations between individual stocks  
 
NO. SH01 SH03 SH04 SH06 SH07 SH09 SH10 SH11 SH12 SH13 SH14 SH16 SH17 
 
A: Short sales correlations 
SH01 1.000             
SH03 0.858 1.000            
SH04 0.878 0.880 1.000           
SH06 0.610 0.622 0.635 1.000          
SH07 0.706 0.699 0.716 0.822 1.000         
SH09 0.796 0.787 0.766 0.760 0.783 1.000        
SH10 0.772 0.866 0.862 0.651 0.709 0.733 1.000       
SH11 0.697 0.690 0.740 0.864 0.826 0.808 0.725 1.000      
SH12 0.583 0.607 0.610 0.897 0.847 0.752 0.653 0.840 1.000     
SH13 0.647 0.628 0.661 0.821 0.781 0.753 0.674 0.835 0.829 1.000    
SH14 0.729 0.686 0.757 0.762 0.777 0.791 0.740 0.805 0.770 0.759 1.000   
SH16 0.577 0.658 0.646 0.810 0.740 0.719 0.654 0.787 0.813 0.791 0.672 1.000  
SH17 0.677 0.646 0.697 0.754 0.727 0.728 0.680 0.897 0.731 0.760 0.746 0.672 1.000 
 B: Margin loans correlations 
SH01 1.000             
SH03 0.870 1.000            
SH04 0.818 0.880 1.000           
SH06 0.652 0.738 0.684 1.000          
SH07 0.762 0.832 0.779 0.872 1.000         
SH09 0.809 0.851 0.804 0.696 0.809 1.000        
SH10 0.824 0.871 0.864 0.744 0.833 0.790 1.000       
SH11 0.726 0.801 0.718 0.818 0.966 0.779 0.736 1.000      
SH12 0.520 0.635 0.580 0.827 0.802 0.597 0.629 0.754 1.000     
SH13 0.681 0.753 0.677 0.811 0.835 0.739 0.725 0.817 0.730 1.000    
SH14 0.640 0.724 0.695 0.815 0.836 0.654 0.741 0.816 0.761 0.796 1.000   
SH16 0.463 0.576 0.528 0.660 0.653 0.559 0.541 0.614 0.700 0.671 0.661 1.000  
SH17 0.537 0.622 0.540 0.565 0.638 0.576 0.549 0.746 0.500 0.579 0.605 0.409 1.000 
Notes: This table presents short sales correlations and margin loans correlations separately in panel A and B. Dur to the limited space, only estimates of 13 out of 73 
stocks are shown. 
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Appendix 5.4 Descriptive statistics of relative short-selling and margin-trading activities  
 
No. 
A: Short-selling activities B: Margin-trading activities 
Short-sales ratio  Short interest ratio Margin-loans ratio Margin interest ratio 
Mean Max Mean Max Mean Max Mean Max  
SH01 2.108 19.169 0.015 0.092 11.730 46.053 2.261 7.366 
SH03 2.164 19.417 0.019 0.131 12.297 40.937 1.637 6.054 
SH04 2.811 25.425 0.026 0.163 10.191 74.892 1.729 4.826 
SH06 1.364 14.006 0.005 0.033 10.412 56.939 0.733 4.128 
SH07 0.736 10.075 0.001 0.014 9.967 37.772 0.336 1.862 
SH09 2.597 12.618 0.029 0.161 14.262 37.240 4.088 14.729 
SH10 2.852 18.076 0.015 0.098 9.019 50.513 0.961 3.450 
SH11 1.832 12.263 0.021 0.104 11.049 39.134 1.864 7.119 
SH12 0.806 8.672 0.007 0.027 13.252 39.906 1.802 6.036 
SH13 1.410 9.797 0.022 0.112 13.195 43.660 3.873 12.651 
SH14 1.657 18.642 0.010 0.040 7.406 31.801 0.399 2.250 
SH16 2.659 21.193 0.021 0.085 12.314 36.185 2.201 9.112 
SH17 2.335 18.062 0.029 0.114 9.993 71.451 2.458 9.536 
SH18 1.103 11.707 0.015 0.054 10.722 32.321 2.080 8.247 
SH19 1.666 9.683 0.024 0.075 9.196 46.696 0.571 1.767 
SH20 0.800 6.551 0.017 0.059 10.198 38.610 2.203 8.178 
SH23 1.455 14.267 0.033 0.153 15.242 50.729 7.440 23.113 
SH24 1.956 21.101 0.012 0.136 10.803 51.723 1.677 7.434 
SH25 3.040 19.136 0.042 0.433 12.074 34.316 3.033 12.148 
SH26 1.322 22.522 0.010 0.061 10.660 63.292 1.462 5.285 
SH27 1.189 14.204 0.007 0.046 9.776 35.411 0.968 4.480 
SH28 1.658 14.473 0.004 0.019 10.849 35.061 0.380 2.077 
SH29 0.935 10.228 0.006 0.031 10.243 38.479 0.751 2.713 
SH30 2.209 25.825 0.014 0.089 12.957 39.171 2.264 9.047 
SH31 1.345 10.917 0.019 0.078 13.304 46.136 3.499 13.031 
SH32 1.333 21.875 0.012 0.095 9.682 66.364 1.365 7.299 
SH33 0.907 10.131 0.009 0.044 12.250 45.123 1.172 3.644 
SH34 1.959 18.572 0.019 0.088 12.044 57.980 2.991 11.901 
SH35  1.369 13.768 0.005 0.051 10.965 46.546 0.822 4.223 
SH36 1.243 20.212 0.009 0.048 10.846 48.963 0.928 3.092 
SH37 1.768 28.517 0.001 0.017 6.931 43.362 0.121 0.754 
SH38 1.199 13.624 0.008 0.029 11.719 44.969 1.548 7.047 
SH39 2.041 18.114 0.014 0.075 8.073 38.784 0.727 4.850 
SH40 1.707 21.843 0.003 0.013 10.629 44.582 0.243 1.275 
SH41 0.943 9.038 0.007 0.033 12.505 38.274 1.602 5.975 
SH43 1.707 21.843 0.009 0.050 9.358 40.339 1.238 3.559 
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SH44 1.335 17.254 0.000 0.003 10.532 39.929 0.068 0.321 
SH45 1.070 13.991 0.004 0.020 11.860 54.338 0.677 2.415 
SH46 1.251 15.336 0.008 0.039 9.350 32.166 1.321 4.601 
SH48 1.707 21.843 0.012 0.083 8.435 40.130 1.808 10.069 
SH49 1.636 13.594 0.011 0.053 13.531 46.765 1.509 4.645 
SH50 2.117 24.848 0.001 0.019 9.693 44.534 0.226 1.637 
SZ01 1.886 12.713 0.017 0.136 11.943 46.876 2.524 8.729 
SZ02 2.437 12.166 0.031 0.138 8.791 48.409 1.485 7.903 
SZ05 1.454 11.963 0.033 0.103 14.630 41.066 3.802 10.593 
SZ06 1.885 19.304 0.026 0.113 14.233 43.400 2.726 12.641 
SZ07 1.513 9.671 0.028 0.120 13.181 35.790 3.247 11.761 
SZ08 1.487 10.358 0.026 0.113 11.709 63.022 3.718 16.690 
SZ09 1.433 12.790 0.020 0.104 11.385 46.065 2.612 8.878 
SZ10 1.783 21.283 0.061 0.668 11.826 40.891 3.990 16.002 
SZ11 1.106 9.135 0.016 0.074 13.767 41.931 2.709 8.562 
SZ13 2.331 17.307 0.043 0.173 8.755 38.096 1.034 5.050 
SZ15 1.617 10.860 0.021 0.062 10.605 37.658 1.664 6.166 
SZ16 2.058 18.935 0.077 0.350 17.953 45.261 6.753 23.022 
SZ17 1.406 15.322 0.018 0.067 9.274 36.411 1.937 4.610 
SZ18 2.062 15.458 0.039 0.118 8.572 30.727 1.577 6.981 
SZ20 1.980 21.080 0.012 0.066 14.335 55.990 2.469 5.809 
SZ21 1.055 11.767 0.013 0.062 10.775 46.233 1.600 6.828 
SZ22 1.846 15.145 0.027 0.094 12.253 36.228 2.075 5.719 
SZ23 2.158 14.830 0.036 0.231 14.094 57.266 3.479 11.061 
SZ24 1.249 11.357 0.029 0.137 14.950 41.096 2.885 6.261 
SZ25 0.806 8.672 0.007 0.027 13.252 39.906 1.802 6.036 
SZ27 0.996 10.650 0.021 0.061 17.899 44.798 5.208 13.316 
SZ28 1.688 13.801 0.019 0.056 9.874 34.279 1.276 4.490 
SZ29 1.291 10.493 0.019 0.072 9.816 33.028 2.202 7.322 
SZ30 2.447 15.313 0.035 0.122 9.357 37.153 1.165 6.483 
SZ34 1.795 18.010 0.014 0.056 11.266 54.503 1.843 4.910 
SZ35 1.152 10.191 0.023 0.095 13.015 41.412 3.605 11.649 
SZ36 1.960 14.853 0.017 0.066 10.995 36.191 1.977 6.268 
SZ37 1.161 7.545 0.033 0.097 13.560 40.126 2.883 8.266 
SZ38 1.312 8.173 0.031 0.119 13.646 37.269 4.933 15.531 
SZ39 0.998 14.990 0.012 0.065 11.100 35.023 1.576 5.502 
SZ40 1.327 9.684 0.027 0.107 11.626 38.698 2.684 8.649 
Notes: Summary statistics of short-selling (margin-trading) activities relative to market trading are presented in Panel A and Panel B separately. The two measures of relative short-selling 
activities are short-sales value/trading value and short interest/market value, while measures of relative margin-trading activities are margin-loans value/trading value and margin interest/market 
value. The unit of these relative activity measures are ten thousand Chinese yuan. 
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Appendix 5.5.A The determinants of short-selling activity: general regression with short-sales value 
Notes: This table presents regression estimates of equation 𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 where the independent variable 𝑋𝑗𝑠 in each equation are specified in the leftmost column. The statistics of goodness-of-fit measures including R-squared, adjusted R-squared and p-value of F-test 
are shown at the bottom of the table. The column in shading is the final regression of the test. The t-statistics presented in parentheses are the t-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
respectively.   
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Ln(SSV) 
Regression in hierarchical approach 
C 
1.3985*** 
(98.95) 
1.3655*** 
(96.51) 
1.7910*** 
(55.69) 
1.3179*** 
(93.61) 
1.3555*** 
(76.17) 
1.3595*** 
(75.50) 
1.3181*** 
(93.57) 
1.3797*** 
(69.99) 
1.3596*** 
(75.50) 
1.3589*** 
(75.40) 
1.3597*** 
(75.51) 
1.3540*** 
(75.01) 
1.3599*** 
(75.44) 
1.3329*** 
(74.08) 
0.9099*** 
(6.47) 
1.2916*** 
(71.47) 
1.3427*** 
(74.36) 
1.8908*** 
(12.24) 
Ln(SSV(-1)) 
0.7576*** 
(328.43) 
0.7636*** 
(330.28) 
0.7590*** 
(325.71) 
0.7467*** 
(319.92) 
0.7463*** 
(319.43) 
0.7465*** 
(319.82) 
0.7467*** 
(319.92) 
0.7462*** 
(319.42) 
0.7465*** 
(319.82) 
0.7462*** 
(319.43) 
0.7464*** 
(319.63) 
0.7463*** 
(319.54) 
0.7465*** 
(319.59) 
0.7475*** 
(321.35) 
0.7472*** 
(321.01) 
0.7377*** 
(310.76) 
0.7476*** 
(321.44) 
0.7364*** 
(309.88) 
Ri(-1)  
0.0458*** 
(24.14) 
0.0461*** 
(24.29) 
0.0448*** 
(23.82) 
0.0450*** 
(23.89) 
0.0449*** 
(23.84) 
0.0448*** 
(23.82) 
0.0450*** 
(23.89) 
0.0449*** 
(23.84) 
0.0448*** 
(23.83) 
0.0449*** 
(23.87) 
0.0452*** 
(23.99) 
0.4513*** 
(23.94) 
0.0885*** 
(37.02) 
0.0885*** 
(37.03) 
0.0875*** 
(36.66) 
0.0886*** 
(37.06) 
0.0874*** 
(36.64) 
Historical volatility 
  
-0.9845*** 
(-14.73)            
 
      
Trading range 
   
0.2704*** 
(38.23) 
0.2669*** 
(37.37) 
0.2724*** 
(38.40) 
0.2704*** 
(38.23) 
0.2694*** 
(37.44) 
0.2724*** 
(38.40) 
0.2704*** 
(38.21) 
0.2720*** 
(38.33) 
0.2715*** 
(38.26) 
0.2716*** 
(38.26) 
0.2899*** 
(40.84) 
0.2882*** 
(40.50) 
0.2424*** 
(32.40) 
0.2923*** 
(41.13) 
0.2399*** 
(32.02) 
Dividend yield 
    
-0.0150*** 
(-3.46)   
-0.0113** 
(-2.50)           
EPS 
     
-0.0419*** 
(-3.70)  
-0.0335*** 
(-2.83) 
-0.0419*** 
(-3.70) 
-0.0422*** 
(-3.74) 
-0.0422*** 
(-3.73) 
-0.0418*** 
(-3.69) 
-0.0454*** 
(-4.00) 
-0.0482*** 
(-4.26) 
-0.0497*** 
(-4.39) 
-0.0653*** 
(-5.77) 
-0.0470*** 
(-4.16) 
-0.0645*** 
(-5.70) 
Price-to-book ratio 
      
0.0001 
(0.46) 
0.0001 
(0.45)           
DEx-dividend date 
        
0.0606 
(0.93)          
DFinancials          
0.2665*** 
(25.37)    
0.2655*** 
(25.34) 
0.2653*** 
(25.32) 
0.2593*** 
(24.79) 
0.2659*** 
(25.38) 
0.2590*** 
(24.78) 
DInsider trading           
0.1064** 
(2.40)   
0.1158*** 
(2.62) 
0.1142*** 
(2.59) 
0.0885** 
(2.01) 
0.1199** 
(2.72) 
0.0921** 
(2.09) 
DAnalyst rating            
0.0616*** 
(4.30)  
0.0713*** 
(4.99) 
0.0715*** 
(5.01) 
0.0805*** 
(5.65) 
0.0706*** 
(4.94) 
0.0807*** 
(5.67) 
DLagged block order 
            
0.1407*** 
(4.92)) 
0.1392*** 
(4.90) 
0.1332*** 
(4.67) 
0.1105*** 
(3.89) 
0.1442*** 
(5.07) 
0.1214*** 
(4.27) 
RM(-1)              
0.0973*** 
(29.03) 
0.0969*** 
(28.89) 
0.0904*** 
(26.88) 
0.0978*** 
(29.19) 
0.0905*** 
(26.95) 
CCI 
              
-0.0041*** 
(-3.03)   
-0.0058*** 
(-3.83) 
Market turnover                
-0.0004*** 
(-19.60)  
-0.0005*** 
(-20.97) 
IPO number 
                
-0.0190*** 
(-6.21) 
-0.0288*** 
(-9.17) 
R-squared  0.6228 0.6256 0.6265 0.6322 0.6322 0.6322 0.6321 0.6323 0.6322 0.6323 0.6323 0.6323 0.6323 0.6362 0.6363 0.6380 0.6364 0.6385 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6225 0.6252 0.6262 0.6318 0.6319 0.6319 0.6318 0.6319 0.6319 0.6319 0.6319 0.6320 0.6320 0.6359 0.6359 0.6376 0.6361 0.6381 
P-value of F test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Appendix 5.5.B The determinants of short-selling activity: regression on positive information with short-sales value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This table presents regression estimates of equation 𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 focusing on positive information events. The independent variable 𝑋𝑗𝑠 in each equation of 
our pooled testing are specified in the leftmost column. The statistics of goodness-of-fit measures including R-squared, adjusted R-squared and p-value of F-test are shown at the bottom 
of the table. The column in shading is the final regression of the test. The t-statistics presented in parentheses are the t-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.   
  
Dependent variable: 
Ln(SSV) 
Regression in hierarchical approach 
C 
1.3596*** 
(75.50) 
1.3543*** 
(75.04) 
1.3597*** 
(75.43) 
1.3328*** 
(74.09) 
0.8813*** 
(6.28) 
1.2913*** 
(71.46) 
1.3424*** 
(74.35) 
1.8734*** 
(12.14) 
Ln(SSV(-1)) 
0.7466*** 
(319.82) 
0.7462*** 
(319.53) 
0.7464*** 
(319.52) 
0.7476*** 
(321.46) 
0.7473*** 
(321.11) 
0.7377*** 
(310.76) 
0.7477*** 
(321.56) 
0.7364*** 
(309.89) 
Ri(-1) 
0.0449*** 
(23.84) 
0.0452*** 
(23.98) 
0.4555*** 
(24.08) 
0.0887*** 
(37.07) 
0.0887*** 
(37.08) 
0.0877*** 
(36.71) 
0.0888*** 
(37.11) 
0.0876*** 
(36.70) 
Historical volatility    
 
      
Trading range 
0.2725*** 
(38.40) 
0.2716*** 
(38.28) 
0.2720*** 
(38.32) 
0.2908*** 
(40.99) 
0.2889*** 
(40.62) 
0.2427*** 
(32.44) 
0.2932*** 
(41.27) 
0.2403*** 
(32.07) 
Dividend yield         
EPS 
-0.0419*** 
(-3.70) 
-0.0418*** 
(-3.69) 
-0.0436*** 
(-3.84) 
-0.0461*** 
(-4.08) 
-0.0478*** 
(-4.22) 
-0.0639*** 
(-5.65) 
-0.0448*** 
(-3.97) 
-0.0629*** 
(-5.57) 
Price-to-book ratio         
DEx-dividend date         
DFinancials    
0.2679*** 
(25.60) 
0.2675*** 
(25.57) 
0.2609*** 
(24.98) 
0.2683*** 
(25.65) 
0.2608*** 
(24.99) 
DInsider purchase 
-0.0271 
(-0.43)        
DAnalyst upgrade  
0.0590*** 
(4.07)  
0.0692*** 
(4.81) 
0.0696*** 
(4.83) 
0.0796*** 
(5.53) 
0.0686*** 
(4.76) 
0.0799*** 
(5.56) 
DLagged plus-tick order 
  
0.2081*** 
(4.82) 
0.2053*** 
(4.78) 
0.2003*** 
(4.66) 
0.1804*** 
(4.21) 
0.2083*** 
(4.85) 
0.1872*** 
(4.37) 
RM(-1)    
0.0972*** 
(29.00) 
0.0968*** 
(28.86) 
0.0902*** 
(26.84) 
0.0977*** 
(29.16) 
0.0904*** 
(26.91) 
CCI 
    
-0.0044*** 
(-3.25)   
-0.0056*** 
(-3.72) 
Market turnover      
-0.0004*** 
(-19.80)  
-0.0005*** 
(-21.09) 
IPO number 
      
-0.0186*** 
(-6.08) 
-0.0287*** 
(-9.13) 
R-squared  0.6322 0.6323 0.6323 0.6362 0.6363 0.6380 0.6363 0.6385 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6319 0.6320 0.6320 0.6358 0.6359 0.6376 0.6360 0.6381 
P-value of F test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Appendix 5.5.C The determinants of short-selling activity: regression on negative information with short-sales value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This table presents regression estimates of equation 𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 focusing on negative information events. The independent variable 𝑋𝑗𝑠 in each equation of our 
pooled testing are specified in the leftmost column. The statistics of goodness-of-fit measures including R-squared, adjusted R-squared and p-value of F-test are shown at the bottom of 
the table. The column in shading is the final regression of the test. The t-statistics presented in parentheses are the t-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.   
  
Dependent variable: 
Ln(SSV) 
Regression in hierarchical approach 
C 
1.3605*** 
(75.55) 
1.3592*** 
(75.48) 
1.3595*** 
(75.41) 
1.3394*** 
(74.70) 
0.8810*** 
(6.28) 
1.2993*** 
(72.17) 
1.3491*** 
(74.94) 
1.8579*** 
(12.04) 
Ln(SSV(-1)) 
0.7463*** 
(319.50) 
0.7465*** 
(319.81) 
0.7466*** 
(319.66) 
0.7479*** 
(321.74) 
0.7476*** 
(321.38) 
0.7381*** 
(311.16) 
0.7479*** 
(321.83) 
0.7368*** 
(310.29) 
Ri(-1) 
0.0450*** 
(23.90) 
0.0450*** 
(23.85) 
0.0449*** 
(23.79) 
0.0878*** 
(36.77) 
0.0879*** 
(36.79) 
0.0867*** 
(36.39) 
0.0879*** 
(36.82) 
0.0867*** 
(36.38) 
Historical volatility    
 
      
Trading range 
0.2720*** 
(38.33) 
0.2723*** 
(38.39) 
0.2721*** 
(38.34) 
0.2916*** 
(41.12) 
0.2898*** 
(40.74) 
0.2443*** 
(32.68) 
0.2940*** 
(41.04) 
0.2420*** 
(32.33) 
Dividend yield         
EPS 
-0.0422*** 
(-3.72) 
-0.0420*** 
(-3.71) 
-0.0439*** 
(-3.68) 
-0.0448*** 
(-3.97) 
-0.0465*** 
(-4.12) 
-0.0626*** 
(-5.54) 
-0.0435*** 
(-3.85) 
-0.0616*** 
(-5.45) 
Price-to-book ratio         
DEx-dividend date         
DFinancials    
0.2702*** 
(25.85) 
0.2698*** 
(25.81) 
0.2632*** 
(25.22) 
0.2706*** 
(25.89) 
0.2631*** 
(25.24) 
DInsider sale 
0.2036*** 
(3.31)   
0.2099*** 
(3.43) 
0.2048*** 
(3.35) 
0.1692*** 
(2.77) 
0.2204*** 
(3.60) 
0.1845*** 
(3.02) 
DAnalyst downgrade  
-0.1137 
(-1.63)       
DLagged minus-tick order 
  
-0.0897 
(0.45)      
RM(-1)    
0.0969*** 
(28.91) 
0.0964*** 
(28.77) 
0.0900*** 
(26.77) 
0.0974*** 
(29.08) 
0.0901*** 
(26.84) 
CCI 
    
-0.0045*** 
(-3.30)   
-0.0053*** 
(-3.57) 
Market turnover      
-0.0004*** 
(-19.61)  
-0.0005*** 
(-20.86) 
IPO number 
      
-0.0188*** 
(-6.17) 
-0.0289*** 
(-9.20) 
R-squared  0.6323 0.6322 0.6322 0.6360 0.6361 0.6376 0.6362 0.6383 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6319 0.6319 0.6319 0.6357 0.6357 0.6374 0.6359 0.6379 
P-value of F test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  
191 
 
Appendix 5.6.A The determinants of margin-trading activity: general regression with margin-loans value 
 
Notes: This table presents regression estimates of equation 𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 where the independent variable 𝑋𝑗𝑠 in each equation are specified in the leftmost column. The statistics of goodness-of-fit measures including R-squared, adjusted R-squared and p-value of F-
test are shown at the bottom of the table. The column in shading is the final regression of the test.  The t-statistics presented in parentheses are the t-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
respectively.   
  
Dependent variable: 
Ln(MLV) 
Regression in hierarchical approach 
C 
0.8474*** 
(68.78) 
0.8683*** 
(70.52) 
1.2943*** 
(62.39) 
0.6797*** 
(113.87) 
1.4436*** 
(63.36) 
1.2754*** 
(61.09) 
1.2930*** 
(63.32) 
1.4508*** 
(63.71) 
1.2758*** 
(61.10) 
1.2750*** 
(61.07) 
1.2756*** 
(61.09) 
1.2750*** 
(61.07) 
1.2776*** 
(61.18) 
1.2746*** 
(61.14) 
0.4491*** 
(6.68) 
1.9321*** 
(92.97) 
1.2752*** 
(61.12) 
0.9186*** 
(13.74) 
Ln(MLV(-1)) 
0.8983*** 
(615.29) 
0.8957*** 
(613.85) 
0.8829*** 
(573.74) 
0.7274*** 
(319.30) 
0.8780*** 
(560.04) 
0.8816*** 
(569.91) 
0.8826*** 
(572.93) 
0.8740*** 
(549.04) 
0.8816*** 
(569.92) 
0.8784*** 
(542.48) 
0.8816*** 
(569.48) 
0.8816*** 
(569.64) 
0.8813*** 
(568.83) 
0.8811*** 
(569.46) 
0.8664*** 
(530.10) 
0.7289*** 
(347.83) 
0.8809*** 
(565.27) 
0.7242*** 
(342.65) 
Ri(-1)  
0.0197*** 
(24.01) 
0.0200*** 
(24.17) 
0.0091*** 
(15.47) 
0.0195*** 
(23.96) 
0.0198*** 
(24.27) 
0.0198*** 
(24.19) 
0.0196*** 
(24.10) 
0.0198*** 
(24.27) 
0.0198*** 
(24.26) 
0.0199*** 
(24.26) 
0.0198*** 
(24.16) 
0.0197*** 
(24.14) 
0.0081*** 
(7.74) 
0.0083*** 
(7.97) 
0.0110*** 
(11.09) 
0.0081*** 
(7.74) 
0.0110*** 
(11.09) 
Historical volatility 
  
-
0.7865*** 
(-25.47)  
-0.8887*** 
(-28.20) 
-
0.8059*** 
(-26.02) 
-
0.7770*** 
(-25.05) 
-
0.9450*** 
(-29.54) 
-
0.8057*** 
(-26.01) 
-0.8059*** 
(-26.02) 
-
0.8057*** 
(-26.01) 
-0.8076*** 
(-26.07) 
-0.8060*** 
(-26.00) 
-0.8008*** 
(-25.87) 
-0.6949*** 
(-22.36) 
-0.3174*** 
(-10.69) 
-0.8010*** 
(-25.88) 
-0.2562*** 
(-8.59) 
Trading range 
   
-0.0051** 
(-2.22)               
Dividend yield 
    
0.0305** 
(6.74)   
0.0303*** 
(6.23)           
EPS 
     
0.0392*** 
(7.77)  
0.0721*** 
(13.54) 
0.0393*** 
(7.77) 
0.0392*** 
(7.77) 
0.0392*** 
(7.76) 
0.0393*** 
(7.78) 
0.0381*** 
(7.51) 
0.0379*** 
(7.48) 
0.0347*** 
(6.89) 
0.0101** 
(2.10) 
0.0378*** 
(7.48) 
0.0089* 
(1.85) 
Price-to-book ratio 
      
-
0.0001*** 
(-3.25) 
-
0.0001*** 
(-3.06)           
DEx-dividend date 
        
-
0.0740*** 
(-2.59)     
-0.0679** 
(-2.38) 
-0.0502** 
(-1.76) 
-0.0861*** 
(-3.18) 
-0.0679** 
(-2.38) 
-0.0766*** 
(-2.84) 
DFinancials          
0.0395*** 
(8.64)    
0.0383*** 
(8.39) 
0.0475*** 
(10.39) 
0.1048*** 
(23.41) 
0.0383*** 
(8.37) 
0.1074*** 
(24.00) 
DInsider trading           
0.0126 
(0.64)        
DAnalyst rating            
-0.0158** 
(-2.50)  
-0.0185*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.0200*** 
(-3.18) 
-0.0446*** 
(-7.44) 
-0.0185*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.0446*** 
(-7.46) 
DLagged block order 
            
0.0758*** 
(5.92) 
0.0767*** 
(6.00) 
0.0584*** 
(4.58) 
0.0537*** 
(4.43) 
0.0765*** 
(5.98) 
0.0473 
(3.90) 
RM(-1)              
0.0255*** 
(17.61) 
0.0247*** 
(17.13) 
0.0135*** 
(9.83) 
0.0254*** 
(17.60) 
0.0135*** 
(9.85) 
CCI 
              
0.0174*** 
(26.94)   
0.0101*** 
(15.95) 
Market turnover                
0.0013*** 
(101.52)  
0.0013*** 
(99.42) 
IPO number 
                
0.0010 
(0.72) 
0.0181*** 
(13.59) 
R-squared  0.8416 0.8426 0.8437 0.8432 0.8437 0.8438 0.8437 0.8445 0.8439 0.8439 0.8438 0.8438 0.8439 0.8444 0.8457 0.8604 0.8444 0.8610 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8415 0.8425 0.8435 0.8430 0.8436 0.8437 0.8436 0.8444 0.8437 0.8437 0.8436 0.8437 0.8437 0.8443 0.8455 0.8603 0.8443 0.8609 
P-value of F test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Appendix 5.6.B The determinants of margin-trading activity: regression on positive information with margin-loans value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This table presents regression estimates of equation 𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 focusing on positive information events. The independent variable 𝑋𝑗𝑠 in each equation of our pooled 
testing are specified in the leftmost column. The statistics of goodness-of-fit measures including R-squared, adjusted R-squared and p-value of F-test are shown at the bottom of the table. The 
column in shading is the final regression of the test. The t-statistics presented in parentheses are the t-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.   
 
Dependent variable: 
Ln(MLV) 
Regression in hierarchical approach 
C 
1.2755*** 
(61.09) 
1.2750*** 
(61.06) 
1.2756*** 
(61.09) 
1.2726*** 
(61.05) 
0.4580*** 
(6.82) 
1.9308*** 
(92.91) 
1.2732*** 
(61.03) 
0.9116*** 
(13.65) 
Ln(MLV(-1)) 
0.8817*** 
(569.86) 
0.8816*** 
(569.69) 
0.8815*** 
(569.49) 
0.8813*** 
(570.17) 
0.8665*** 
(530.38) 
0.7291*** 
(347.99) 
0.8812*** 
(565.90) 
0.7243*** 
(342.75) 
Ri(-1) 
0.0199*** 
(24.26) 
0.0198*** 
(24.17) 
0.0196*** 
(23.92) 
0.0080*** 
(7.59) 
0.0082*** 
(7.83) 
0.0110*** 
(10.96) 
0.0080*** 
(7.60) 
0.0109*** 
(10.96) 
Historical volatility 
-0.8060*** 
(-26.02) 
-0.8075*** 
(-26.07) 
-0.8061*** 
(-26.00) 
-0.8008*** 
(-25.87) 
-0.6942*** 
(-22.33) 
-0.3173*** 
(-10.68) 
-0.8010*** 
(-25.87) 
-0.2558*** 
(-8.57) 
Trading range         
Dividend yield         
EPS 
0.0393*** 
(7.77) 
0.0393*** 
(7.78) 
0.0389*** 
(7.70) 
0.0388*** 
(7.68) 
0.0354*** 
(7.03) 
0.0107** 
(2.23) 
0.0388*** 
(7.67) 
0.0094** 
(1.96) 
Price-to-book ratio         
DEx-dividend date    
-0.0684** 
(-2.39) 
-0.0505* 
(-1.78) 
-0.0865*** 
(-3.20) 
-0.0683** 
(-2.39) 
-0.0769*** 
(-2.85) 
DFinancials    
0.0387*** 
(8.48) 
0.0477*** 
(10.46) 
0.1051*** 
(23.50) 
0.0387*** 
(8.47) 
0.1077*** 
(24.09) 
DInsider purchase 
0.0124 
(0.45)        
DAnalyst upgrade  
-0.0149** 
(-2.33)  
-0.0176*** 
(-2.75) 
-0.0193*** 
(-3.03) 
-0.0446*** 
(-7.36) 
-0.0176*** 
(-2.76) 
-0.0447*** 
(-7.40) 
DLagged plus-tick order   
0.1069*** 
(5.49) 
0.1076*** 
(5.53) 
0.0935*** 
(4.83) 
0.0812*** 
(4.41) 
0.1074*** 
(5.53) 
0.0755*** 
(4.11) 
RM(-1)    
0.0254*** 
(17.60) 
0.0247*** 
(17.12) 
0.0135*** 
(9.83) 
0.0254*** 
(17.58) 
0.0135*** 
(9.86) 
CCI     
0.0175*** 
(27.09)   
0.0101*** 
(16.06) 
Market turnover      
0.0013*** 
(101.55)  
0.0013*** 
(99.42) 
IPO number       
0.0011 
(0.81) 
0.0181*** 
(13.56) 
R-squared  0.8438 0.8438 0.8439 0.8444 0.8457 0.8604 0.8444 0.8610 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8437 0.8437 0.8437 0.8443 0.8455 0.8603 0.8443 0.8609 
P-value of F test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Appendix 5.6.C The determinants of margin-trading activity: regression on negative information with margin-loans value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This table presents regression estimates of equation 𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 focusing on negative information events. The independent variable 𝑋𝑗𝑠 in each equation of our pooled 
testing are specified in the leftmost column. The statistics of goodness-of-fit measures including R-squared, adjusted R-squared and p-value of F-test are shown at the bottom of the table. The 
column in shading is the final regression of the test.  The t-statistics presented in parentheses are the t-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.   
  
  
Dependent variable: 
Ln(MLV) 
Regression in hierarchical approach 
C 
1.2758*** 
(61.10) 
1.2759*** 
(61.10) 
1.2767*** 
(61.12) 
1.2733*** 
(61.08) 
0.4658*** 
(6.94) 
1.9309*** 
(92.89) 
1.2740*** 
(61.07) 
0.9061*** 
(13.57) 
Ln(MLV(-1)) 
0.8816*** 
(569.42) 
0.8816*** 
(569.64) 
0.8816*** 
(569.10) 
0.8815*** 
(570.55) 
0.8666*** 
(530.74) 
0.7298*** 
(348.67) 
0.8813*** 
(566.25) 
0.7250*** 
(343.44) 
Ri(-1) 
0.0198*** 
(24.23) 
0.0199*** 
(24.27) 
0.0199*** 
(24.29) 
0.0084*** 
(8.00) 
0.0086*** 
(8022) 
0.0114*** 
(11.51) 
0.0084*** 
(8.01) 
0.0114*** 
(11.50) 
Historical volatility 
-0.8053*** 
(-26.00) 
-0.8060*** 
(-26.02) 
-0.8079*** 
(-26.06) 
-0.7991*** 
(-25.84) 
-0.6923*** 
(-22.30) 
-0.3143*** 
(-10.59) 
-0.7993*** 
(-25.85) 
-0.2529*** 
(-8.49) 
Trading range         
Dividend yield         
EPS 
0.0392*** 
(7.76) 
0.0393*** 
(7.77) 
0.0388*** 
(7.66) 
0.0390*** 
(7.73) 
0.0355*** 
(7.07) 
0.0108** 
(2.26) 
0.0390*** 
(7.73) 
0.0095*** 
(1.98) 
Price-to-book ratio         
DEx-dividend date    
-0.0683** 
(-2.39) 
-0.0504* 
(-1.77) 
-0.0870*** 
(-3.21) 
-0.0682** 
(-2.39) 
-0.0773*** 
(-2.86) 
DFinancials    
0.0401*** 
(8.79) 
0.0490*** 
(10.75) 
0.1062*** 
(23.74) 
0.0401*** 
(8.78) 
0.1087*** 
(24.32) 
DInsider sale 
-0.0435 
(-1.57)        
DAnalyst downgrade  
0.0496* 
(1.69)  
0.0441 
(1.51) 
0.0437 
(1.50) 
0.0357 
(1.29) 
0.0441 
(1.51) 
0.0347 
(1.25) 
DLagged minus-tick order   
   -0.0469 
(-0.87)      
RM(-1)    
0.0253*** 
(17.50) 
0.0245*** 
(17.00) 
0.0132*** 
(9.62) 
0.0253*** 
(17.48) 
0.0132*** 
(9.64) 
CCI     
0.0175*** 
(27.23)   
0.0102*** 
(16.15) 
Market turnover      
0.0013*** 
(101.41)  
0.0013*** 
(99.25) 
IPO number       
0.0012 
(0.85) 
0.0181*** 
(13.56) 
R-squared  0.8438 0.8438 0.8438 0.8444 0.8457 0.8603 0.8444 0.8610 
Adjusted R-squared 0.8437 0.8437 0.8437 0.8443 0.8455 0.8602 0.8442 0.8609 
P-value of F test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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 Appendix 5.7.A The determinants of short-selling activity: general regression with short-sales ratio 
 
Notes: This table presents regression estimates of equation 𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 where the independent variable 𝑋𝑗𝑠 in each equation are specified in the leftmost column. The statistics of goodness-of-fit measures including R-squared, adjusted R-squared and p-value of F-test 
are shown at the bottom of the table. The column in shading is the final regression of the test. The t-statistics presented in parentheses are the t-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
respectively.   
 
  
Dependent variable: 
Ln(SSR) 
Regression in hierarchical approach 
C 
-0.0639*** 
(-15.30) 
-0.0613*** 
(-14.80) 
0.3726*** 
(17.26) 
-0.0691*** 
(-12.79) 
0.2779*** 
(11.15) 
0.3757*** 
(16.20) 
0.3793*** 
(17.54) 
0.2989*** 
(11.73) 
0.2779*** 
(11.15) 
0.2779*** 
(11.14) 
0.2774*** 
(11.12) 
0.2746*** 
(11.00) 
0.2757*** 
(11.04) 
0.6030*** 
(19.24) 
2.8695*** 
(20.38) 
0.6077*** 
(19.44) 
0.2921*** 
(11.65) 
2.6799*** 
(18.85) 
Ln(SSR(-1)) 
0.7395*** 
(332.57) 
0.7445*** 
(336.79) 
0.7363*** 
(328.59) 
0.7445*** 
(336.81) 
0.7351*** 
(327.24) 
0.7363*** 
(328.59) 
0.7360*** 
(328.20) 
0.7346*** 
(326.73) 
0.7351*** 
(327.23) 
0.7360*** 
(328.54) 
0.7351*** 
(327.24) 
0.7350*** 
(327.04) 
0.7350*** 
(327.07) 
0.7294*** 
(321.77) 
0.7237*** 
(316.17) 
0.7299*** 
(322.79) 
0.7332*** 
(326.09) 
0.7235*** 
(316.72) 
Ri(-1)  
0.0643*** 
(37.86) 
0.0649*** 
(38.29) 
0.0643*** 
(37.87) 
0.0644*** 
(37.99) 
0.0649*** 
(38.29) 
0.0649*** 
(38.30) 
0.0644*** 
(38.00) 
0.0644*** 
(37.99) 
0.0644*** 
(38.00) 
0.0644*** 
(38.00) 
0.0645*** 
(38.04) 
0.0644*** 
(37.97) 
0.0624*** 
(36.73) 
0.0619*** 
(36.48) 
0.0908*** 
(42.07) 
0.0917*** 
(42.45) 
0.0904*** 
(41.96) 
Historical volatility 
  
-1.0286*** 
(-20.48)  
-0.9512*** 
(-18.57) 
-1.0290*** 
(-20.49) 
-1.0487*** 
(-20.81) 
-0.9671*** 
(-18.80) 
-0.9512*** 
(-18.57) 
-0.9507*** 
(-18.55) 
-0.9502*** 
(-18.54) 
-0.9532*** 
(-18.60) 
-0.9476*** 
(-18.48) 
-1.4156*** 
(-24.52) 
-1.5145*** 
(-26.13) 
-1.4098*** 
(-24.48) 
-0.9194*** 
(-17.97) 
-1.4666*** 
(-25.29) 
Trading range 
   
0.0143*** 
(2.26)               
Dividend yield 
    
-0.0287*** 
(-7.58)   
-0.0315*** 
(-7.97) 
-0.0287*** 
(-7.58) 
-0.0287*** 
(-7.58) 
-0.0287*** 
(-7.57) 
-0.0289*** 
(-7.62) 
-0.0287*** 
(-7.58) 
-0.0162*** 
(-4.21) 
-0.0113*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.0152*** 
(-3.97) 
-0.0251*** 
(-6.64) 
-0.0094** 
(-2.45) 
EPS 
     
-0.0030 
(-0.37)  
-0.0225*** 
(-2.66)   
 
        
Price-to-book ratio 
      
0.0003*** 
(4.64) 
0.0003*** 
(4.53)           
DEx-dividend date 
        
0.0139 
(0.24)          
DFinancials          
0.0275*** 
(2.96)    
0.0276*** 
(2.97) 
0.0285*** 
(3.07) 
0.0291*** 
(3.12) 
0.0293*** 
(3.15) 
0.0303*** 
(3.26) 
DInsider trading           
0.0286 
(0.71)        
DAnalyst rating            
0.0309** 
(2.47)  
0.0289** 
(2.31) 
0.0317** 
(2.54) 
0.0349*** 
(2.80) 
0.0359*** 
(2.87) 
0.0370*** 
(2.97) 
DLagged block order 
            
0.0317* 
(1.65) 
0.0571** 
(2.20) 
0.0773*** 
(2.98) 
0.0591** 
(2.29) 
0.0423 
(1.64) 
0.0824*** 
(3.19) 
RM(-1) 
             
-0.0004*** 
(-17.45) 
-0.0002*** 
(-11.50) 
-0.0652*** 
(-21.25) 
-0.0628*** 
(-20.47) 
-0.0655*** 
(-21.38) 
CCI 
              
-0.0217*** 
(-16.51)   
-0.0198*** 
(-14.96) 
Market turnover                
-0.0004*** 
(-16.13)  
-0.0003*** 
(-10.70) 
IPO number 
                
-0.0382*** 
(-14.02) 
-0.0245*** 
(-8.83) 
R-squared  0.5560 0.5627 0.5702 0.5627 0.5650 0.5647 0.5648 0.5651 0.5647 0.5650 0.5647 0.5650 0.5650 0.5662 0.5683 0.5674 0.5676 0.5699 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5556 0.5624 0.5697 0.5624 0.5646 0.5643 0.5644 0.5647 0.5643 0.5646 0.5644 0.5646 0.5646 0.5658 0.5679 0.5671 0.5672 0.5695 
P-value of F test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Appendix 5.7.B The determinants of short-selling activity: regression on positive information with short-sales ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This table presents regression estimates of equation 𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 focusing on positive information events. The independent variable 𝑋𝑗𝑠 in each equation of our 
pooled testing are specified in the leftmost column. The statistics of goodness-of-fit measures including R-squared, adjusted R-squared and p-value of F-test are shown at the bottom of 
the table. The column in shading is the final regression of the test. The t-statistics presented in parentheses are the t-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.   
  
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Ln(SSR) 
Regression in hierarchical approach 
C 
0.2780*** 
(11.15) 
0.2748*** 
(11.01) 
0.2746*** 
(11.00) 
2.8695*** 
(20.38) 
3.1810*** 
(23.00) 
0.6077*** 
(19.44) 
0.2917*** 
(11.65) 
2.6727*** 
(18.81) 
Ln(SSR(-1)) 
0.7350*** 
(327.20) 
0.7350*** 
(327.03) 
0.7350*** 
(327.06) 
0.7237*** 
(316.17) 
0.7266*** 
(319.10) 
0.7299*** 
(322.71) 
0.7331*** 
(326.04) 
0.7234*** 
(316.63) 
Ri(-1) 
0.0644*** 
(37.99) 
0.0645*** 
(38.04) 
0.0646*** 
(38.06) 
0.0619*** 
(36.48) 
0.0911*** 
(42.19) 
0.0911*** 
(42.15) 
0.0919*** 
(42.53) 
0.0907*** 
(42.05) 
Historical volatility 
-0.9517*** 
(-18.58) 
-0.9536*** 
(-18.61) 
-0.9458*** 
(-18.45) 
-1.5145*** 
(-26.13) 
-1.2141*** 
(-22.94) 
-1.4093*** 
(-24.47) 
-0.9186*** 
(-17.96) 
-1.4661*** 
(-25.28) 
Trading range         
Dividend yield 
-0.0290*** 
(-7.65) 
-0.0289*** 
(-7.62) 
-0.0287*** 
(-7.57) 
-0.0287*** 
(-7.60) 
-0.0178*** 
(-4.68) 
-0.0152*** 
(-3.95) 
-0.0251*** 
(-6.63) 
-0.0094** 
(-2.44) 
EPS          
Price-to-book ratio         
DEx-dividend date         
DFinancials    
0.0272*** 
(2.93) 
0.0286*** 
(3.08) 
0.0289*** 
(3.11) 
0.0291*** 
(3.14) 
0.0305*** 
(3.29) 
DInsider purchase 
-0.0893 
(-1.58)        
DAnalyst upgrade  
0.0313** 
(2.48)  
0.0374*** 
(2.97) 
0.0400*** 
(3.18) 
0.0349*** 
(2.77) 
0.0365*** 
(2.91) 
0.0371*** 
(2.95) 
DLagged plus-tick order   
0.1156*** 
(2.91) 
0.1156*** 
(2.91) 
0.1439*** 
(3.63) 
0.1424*** 
(3.59) 
0.1228*** 
(3.10) 
0.1589*** 
(4.01) 
RM(-1) 
   
-0.0621*** 
(-20.22) 
-0.0633*** 
(-20.66) 
-0.0652*** 
(-21.25) 
-0.0628*** 
(-20.48) 
-0.0655*** 
(-21.39) 
CCI 
    
-0.0268*** 
(-21.51)   
-0.0198*** 
(-14.92) 
Market turnover      
-0.0004*** 
(-18.64)  
-0.0003*** 
(-11.68) 
IPO number 
      
-0.0382*** 
(-14.02) 
-0.0245*** 
(-8.81) 
R-squared  0.5647 0.5650 0.5650 0.5667 0.5688 0.5683 0.5676 0.5699 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5643 0.5646 0.5646 0.5663 0.5685 0.5679 0.5672 0.5695 
P-value of F test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Appendix 5.7.C The determinants of short-selling activity: regression on negative information with short-sales ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This table presents regression estimates of equation 𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 focusing on negative information events. The independent variable 𝑋𝑗𝑠 in each equation of our 
pooled testing are specified in the leftmost column. The statistics of goodness-of-fit measures including R-squared, adjusted R-squared and p-value of F-test are shown at the bottom of 
the table. The column in shading is the final regression of the test. The t-statistics presented in parentheses are the t-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.   
 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Ln(SSR) 
Regression in hierarchical approach 
C 
0.2757*** 
(11.05) 
0.2776*** 
(11.13) 
0.2785*** 
(11.16) 
0.2597*** 
(10.43) 
3.1685*** 
(22.92) 
0.6120*** 
(19.60) 
0.2960*** 
(11.83) 
2.6799*** 
(18.71) 
Ln(SSR(-1)) 
0.7350*** 
(327.19) 
0.7350*** 
(327.07) 
0.7350*** 
(326.99) 
0.7359*** 
(328.25) 
0.7269*** 
(319.35) 
0.7300*** 
(322.88) 
0.7333*** 
(326.23) 
0.7236*** 
(316.85) 
Ri(-1) 
0.0645*** 
(38.03) 
0.0643*** 
(37.96) 
0.0643*** 
(37.96) 
0.0915*** 
(42.39) 
0.0906*** 
(42.04) 
0.0906*** 
(42.03) 
0.0915*** 
(42.42) 
0.0902*** 
(41.91) 
Historical volatility 
-0.9480*** 
(-18.50) 
-0.9500*** 
(-18.54) 
-0.9509*** 
(-18.55) 
-0.9123*** 
(-17.83) 
-1.2110*** 
(-22.89) 
-1.4078*** 
(-24.45) 
-0.9168*** 
(-17.94) 
-1.4637*** 
(-25.25) 
Trading range         
Dividend yield 
-0.0289*** 
(-7.61) 
-0.0287*** 
(-7.57) 
-0.0287*** 
(-7.56) 
-0.0288*** 
(-7.61) 
-0.0179*** 
(-4.71) 
-0.0153*** 
(-3.98) 
-0.0252*** 
(-6.64) 
-0.0095** 
(-2.47) 
EPS 
 
        
Price-to-book ratio         
DEx-dividend date         
DFinancials    
0.0281*** 
(3.03) 
0.0297*** 
(3.20) 
0.0298*** 
(3.21) 
0.0300*** 
(3.24) 
0.0315*** 
(3.40) 
DInsider sale 
0.1137** 
(2.03)   
0.1219** 
(2.18) 
0.1471*** 
(2.64) 
0.1618** 
(2.90) 
0.1427** 
(2.56) 
0.1219** 
(2.18) 
DAnalyst downgrade  
-0.0026 
(-0.04)       
DLagged minus-tick order 
  
-0.0235 
(-0.71)      
RM(-1)    
-0.0619*** 
(-20.16) 
-0.0631*** 
(-20.59) 
-0.0650*** 
(-21.20) 
-0.0626*** 
(-20.42) 
-0.0653*** 
(-21.33) 
CCI     
-0.0266*** 
(-21.39)   
-0.0196*** 
(-14.97) 
Market turnover      
-0.0004*** 
(-18.64)  
-0.0003*** 
(-11.72) 
IPO number       
-0.0382*** 
(-14.04) 
-0.0247*** 
(-8.86) 
R-squared  0.5650 0.5647 0.5647 0.5669 0.5690 0.5685 0.5678 0.5701 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5646 0.5643 0.5643 0.5664 0.5686 0.5681 0.5674 0.5697 
P-value of F test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Appendix 5.8.A The determinants of margin-trading activity: general regression with margin-loans ratio 
 
Notes: This table presents regression estimates of equation 𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 where the independent variable 𝑋𝑗𝑠 in each equation are specified in the leftmost column. The statistics of goodness-of-fit measures including R-squared, adjusted R-squared and p-value of F-
test are shown at the bottom of the table. The column in shading is the final regression of the test. The t-statistics presented in parentheses are the t-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
respectively.   
  
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Ln(MLR) 
Regression in hierarchical approach 
C 
0.4962*** 
(108.37) 
0.4949*** 
(108.20) 
1.5506*** 
(118.29) 
0.4994*** 
(104.65) 
1.5042*** 
(110.75) 
1.5224*** 
(115.21) 
1.5502*** 
(118.25) 
1.4940*** 
(109.89) 
1.5226*** 
(115.22) 
1.5228*** 
(115.21) 
1.5231*** 
(115.21) 
1.5212*** 
(115.02) 
1.5186*** 
(114.91) 
1.5299*** 
(115.47) 
0.7652*** 
(15.89) 
1.4221*** 
(106.60) 
1.5362*** 
(115.82) 
1.1306*** 
(22.71) 
Ln(MLR(-1)) 
0.7842*** 
(416.84) 
0.7848*** 
(417.65) 
0.6703*** 
(296.93) 
0.7847*** 
(417.59) 
0.6678*** 
(294.92) 
0.6664*** 
(293.82) 
0.6702*** 
(296.84) 
0.6652*** 
(292.85) 
0.6664*** 
(293.81) 
0.6650*** 
(293.78) 
0.6664*** 
(293.82) 
0.6667*** 
(293.59) 
0.6667*** 
(293.51) 
0.6642*** 
(291.09) 
0.6599*** 
(287.79) 
0.6311*** 
(265.69) 
0.6635*** 
(290.77) 
0.6276*** 
(263.64) 
Ri(-1)  
0.0110*** 
(17.16) 
0.0085*** 
(13.65) 
0.0111*** 
(17.19) 
0.0087*** 
(13.98) 
0.0085*** 
(13.69) 
0.0085*** 
(13.65) 
0.0087*** 
(13.92) 
0.0085*** 
(13.69) 
0.0084*** 
(13.68) 
0.0085*** 
(13.71) 
0.0088*** 
(14.08) 
0.0086*** 
(13.88) 
0.0035*** 
(4.30) 
0.0032*** 
(3.99) 
0.0018** 
(2.27) 
0.0034*** 
(4.25) 
0.0016** 
(2.01) 
Historical volatility 
  
-1.8554*** 
(-85.56)  
-1.8211*** 
(-83.42) 
-1.8715*** 
(-86.31) 
-1.8532*** 
(-85.38) 
-1.8422*** 
(-84.04) 
-1.8716*** 
(-86.31) 
-1.8718*** 
(-86.31) 
-1.8725*** 
(-86.32) 
-1.8647*** 
(-86.02) 
-1.8647*** 
(-86.02) 
-1.8735*** 
(-86.37) 
-1.8437*** 
(-84.82) 
-1.6718*** 
(-76.19) 
-1.8691*** 
(-86.18) 
-1.6480*** 
(-75.06) 
Trading range 
   
-0.0085*** 
(-3.42)               
Dividend yield 
    
0.0179*** 
(12.92)   
0.0126*** 
(8.70)           
EPS 
     
0.0476*** 
(15.80)  
 0.0400*** 
(12.55) 
 0.0476*** 
(15.80) 
 0.0476*** 
(15.80) 
 0.0477*** 
(15.82) 
 0.0477*** 
(15.86) 
 0.0473*** 
(15.69) 
 0.0476*** 
(15.79) 
0.0471*** 
(15.64) 
0.0384*** 
(12.84) 
 0.0476*** 
(15.78) 
0.0380*** 
(12.69) 
Price-to-book ratio 
      
-0.0001** 
(-2.36) 
-0.0001** 
(-2.56)           
DEx-dividend date 
        
-0.0350* 
(-1.67)     
-0.0337 
(-1.61) 
-0.0305 
(-1.46) 
-0.0378* 
(-1.82) 
-0.0347* 
(-1.65) 
-0.0384* 
(-1.85) 
DFinancials          
 0.0527*** 
(15.29)    
0.0527*** 
(15.27) 
0.0525*** 
(15.24) 
0.0529*** 
(15.48) 
0.0528*** 
(15.29) 
0.0529*** 
(15.51) 
DInsider trading           
0.0248* 
(1.65)   
0.0222 
(1.48) 
0.0247* 
(1.65) 
0.0445*** 
(2.99) 
0.0205 
(1.36) 
0.0425*** 
(2.86) 
DAnalyst rating            
-0.0181*** 
(-3.92)  
-0.0173*** 
(-3.74) 
-0.0180*** 
(-3.90) 
-0.0162*** 
(-3.53) 
-0.0176*** 
(-3.80) 
-0.0170*** 
(-3.71) 
DLagged block order 
            
0.0310*** 
(3.17) 
0.0317*** 
(3.25) 
0.0227*** 
(2.32) 
0.0123 
(1.28) 
0.0344*** 
(3.52) 
0.0137 
(1.41) 
RM(-1)              
0.0117*** 
(10.34) 
0.0115*** 
(10.21) 
 0.0097*** 
(8.67) 
0.0119*** 
(10.54) 
0.0100*** 
(8.99) 
CCI 
              
0.0073*** 
(16.52)   
0.0029*** 
(6.19) 
Market turnover                
 0.0004*** 
(45.29)  
0.0004*** 
(43.82) 
IPO number 
                
0.0088* 
(1.91) 
0.0172*** 
(7.14) 
R-squared  0.6527 0.6537 0.6758 0.6537 0.6763 0.6765 0.6758 0.6768 0.6765 0.6765 0.6765 0.6765 0.6765 0.6767 0.6775 0.6827 0.6769 0.6836 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6525 0.6534 0.6755 0.6535 0.6760 0.6763 0.6756 0.6765 0.6762 0.6764 0.6763 0.6764 0.6763 0.6764 0.6772 0.6825 0.6767 0.6834 
P-value of F test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Appendix 5.8.B The determinants of margin-trading activity: regression on positive information with margin-loans ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This table presents regression estimates of equation 𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 focusing on positive information events. The independent variable 𝑋𝑗𝑠 in each equation of our 
pooled testing are specified in the leftmost column. The statistics of goodness-of-fit measures including R-squared, adjusted R-squared and p-value of F-test are shown at the bottom of the 
table. The column in shading is the final regression of the test. The t-statistics presented in parentheses are the t-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.   
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Ln(MLR) 
Regression in hierarchical approach 
C 
1.5228*** 
(115.22) 
1.5213*** 
(115.03) 
1.5185*** 
(114.90) 
1.5295*** 
(115.47) 
0.7614*** 
(15.83) 
1.4212*** 
(106.55) 
1.5358*** 
(115.82) 
1.1275*** 
(22.67) 
Ln(MLR(-1)) 
0.6664*** 
(293.81) 
0.6667*** 
(293.56) 
0.6668*** 
(293.62) 
0.6643*** 
(291.18) 
0.6600*** 
(287.83) 
0.6312*** 
(265.75) 
0.6636*** 
(290.86) 
0.6277*** 
(263.69) 
Ri(-1) 
0.0085*** 
(13.69) 
0.0088*** 
(14.09) 
0.0086*** 
(13.83) 
0.0034*** 
(4.25) 
0.0032*** 
(3.94) 
0.0018** 
(2.22) 
0.0034*** 
(4.20) 
0.0016** 
(1.96) 
Historical volatility 
-1.8721*** 
(-86.33) 
-1.8646*** 
(-86.02) 
-1.8649*** 
(-86.02) 
-1.8727*** 
(-86.36) 
-1.8426*** 
(-84.79) 
-1.6705*** 
(-76.14) 
-1.8685*** 
(-86.18) 
-1.6467*** 
(-75.01) 
Trading range         
Dividend yield         
EPS 
 0.0477*** 
(15.82) 
 0.0478*** 
(15.87) 
 0.0477*** 
(15.82) 
 0.0480*** 
(15.92) 
0.0473*** 
(15.73) 
0.0385*** 
(12.87) 
 0.0479*** 
(15.92) 
0.0380*** 
(12.73) 
Price-to-book ratio         
DEx-dividend date    
-0.0337 
(-1.61) 
-0.0305 
(-1.46) 
-0.0378* 
(-1.82) 
-0.0347* 
(-1.65) 
-0.0383* 
(-1.85) 
DFinancials    
0.0526*** 
(15.25) 
0.0526*** 
(15.27) 
0.0531*** 
(15.57) 
0.0526*** 
(15.25) 
0.0531*** 
(15.59) 
DInsider purchase 
0.0346 
(1.64)        
DAnalyst upgrade  
-0.0195*** 
(-4.18)  
-0.0186*** 
(-4.00) 
-0.0193*** 
(-4.15) 
-0.0172*** 
(-3.72) 
-0.0189*** 
(-4.06) 
-0.0179*** 
(-3.89) 
DLagged plus-tick order   
0.0287* 
(1.90) 
0.0297** 
(1.97) 
0.0227 
(1.50) 
0.0112 
(0.75) 
0.0314** 
(2.08) 
0.0116 
(0.78) 
RM(-1)    
0.0117*** 
(10.35) 
0.0115*** 
(10.22) 
 0.0097*** 
(8.71) 
0.0119*** 
(10.55) 
0.0101*** 
(9.02) 
CCI     
0.0074*** 
(16.61)   
0.0029*** 
(6.24) 
Market turnover      
 0.0004*** 
(45.27)  
0.0004*** 
(43.78) 
IPO number       
0.0158*** 
(8.85) 
0.0253*** 
(17.14) 
R-squared  0.6764 0.6765 0.6765 0.6766 0.6775 0.6827 0.6769 0.6836 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6762 0.6763 0.6763 0.6764 0.6772 0.6825 0.6766 0.6834 
P-value of F test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Appendix 5.8.C The determinants of margin-trading activity: regression on negative information with margin-loans ratio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This table presents regression estimates of equation 𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 focusing on negative information events. The independent variable 𝑋𝑗𝑠 in each equation of our pooled 
testing are specified in the leftmost column. The statistics of goodness-of-fit measures including R-squared, adjusted R-squared and p-value of F-test are shown at the bottom of the table. The 
column in shading is the final regression of the test. The t-statistics presented in parentheses are the t-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Ln(MLR) 
Regression in hierarchical approach 
C 
1.5225*** 
(115.19) 
1.5189*** 
(114.93) 
1.5189*** 
(114.94) 
1.5277*** 
(115.43) 
0.7598*** 
(15.80) 
1.4193*** 
(106.50) 
1.5339*** 
(115.78) 
1.1273*** 
(22.66) 
Ln(MLR(-1)) 
0.6664*** 
(293.82) 
0.6667*** 
(293.52) 
0.6667*** 
(293.55) 
0.6644*** 
(291.21) 
0.6601*** 
(287.86) 
0.6313*** 
(265.77) 
0.6637*** 
(290.90) 
0.6277*** 
(263.73) 
Ri(-1) 
0.0085*** 
(13.70) 
0.0087*** 
(13.94) 
0.0087*** 
(13.98) 
0.0034*** 
(4.18) 
0.0031*** 
(3.84) 
0.0017** 
(2.10) 
0.0033*** 
(4.13) 
0.0015* 
(1.84) 
Historical volatility 
-1.8718*** 
(-86.30) 
-1.8655*** 
(-86.06) 
-1.8654*** 
(-86.06) 
-1.8743*** 
(-86.44) 
-1.8441*** 
(-84.86) 
-1.6714*** 
(-76.18) 
-1.8701*** 
(-86.26) 
-1.6477*** 
(-75.06) 
Trading range         
Dividend yield         
EPS 
 0.0476*** 
(15.80) 
 0.0479*** 
(15.88) 
 0.0474*** 
(15.74) 
 0.0480*** 
(15.94) 
0.0473*** 
(15.73) 
0.0384*** 
(12.85) 
 0.0480*** 
(15.94) 
0.0380*** 
(12.71) 
Price-to-book ratio         
DEx-dividend date    
-0.0333 
(-1.58) 
-0.0301 
(-1.43) 
-0.0374* 
(-1.80) 
-0.0342 
(-1.63) 
-0.0380* 
(-1.83) 
DFinancials    
0.0525*** 
(15.25) 
0.0526*** 
(15.30) 
0.0533*** 
(15.63) 
0.0525*** 
(15.25) 
0.0533*** 
(15.65) 
DInsider sale 
-0.0116 
(0.55)   
 
     
DAnalyst downgrade  
0.0450* 
(1.92)  
0.0430* 
(1.84) 
0.0405* 
(1.73) 
0.0235 
(1.01) 
0.0429* 
(1.83) 
0.0221 
(0.95) 
DLagged minus-tick order   
0.0199 
(1.42)      
RM(-1)    
0.0118*** 
(10.42) 
0.0116*** 
(10.30) 
 0.0098*** 
(8.78) 
0.0120*** 
(10.62) 
0.0102*** 
(9.10) 
CCI     
0.0074*** 
(16.60)   
0.0029*** 
(6.20) 
Market turnover      
 0.0004*** 
(45.31)  
0.0004*** 
(43.82) 
IPO number       
0.0087* 
(1.88) 
0.0172*** 
(7.11) 
R-squared  0.6765 0.6765 0.6764 0.6766 0.6774 0.6827 0.6768 0.6836 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6763 0.6764 0.6762 0.6764 0.6772 0.6824 0.6766 0.6833 
P-value of F test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
This thesis includes three empirical studies related to short selling and margin trading. Chapter 
3 investigates the impact of the dual introduction event on feedback trading behaviour and 
stock volatility dynamics of the designated stocks. With more precise trading data, Chapter 4 
investigates the different impacts of short-selling activity and margin-trading activity on the 
level of feedback trading and returns volatility separately. Also, in Chapter 4 we analyse the 
impact differences between the trading activity of retail margin investors and that conducted 
by their institutional counterparts. To justify the roles of short sellers and margin traders in the 
financial markets, Chapter 5 adopts the panel regressions to study the determinants of short 
selling and margin trading. 
 
6.1 Summary of Findings and Policy Implications 
 
With a combination of the heterogeneous trader model and GARCH model, Chapter 3 
examines the impact of short selling and margin trading on feedback trading behaviour and 
stock volatility dynamics. A unanimous conclusion is received from the results of the baseline 
model and the extended model with Heaviside indicators. The dual introduction of short selling 
and margin trading leads to a reduction in unconditional positive autocorrelation and a 
substantially lower level of positive feedback trading. These findings indicate that the 
introduction event has a stabilising effect on the A-share stock market. In addition to that, we 
study the different impacts of short selling and margin trading on feedback trading by 
investigating the coefficient indicators conditional on positive and negative historical returns. 
The findings are opposite to our hypotheses. The estimated coefficients suggest that the 
designated stocks eligible for short selling see a rise in both the unconditional autocorrelations 
and the positive feedback trading conditional on negative historical returns. In terms of margin 
trading conditional on positive historical returns, a significant drop in both unconditional 
negative autocorrelation and positive feedback trading are found. We thus conclude that 
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compared to short selling, margin trading is more favourable to the stabilisation of the stock 
market. 
 
Concerning the changes in volatility, a substantial reduction in the level of stock returns 
volatility is observed after the introduction. However, a similar trend displays simultaneously 
among the treatment and the control stocks. Since factors other than the introduction event may 
also affect the key coefficients in our model, the control groups are constructed for each 
individual treatment stocks and indices. The detailed GARCH estimates prove that our 
considerations are necessary. We find that for both the treatment and control groups, the 
increase occurs only in the unconditional volatility, rather than the news coefficient and the 
volatility persistency. As the results of the two-period approach, the designated stocks increase 
more in the unconditional volatility compared to the control stocks, which indicates no 
advantages of the two introduced mechanisms. However, the facts that the designated stocks 
decrease less in the news coefficients and decrease more in the volatility persistency suggest 
that short selling and margin trading play a supporting role in terms of informational efficiency. 
 
In all, our results of Chapter 3 show that the introduction event of short selling and margin 
trading contribute to a moderated level of unconditional positive autocorrelation and 
conditional positive feedback trading behaviour. And no evidence shows that the two 
mechanisms increase the volatility persistence in stocks returns, which may destabilise the 
stock markets. Instead, our findings support that the two mechanisms improve the 
informational efficiency and help stabilise the stock markets. However, the aggravating impact 
of short selling on conditional positive feedback trading should not be ignored. In fact, the 
Chinese regulators have already paid close attention to this issue. The rigorous requirements 
for the qualification of investors who are eligible for short selling and margin trading have been 
aggressively reiterated by the CSRC after the stock crash happened in 2015. The findings of 
this study would not only provide important policy implications for Chinese regulators but 
worldwide regulators who are trapped with the issues of short sales constraints and margin 
requirements.  
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Chapter 4 focuses on two research questions. We firstly examine whether a larger amount of 
short-selling/margin-trading activity is associated with a higher level of positive feedback 
trading and stock returns volatility. Then, we investigate the impact differences of the margin 
activities conducted by retail investors and institutional investors on feedback trading 
behaviour and stock returns volatility. There is no evidence showing that activity of short 
selling/margin trading increases positive feedback trading. However, we observe an increasing 
impact of short-selling activity on negative feedback trading. In terms of stock returns volatility, 
margin-trading activity has a significant increasing impact on it, while short-selling activity 
seems to have a slightly decreasing impact. After being scaled by margin-trading activity, our 
results of short-selling activity on feedback trading and volatility remain the same. Although 
evidence shows that neither activity of short selling nor that of margin trading increase positive 
feedback trading, an increased level of negative feedback trading by short-selling activity is far 
from being a good thing to the market. In the final analysis, negative feedback trading is not a 
fundamental-based strategy, which reflects the intrinsic value of a stock.  
 
The number of margin account separately opened by retail and institutional investors has no 
significant impact on feedback trading behaviour during the stable and booming periods. When 
the growth rate of account number held by institutional investors is greater than their retail 
counterparts, the level of stock returns volatility decreases. This implies that compared to retail 
margin investors, institutional margin investors are better informed. During the bearish and 
crash periods, the participation of retail margin investors leads to a higher level of negative 
feedback trading in the market. Consistent with the analysis above, retail investors who are less 
financially educated tend to conduct more irrational trades and bring more uncertainty to the 
market.  
 
The findings of Chapter 4 have obvious policy implications. It is well-known that the Chinese 
stock markets have long been a retail-dominated market, although things start to change in 
recent five years. In such an environment, the basic financial education to the public of how to 
make rational investments would be beneficial to reduce misunderstood strategies like negative 
feedback trading and help investors keep confident even when they face a declining trend. The 
recent changes in the policy of the A-share market that simply suppress short selling thus seem 
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to have an adverse impact on the markets. To promote market stability, margin trading should 
be paid more attention in terms of volatility control. In an emerging market like China, 
systematic defects in trading mechanisms and financial regulations are obvious. The illegal 
transactions like inside information leakage often slip under the CSRC’s supervision. The 
introduction of margin trading itself might be beneficial to the market, but lax-regulated margin 
trading activity could be a problem. Since short selling and margin trading involve more risks 
and retail investors are less financially educated, the requirements for the qualification of retail 
investors to participate margin trades should be more stringent. A market with more 
professional investors seems an irresistible historical trend. 
 
To figure out what motivates short sellers and margin traders to make their investment 
decisions, Chapter 5 investigates the determinants of short-selling activity and margin-trading 
activity separately from both the firm and the market perspectives. Taking together with control 
variables, the firm-level determinants of short-selling (margin-trading) activity include past 
short-selling (margin-trading) activities, past stock returns, stock returns volatility, financial 
ratios, ex-dividend date events, industry classifications, insider trading events, stock analyst 
recommendations, block trading events, whereas the market-level factors include past market 
performance and investor sentiment.  
 
With the pooled regressions of a hierarchical approach, we find that short-selling activity is 
significantly related to past short-selling activity, past stock returns, historical volatility, EPS, 
industry classification, insider sale, analyst upgrade, block plus-tick order, past market 
performance and CCI. While margin-trading activity is decided by past margin-trading activity, 
past stock returns, historical volatility, EPS, ex-dividend date event, industry classification, 
insider purchase, analyst upgrade and downgrade, block plus-tick order, past market 
performance and market turnover. These findings suggest that the motivations of short sellers 
and margin trader are fairly fundament-related. Both of these two types of traders are not simply 
opportunistic. Also, we notice that unlike short sellers, margin traders are momentum traders 
at both the individual stock level and the market level. This indicates that activities of margin 
traders may lead more uncertainty to the market. 
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In all, the findings of this study provide crucial additional insights into the nature of information 
advantages that lead to abnormal returns earned by short sellers and margin traders. Our results 
allow novel inferences about how short sellers and margin traders contribute to price discovery 
and market efficiency. By identifying information sources of short sellers and margin traders, 
the study has important implications for policymakers and financial regulators, particularly for 
an emerging market like China. Our findings would also help the public to have better 
understandings of short selling and margin trading. The two mechanisms should not be treated 
as scapegoats when the market becomes depressed and unsettled. It is reasonable to believe 
that these two types of traders are advanced investors who can efficiently exploit publicly 
accessible information.  
 
6.2 Limitations and Further Research  
 
This thesis has its limitations. As for Chapter 3, we adopt a sample span of eight years from 
31/03/2006 to 31/03/2014. Especially for GARCH-type models, a larger sample size implies a 
better estimation. If a sample of less than 1000 daily observations is used, the estimation will 
be very unlikely to give us the real information about the parameters (Ng and Lam 2006). Our 
sample size is limited to eight years due to the late foundation of the Chinese equity markets. 
Because of the late foundation of the A-share market, 30 stocks among the designated 90 stocks 
lack data in an earlier stage of our sample period. This significantly reduces our original sample 
size. Second, the less annual trading days of the whole market and the more suspension trading 
dates of individual stocks in the Chinese market setting cause serious data discontinuity. The 
high frequency of non-trading days leads to non-convergence issue in the GARCH regressions 
and a further data loss of 15 stocks. Third, to maintain data continuity and model suitability, 
we only adopt the first batch of 90 stocks during the reform as our research objects. However, 
until now, six batches and several small changes have been taken in the designated list since 
its first announcement. This feature of data can be exploited as a real plus for future studies. 
Nevertheless, we realise that the different impacts of short selling and margin trading on 
feedback trading, returns volatility and related issues of China’s 2010 event can be studied 
further with stricter analysis by adopting the activities data of each mechanism. Our study also 
introduces some potential research questions for future studies. In this chapter, we focus on the 
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impacts of the introduction short selling and margin trading on feedback trading and volatility. 
The impacts may be extended to many different fields, like earnings management (e.g., Fang 
et al. 2016) and stock manipulation (e.g., Finnerty 2005). 
 
To answer the question raised from Chapter 3, Chapter 4 adopts the more precise data of each 
mechanism’s activity to investigates the impact of short-selling and margin-trading activity on 
the level of feedback trading and stock returns volatility. Again, since GARCH-type models 
have been extensively applied in this study as well, data loss stemming from the 
nonconvergence issue may cause our results to deviate from the facts. Other volatility measures 
which can prevent this type of issue should be considered. Besides, we study the different 
impacts of retail margin investors and institutional margin investors with indirect monthly data 
of the margin account number opened by these two types of investors. A study with more 
detailed and higher-frequency activity data of different kinds of short-selling and margin-
trading investors in other markets would be an addition to the literature. 
 
Chapter 5 extends the current literature of the determinants of short selling, and at the first time, 
it identifies the determinants of margin trading. However, it can be easily seen that the question 
of the determinants of short-selling and margin-trading activity is an open topic. The factors 
considered in the study is not only limited by our understanding of the extant literature but also 
the market settings and the data accessibility. As a study of an emerging market, our findings 
may not be perfectly applied to the same issue of the developed market. In domestic China, 
trades on margin currently only includes the two mechanisms studied in our study, while in 
more advanced markets, short selling and margin trading activities may also be affected by the 
trading of futures and options. The data accessibility in the A-share market also leads certain 
limitations to our study. The determinants of short-selling/margin-trading activity conducted 
by different groups can be an interesting research topic.   
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